"The General Assembly,
Considering Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations,
Considering the exchange of views which has taken place in the Security Council at its Two hundred and fourth, Two hundred and fifth and Two hundred and sixth Meetings, relating to the admission of certain States to membership in the United Nations,
Considering Article 96 of the Charter,
Requests the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on the following question :
Is a Member of the United Nations which is called upon, in virtue of Article 4 of the Charter, to pronounce itself by its vote, either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly, on the admission of a State to membership in the United Nations, juridically entitled to make its consent to the admission dependent on conditions not expressly provided by paragraph 1 of the said Article ? In particular, can such a Member, while it recognizes the conditions set forth in that provision to be fulfilled by the State concerned, subject its affirmative vote to the additional condition that other States be admitted to membership in the United Nations together with that State ?
Instructs the Secretary-General to place at the disposal of the Court the records of the above-mentioned meetings of the Security Council."
By a note dated November 24th, 1947, and filed in the Registry on November 29th, the Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitted to the Registrar a copy of the Resolution of the General Assembly. In a telegram sent on December 10th, the Secretary-General informed the Registrar that the note of November 24th was to be regarded as the official notification and that certified true copies of the Resolution had been despatched. These copies reached the Registry on December 12th, and the question was then entered in the General List under No. 3.
The same day, the Registrar gave notice of the request for an opinion to all States entitled to appear before the Court, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 66 of the Statute. Furthermore,
By the date thus fixed, written statements were received from the following States: China, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Canada, United States of America, Greece, Yugoslavia, Belgium, Iraq, Ukraine, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Australia. These statements were communicated to all Members of the United Nations, who were informed that the President had fixed April 15th, 1948, as the opening date of the oral proceedings. A statement from the Government of Siam, dated January 30th, 1948, which was received in the Registry on February 14th, i.e., after the expiration of the time-limit, was accepted by decision of the President and was also transmitted to the other Members of the United Nations.
By its Resolution the General Assembly instructed the Secretary-General to place at the disposal of the Court the records of certain meetings of the Security Council. In accordance with these instructions and with paragraph 2 of Article 65 of the Statute, where it is laid down that every question submitted for an opinion shall be accompanied by all documents likely to throw light upon it, the Secretary-General sent to the Registry the documents which are enumerated in Section I of the list annexed to the present opinion1. A part of these documents reached the Registry on February 10th, 1948, and the remainder on March 20th. The Secretary-General also announced by a letter of February 12th, 1948, that he had designated a representative, authorized to present any written and oral statements which might facilitate the Court's task.
Furthermore, the Governments of the French Republic, of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, of the Kingdom of Belgium, of the Czechoslovak Republic, and of the Republic of Poland announced that they had designated representatives to present oral statements before the Court.
By decision of the Court, the opening of the oral proceedings was postponed from April 15th to April 22nd, 1948. In the course of public sittings held on April 22nd, 23rd and 24th, the Court heard the oral statements presented
—on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, by its representative, Mr. Ivan Kerno, Assistant Secretary-General in charge of the Legal Department;
—on behalf of the Government of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, by its representative, Mr. Milan Bartos, Minister Plenipotentiary ;
—on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium, by its representative, M. Georges Kaeckenbeeck, D.C.L., Minister Plenipotentiary, Head of the Division for Peace Conferences and International Organization at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ;
—on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Czechoslovakia, by its representative, Mr. Vladimir Vochoc, Professor of International Law in Charles University at Prague ;
—on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Poland, by its representative, Mr. Manfred Lachs, Professeur agrégé of International Law at the University of Warsaw.
In the course of the hearings, new documents were filed by the representatives accredited to the Court. These documents are enumerated in Section II of the list annexed to the present opinion1.
Before examining the request for an opinion, the Court considers it necessary to make the following preliminary remarks :
The question put to the Court is divided into two parts, of which the second begins with the words "In particular", and is presented as an application of a more general idea implicit in the first.
The request for an opinion does not refer to the actual vote. Although the Members are bound to conform to the requirements of Article 4 in giving their votes, the General Assembly can hardly be supposed to have intended to ask the Court’s opinion as to the reasons which, in the mind of a Member, may prompt its vote. Such reasons, which enter into a mental process, are obviously subject to no control. Nor does the request concern a Member’s freedom of expressing its opinion. Since it concerns a condition or conditions on which a Member "makes its consent dependent", the question can only relate to the statements made by a Member concerning the vote it proposes to give.
It is clear from the General Assembly’s Resolution of November 17th, 1947, that the Court is not called upon either to define the meaning and scope of the conditions on which admission is made dependent, or to specify the elements which may serve in a concrete case to verify the existence of the requisite conditions.
The question put is in effect confined to the following point only : are the conditions stated in paragraph 1 of Article 4 exhaustive in character in the sense that an affirmative reply would lead to the conclusion that a Member is not legally entitled to make admission dependent on conditions not expressly provided for in that Article, while a negative reply would, on the contrary, authorize a Member to make admission dependent also on other conditions.
Understood in this light, the question, in its two parts, is and can only be a purely legal one. To determine the meaning of a treaty provision—to determine, as in this case, the character (exhaustive or otherwise) of the conditions for admission stated therein—is a problem of interpretation and consequently a legal question.
