For Bosnia and Herzegovina: Mr. Sakib Softic,
Mr. Phon van den Biesen,
Mr. Alain Pellet,
Mr. Thomas M. Franck,
Ms Brigitte Stern,
Mr. Luigi Condorelli,
Ms Magda Karagiannakis,
Ms Joanna Korner,
Ms Laura Dauban,
Mr. Antoine Ollivier,
Mr. Morten Torkildsen.
For Serbia and Montenegro: H.E. Mr. Radoslav Stojanovic,
Mr. Sasa Obradovic,
Mr. Vladimir Cvetkovic,
Mr. Tibor Varady,
Mr. Ian Brownlie,
Mr. Xavier de Roux,
Ms Natasa Fauveau-Ivanovic,
Mr. Andreas Zimmerman,
Mr. Vladimir Djeric,
Mr. Igor Olujic.
"Accordingly, while reserving the right to revise, supplement or amend this Application, and subject to the presentation to the Court of the relevant evidence and legal arguments, Bosnia and Herzegovina requests the Court to adjudge and declare as follows :
(a) that Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has breached, and is continuing to breach, its legal obligations toward the People and State of Bosnia and Herzegovina under Articles I, II (a), II (b), II (c), II (d), III (a), III (b), III (c), III (d), III (e),IVandVof the Genocide Convention ;
(b) that Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has violated and is continuing to violate its legal obligations toward the People and State of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, their Additional Protocol I of 1977, the customary international laws of war including the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare of 1907, and other fundamental principles of international humanitarian law ;
(c) that Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has violated and continues to violate Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26 and 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights with respect to the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina ;
(d) that Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), in breach of its obligations under general and customary international law, has killed, murdered, wounded, raped, robbed, tortured, kidnapped, illegally detained, and exterminated the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and is continuing to do so ;
(e) that in its treatment of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has violated, and is continuing to violate, its solemn obligations under Articles 1 (3), 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter ;
(f) that Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has used and is continuing to use force and the threat of force against Bosnia and Herzegovina in violation of Articles 2 (1), 2 (2), 2 (3), 2 (4) and 33 (1), of the United Nations Charter ;
(g) that Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), in breach of its obligations under general and customary international law, has used and is using force and the threat of force against Bosnia and Herzegovina ;
(h) that Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), in breach of its obligations under general and customary international law, has violated and is violating the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina by:
— armed attacks against Bosnia and Herzegovina by air and land ;
— aerial trespass into Bosnian airspace ;
— efforts by direct and indirect means to coerce and intimidate the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina ;
(i) that Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), in breach of its obligations under general and customary international law, has intervened and is intervening in the internal affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina ;
(j) that Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), in recruiting, training, arming, equipping, financing, supplying and otherwise encouraging, supporting, aiding, and directing military and paramilitary actions in and against Bosnia and Herzegovina by means of its agents and surrogates, has violated and is violating its express charter and treaty obligations to Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in particular, its charter and treaty obligations under Article 2 (4), of the United Nations Charter, as well as its obligations under general and customary international law ;
(k) that under the circumstances set forth above, Bosnia and Herzegovina has the sovereign right to defend Itself and its People under United Nations Charter Article 51 and customary international law, including by means of immediately obtaining military weapons, equipment, supplies and troops from other States ;
(l) that under the circumstances set forth above, Bosnia and Herzegovina has the sovereign right under United Nations Charter Article 51 and customary international law to request the immediate assistance of any State to come to its defence, including by military means (weapons, equipment, supplies, troops, etc.) ;
(m) that Security Council resolution 713 (1991), imposing a weapons embargo upon the former Yugoslavia, must be construed in a manner that shall not impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the terms of United Nations Charter Article 51 and the rules of customary international law;
(n) that all subsequent Security Council resolutions that refer to or reaffirm resolution 713 (1991) must be construed in a manner that shall not impair the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefence of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the terms of United Nations Charter Article 51 and the rules of customary international law ;
(o) that Security Council resolution 713 (1991) and all subsequent Security Council resolutions referring thereto or reaffirming thereof must not be construed to impose an arms embargo upon Bosnia and Herzegovina, as required by Articles 24 (1) and 51 of the United Nations Charter and in accordance with the customary doctrine of ultra vires ;
(p) that pursuant to the right of collective self-defence recognized by United Nations Charter Article 51, all other States parties to the Charter have the right to come to the immediate defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina — at its request — including by means of immediately providing It with weapons, military equipment and supplies, and armed forces (soldiers, sailors, air-people, etc.) ;
(q) that Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and its agents and surrogates are under an obligation to cease and desist immediately from its breaches of the foregoing legal obligations, and is under a particular duty to cease and desist immediately :
— from its systematic practice of so-called 'ethnic cleansing' of the citizens and sovereign territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina ;
— from the murder, summary execution, torture, rape, kidnapping, mayhem, wounding, physical and mental abuse, and detention of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina ;
— from the wanton devastation of villages, towns, districts, cities, and religious institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina ;
— from the bombardment of civilian population centres in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and especially its capital, Sarajevo ;
— from continuing the siege of any civilian population centres in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and especially its capital, Sarajevo ;
— from the starvation of the civilian population in Bosnia and Herzegovina ;
— from the interruption of, interference with, or harassment of humanitarian relief supplies to the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the international community ;
— from all use of force — whether direct or indirect, overt or covert — against Bosnia and Herzegovina, and from all threats of force against Bosnia and Herzegovina ;
— from all violations of the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including all intervention, direct or indirect, in the internal affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina ;
— from all support of any kind — including the provision of training, arms, ammunition, finances, supplies, assistance, direction or any other form of support — to any nation, group, organization, movement or individual engaged or planning to engage in military or paramilitary actions in or against Bosnia and Herzegovina ;
(r) that Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has an obligation to pay Bosnia and Herzegovina, in its own right and as parens patriae for its citizens, reparations for damages to persons and property as well as to the Bosnian economy and environment caused by the foregoing violations of international law in a sum to be determined by the Court. Bosnia and Herzegovina reserves the right to introduce to the Court a precise evaluation of the damages caused by Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)."
