This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 1(6) and Article 26(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty, signed at Lisbon on 17 December 1994 (OJ 1994 L 380, p. 24; "the ECT") approved on behalf of the European Communities by Council and Commission Decision 98/181/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 23 September 1997 (OJ 1998 L 69, p. 1).
The request has been made in proceedings between the Republic of Moldova and Komstroy LLC, concerning the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal that made an award in Paris (France) on 25 October 2013.
According to the preamble to the ECT, the contracting parties concluded that treaty, inter alia, "wishing to implement the basic concept of the European Energy Charter initiative which is to catalyse economic growth by means of measures to liberalise investment and trade in energy".
"As used in this Treaty:
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5. "Economic activity in the energy sector" means an economic activity concerning the exploration, extraction, refining, production, storage, land transport, transmission, distribution, trade, marketing, or sale of energy materials and products except those included in Annex NI, or concerning the distribution of heat to multiple premises.
6. "Investment" means every kind of asset, owned or controlled directly or indirectly by an investor and includes:
(a) tangible and intangible, and movable and immovable, property, and any property rights such as leases, mortgages, liens, and pledges;
(b) a company or business enterprise, or shares, stock, or other forms of equity participation in a company or business enterprise, and bonds and other debt of a company or business enterprise;
(c) claims to money and claims to performance pursuant to [a] contract having an economic value and associated with an investment;
(d) intellectual property;
(e) returns;
(f) any right conferred by law or contract or by virtue of any licences and permits granted pursuant to law to undertake any economic activity in the energy sector.
A change in the form in which assets are invested does not affect their character as investments and the term "investment" includes all investments, whether existing at or made after the later of the date of entry into force of this Treaty for the Contracting Party of the investor making the investment and that for the Contracting Party in the area of which the investment is made (hereinafter referred to as the "effective date") provided that the Treaty shall only apply to matters affecting such investments after the effective date.
"Investment" refers to any investment associated with an economic activity in the energy sector and to investments or classes of investments designated by a Contracting Party in its area as "Charter efficiency projects" and so notified to the Secretariat.
7. "Investor" means:
(a) with respect to a Contracting Party:
(i) a natural person having the citizenship or nationality of or who is permanently residing in that Contracting Party in accordance with its applicable law;
(ii) a company or other organisation organised in accordance with the law applicable in that Contracting Party;
(b) with respect to a "third State", a natural person, company or other organisation which fulfils, mutatis mutandis, the conditions specified in subparagraph (a) for a Contracting Party.'
"1. Disputes between a Contracting Party and an investor of another Contracting Party relating to an investment of the latter in the area of the former, which concern an alleged breach of an obligation of the former under Part III shall, if possible, be settled amicably.
2. If such disputes can not be settled according to the provisions of paragraph 1 within a period of three months from the date on which either party to the dispute requested amicable settlement, the investor party to the dispute may choose to submit it for resolution:
(a) to the courts or administrative tribunals of the Contracting Party to the dispute;
[or]
(b) in accordance with any applicable, previously agreed dispute settlement procedure;
or
(c) in accordance with the following paragraphs of this Article.
3. (a) Subject only to subparagraphs (b) and (c), each Contracting Party hereby gives its unconditional consent to the submission of a dispute to international arbitration or conciliation in accordance with the provisions of this Article.
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4. In the event that an investor chooses to submit the dispute for resolution under subparagraph (2)(c), the investor shall further provide its consent in writing for the dispute to be submitted to:
(a) (i) the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, established pursuant to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States opened for signature at Washington, 18 March 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the "Icsid Convention"), if the Contracting Party of the investor and the Contracting Party party to the dispute are both parties to the Icsid Convention;
or
(ii) the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, established pursuant to the Convention referred to in subparagraph (a)(i), under the rules governing the Additional Facility for the Administration of Proceedings by the Secretariat of the Centre … if the Contracting Party of the investor or the Contracting Party to the dispute, but not both, is a party to the Icsid Convention;
(b) a sole arbitrator or ad hoc arbitration tribunal established under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (hereinafter referred to as "Uncitral");
or
(c) an arbitral proceeding under the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm [(Sweden)] Chamber of Commerce.
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6. A tribunal established pursuant to paragraph 4 shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this Treaty and applicable rules and principles of international law.
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8. The awards of arbitration, which may include an award of interest, shall be final and binding upon the parties to the dispute. …"
"An action for annulment is available only in the following cases:
1° Where the arbitral tribunal wrongly declared itself to have or not to have jurisdiction, or
2° Where the arbitral tribunal was improperly constituted, or
3° Where the arbitral tribunal issued a ruling without fulfilling the mandate entrusted to it, or
4° Where the adversarial principle was not observed or
5° Where the recognition or enforcement of the award is contrary to international public policy."