It has nevertheless been contended that the question put must be regarded as a political one and that, for this reason, it falls outside the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court cannot attribute a political character to a request which, framed in abstract terms, invites it to undertake an essentially judicial task, the interpretation of a treaty provision. It is not concerned with the motives which may have inspired this request, nor with the considerations which, in the concrete cases submitted for examination to the Security Council, formed the subject of the exchange of views which took place in that body. It is the duty of the Court to envisage the question submitted to it only in the abstract form which has been given to it ; nothing which is said in the present opinion refers, either directly or indirectly, to concrete cases or to particular circumstances.
It has also been contended that the Court should not deal with a question couched in abstract terms. That is a mere affirmation devoid of any justification. According to Article 96 of the Charter and Article 65 of the Statute, the Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question, abstract or otherwise.
Lastly, it has also been maintained that the Court cannot reply to the question put because it involves an interpretation of the Charter. Nowhere is any provision to be found forbidding the Court, "the principal judicial organ of the United Nations", to exercise in regard to Article 4 of the Charter, a multilateral treaty, an interpretative function which falls within the normal exercise of its judicial powers.
Accordingly, the Court holds that it is competent, on the basis of Article 96 of the Charter and Article 65 of the Statute, and
Moreover, the spirit as well as the terms of the paragraph preclude the idea that considerations extraneous to these principles and obligations can prevent the admission of a State which complies with them. If the authors of the Charter had meant to leave Members free to import into the application of this provision considerations extraneous to the conditions laid down therein, they would undoubtedly have adopted a different wording.
The Court considers that the text is sufficiently clear ; consequently, it does not feel that it should deviate from the consistent practice of the Permanent Court of International Justice, according to which there is no occasion to resort to preparatory work if the text of a convention is sufficiently clear in itself.
The Court furthermore observes that Rule 60 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council is based on this interpretation. The first paragraph of this Rule reads as follows :
"The Security Council shall decide whether in its judgment the applicant is a peace-loving State and is able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter, and accordingly whether to recommend the applicant State for membership."
It does not, however, follow from the exhaustive character of paragraph 1 of Article 4 that an appreciation is precluded of such circumstances of fact as would enable the existence of the requisite conditions to be verified.
Article 4 does not forbid the taking into account of any factor which it is possible reasonably and in good faith to connect with the conditions laid down in that Article. The taking into account of such factors is implied in the very wide and very elastic nature of the prescribed conditions ; no relevant political factor— that is to say, none connected with the conditions of admission—is excluded.
But paragraph 2 is concerned only with the procedure for admission, while the preceding paragraph lays down the substantive law. This procedural character is clearly indicated by the words "will be effected", which, by linking admission to the decision, point clearly to the fact that the paragraph is solely concerned with the manner in which admission is effected, and not with the subject of the judgment of the Organization, nor with the nature of the appreciation involved in that judgment, these two questions being dealt with in the preceding paragraph. Moreover, this paragraph, in referring to the "recommendation" of the Security Council and the "decision" of the General Assembly, is designed only to determine the respective functions of these two organs which consist in pronouncing upon the question whether or not the applicant State shall be admitted to membership after having established whether or not the prescribed conditions are fulfilled.
The political character of an organ cannot release it from the observance of the treaty provisions established by the Charter when they constitute limitations on its powers or criteria for its judgment. To ascertain whether an organ has freedom of choice for its decisions, reference must be made to the terms of its constitution. In this case, the limits of this freedom are fixed by Article 4 and allow for a wide liberty of appreciation. There is therefore no conflict between the functions of the political organs, on the one hand, and the exhaustive character of the prescribed conditions, on the other.
It has been sought to base on the political responsibilities assumed by the Security Council, in virtue of Article 24 of the Charter, an argument justifying the necessity for according to the Security Council as well as to the General Assembly complete freedom of appreciation in connexion with the admission of new Members. But Article 24, owing to the very general nature of its terms, cannot, in the absence of any provision, affect the special rules for admission which emerge from Article 4.
The foregoing considerations establish the exhaustive character of the conditions prescribed in Article 4.
The second part of the question concerns a demand on the part of a Member making its consent to the admission of an applicant dependent on the admission of other applicants.
The provisions of Article 4 necessarily imply that every application for admission should be examined and voted on separately and on its own merits ; otherwise it would be impossible to determine whether a particular applicant fulfils the necessary conditions. To subject an affirmative vote for the admission of an applicant State to the condition that other States be admitted with that State would prevent Members from exercising their judgment in each case with complete liberty, within the scope of the prescribed conditions. Such a demand is incompatible with the letter and spirit of Article 4 of the Charter.
For these reasons,
by nine votes to six,
is of opinion that a Member of the United Nations which is called upon, in virtue of Article 4 of the Charter, to pronounce itself by its vote, either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly, on the admission of a State to membership in the United Nations, is not juridically entitled to make its consent to the admission dependent on conditions not expressly provided by paragraph 1 of the said Article ;
and that, in particular, a Member of the Organization cannot, while it recognizes the conditions set forth in that provision to be fulfilled by the State concerned, subject its affirmative vote to the additional condition that other States be admitted to membership in the United Nations together with that State.
The present opinion has been drawn up in French and in English, the French text being authoritative.