On behalf of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
in the Memorial :
"On the basis of the evidence and legal arguments presented in this Memorial, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Requests the International Court of Justice to adjudge and declare,
1. That the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), directly, or through the use of its surrogates, has violated and is violating the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, by destroying in part, and attempting to destroy in whole, national, ethnical or religious groups within the, but not limited to the, territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including in particular the Muslim population, by
— killing members of the group ;
— causing deliberate bodily or mental harm to members of the group ; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part ;
— imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group ;
2. That the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has violated and is violating the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by conspiring to commit genocide, by complicity in genocide, by attempting to commit genocide and by incitement to commit genocide ;
3. That the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has violated and is violating the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by aiding and abetting individuals and groups engaged in acts of genocide ;
4. That the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has violated and is violating the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by virtue of having failed to prevent and to punish acts of genocide ;
5. That the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) must immediately cease the above conduct and take immediate and effective steps to ensure full compliance with its obligations under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide ;
6. That the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) must wipe out the consequences of its international wrongful acts and must restore the situation existing before the violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide were committed ;
7. That, as a result of the international responsibility incurred for the above violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is required to pay, and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is entitled to receive, in its own right and as parens patriae for its citizens, full compensation for the damages and losses caused, in the amount to be determined by the Court in a subsequent phase of the proceedings in this case.
The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina reserves its right to supplement or amend its submissions in the light of further pleadings.
The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina also respectfully draws the attention of the Court to the fact that it has not reiterated, at this point, several of the requests it made in its Application, on the formal assumption that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has accepted the jurisdiction of this Court under the terms of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. If the Respondent were to reconsider its acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court under the terms of that Convention — which it is, in any event, not entitled to do — the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina reserves its right to invoke also all or some of the other existing titles of jurisdiction and to revive all or some of its previous submissions and requests."
On behalf of the Government of Serbia and Montenegro,
in the Counter-Memorial1 :
"The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requests the International Court of Justice to adjudge and declare :
1. In view of the fact that no obligations established by the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide have been violated with regard to Muslims and Croats,
— since the acts alleged by the Applicant have not been committed at all, or not to the extent and in the way alleged by the Applicant, or
— if some have been committed, there was absolutely no intention of committing genocide, and/or
— they have not been directed specifically against the members of one ethnic or religious group, i.e. they have not been committed against individuals just because they belong to some ethnic or religious group, consequently, they cannot be qualified as acts of genocide or other acts prohibited by the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide ; and/or
2. In view of the fact that the acts alleged by the Applicant in its submissions cannot be attributed to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
— since they have not been committed by the organs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
— since they have not been committed on the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
— since they have not been committed by the order or under control of the organs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
— since there is no other grounds based on the rules of international law to consider them as acts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
therefore the Court rejects all claims of the Applicant ; and
3. Bosnia and Herzegovina is responsible for the acts of genocide committed against the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and for other violations of the obligations established by the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
— because it has incited acts of genocide by the ‘Islamic Declaration', and in particular by the position contained in it that 'there can be no peace or coexistence between "Islamic faith" and "non-Islamic" social and political institutions',
— because it has incited acts of genocide by the Novi Vox, paper of the Muslim youth, and in particular by the verses of a 'Patriotic Song' which read as follows :
Dear mother, I'm going to plant willows,
We'll hang Serbs from them.
Dear mother, I'm going to sharpen knives,
We'll soon fill pits again' ;
— because it has incited acts of genocide by the paper Zmaj od Bosne, and in particular by the sentence in an article published in it that 'Each Muslim must name a Serb and take oath to kill him' ;
— because public calls for the execution of Serbs were broadcast on radio 'Hajat' and thereby acts of genocide were incited ;
— because the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as other organs of Bosnia and Herzegovina have committed acts of genocide and other acts prohibited by the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, against the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which have been stated in Chapter Seven of the Counter-Memorial ;
— because Bosnia and Herzegovina has not prevented the acts of genocide and other acts prohibited by the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, against the Serbs on its territory, which have been stated in Chapter Seven of the CounterMemorial ;
4. Bosnia and Herzegovina has the obligation to punish the persons held responsible for the acts of genocide and other acts prohibited by the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide;
5. Bosnia and Herzegovina is bound to take necessary measures so that the said acts would not be repeated in the future ;
6. Bosnia and Herzegovina is bound to eliminate all consequences of the violation of the obligations established by the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and provide adequate compensation."
On behalf of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
in the Reply :
"Therefore the Applicant persists in its claims as presented to this Court on 14 April 1994, and recapitulates its Submissions in their entirety. Bosnia and Herzegovina requests the International Court of Justice to adjudge and declare,
1. That the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, directly, or through the use of its surrogates, has violated and is violating the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, by destroying in part, and attempting to destroy in whole, national, ethnical or religious groups within the, but not limited to the, territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including in particular the Muslim population, by
— killing members of the group ;
— causing deliberate bodily or mental harm to members of the group ;
— deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part ;
— imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group ;
2. That the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has violated and is violating the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by conspiring to commit genocide, by complicity in genocide, by attempting to commit genocide and by incitement to commit genocide ;
3. That the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has violated and is violating the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by aiding and abetting individuals and groups engaged in acts of genocide;
4. That the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has violated and is violating the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by virtue of having failed to prevent and to punish acts of genocide ;
5. That the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia must immediately cease the above conduct and take immediate and effective steps to ensure full compliance with its obligations under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide ;
6. That the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia must wipe out the consequences of its international wrongful acts and must restore the situation existing before the violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide were committed ;
7. That, as a result of the international responsibility incurred for the above violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is required to pay, and Bosnia and Herzegovina is entitled to receive, in its own right and as parens patriae for its citizens, full compensation for the damages and losses caused, in the amount to be determined by the Court in a subsequent phase of the proceedings in this case.
Bosnia and Herzegovina reserves its right to supplement or amend its submissions in the light of further pleadings ;
8. On the very same grounds the conclusions and submissions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with regard to the submissions of Bosnia and Herzegovina need to be rejected ;
9. With regard to the Respondent's counter-claims the Applicant comes to the following conclusion. There is no basis in fact and no basis in law for the proposition that genocidal acts have been committed against Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There is no basis in fact and no basis in law for the proposition that any such acts, if proven, would have been committed under the responsibility of Bosnia and Herzegovina or that such acts, if proven, would be attributable to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Also, there is no basis in fact and no basis in law for the proposition that Bosnia and Herzegovina has violated any of its obligations under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. On the contrary, Bosnia and Herzegovina has continuously done everything within its possibilities to adhere to its obligations under the Convention, and will continue to do so ;
10. For these reasons, Bosnia and Herzegovina requests the International Court of Justice to reject the counter-claims submitted by the Respondent in its Counter-Memorial of 23 July 1997."