Taking the view that certain conduct by the Republic of Moldova in that context constituted serious breaches of the undertakings made under the ECT, Energoalians initiated the ad hoc arbitration procedure provided for in Article 26(4)(b) of that treaty.
By judgment of 12 April 2016, the cour d'appel de Paris (Court of Appeal, Paris) annulled the arbitral award on the ground that the arbitral tribunal had wrongly declared that it had jurisdiction. In fact, according to that court, the dispute between Energoalians and the Republic of Moldova concerned a claim, assigned by Derimen to Energoalians, the sole subject matter of which was the sale of electricity. In the absence of any economic contribution made by Ergoalians in Moldova, such a claim could not be regarded as an "investment", within the meaning of the ECT, upon which the jurisdiction of that arbitral tribunal could be based.
On an appeal on a point of law lodged by Komstroy, the successor in law to Energoalians since 6 October 2014, the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation, France), by judgment of 28 March 2018, set aside the judgment of the cour d'appel de Paris (Court of Appeal, Paris) of 12 April 2016, on the ground that that court had interpreted the concept of "investment" by adding a condition to it which was not provided for in the ECT, and referred the parties back to the cour d'appel de Paris (Court of Appeal, Paris) sitting in a different composition.
Before the cour d'appel de Paris (Court of Appeal, Paris), the Republic of Moldova submitted that the arbitral tribunal should have declined jurisdiction. It submits that, first of all, the claim acquired by Energoalians from Derimen, which arose from a contract for the sale of electricity, is not an "investment", within the meaning of Article 26(1) ECT, read in the light of Article 1(6) of that treaty, and could not therefore be the subject matter of arbitration proceedings, the latter only being provided for in the context of Part III ECT, regarding, specifically, investments. Next, even if that claim could constitute an "investment", within the meaning of those provisions, it was not an investment "of" a company of a State that is a Contracting Party to the ECT, Derimen being a company registered in the British Virgin Islands. Finally, that claim allegedly relates to a transaction, for the sale of electricity, that was not made in the "area" of Moldova, as the electricity was sold and transported only to the border between Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, on the Ukrainian side.
"[(1)] Must [Article 1(6) ECT] be interpreted as meaning that a claim which arose from a contract for the sale of electricity and which did not involve any economic contribution on the part of the investor in the host State can constitute an "investment" within the meaning of that article?
[(2)] Must [Article 26(1) ECT] be interpreted as meaning that the acquisition, by an investor of a Contracting Party, of a claim established by an economic operator which is not from one of the States that are Contracting Parties to that treaty constitutes an investment?
[(3)] Must [Article 26(1) ECT] be interpreted as meaning that a claim held by an investor, which arose from a contract for the sale of electricity supplied at the border of the host State, can constitute an investment made in the area of another Contracting Party, in the case where the investor does not carry out any economic activity in the territory of that latter Contracting Party?"
It is apparent from the Court's settled case-law that an agreement concluded by the Council, pursuant to Articles 217 and 218 TFEU constitutes, as regards the European Union, an act of one of its institutions, that the provisions of such an agreement form an integral part of the legal order of the European Union from the time it enters into force and that, in the context of that legal order the Court has jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of that agreement (judgments of 30 April 1974, Haegeman, 181/73, EU:C:1974:41, paragraphs 3 to 6; of 8 March 2011, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, C-240/09, EU:C:2011:125, paragraph 30; and of 22 November 2017, Aebtri, C-224/16, EU:C:2017:880, paragraph 50).
That choice, made freely by those parties, has the effect of rendering applicable French law as the lex fori to the dispute in the main proceedings under the conditions and within the limits laid down by that law. In particular, under Article 1520 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the French courts have jurisdiction to hear actions to set aside an arbitral award made in France for lack of jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. EU law forms part of the law in force in every Member State (judgment of 6 March 2018, Achmea, C-284/16, EU:C:2018:158, paragraph 41).
By its first question, which must be considered having regard to the subject matter of the dispute in the main proceedings relating to the jurisdiction of the ad hoc arbitral tribunal which made the award referred to in paragraph 13 of the present judgment, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 1(6) and Article 26(1) ECT must be interpreted as meaning that the acquisition, by an undertaking of a contracting party to that treaty, of a claim arising from a contract for the supply of electricity, which is not associated with an investment, held by an undertaking of a third State to that treaty against a public undertaking of another Contracting Party to the same treaty, may constitute an "investment", within the meaning of those provisions, even though that claim did not involve any economic contribution on the part of the acquirer in the area of the host Contracting Party.
