| Short Title | Full Case Title and Citation |
| Argentina – Ceramic Tiles | Panel Report, Argentina – Definitive Anti‑Dumping Measures on Imports of Ceramic Floor Tiles from Italy, WT/DS189/R, adopted 5 November 2001, DSR 2001:XII, 6241 |
| Argentina – Poultry Anti‑Dumping Duties | Panel Report, Argentina – Definitive Anti‑Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil, WT/DS241/R, adopted 19 May 2003, DSR 2003:V, 1727 |
| Australia – Salmon | Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VIII, 3327 |
| Brazil – Retreaded Tyres | Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted 17 December 2007, DSR 2007:IV, 1527 |
| Canada - Aircraft | Panel Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/R, adopted 20 August 1999, upheld by Appellate Body Report WT/DS70/AB/R, DSR 1999:IV, 1443 |
| Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports | Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain, WT/DS276/AB/R, adopted 27 September 2004, DSR 2004:VI, 2739 |
| EC – Bed Linen | Panel Report, European Communities – Anti‑Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton‑Type Bed Linen from India, WT/DS141/R, adopted 12 March 2001, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS141/AB/R, DSR 2001:VI, 2077 |
| EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips | Panel Report, European Communities – Countervailing Measures on Dynamic Random Access Memory Chips from Korea, WT/DS299/R, adopted 3 August 2005, DSR 2005:XVIII, 8671 |
| EC – Fasteners (China) | Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/AB/R, adopted 28 July 2011 |
| EC – Fasteners (China) | Panel Report, European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/R and Corr.1, adopted 28 July 2011, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS397/AB/R |
| EC – Hormones | Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, DSR 1998:I, 135 |
| EC – Salmon (Norway) | Panel Report, European Communities – Anti‑Dumping Measure on Farmed Salmon from Norway, WT/DS337/R, adopted 15 January 2008, and Corr.1, DSR 2008:I, 3 |
| EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings | Panel Report, European Communities – Anti‑Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil, WT/DS219/R, adopted 18 August 2003, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS219/AB/R, DSR 2003:VII, 2701 |
| Guatemala – Cement I | Panel Report, Guatemala – Anti‑Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico, WT/DS60/R, adopted 25 November 1998, as reversed by Appellate Body Report WT/DS60/AB/R, DSR 1998:IX, 3797 |
| Guatemala – Cement II | Panel Report, Guatemala – Definitive Anti‑Dumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico, WT/DS156/R, adopted 17 November 2000, DSR 2000:XI, 5295 |
| India - Autos | Panel Report, India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, WT/DS146/R, WT/DS175/R and Corr.1, adopted 5 April 2002, DSR 2002:V, 1827 |
| Japan – DRAMs (Korea) | Appellate Body Report, Japan – Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random Access Memories from Korea, WT/DS336/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 17 December 2007, DSR 2007:VII, 2703 |
| Japan – DRAMs (Korea) | Panel Report, Japan – Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random Access Memories from Korea, WT/DS336/R, adopted 17 December 2007, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS336/AB/R, DSR 2007:VII, 2805 |
| Korea – Certain Paper | Panel Report, Korea – Anti‑Dumping Duties on Imports of Certain Paper from Indonesia, WT/DS312/R, adopted 28 November 2005, DSR 2005:XXII, 10637 |
| Mexico – Anti‑Dumping Measures on Rice | Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Definitive Anti‑Dumping Measures on Beef and Rice, Complaint with Respect to Rice, WT/DS295/AB/R, adopted 20 December 2005, DSR 2005:XXII, 10853 |
| Mexico – Anti‑Dumping Measures on Rice | Panel Report, Mexico – Definitive Anti‑Dumping Measures on Beef and Rice, Complaint with Respect to Rice, WT/DS295/R, adopted 20 December 2005, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS295/AB/R, DSR 2005:XXIII, 11007 |
| Mexico – Olive Oil | Panel Report, Mexico – Definitive Countervailing Measures on Olive Oil from the European Communities, WT/DS341/R, adopted 21 October 2008, DSR 2008:IX, 3179 |
| Mexico – Steel Pipes and Tubes | Panel Report, Mexico – Anti‑Dumping Duties on Steel Pipes and Tubes from Guatemala, WT/DS331/R, adopted 24 July 2007, DSR 2007:IV, 1207 |
| US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) | Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 25 March 2011 |
| US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) | Panel Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/R, adopted 25 March 2011, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS379/AB/R |