On behalf of the Government of Serbia and Montenegro,
in the Rejoinder2 :
"The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requests the International Court of Justice to adjudge and declare :
1. In view of the fact that no obligations established by the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide have been violated with regard to Muslims and Croats,
— since the acts alleged by the Applicant have not been committed at all, or not to the extent and in the way alleged by the Applicant, or
— if some have been committed, there was absolutely no intention of committing genocide, and/or
— they have not been directed specifically against the members of one ethnic or religious group, i.e. they have not been committed against individuals just because they belong to some ethnic or religious group,
consequently they cannot be qualified as acts of genocide or other acts prohibited by the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and/or
2. In view of the fact that the acts alleged by the Applicant in its submissions cannot be attributed to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
— since they have not been committed by the organs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
— since they have not been committed on the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
— since they have not been committed by the order or under control of the organs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
— since there are no other grounds based on the rules of international law to consider them as acts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
therefore the Court rejects all the claims of the Applicant, and
3. Bosnia and Herzegovina is responsible for the acts of genocide committed against Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and for other violations of the obligations established by the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
— because it has incited acts of genocide by the 'Islamic Declaration', and in particular by the position contained in it that 'there can be no peace or coexistence between "Islamic faith" and "non-Islamic" social and political institutions',
— because it has incited acts of genocide by the Novi Vox, paper of the Muslim youth, and in particular by the verses of a 'Patriotic Song' which read as follows :
Dear mother, I'm going to plant willows,
We'll hang Serbs from them.
Dear mother, I'm going to sharpen knives,
We'll soon fill pits again' ;
— because it has incited acts of genocide by the paper Zmaj od Bosne, and in particular by the sentence in an article published in it that 'Each Muslim' must name a Serb and take oath to kill him ;
— because public calls for the execution of Serbs were broadcast on radio 'Hajat' and thereby acts of genocide were incited ;
— because the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as other organs of Bosnia and Herzegovina have committed acts of genocide and other acts prohibited by the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (enumerated in Article III), against Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which have been stated in Chapter Seven of the Counter-Memorial ;
— because Bosnia and Herzegovina has not prevented the acts of genocide and other acts prohibited by the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (enumerated in Article III), against Serbs on its territory, which have been stated in Chapter Seven of the Counter-Memorial ;
4. Bosnia and Herzegovina has the obligation to punish the persons held responsible for the acts of genocide and other acts prohibited by the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide;
5. Bosnia and Herzegovina is bound to take necessary measures so that the said acts would not be repeated in the future ;
6. Bosnia and Herzegovina is bound to eliminate all the consequences of violation of the obligations established by the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and to provide adequate compensation."
On behalf of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
at the hearing of 24 April 2006 :
"Bosnia and Herzegovina requests the International Court of Justice to adjudge and declare :
1. That Serbia and Montenegro, through its organs or entities under its control, has violated its obligations under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by intentionally destroying in part the non-Serb national, ethnical or religious group within, but not limited to, the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including in particular the Muslim population, by
— killing members of the group ;
— causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group ;
— deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part ;
— imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group ;
— forcibly transferring children of the group to another group ;
2. Subsidiarily :
(i) that Serbia and Montenegro has violated its obligations under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by complicity in genocide as defined in paragraph 1, above ; and/or
(ii) that Serbia and Montenegro has violated its obligations under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by aiding and abetting individuals, groups and entities engaged in acts of genocide, as defined in paragraph 1 above ;
3. That Serbia and Montenegro has violated its obligations under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by conspiring to commit genocide and by inciting to commit genocide, as defined in paragraph 1 above ;
4. That Serbia and Montenegro has violated its obligations under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide for having failed to prevent genocide ;
5. That Serbia and Montenegro has violated and is violating its obligations under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide for having failed and for failing to punish acts of genocide or any other act prohibited by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and for having failed and for failing to transfer individuals accused of genocide or any other act prohibited by the Convention to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and to fully co-operate with this Tribunal ;
6. That the violations of international law set out in submissions 1 to 5 constitute wrongful acts attributable to Serbia and Montenegro which entail its international responsibility, and, accordingly,
(a) that Serbia and Montenegro shall immediately take effective steps to ensure full compliance with its obligation to punish acts of genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide or any other act prohibited by the Convention and to transfer individuals accused of genocide or any other act prohibited by the Convention to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and to fully co-operate with this Tribunal ;
(b) that Serbia and Montenegro must redress the consequences of its international wrongful acts and, as a result of the international responsibility incurred for the above violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, must pay, and Bosnia and Herzegovina is entitled to receive, in its own right and as parens patriae for its citizens, full compensation for the damages and losses caused. That, in particular, the compensation shall cover any financially assessable damage which corresponds to :
(i) damage caused to natural persons by the acts enumerated in Article III of the Convention, including non-material damage suffered by the victims or the surviving heirs or successors and their dependants ;
(ii) material damage caused to properties of natural or legal persons, public or private, by the acts enumerated in Article III of the Convention ;
(iii) material damage suffered by Bosnia and Herzegovina in respect of expenditures reasonably incurred to remedy or mitigate damage flowing from the acts enumerated in Article III of the Convention;
(c) that the nature, form and amount of the compensation shall be determined by the Court, failing agreement thereon between the Parties one year after the Judgment of the Court, and that the Court shall reserve the subsequent procedure for that purpose ;
(d) that Serbia and Montenegro shall provide specific guarantees and assurances that it will not repeat the wrongful acts complained of, the form of which guarantees and assurances is to be determined by the Court;
7. That in failing to comply with the Orders for indication of provisional measures rendered by the Court on 8 April 1993 and 13 September 1993 Serbia and Montenegro has been in breach of its international obligations and is under an obligation to Bosnia and Herzegovina to provide for the latter violation symbolic compensation, the amount of which is to be determined by the Court."
On behalf of the Government of Serbia and Montenegro,
at the hearing of 9 May 2006 :
"Serbia and Montenegro asks the Court to adjudge and declare :
— that this Court has no jurisdiction because the Respondent had no access to the Court at the relevant moment ; or, in the alternative ;
— that this Court has no jurisdiction over the Respondent because the Respondent never remained or became bound by Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and because there is no other ground on which jurisdiction over the Respondent could be based.
In case the Court determines that jurisdiction exists Serbia and Montenegro asks the Court to adjudge and declare :
— That the requests in paragraphs 1 to 6 of the Submissions of Bosnia and Herzegovina relating to alleged violations of the obligations under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide be rejected as lacking a basis either in law or in fact.
