In order to found the jurisdiction of the Court, the Application relied on the declarations made by the two Parties accepting the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court.
Cameroon duly filed such a statement within the time-limit so prescribed, and the case became ready for hearing in respect of the preliminary objections.
By an Order of 30 June 1999 the Court declared Nigeria’s counter-claims admissible, decided that Cameroon should submit a Reply and Nigeria a Rejoinder and fixed 4 April 2000 and 4 January 2001 respectively as the timelimits for the filing of these two pleadings. In its Order the Court also reserved the right of Cameroon to present its views in writing a second time on the Nigerian counter-claims in an additional pleading which might be the subject of a subsequent Order.
The Reply and the Rejoinder were duly filed within the time-limits so fixed.
In accordance with the provisions of Article 83 of the Rules of Court, the Application for permission to intervene by Equatorial Guinea was immediately communicated to Cameroon and to Nigeria, and the Court fixed 16 August 1999 as the time-limit for the filing of written observations by those States. Each of the two States filed its observations within the time-limit so fixed, and those observations were transmitted to the opposing Party and to Equatorial Guinea. On 3 September 1999 the Agent of Equatorial Guinea informed the Court of the views of his Government on the observations made by the Parties; Equatorial Guinea noted that neither of the two Parties had objected in principle to the intervention, and it expressed the view that hearings were not necessary to decide whether the Application for permission to intervene should be granted.
By an Order of 21 October 1999 the Court, considering that Equatorial Guinea had sufficiently established that it had an interest of a legal nature which could be affected by any judgment which the Court might hand down for the purpose of determining the maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, authorized it to intervene in the case to the extent, in the manner and for the purposes set out in its Application. The Court further fixed the following time-limits for the filing of the written statement and the written observations referred to in Article 85, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court: 4 April 2001 for the written statement of Equatorial Guinea and 4 July 2001 for the written observations of Cameroon and of Nigeria on that statement.
The written statement of Equatorial Guinea and the written observations of the Parties were duly filed within the time-limits so fixed.
Cameroon duly filed the additional pleading within the time-limit so fixed, and the case became ready for hearing.
For Cameroon: H.E. Mr. Amadou Ali,
Mr. Maurice Kamto,
Mr. Alain Pellet,
Mr. Peter Y. Ntamark,
Mr. Malcolm N. Shaw,
Mr. Bruno Simma,
Mr. Jean-Pierre Cot,
Mr. Daniel Khan,
Mr. Joseph-Marie Bipoun Woum,
Mr. Michel Aurillac,
Mr. Christian Tomuschat,
Mr. Maurice Mendelson,
Mr. Jean-Marc Thouvenin,
Mr. Olivier Corten,
Sir Ian Sinclair.
For Nigeria: H.E. the Honourable Musa E. Abdullahi,
Mrs. Nella Andem-Ewa,
Sir Arthur Watts,
Mr. Ian Brownlie,
Mr. Georges Abi-Saab,
Alhaji Abdullahi Ibrahim,
Mr. Alastair Macdonald,
Mr. James Crawford,
Mr. Richard Akinjide.
For Equatorial Guinea: H.E. Mr. Ricardo Mangue Obama N’Fube,
Mr. David A. Colson,
Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy.
At the hearings questions were put by Members of the Court, to which replies were given orally and in writing. Each Party submitted its written comments, in accordance with Article 72 of the Rules of Court, on the other’s written replies.
"On the basis of the foregoing statement of facts and legal grounds, the Republic of Cameroon, while reserving for itself the right to complement, amend or modify the present Application in the course of the proceedings and to submit to the Court a request for the indication of provisional measures should they prove to be necessary, asks the Court to adjudge and declare:
(a) that sovereignty over the Peninsula of Bakassi is Cameroonian, by virtue of international law, and that that Peninsula is an integral part of the territory of Cameroon;
(b) that the Federal Republic of Nigeria has violated and is violating the fundamental principle of respect for frontiers inherited from colonization (uti possidetis juris) ;
(c) that by using force against the Republic of Cameroon, the Federal Republic of Nigeria has violated and is violating its obligations under international treaty law and customary law;
(d) that the Federal Republic of Nigeria, by militarily occupying the Cameroonian Peninsula of Bakassi, has violated and is violating the obligations incumbent upon it by virtue of treaty law and customary law;
(e) that in view of these breaches of legal obligation, mentioned above, the Federal Republic of Nigeria has the express duty of putting an end to its military presence in Cameroonian territory, and effecting an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of its troops from the Cameroonian Peninsula of Bakassi;
(e') that the internationally unlawful acts referred to under (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) above involve the responsibility of the Federal Republic of Nigeria;
(e") that, consequently, and on account of the material and non-material damage inflicted upon the Republic of Cameroon, reparation in an amount to be determined by the Court is due from the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the Republic of Cameroon, which reserves the introduction before the Court of [proceedings for] a precise assessment of the damage caused by the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
(f) In order to prevent any dispute arising between the two States concerning their maritime boundary, the Republic of Cameroon requests the Court to proceed to prolong the course of its maritime boundary with the Federal Republic of Nigeria up to the limit of the maritime zones which international law places under their respective jurisdictions."