| US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS | Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) from Korea, WT/DS296/AB/R, adopted 20 July 2005, DSR 2005:XVI, 8131 |
| US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS | Panel Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) from Korea, WT/DS296/R, adopted 20 July 2005, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS296/AB/R, DSR 2005:XVII, 8243 |
| US – Export Restraints | Panel Report, United States – Measures Treating Exports Restraints as Subsidies, WT/DS194/R and Corr.2, adopted 23 August 2001, DSR 2001:XI, 5767 |
| US – Hot‑Rolled Steel | Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti‑Dumping Measures on Certain Hot‑Rolled Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS184/AB/R, adopted 23 August 2001, DSR 2001:X, 4697 |
| US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) | Panel Report, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/R, WT/DS234/R, adopted 27 January 2003, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R, DSR 2003:II, 489 |
| US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (Article 21.5 – Argentina) | Panel Report, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti‑Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Argentina, WT/DS268/RW, adopted 11 May 2007, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS268/AB/RW, DSR 2007:IX‑X, 3609 |
| US – Softwood Lumber II | GATT Panel Report, Panel on United States – Measures Affecting Imports of Softwood Lumber from Canada, SCM/162, adopted 27 October 1993, BISD 40S/358 |
| US – Softwood Lumber IV | Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS257/AB/R, adopted 17 February 2004, DSR 2004:II, 571 |
| US – Softwood Lumber IV | Panel Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS257/R and Corr.1, adopted 17 February 2004, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS257/AB/R, DSR 2004:II, 641 |
| US – Softwood Lumber V | Panel Report, United States – Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS264/R, adopted 31 August 2004, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS264/AB/R, DSR 2004:V, 1937 |
| US – Softwood Lumber VI (Article 21.5 – Canada) | Appellate Body Report, United States – Investigation of the International Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada, WT/DS277/AB/RW, adopted 9 May 2006, and Corr.1, DSR 2006:XI, 4865 |
| US – Tyres (China) | Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting Imports of Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tyres from China, WT/DS399/AB/R, adopted 5 October 2011 |
| US – Wool Shirts and Blouses | Appellate Body Report, United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, WT/DS33/AB/R, adopted 23 May 1997, and Corr.1, DSR 1997:I, 323 |
| Abbreviation | Full Reference |
| Additional Application | New Subsidy Allegations Application (20 July 2009) (Exhibits CHN-5 and US-16) |
| AK Steel | AK Steel Corporation |
| Anti-Dumping Agreement | Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 |
| Application | Petition for the Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Investigation (29 April 2009) (Exhibits CHN-2 and US-2) |
| ATI | ATI Allegheny Ludlum Corporation |
| AUV | Average unit value |
| Baosteel | Baosteel Group Corporation |
| DSU | Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing Settlement of Disputes |
| Final Determination | MOFCOM, Final Determination [2010] No. 21 (10 April 2010) (Exhibits CHN-16 and US-28) |
| Final Disclosure | MOFCOM, Memorandum Regarding the Factual Disclosure on the Dumping Margin and Ad Valorem Subsidy Rate for Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel Antidumping and Countervailing Cases (15 March 2010) (Exhibit US-26) |
| Final Injury Disclosure | MOFCOM, Essential Facts under Consideration which Form the Basis of the Determination on Industry Injury, 5 March 2010 (Exhibits CHN-29 and US-27) |
| GATT 1994 | General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 |
| GOES | Grain oriented flat-rolled electrical steel |
| MOFCOM | Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China |
| POI | Period of investigation |
| Preliminary Determination | MOFCOM, Preliminary Determination [2009] No. 99 (10 December 2009) (Exhibits CHN-17 and US-5) |
| SCM Agreement | Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures |
| USD | US dollars |
| VRA | Voluntary restraint agreement |
| WISCO | Wuhan Iron and Steel Corporation |
| WTO Agreement | Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization |
To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited by the parties to the dispute, the matter referred to the DSB by the United States in document WT/DS414/2 and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements.