— In any event, that the acts and/or omissions for which the respondent State is alleged to be responsible are not attributable to the respondent State. Such attribution would necessarily involve breaches of the law applicable in these proceedings.
— Without prejudice to the foregoing, that the relief available to the applicant State in these proceedings, in accordance with the appropriate interpretation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, is limited to the rendering of a declaratory judgment.
— Further, without prejudice to the foregoing, that any question of legal responsibility for alleged breaches of the Orders for the indication of provisional measures, rendered by the Court on 8 April 1993 and 13 September 1993, does not fall within the competence of the Court to provide appropriate remedies to an applicant State in the context of contentious proceedings, and, accordingly, the request in paragraph 7 of the Submissions of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be rejected."
"this acceptance cannot have, and does not have, any effect on the applicable rules of state responsibility. Obviously, these cannot be altered bilaterally or retroactively. At the time when genocide was committed and at the time of the initiation of this case, Serbia and Montenegro constituted a single state. Therefore, Bosnia and Herzegovina is of the opinion that both Serbia and Montenegro, jointly and severally, are responsible for the unlawful conduct that constitute the cause of action in this case."
"The issue of international-law succession of [the] State union of Serbia and Montenegro is regulated in Article 60 of [the] Constitutional Charter, and according to [that] Article the legal successor of [the] State union of Serbia and Montenegro is the Republic of Serbia, which, as a sovereign state, [has] become [the] follower of all international obligations and successor in international organizations."
The Chief State Prosecutor concluded that in the dispute before the Court, "the Republic of Montenegro may not have [the] capacity of respondent, [for the] above mentioned reasons".
"…
1. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, continuing the state, international legal and political personality of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, shall strictly abide by all the commitments that the SFR of Yugoslavia assumed internationally,
Remaining bound by all obligations to international organizations and institutions whose member it is..." (United Nations doc. A/ 46/915, Ann. II).
"The Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, at its session held on 27 April 1992, promulgated the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Under the Constitution, on the basis of the continuing personality of Yugoslavia and the legitimate decisions by Serbia and Montenegro to continue to live together in Yugoslavia, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is transformed into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, consisting of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro.
Strictly respecting the continuity of the international personality of Yugoslavia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall continue to fulfil all the rights conferred to, and obligations assumed by, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in international relations, including its membership in all international organizations and participation in international treaties ratified or acceded to by Yugoslavia." (United Nations doc. A/46/915, Ann. I.)
"The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and all subsequent relevant resolutions,
Considering that the state formerly known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased to exist,
Recalling in particular resolution 757 (1992) which notes that 'the claim by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations has not been generally accepted',
1. Considers that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations ; and therefore recommends to the General Assembly that it decide that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly ;
2. Decides to consider the matter again before the end of the main part of the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly."
The resolution was adopted by 12 votes in favour, none against, and 3 abstentions.
"The General Assembly,
Having received the recommendation of the Security Council of 19 September 1992 that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly,
1. Considers that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations ; and therefore decides that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly ;
2. Takes note of the intention of the Security Council to consider the matter again before the end of the main part of the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly."
The resolution was adopted by 127 votes to 6, with 26 abstentions.
"While the General Assembly has stated unequivocally that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot automatically continue the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations and that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations, the only practical consequence that the resolution draws is that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly. It is clear, therefore, that representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) can no longer participate in the work of the General Assembly, its subsidiary organs, nor conferences and meetings convened by it.
On the other hand, the resolution neither terminates nor suspends Yugoslavia's membership in the Organization. Consequently, the seat and nameplate remain as before, but in Assembly bodies representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot sit behind the sign 'Yugoslavia'. Yugoslav missions at United Nations Headquarters and offices may continue to function and may receive and circulate documents. At Headquarters, the Secretariat will continue to fly the flag of the old Yugoslavia as it is the last flag of Yugoslavia used by the Secretariat. The resolution does not take away the right of Yugoslavia to participate in the work of organs other than Assembly bodies. The admission to the United Nations of a new Yugoslavia under Article 4 of the Charter will terminate the situation created by resolution 47/1." (United Nations doc. A/47/485 ; emphasis in the original.)
"In the wake of fundamental democratic changes that took place in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in the capacity of President, I have the honour to request the admission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations in light of the implementation of the Security Council resolution 777 (1992)." (United Nations doc. A/55/528-S/2000/1043; emphasis added.)
"There are of course circumstances in which the party failing to put forward an objection to jurisdiction might be held to have acquiesced in jurisdiction (Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1972, p. 52, para. 13). However, apart from such circumstances, a party failing to avail itself of the Article 79 procedure may forfeit the right to bring about a suspension of the proceedings on the merits, but can still argue the objection along with the merits." (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 29, para. 24).
This first contention of Bosnia and Herzegovina must thus be understood as a claim that the Respondent, by its conduct in relation to the case, including the failure to raise the issue of the application of Article 35 of the Statute, by way of preliminary objection or otherwise, at an earlier stage of the proceedings, should be held to have acquiesced in jurisdiction. This contention is thus parallel to the argument mentioned above (paragraph 85), also advanced by Bosnia and Herzegovina, that the Respondent is debarred from asking the Court to examine that issue for reasons of good faith, including estoppel and the principle allegans contraria nemo audietur.
The latter question may be regarded as an issue prior to that of jurisdiction ratione personae, or as one constitutive element within the concept of jurisdiction ratione personae. Either way, unlike the majority of questions of jurisdiction, it is not a matter of the consent of the parties. As the Court observed in the cases concerning the Legality of Use of Force,
"a distinction has to be made between a question of jurisdiction that relates to the consent of a party and the question of the right of a party to appear before the Court under the requirements of the Statute, which is not a matter of consent. The question is whether as a matter of law Serbia and Montenegro was entitled to seise the Court as a party to the Statute at the time when it instituted proceedings in these cases. Since that question is independent of the views or wishes of the Parties, even if they were now to have arrived at a shared view on the point, the Court would not have to accept that view as necessarily the correct one. The function of the Court to enquire into the matter and reach its own conclusion is thus mandatory upon the Court irrespective of the consent of the parties and is in no way incompatible with the principle that the jurisdiction of the Court depends on consent." (Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 295, para. 36 ; emphasis in the original.)
"The admission of the FRY to the United Nations as a new Member on 1 November 2000 is certainly a new fact...
The admission of the FRY to the United Nations as a new Member clears ambiguities and sheds a different light on the issue of the membership of the FRY in the United Nations, in the Statute and in the Genocide Convention." (Application for Revision, I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 12, para. 18.)
