• However Carpatsky did not duly invoke that the breach of contract was intentional or that the limitation of liability should not apply for that reason.
• In any event, this was only invoked after the proceedings were declared to have been concluded or after the arbitral tribunal had notified the parties that no new circumstances may be presented.
• Ukrnafta had no opportunity to anticipate that the arbitral tribunal would apply the statutory provision in question as grounds for the award. For this reason. Ukrnafta was prevented from presenting its case by for instance, invoking legal facts and adducing evidence on this issue.
• The arbitral tribunal did not consider Ukrnafta's other objections relating to a limitation of liability considering that the arbitral tribunal had found that Ukrnafta had committed an intentional breach of contract However, Ukrnafta declared that its other objections were not dependent on the objection concerning the limitation of liability.
On 26 July 2010 Ukrnafta asked for the permission of the arbitral tribunal to submit evidence in the form of a new act passed on 8 July 2010 regarding gas price regulation in Ukraine ('the Natural Gas Act’) as well as some supplementary documentation. However. Ukrnafta was notified in a written communication from the arbitral tribunal on 28 July 2010 that the company was not permitted to submit the Act. Through this Ukrnafta was deprived of its right to bring its action in the arbitration proceedings. The Natural Gas Act was highly relevant to the issue of governmental regulation of natural gas prices and whether the price regulation that applied at the time would terminate. It was not possible to adduce the Act any earlier. According lo Article 34 of the arbitration rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (’the SCC Rules’) it is possible for an arbitral tribunal to reopen proceedings once they have been closed. There are strong reasons to do so in this case.