(a) China acted inconsistently with Articles 11.2 and 11.3 of the SCM Agreement when it initiated a countervailing duty investigation with respect to 11 of the programmes included in the application;
(b) China acted inconsistently with Articles 12.4.1 of the SCM Agreement and 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it failed to require adequate non-confidential summaries of confidential information included in the application;
(c) China acted inconsistently with Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement because its use of facts available for known exporters was improper;
(d) China acted inconsistently with Article 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it failed to make available to the respondent companies the calculations used to determine these companies' final dumping margins;
(e) China acted inconsistently with Article 22.3 of the SCM Agreement because it failed adequately to explain the findings and conclusions supporting its determination that the competitive bidding process under the United States Government procurement statutes at issue did not result in prices that reflected market conditions;
(f) China acted inconsistently with Articles 6.8 and 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it applied anti-dumping duties based on facts available to "unknown" United States exporters and did not disclose the essential facts that led to that result;
(g) China acted inconsistently with Articles 12.2 and 12.2.2 of the Antidumping Agreement because MOFCOM failed to provide in sufficient detail the findings and conclusions leading to application of facts available to "unknown" United States producers/exporters. MOFCOM also failed to provide "all relevant information" on the facts underlying its determination that recourse to facts available was warranted in the calculation of the "all others" antidumping rate;
(h) China acted inconsistently with Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 because the "all others" anti-dumping duty levied by China was greater in amount than the appropriate margin of dumping;
(i) China acted inconsistently with Articles 12.7, 12.8, 22.3 and 22.5 of the SCM Agreement because it applied countervailing duties based on facts available to "unknown" United States exporters and provided no detail in its final determination or final disclosure documents regarding the findings that led to the application of facts available;
(j) China acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 6.9 and 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Articles 15.1, 15.2, 12.8 and 22.5 of the SCM Agreement because its price effects analysis was not based on positive evidence and it did not engage in an objective examination of the evidence. Further, China did not disclose the essential facts supporting its price effects analysis and did not offer an adequate explanation for its price effects findings;
(k) China acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1, 3.5, 6.9 and 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Articles 12.8, 15.1, 15.5 and 22.5 of the SCM Agreement because its causation analysis was not supported by positive evidence or based on an objective examination of the evidence. Further, China failed to disclose the essential facts supporting its analysis and did not provide an adequate explanation for its causation findings; and
(l) Consequently, China also acted inconsistently with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 10 of the SCM Agreement.
[A] panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements.6 (emphasis added)
11.2 An application under paragraph 1 shall include sufficient evidence of the existence of (a) a subsidy and, if possible, its amount, (b) injury within the meaning of Article VI of GATT 1994 as interpreted by this Agreement, and (c) a causal link between the subsidized imports and the alleged injury. Simple assertion, unsubstantiated by relevant evidence, cannot be considered sufficient to meet the requirements of this paragraph. The application shall contain such information as is reasonably available to the applicant on the following:
...
(iii) evidence with regard to the existence, amount and nature of the subsidy in question.
11.3 The authorities shall review the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the application to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to justify the initiation of an investigation.
[B]y introducing the notion of financial contribution, the drafters foreclosed the possibility of the treatment of any government action that resulted in a benefit as a subsidy. Indeed, this is arguably the principal significance of the concept of financial contribution, which can be characterised as one of the 'gateways' to the SCM Agreement, along with the concepts of benefit and specificity. To hold that the concept of financial contribution is about the effects, rather than the nature, of a government action would be effectively to write it out of the Agreement, leaving the concepts of benefit and specificity as the sole determinants of the scope of the Agreement.
Reading the term "price support" in this context, it is our view that it does not include all government intervention that may have an effect on prices, such as tariffs and quantitative restrictions. In particular, it is not clear that Article 1.1(a)(2) was intended to capture all manner of government measures that do not otherwise constitute a financial contribution, but may have an indirect effect on a market, including on prices. The concept of "price support" also acts as a gateway to the SCM Agreement, and it is our view that its focus is on the nature of government action, rather than upon the effects of such action. Consequently, the concept of " price support" has a more narrow meaning than suggested by the applicants, and includes direct government intervention in the market with the design to fix the price of a good at a particular level, for example, through purchase of surplus production when price is set above equilibrium.