Essentially the contention of the FRY was that its admission to membership in 2000 necessarily implied that it was not a Member of the United Nations and thus not a party to the Statute in 1993, when the proceedings in the present case were instituted, so that the Court would have had no jurisdiction in the case.
"the FRY claims that the facts which existed at the time of the 1996 Judgment and upon the discovery of which its request for revision of that Judgment is based 'are that the FRY was not a party to the Statute, and that it did not remain bound by the Genocide Convention continuing the personality of the former Yugoslavia'. It argues that these 'facts' were 'revealed' by its admission to the United Nations on 1 November 2000 and by [a letter from the United Nations Legal Counsel] of 8 December 2000.
In the final version of its argument, the FRY claims that its admission to the United Nations and the Legal Counsel's letter of 8 December 2000 simply 'revealed' two facts which had existed in 1996 but had been unknown at the time : that it was not then a party to the Statute of the Court and that it was not bound by the Genocide Convention." (I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 30, paras. 66 and 69.)
"In advancing this argument, the FRY does not rely on facts that existed in 1996. In reality, it bases its Application for revision on the legal consequences which it seeks to draw from facts subsequent to the Judgment which it is asking to have revised. Those consequences, even supposing them to be established, cannot be regarded as facts within the meaning of Article 61. The FRY's argument cannot accordingly be upheld." (Ibid., pp. 30-31, para. 69.)
"regard the alleged 'decisive facts' specified by Serbia and Montenegro as 'facts that existed in 1996' for the purpose of Article 61. The Court therefore did not have to rule on the question whether 'the legal consequences' could indeed legitimately be deduced from the later facts ; in other words, it did not have to say whether it was correct that Serbia and Montenegro had not been a party to the Statute or to the Genocide Convention in 1996." (Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 313, para. 87.)
"It follows from the foregoing that it has not been established that the request of the FRY is based upon the discovery of 'some fact' which was 'when the judgment was given, unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming revision'. The Court therefore concludes that one of the conditions for the admissibility of an application for revision prescribed by paragraph 1 of Article 61 of the Statute has not been satisfied." (I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 31, para. 72.)
In its 2004 decisions in the Legality of Use of Force cases the Court further commented on this finding :
"The Court thus made its position clear that there could have been no retroactive modification of the situation in 2000, which would amount to a new fact, and that therefore the conditions of Article 61 were not satisfied. This, however, did not entail any finding by the Court, in the revision proceedings, as to what that situation actually was." (Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 314, para. 89.)
"the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia... signed the Genocide Convention on 11 December 1948 and deposited its instrument of ratification, without reservation, on 29 August 1950. At the time of the proclamation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, on 27 April 1992, a formal declaration was adopted on its behalf to the effect that :
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, continuing the State, international legal and political personality of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, shall strictly abide by all the commitments that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia assumed internationally.'
This intention thus expressed by Yugoslavia to remain bound by the international treaties to which the former Yugoslavia was party was confirmed in an official Note of 27 April 1992 from the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General. The Court observes, furthermore, that it has not been contested that Yugoslavia was party to the Genocide Convention. Thus, Yugoslavia was bound by the provisions of the Convention on the date of the filing of the Application in the present case, namely, on 20 March 1993." (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia) Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 610, para. 17.)
In particular, the fact that a judgment may, in addition to rejecting specific preliminary objections, contain a finding that "the Court has jurisdiction" in the case does not necessarily prevent subsequent examination of any jurisdictional issues later arising that have not been resolved, with the force of res judicata, by such judgment. The Parties have each referred in this connection to the successive decisions in the Corfu Channel case, which the Court has already considered above (paragraph 118). Mention may also be made of the judgments on the merits in the two cases concerning Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland) (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland) (I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 20, para. 42 ; pp. 203-204, para. 74), which dealt with minor issues of jurisdiction despite an express finding of jurisdiction in previous judgments (I.C.J. Reports 1973, p. 22, para. 46 ; p. 66, para. 46). Even where the Court has, in a preliminary judgment, specifically reserved certain matters of jurisdiction for later decision, the judgment may nevertheless contain a finding that "the Court has jurisdiction" in the case, this being understood as being subject to the matters reserved (see Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 442, para. 113 (1) (c), and pp. 425-426, para. 76 ; cf. also, in connection with an objection to admissibility, Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom) (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 29, para. 51, and pp. 30-31, paras. 53 (2) (b) and 53 (3) ; p. 134, para. 50, and p. 156, paras. 53 (2) (b) and 53 (3)).
"No specific assertion was made in the Application [of 1993, in the present case] that the Court was open to Serbia and Montenegro under Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court, but it was later made clear that the Applicant claimed to be a Member of the United Nations and thus a party to the Statute of the Court, by virtue of Article 93, paragraph 1, of the Charter, at the time of filing of the Application... [T]his position was expressly stated in the Memorial filed by Serbia and Montenegro on 4 January 2000..." (Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 299, para. 47.)
The question whether the FRY was a continuator or a successor State of the SFRY was mentioned in the Memorial of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The view of Bosnia and Herzegovina was that, while the FRY was not a Member of the United Nations, as a successor State of the SFRY which had expressly declared that it would abide by the international commitments of the SFRY, it was nevertheless a party to the Statute. It is also essential, when examining the text of the 1996 Judgment, to take note of the context in which it was delivered, in particular as regards the contemporary state of relations between the Respondent and the United Nations, as recounted in paragraphs 88 to 99 above.
"the significance of this new development in 2000 is that it has clarified the thus far amorphous legal situation concerning the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia vis-a-vis the United Nations. It is in that sense that the situation that the Court now faces in relation to Serbia and Montenegro is manifestly different from that which it faced in 1999. If, at that time, the Court had had to determine definitively the status of the Applicant vis-a-vis the United Nations, its task of giving such a determination would have been complicated by the legal situation, which was shrouded in uncertainties relating to that status. However, from the vantage point from which the Court now looks at the legal situation, and in light of the legal consequences of the new development since 1 November 2000, the Court is led to the conclusion that Serbia and Montenegro was not a Member of the United Nations, and in that capacity a State party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, at the time of filing its Application to institute the present proceedings before the Court on 29 April 1999." (Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004, pp. 310-311, para. 79.)
As the Court here recognized, in 1999 — and even more so in 1996 — it was by no means so clear as the Court found it to be in 2004 that the Respondent was not a Member of the United Nations at the relevant time. The inconsistencies of approach expressed by the various United Nations organs are apparent from the passages quoted in paragraphs 91 to 96 above.