The Court has consistently held that an international agreement cannot affect the allocation of powers laid down by the Treaties and, hence, the autonomy of the EU legal system, observance of which is ensured by the Court. That principle is enshrined in particular in Article 344 TFEU, under which the Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those provided for in the Treaties (judgment of 6 March 2018, Achmea, C-284/16, EU:C:2018:158, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
According to further settled case-law of the Court, the autonomy of EU law with respect both to the law of the Member States and to international law is justified by the essential characteristics of the European Union and its law, relating in particular to the constitutional structure of the European Union and the very nature of that law. EU law is characterised by the fact that it stems from an independent source of law, the Treaties, by its primacy over the laws of the Member States, and by the direct effect of a whole series of provisions which are applicable to their nationals and to the Member States themselves. Those characteristics have given rise to a structured network of principles, rules and mutually interdependent legal relations binding the European Union and its Member States reciprocally and binding its Member States to each other (judgment of 6 March 2018, Achmea, C-284/16, EU:C:2018:158, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited, and Opinion 1/17 (EU-Canada CET Agreement), of 30 April 2019, EU:C:2019:341, paragraph 109 and the case-law cited).
In order to ensure that those specific characteristics and the autonomy of the legal order thus created are preserved, the Treaties have established a judicial system intended to ensure consistency and uniformity in the interpretation of EU law. In accordance with Article 19 TEU, it is for the national courts and tribunals and the Court to ensure the full application of that law in all the Member States and to ensure effective judicial protection of the rights of individuals under that law, the Court having exclusive jurisdiction to give the definitive interpretation of that law. To that end, that system includes, in particular, the preliminary ruling procedure provided for in Article 267 TFEU (judgment of 6 March 2018, Achmea, C-284/16, EU:C:2018:158, paragraphs 35 and 36 and the case-law cited, and Opinion 1/17 (EU-Canada CET Agreement), of 30 April 2019, EU:C:2019:341, paragraph 111 and the case-law cited).
By setting up a dialogue between one court and another, specifically between the Court of Justice and the courts and tribunals of the Member States, that procedure, which is the keystone of the judicial system as thus conceived, has the objective of securing the uniform interpretation of EU law, thereby ensuring its consistency, its full effect and its autonomy as well as, ultimately, the particular nature of the law established by the Treaties (judgment of 6 March 2018, Achmea, C - 284/16, EU:C:2018:158, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
It must therefore be ascertained, in the second place, whether such an arbitral tribunal is situated within the judicial system of the European Union, and in particular whether it can be regarded as a court or tribunal of a Member State within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU. The consequence of a tribunal set up by Member States being situated within the EU judicial system is that its decisions are subject to mechanisms capable of ensuring the full effectiveness of the rules of the European Union (judgment of 6 March 2018, Achmea, C-284/16, EU:C:2018:158, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).
In the precisely same way as the arbitral tribunal at issue in the case giving rise to the judgment of 6 March 2018, Achmea (C-284/16, EU:C:2018:158, paragraph 45), an ad hoc arbitral tribunal, such as that referred to in Article 26(6) ECT, does not constitute a component of the judicial system of a Member State, in this case the French Republic. Indeed it is precisely the exceptional nature of that court's jurisdiction, by comparison with that of the courts of the contracting parties to the ECT, which is one of the main reasons for the existence of Article 26(2)(c) and (4) of that treaty. That is all the more so given that, if the arbitral tribunal concerned were one of the courts of a Contracting Party to that treaty, it would be included amongst the courts referred to in Article 26(2)(a) ECT and thus Article 26(2)(c) ECT would lose any effectiveness.
That characteristic of such an arbitral tribunal means that it cannot, in any event, be classified as a court or tribunal "of a Member State" within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU, and is not therefore entitled to make a reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling (see, by analogy, judgment of 6 March 2018, Achmea, C-284/16, EU:C:2018:158, paragraphs 46 and 49).
It is true that, in relation to commercial arbitration, the Court has held that the requirements of efficient arbitration proceedings justify the review of arbitral awards by the courts of the Member States being limited in scope, provided that the fundamental provisions of EU law can be examined in the course of that review and they can, if necessary, be the subject of a reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling (judgment of 6 March 2018, Achmea, C-284/16, EU:C:2018:158, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).
However, arbitration proceedings such as those referred to in Article 26 ECT are different from commercial arbitration proceedings. While the latter originate in the freely expressed wishes of the parties concerned, the former derives from a treaty whereby, in accordance with Article 26(3)(a) ECT, Member States agree to remove from the jurisdiction of their own courts and, hence, from the system of judicial remedies which the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU requires them to establish in the fields covered by EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C-64/16, EU:C:2018:117, paragraph 34), disputes which may concern the application or interpretation of that law. In those circumstances, the considerations set out in the preceding paragraph relating to commercial arbitration do not apply to arbitration proceedings such as those referred to in Article 26(2(c) ECT (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 March 2018, Achmea, C-284/16, EU:C:2018:158, paragraph 55).