Entrustment and direction do not cover 'the situation in which the government intervenes in the market in some way, which may or may not have a particular result simply based on the given factual circumstances and the exercise of free choice by the actors in that market'. Thus, government 'entrustment' or 'direction' cannot be inadvertent or a mere by-product of governmental regulation…[N]ot all government measures capable of conferring benefits would necessarily fall within Article 1.1(a); otherwise paragraph (i) through (iv) of Article 1.1(a) would not be necessary because all government measures conferring benefits, per se, would be subsidies.
· Over $2.8 billion dollars in loans, grants, and guarantees;
· Programs to leverage funds generating at least USD 5 billion in private investment in economic and community development projects;
· Investments in rural, urban, and suburban sites;
· New capital resources for small cities and communities;
· Tools to make Pennsylvania a leader in real estate and business development;
· Incentives and services to attract high-growth firms;
· Resources that allow our traditional industries, especially manufacturing, to access new technology to enhance their productivity
(i) The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission regulates interstate power transmission and the wholesale electricity market. The regulation of the wholesale market includes examining and approving the power price. In particular, every power company submits a tariff table to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which has the power to adjust and amend the table if it is not in line with the public interest150;
(ii) There are also state-based electric power regulatory institutions that regulate the price for power distribution and in-state retail sales151;
(iii) The additional application also indicates that there are four categories of companies that make up the United States electricity industry: (a) public power companies that are "operated by privates"; (b) independent power generating companies; (c) municipal power companies owned by local governments; and (d) the hydropower regulatory bureaus belonging to the Federal Government152; and
(iv) There is differentiated pricing in the electricity market, with the steel industry receiving a lower price than some other industries and a lower price than the national average.153
(i) There are no national policies directing the electricity industry to provide energy to the steel industry at lower prices;
(ii) There is no agency that sets retail prices for electricity for the entire country;
(iii) Any difference in price paid by the steel industry for electricity is due to a "bulk discount" negotiated directly between the steel industry and the electricity company;
(iv) Differences in prices are due to market forces;
(v) Steel producers pay less for electricity because they purchase it from non-utilities at a substantial discount; and
(vi) One of the GOES companies in the United States receives its electricity purely from private entities.
The authorities shall require [interested Members or] interested parties providing confidential information to furnish non-confidential summaries thereof. These summaries shall be in sufficient detail to permit a reasonable understanding of the substance of the information submitted in confidence. In exceptional circumstances, such [Members or] parties may indicate that such information is not susceptible of summary. In such exceptional circumstances, a statement of the reasons why summarization is not possible must be provided.166
For the convenience of interested parties to have a general idea about the confidential information, the petitioner hereby summarize the confidential information applied including the narratives and annex marked **.
To help other interested parties to access to comprehensive information the petitioners applied for confidential treatment, the petitioners made explanations in the public version of the petition about the part that were applied for confidential treatment, and below are non-confidential summaries of the appendices that have been applied for confidential treatment.215
This part involves sales price of the subject merchandise by the petitioners from 2006 to February 2009. As they are business proprietary of the petitioners, disclosure of which will seriously harm the interest of the petitioners; therefore, the petitioners applied for confidential treatment of the information.
(i) an assertion that the applicants met the standing requirements under the Chinese regulations;
(ii) the discussion of the domestic industry in the application, which mentions only two producers. China argues that this indicates that the applicants account for 100% of the domestic industry; and
(iii) Appendix 13 to the application, which provides figures for the total domestic GOES output and the output of each applicant over the period 2006-2007, and estimates for 2008 and beyond.217
(i) Percentage changes in domestic apparent consumption on page 5 of the application. In particular, page 5 states that since 2006, domestic apparent consumption has maintained a year-on-year growth rate of 20%. By 2008, there had been a growth of 50% over 2006 levels.
(ii) Table 32 of the application provides year-on-year percentage changes from 2006 to 2007 and from 2007 to 2008. These figures are also discussed in the commentary on causation following Tables 32 and 33.