"the fundamental nature of access as a precondition for the exercise of the Court's judicial function means that positive findings on access cannot be taken as definitive and final until the final judgment is rendered in proceedings, because otherwise it would be possible that the Court renders its final decision with respect to a party over which it cannot exercise [its] judicial function. In other words, access is so fundamental that, until the final judgment, it overrides the principle of res judicata. Thus, even if the 1996 Judgment had made a finding on access, quod non, that would not be a bar for the Court to re-examine this issue until the end of the proceedings."
A similar argument advanced by the Respondent is based on the principle that the jurisdiction of the Court derives from a treaty, namely the Statute of the Court ; the Respondent questions whether the Statute could have endowed the 1996 Judgment with any effects at all, since the Respondent was, it alleges, not a party to the Statute. Counsel for the Respondent argued that
"Today it is known that in 1996 when the decision on preliminary objections was rendered, the Respondent was not a party to the Statute. Thus, there was no foothold, Articles 36 (6), 59, and 60 did not represent a binding treaty provision providing a possible basis for deciding on jurisdiction with res judicata effects."
"The Contracting Parties,
Having considered the declaration made by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 96 (I) dated 11 December 1946 that genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world,
Recognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity, and
Being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is required,
Hereby agree as hereinafter provided..."
"In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such :
(a) Killing members of the group ;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part ;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group ;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."
Article III provides as follows :
"The following acts shall be punishable :
(a) Genocide ;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide ;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide ;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide ;
(e) Complicity in genocide."
"[p]ersons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction".
Article VII provides for extradition.
"Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III."
"Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute."
The remaining ten Articles are final clauses dealing with such matters as parties to the Convention and its entry into force.
"The Court now comes to the second proposition advanced by Yugoslavia [in support of one of its preliminary objections], regarding the type of State responsibility envisaged in Article IX of the Convention. According to Yugoslavia, that Article would only cover the responsibility flowing from the failure of a State to fulfil its obligations of prevention and punishment as contemplated by Articles V, VI and VII ; on the other hand, the responsibility of a State for an act of genocide perpetrated by the State itself would be excluded from the scope of the Convention.
The Court would observe that the reference to Article IX to 'the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III', does not exclude any form of State responsibility.
Nor is the responsibility of a State for acts of its organs excluded by Article IV of the Convention, which contemplates the commission of an act of genocide by 'rulers' or 'public officials'.
In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that it must reject the fifth preliminary objection of Yugoslavia. It would moreover observe that it is sufficiently apparent from the very terms of that objection that the Parties not only differ with respect to the facts of the case, their imputability and the applicability to them of the provisions of the Genocide Convention, but are moreover in disagreement with respect to the meaning and legal scope of several of those provisions, including Article IX. For the Court, there is accordingly no doubt that there exists a dispute between them relating to 'the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the... Convention, including... the responsibility of a State for genocide...', according to the form of words employed by that latter provision (cf. Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1988, pp. 27-32)." (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), pp. 616-617, paras. 32-33 ; emphasis now added to 1996 text.)
The Applicant relies in particular on the sentences in paragraph 32 which have been emphasized in the above quotation. The Respondent submits that
"this expression of opinion is of marked brevity and is contingent upon the dismissal of the preliminary objection based upon the existence or otherwise of a dispute relating to the interpretation of the Genocide Convention. The interpretation adopted in this provisional mode by the Court is not buttressed by any reference to the substantial preparatory work of the Convention.
In the circumstances, there is no reason of principle or consideration of common sense indicating that the issue of interpretation is no longer open."
While submitting that the Court determined the issue and spoke emphatically on the matter in 1996 the Applicant also says that this present phase of the case
"will provide an additional opportunity for this Court to rule on [the] important matter, not only for the guidance of the Parties here before you, but for the benefit of future generations that should not have to fear the immunity of States from responsibility for their genocidal acts".
"the Genocide Convention does not provide for the responsibility of States for acts of genocide as such. The duties prescribed by the Convention relate to 'the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide' when this crime is committed by individuals : and the provisions of Articles V and VI [about enforcement and prescription]... make this abundantly clear."
It argues that the Court therefore does not have jurisdiction ratione materiae under Article IX ; and continues :
"[t]hese provisions [Articles I, V, VI and IX] do not extend to the responsibility of a Contracting Party as such for acts of genocide but [only] to responsibility for failure to prevent or to punish acts of genocide committed by individuals within its territory or... its control".
The sole remedy in respect of that failure would, in the Respondent's view, be a declaratory judgment.
"for a State to be responsible under the Genocide Convention, the facts must first be established. As genocide is a crime, it can only be established in accordance with the rules of criminal law, under which the first requirement to be met is that of individual responsibility. The State can incur responsibility only when the existence of genocide has been established beyond all reasonable doubt. In addition, it must then be shown that the person who committed the genocide can engage the responsibility of the State..."
(This contention went on to mention responsibility based on breach of the obligation to prevent and punish, matters considered later in this Judgment.)
"The origins of the Convention show that it was the intention of the United Nations to condemn and punish genocide as 'a crime under international law' involving a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, a denial which shocks the conscience of mankind and results in great losses to humanity, and which is contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations (Resolution 96 (I) of the General Assembly, December 11th 1946). The first consequence arising from this conception is that the principles underlying the Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation. A second consequence is the universal character both of the condemnation of genocide and of the co-operation required 'in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge' (Preamble to the Convention)...
The objects of such a convention must also be considered. The Convention was manifestly adopted for a purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose. It is indeed difficult to imagine a convention that might have this dual character to a greater degree, since its object on the one hand is to safeguard the very existence of certain human
groups and on the other to confirm and endorse the most elementary principles of morality." (Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23.)
Later in that Opinion, the Court referred to "the moral and humanitarian principles which are its basis" (ibid., p. 24). In earlier phases of the present case the Court has also recalled resolution 96 (I) (I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 23 ; see also pp. 348 and 440) and has quoted the 1951 statement (I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 616). The Court reaffirmed the 1951 and 1996 statements in its Judgment of 3 February 2006 in the case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), paragraph 64, when it added that the norm prohibiting genocide was assuredly a peremptory norm of international law (jus cogens).
"The High Contracting Parties
Being convinced that the prevention and punishment of genocide requires international co-operation,
Hereby agree to prevent and punish the crime as hereinafter provided."
The first Article would have provided "[g]enocide is a crime under international law whether committed in time of peace or in time of war" (report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 5 April to 10 May 1948, United Nations, Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Seventh Session, Supplement No. 6, doc. E/794, pp. 2, 18).