Having regard to all the characteristics of the arbitral tribunal set out in paragraphs 48 to 59 of the present judgment, it must be considered that, if the provisions of Article 26 ECT allowing such a tribunal to be entrusted with the resolution of a dispute were to apply as between an investor of one Member State and another Member State, it would mean that, by concluding the ECT, the European Union and the Member States which are parties to it established a mechanism for settling such a dispute that could exclude the possibility that that dispute, notwithstanding the fact that it concerns the interpretation or application of EU law, would be resolved in a manner that guarantees the full effectiveness of that law (see, by analogy, judgment of 6 March 2018, Achmea, C-284/16, EU:C:2018:158, paragraph 56).
It is true that, according to settled case-law of the Court, an international agreement providing for the establishment of a court responsible for the interpretation of its provisions and whose decisions are binding on the EU institutions, including the Court of Justice of the European Union, is not in principle incompatible with EU law. The competence of the European Union in the field of international relations and its capacity to conclude international agreements necessarily entail the power to submit to the decisions of a court which is created or designated by such agreements as regards the interpretation and application of their provisions, provided that the autonomy of the European Union and its legal order is respected (judgment of 6 March 2018, Achmea, C-284/16, EU:C:2018:158, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).
Such a possibility would, as the Court held in the case giving rise to the judgment of 6 March 2018, Achmea (C-284/16, EU:C:2018:158, paragraph 58) and as the Advocate General observed in essence in point 83 of his Opinion, call into question the preservation of the autonomy and of the particular nature of the law established by the Treaties, ensured in particular by the preliminary ruling procedure provided for in Article 267 TFEU.
It should be noted in that regard that, despite the multilateral nature of the international agreement of which it forms part, a provision such as Article 26 ECT is intended, in reality, to govern bilateral relations between two of the Contracting Parties, in an analogous way to the provision of the bilateral investment treaty at issue in the case giving rise to the judgment of 6 March 2018, Achmea (C-284/16, EU:C:2018:158, paragraph 58).
As regards the first condition, it must be observed that this is satisfied in the present case. A claim arising from a contract for the supply of electricity constitutes an asset held directly by an investor, it being specified that the term "investor", defined in Article 1(7) ECT and used in particular in Article 26(1) ECT, designates, inter alia, as regards a Contracting Party such as Ukraine, any undertaking organised in accordance with the legislation applicable in the territory of that Contracting Party. Consequently, Komstroy must be regarded as an investor that directly owns an asset in the form of a claim arising from a contract for the supply of electricity. It should be stated in that regard that the fact that Komstroy acquired the claim from an undertaking of a third State to the ECT cannot call into question its status as an "investor", within the meaning of the ECT, since, as the Advocate General observed in point 138 of his Opinion, an investment may, by virtue of Article 1(7) ECT, be made by an economic operator of a third State to the ECT.
As regards the second condition, it must be held that a debt arising under a contract for the supply of electricity could in principle fall within the scope of both point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 1(6) ECT and point (f) of the first subparagraph of Article 1(6) ECT.
As regards, first, point (f) of the first subparagraph of Article 1(6) ECT, "investment" within the meaning of that provision includes "any right conferred by … contract … to undertake any economic activity in the energy sector". A claim may be regarded as a "right conferred by … contract". However, as the Advocate General noted, in essence, in point 122 of his Opinion, a claim arising from a mere contract for the sale of electricity cannot, in itself, be regarded as having been granted in order to undertake an economic activity in the energy sector.
As regards, secondly, point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 1(6) ECT, that provision states that the concept of "investment" includes "claims to money and claims to performance pursuant to [a] contract having an economic value and associated with an investment". It must therefore be ascertained whether a claim arising from a contract for the supply of electricity can amount to such a claim.
In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question referred is that Article 1(6) and Article 26(1) ECT must be interpreted as meaning that the acquisition, by an undertaking of a Contracting Party to that treaty, of a claim arising from a contract for the supply of electricity, which is not connected with an investment, held by an undertaking of a third State against a public undertaking of another Contracting Party to that treaty, does not constitute an "investment" within the meaning of those provisions.
On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby rules:
Article 1(6) and Article 26(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty, signed at Lisbon on 17 December 1994, approved on behalf of the European Communities by Council and Commission Decision 98/181/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 23 September 1997, must be interpreted as meaning that the acquisition, by an undertaking of a Contracting Party to that treaty, of a claim arising from a contract for the supply of electricity, which is not connected with an investment, held by an undertaking of a third State against a public undertaking of another Contracting Party to that treaty, does not constitute an "investment" within the meaning of those provisions.
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