(iii) Appendix 13 to the application, which provides public data on apparent domestic consumption over the period 2006-2007, with estimates for 2008 and beyond.
Please read questions carefully before answering. When answering a question, please write the question down first and put your answer directly below it and point out the support evidence to it. If the question does not apply to you, please write down explicitly, "this question does not apply to my company" and state the reasons.232
(1) Please answer all the questions listed by Annex I.
(2) Does your company attend bidding when selling products to government? If yes, please explain the specific bidding procedure and bidding rules as well as the agencies and departments to which your company submit bid tender.
(3) Please provide all the relevant information (not limited to the subject merchandise), in the form of tables, regarding government procurement signed within the POI as well as those not performed within the POI, which includes: the specific names of the purchaser, purchasing time, name of purchased products, the supply quantity, [value], price, payment and the contract progress, etc. The contract, bid tender etc. related evidence shall be provided. The selling price of the involved products that are sold to other private purchaser shall be provided as well.
(4) Please provide the information regarding domestic sales of all the products in POI, in the form of tables. The quantity and [value] of each product sold to each client shall be provided.233
The prima facie evidence owned by the Investigating Authority showed that your company's products (not limited to the product concerned) could have been sold to the USG or public bodies, or have been sold to contractors of relevant projects who have been bound by the Buy America Act. There was a possibility that the prices of these transactions was higher than then market prices and consequently brought benefit to your company. Therefore, so long as your company's products were sold in the domestic market, the transactions shall be reported. If your company was of the view that, regarding the product concerned and your company's other products, there was no purchase from the government or public body, or there was no transaction bound by the Buy America Act, it was your company who shall bear the burden of proof.238
Since the investigation authority had already given explanations to relevant issues and offered the respondent a chance of re-submitting the responses, the investigation regret to see that AK Steel Corporation still didn't answer the questions for Government Procurement Program as required by the questionnaire. Therefore, though AK Steel Corporation provided some of its domestic sales data in the Comments on Preliminary Determination, the investigation authority would not verify those sales data in the anti-subsidy verification.242
We understand that recourse to facts available does not permit an investigating authority to use any information in whatever way it chooses....to the extent possible, an investigating authority using "facts available" in a countervailing duty investigation must take into account all the substantiated facts provided by an interested party, even if those facts may not constitute the complete information requested by the party...the facts available to the agency are generally limited to those that may reasonably replace the information that an interested party failed to provide.245
Like Article 6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article 12 of the SCM Agreement as a whole sets out evidentiary rules that apply throughout the course of the...investigation, and provides also for due process rights that are enjoyed by interested parties throughout...an investigation....[T]his due process obligation...requires the investigating authority...to take into account the information submitted by an interested party.246
Though the SCM Agreement does not have a facts available Annex, "it would be anomalous if Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement were the permit the use of facts available in countervailing duty investigations in a manner markedly different from that in anti-dumping investigations."247
· Automotive: 32%;
· Infrastructure and Manufacturing: 29%; and
· Distributors and Converters: 39%.248
With regard to government procurement, AK Steel provides in Exhibit II.3 of the Revised Subsidy Questionnaire Response a list of all its customers during the period of investigation ("POI") grouped by product category. This list demonstrates that AK Steel did not sell either the subject merchandise or any other product to any government entity during the POI.
To the extent MOFCOM is requiring AK Steel to demonstrate that none of the steel it sold to non-government entities was used in a project that was subject to the "Buy America" or similar act, MOFCOM is imposing an impossible burden. AK Steel has no reason to know what its customers do with their purchases. Because such a substantial proportion of AK Steel's products are sold to service centers, which resell the products to end users, there is no way to find out. Moreover, as stated in AK Steel's questionnaire response, even if the government ultimately overpaid for a project incorporating steel that may have originated with AK Steel, the entity that received the overpayment did not provide any of that overpayment to AK Steel, which received only a market-determined price for its product.251
In cases in which any interested Member or interested party refuses access to, or otherwise does not provide, necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes the investigation, preliminary and final determinations, affirmative or negative, may be made on the basis of the facts available.