Belgium was of the view that the undertaking to prevent and punish should be made more effective by being contained in the operative part of the Convention rather than in the Preamble and proposed the following Article I to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly : "The High Contracting Parties undertake to prevent and punish the crime of genocide." (United Nations doc. A/C.6/217.) The Netherlands then proposed a new text of Article I combining the Ad Hoc Committee draft and the Belgian proposal with some changes : "The High Contracting Parties reaffirm that genocide is a crime under international law, which they undertake to prevent and to punish, in accordance with the following articles." (United Nations docs. A/C.6/220 ; United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Part I, Sixth Committee, Summary Records of the 68th meeting, p. 45.) The Danish representative thought that Article I should be worded more effectively and proposed the deletion of the final phrase — "in accordance with the following articles" (ibid., p. 47). The Netherlands representative agreed with that suggestion (ibid., pp. 49-50). After the USSR's proposal to delete Article I was rejected by 36 votes to 8 with 5 abstentions and its proposal to transfer its various points to the Preamble was rejected by 40 votes to 8, and the phrase "whether committed in time of peace or of war" was inserted by 30 votes to 7 with 6 abstentions, the amended text of Article I was adopted by 37 votes to 3 with 2 abstentions (ibid., pp. 51 and 53).
"Where crimes against international law are committed by State officials, it will often be the case that the State itself is responsible for the acts in question or for failure to prevent or punish them. In certain cases, in particular aggression, the State will by definition be involved. Even so, the question of individual responsibility is in principle distinct from the question of State responsibility. The State is not exempted from its own responsibility for internationally wrongful conduct by the prosecution and punishment of the State officials who carried it out." (ILC Commentary on the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ILC Report A/56/10, 2001, Commentary on Article 58, para. 3.)
The Commission quoted Article 25, paragraph 4, of the Rome Statute, and concluded as follows :
"Article 58... [makes] it clear that the Articles do not address the question of the individual responsibility under international law of any person acting on behalf of a State. The term 'individual responsibility' has acquired an accepted meaning in light of the Rome Statute and other instruments ; it refers to the responsibility of individual persons, including State officials, under certain rules of international law for conduct such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity."
"it was provided in article IX that those disputes, among others, which concerned the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the acts enumerated in article III, should be submitted to the International Court of Justice. According to the joint amendment, on the other hand, the disputes would not be those which concerned the responsibility of the State but those which resulted from an accusation to the effect that the crime had been committed in the territory of one of the contracting parties." (United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Part I, Sixth Committee, Summary Records of the 131st Meeting, p. 690.)
By that time in the deliberations of the Sixth Committee it was clear that only individuals could be held criminally responsible under the draft Convention for genocide. The Chairman was plainly of the view that the Article IX, as it had been modified, provided for State responsibility for genocide.
"(a) Killing members of the group ;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group ;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group ; [and]
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group" —
themselves include mental elements. "Killing" must be intentional, as must "causing serious bodily or mental harm". Mental elements are made explicit in paragraphs (c) and (d) of Article II by the words "deliberately" and "intended", quite apart from the implications of the words "inflicting" and "imposing" ; and forcible transfer too requires deliberate intentional acts. The acts, in the words of the ILC, are by their very nature conscious, intentional or volitional acts (Commentary on Article 17 of the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, ILC Report 1996, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1996, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 44, para. 5).
"the mens rea requirement for persecution is higher than for ordinary crimes against humanity, although lower than for genocide. In this context the Trial Chamber wishes to stress that persecution as a crime against humanity is an offence belonging to the same genus as genocide. Both persecution and genocide are crimes perpetrated against persons that belong to a particular group and who are targeted because of such belonging. In both categories what matters is the intent to discriminate : to attack persons on account of their ethnic, racial, or religious characteristics (as well as, in the case of persecution, on account of their political affiliation). While in the case of persecution the discriminatory intent can take multifarious inhumane forms and manifest itself in a plurality of actions including murder, in the case of genocide that intent must be accompanied by the intention to destroy, in whole or in part, the group to which the victims of the genocide belong. Thus, it can be said that, from the viewpoint of mens rea, genocide is an extreme and most inhuman form of persecution. To put it differently, when persecution escalates to the extreme form of wilful and deliberate acts designed to destroy a group or part of a group, it can be held that such persecution amounts to genocide." (IT-95-16-T, Judgment, 14 January 2000, para. 636.)
"First, the group targeted is not sufficiently well defined as such, since, according to the Applicant's allegation, that group consists of the non-Serbs, thus an admixture of all the individuals living in Bosnia and Herzegovina except the Serbs, but more particularly the Muslim population, which accounts for only a part of the non-Serb population. Second, the intent to destroy concerned only a part of the non-Serb population, but the Applicant failed to specify which part of the group was targeted."
In addition to those issues of the negative definition of the group and its geographic limits (or their lack), the Parties also discussed the choice between subjective and objective approaches to the definition. The Parties essentially agree that international jurisprudence accepts a combined subjective-objective approach. The issue is not in any event significant on the facts of this case and the Court takes it no further.
"The number of individuals targeted should be evaluated not only in absolute terms, but also in relation to the overall size of the entire group. In addition to the numeric size of the targeted portion, its prominence within the group can be a useful consideration. If a specific part of the group is emblematic of the overall group, or is essential to its survival, that may support a finding that the part qualifies as substantial within the meaning of Article 4 [of the Statute which exactly reproduces Article II of the Convention]." (IT-98-33-A, Judgment, 19 April 2004, para. 12 ; footnote omitted.)
Establishing the "group" requirement will not always depend on the substantiality requirement alone although it is an essential starting point. It follows in the Court's opinion that the qualitative approach cannot stand alone. The Appeals Chamber in Krstic also expresses that view.
"Serbia and Montenegro should not be allowed to respond to our quoting the redacted SDC reports if it does not provide at the very same time the Applicant and the Court with copies of entirely unredacted versions of all the SDC shorthand records and of all of the minutes of the same. Otherwise, Serbia and Montenegro would have an overriding advantage over Bosnia and Herzegovina with respect to documents, which are apparently, and not in the last place in the Respondent's eyes, of direct relevance to winning or losing the present case. We explicitly, Madam President, request the Court to instruct the Respondent accordingly." (Emphasis in the original.)
"The Court will treat with caution evidentiary materials specially prepared for this case and also materials emanating from a single source. It will prefer contemporaneous evidence from persons with direct knowledge. It will give particular attention to reliable evidence acknowledging facts or conduct unfavourable to the State represented by the person making them (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 41, para. 64). The Court will also give weight to evidence that has not, even before this litigation, been challenged by impartial persons for the correctness of what it contains. The Court moreover notes that evidence obtained by examination of persons directly involved, and who were subsequently cross-examined by judges skilled in examination and experienced in assessing large amounts of factual information, some of it of a technical nature, merits special attention. The Court thus will give appropriate consideration to the Report of the Porter Commission, which gathered evidence in this manner. The Court further notes that, since its publication, there has been no challenge to the credibility of this Report, which has been accepted by both Parties." (Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005,p.35, para. 61. See also paras. 78-79, 114 and 237-242.)
"[W]e do not regard all the material of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia as having the same relevance or probative value. We have primarily based ourselves upon the judgments of the Tribunal's Trial and Appeals Chambers, given that only the judgments can be regarded as establishing the facts about the crimes in a credible way."
And he went on to point out that the Tribunal has not so far, with the exception of Srebrenica, held that genocide was committed in any of the situations cited by the Applicant. He also called attention to the criticisms already made by Respondent's counsel of the relevant judgment concerning General Krstic who was found guilty of aiding and abetting genocide at Srebrenica.
(1) The Prosecutor's decision to include or not certain changes in an indictment;
(2) The decision of a judge on reviewing the indictment to confirm it and issue an arrest warrant or not;
(3) If such warrant is not executed, a decision of a Trial Chamber (of three judges) to issue an international arrest warrant, provided the Chamber is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed all or any of the crimes charged;
(4) The decision of a Trial Chamber on the accused's motion for acquittal at the end of the prosecution case;
(5) The judgment of a Trial Chamber following the full hearings;
(6) The sentencing judgment of a Trial Chamber following a guilty plea.
The Court was also referred to certain decisions of the Appeals Chamber.
"This report has been prepared on the basis of archival research within the United Nations system, as well as on the basis of interviews with individuals who, in one capacity or another, participated in or had knowledge of the events in question. In the interest of gaining a clearer understanding of these events, I have taken the exceptional step of entering into the public record information from the classified files of the United Nations. In addition, I would like to record my thanks to those Member States, organizations and individuals who provided information for this report. A list of persons interviewed in this connection is attached as annex 1. While that list is fairly extensive, time, as well as budgetary and other constraints, precluded interviewing many other individuals who would be in a position to offer important perspectives on the subject at hand. In most cases, the interviews were conducted on a non-attribution basis to encourage as candid a disclosure as possible. I have also honoured the request of those individuals who provided information for this report on the condition that they not be identified." (A/54/549, para. 8.)
"The United Nations has hitherto not publicly disclosed the full details of the attack carried out on Srebrenica from 6 to 11 July 1995. The account which follows has now been reconstructed mainly from reports filed at that time by Dutchbat and the United Nations military observers. The accounts provided have also been supplemented with information contained in the Netherlands report on the debriefing of Dutchbat, completed in October 1995, and by information provided by Bosniac, Bosnian Serb and international sources. In order to independently examine the information contained in various secondary sources published over the past four years, as well to corroborate key information contained in the Netherlands debriefing report, interviews were conducted during the preparation of this report with a number of key personnel who were either in Srebrenica at the time, or who were involved in decision-making at higher levels in the United Nations chain of command." (A/54/549, Chap. VII, p. 57.)
The introductory note to the next chapter, "The Aftermath of the fall of Srebrenica : 12-20 July 1995", contains this description of the sources:
"The following section attempts to describe in a coherent narrative how thousands of men and boys were summarily executed and buried in mass graves within a matter of days while the international community attempted to negotiate access to them. It details how evidence of atrocities taking place gradually came to light, but too late to prevent the tragedy which was unfolding. In 1995, the details of the tragedy were told in piecemeal fashion, as survivors of the mass executions began to provide accounts of the horrors they had witnessed ; satellite photos later gave credence to their accounts.
The first official United Nations report which signalled the possibility of mass executions having taken place was the report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, dated 22 August 1995 (E/CN.4/1996/9). It was followed by the Secretary-General's reports to the Security Council, pursuant to resolution 1010 (1995), of 30 August (S/1995/755) and 27 November 1995 (S/1995/988). Those reports included information obtained from governmental and non-governmental organizations, as well as information that had appeared in the international and local press. By the end of 1995, however, the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia had still not been granted access to the area to corroborate the allegations of mass executions with forensic evidence.
The Tribunal first gained access to the crime scenes in January 1996. The details of many of their findings were made public in July 1996, during testimony under rule 60 of the Tribunal's rules of procedure, in the case against Ratio [si c; Ratko] Mladic and Radovan Karadzic. Between that time and the present, the Tribunal has been able to conduct further investigations in the areas where the executions were reported to have taken place and where the primary and secondary mass graves were reported to have been located. On the basis of the forensic evidence obtained during those investigations, the Tribunal has now been able to further corroborate much of the testimony of the survivors of the massacres. On 30 October 1998, the Tribunal indicted Radislav Krstic, Commander of the BSA's Drina Corps, for his alleged involvement in those massacres. The text of the indictment provides a succinct summary of the information obtained to date on where and when the mass executions took place.
The aforementioned sources of information, coupled with certain additional confidential information that was obtained during the preparation of this report, form the basis of the account which follows. Sources are purposely not cited in those instances where such disclosure could potentially compromise the Tribunal's ongoing work." (A/54/549, Chap. VIII, p. 77.)
"The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that all but three of the persons listed in Schedule C to the Indictment were killed at the KP Dom. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that these persons fell within the pattern of events that occurred at the KP Dom during the months of June and July 1992, and that the only reasonable explanation for the disappearance of these persons since that time is that they died as a result of acts or omissions, with the relevant state of mind [sc. that required to establish murder], at the KP Dom." (IT-97-25-T, Judgment, 15 March 2002, para. 330.)
"[b]ecause of the level of mistreatment, many prisoners died. One man stated that during his stay, mid-July to mid-August, 13 prisoners were beaten to death. Another prisoner died because he had gangrene which went untreated. Five more may have died from hunger. Allegedly, 20 prisoners died prior to September." (Vol. IV, Ann. VIII, p. 63.)
Killings at the Batkovic camp are also mentioned in the Dispatch of the United States State Department of19 April 1993. According to a witness, several men died as a result of bad conditions and beatings at the camp (United States Dispatch, 19 April 1993, Vol. 4, No. 30, p. 538).