In its Additional Application, Cameroon made the following requests:
"On the basis of the foregoing statement of facts and legal grounds, and subject to the reservations expressed in paragraph 20 of its Application of 29 March 1994, the Republic of Cameroon asks the Court to adjudge and declare:
(a) that sovereignty over the disputed parcel in the area of Lake Chad is Cameroonian, by virtue of international law, and that that parcel is an integral part of the territory of Cameroon;
(b) that the Federal Republic of Nigeria has violated and is violating the fundamental principle of respect for frontiers inherited from colonization (uti possidetis juris), and its recent legal commitments concerning the demarcation of frontiers in Lake Chad;
(c) that the Federal Republic of Nigeria, by occupying, with the support of its security forces, parcels of Cameroonian territory in the area of Lake Chad, has violated and is violating its obligations under treaty law and customary law;
(d) that in view of these legal obligations, mentioned above, the Federal Republic of Nigeria has the express duty of effecting an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of its troops from Cameroonian territory in the area of Lake Chad;
(e) that the internationally unlawful acts referred to under (a), (b), (c) and (d) above involve the responsibility of the Federal Republic of Nigeria;
(e') that consequently, and on account of the material and non-material damage inflicted upon the Republic of Cameroon, reparation in an amount to be determined by the Court is due from the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the Republic of Cameroon, which reserves the introduction before the Court of [proceedings for] a precise assessment of the damage caused by the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
(f) That in view of the repeated incursions of Nigerian groups and armed forces into Cameroonian territory, all along the frontier between the two countries, the consequent grave and repeated incidents, and the vacillating and contradictory attitude of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in regard to the legal instruments defining the frontier between the two countries and the exact course of that frontier, the Republic of Cameroon respectfully asks the Court to specify definitively the frontier between Cameroon and the Federal Republic of Nigeria from Lake Chad to the sea."
On behalf of the Government of Cameroon,
in the Memorial:
"The Republic of Cameroon has the honour to request that the Court be pleased to adjudge and declare:
(a) That the lake and land boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria takes the following course:
— from the point at longitude 14° 04'59" 9999 E of Greenwich and latitude 13° 05'00"0001 N, it then runs through the point located at longitude 14°12'11"7E and latitude 12°32'17"4N;
— thence it follows the course fixed by the Franco-British Declaration of 10 July 1919, as specified in paragraphs 3 to 60 of the Thomson/Marchand Declaration, confirmed by the Exchange of Letters of 9 January 1931, as far as the ‘very prominent peak’ described in the latter provision and called by the usual name of ‘Mount Kombon’;
— from Mount Kombon the boundary then runs to ‘Pillar 64’ mentioned in paragraph 12 of the Anglo-German Agreement of Obokum of 12 April 1913 and follows, in that sector, the course described in Section 6 (1) of the British Nigeria (Protectorate and Cameroons) Order in Council of 2 August 1946;
— from Pillar 64 it follows the course described in paragraphs 13 to 21 of the Obokum Agreement of 12 April 1913 as far as Pillar 114 on the Cross River;
— thence, as far as the intersection of the straight line joining Bakassi Point to King Point and the centre of the navigable channel of the Akwayafe, the boundary is determined by paragraphs 16 to 21 of the Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913.
(b) That in consequence, inter alia, sovereignty over the Peninsula of Bakassi and over the disputed parcel occupied by Nigeria in the area of Lake Chad, in particular over Darak and its region, is Cameroonian.
(c) That the boundary of the maritime zones appertaining respectively to the Republic of Cameroon and to the Federal Republic of Nigeria follows the following course:
— from the intersection of the straight line joining Bakassi Point to King Point and the centre of the navigable channel of the Akwayafe to ‘point 12’, that boundary is determined by the ‘compromise line’ entered on British Admiralty Chart No. 3343 by the Heads of State of the two countries on 4 April 1971 (Yaounde Declaration) and, from that ‘point 12’ to ‘point G’, by the Declaration signed at Maroua on 1 June 1975;
— from point G that boundary then swings south-westward in the direction which is indicated by points G, H, I, J and K represented on the sketch-map on page 556 of this Memorial and meets the requirement for an equitable solution, up to the outer limit of the maritime zones which international law places under the respective jurisdictions of the two Parties.
(d) That by contesting the courses of the boundary defined above under (a) and (c), the Federal Republic of Nigeria has violated and is violating the fundamental principle of respect for frontiers inherited from colonization (uti possidetis juris) and its legal commitments concerning the demarcation of frontiers in Lake Chad and land and maritime delimitation.
(e) That by using force against the Republic of Cameroon and, in particular, by militarily occupying parcels of Cameroonian territory in the area of Lake Chad and the Cameroonian Peninsula of Bakassi, and by making repeated incursions, both civilian and military, all along the boundary between the two countries, the Federal Republic of Nigeria has violated and is violating its obligations under international treaty law and customary law.
(f) That the Federal Republic of Nigeria has the express duty of putting an end to its civilian and military presence in Cameroonian territory and, in particular, of effecting an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of its troops from the occupied area of Lake Chad and from the Cameroonian Peninsula of Bakassi and of refraining from such acts in the future;
(g) That the internationally wrongful acts referred to above and described in detail in the body of this Memorial involve the responsibility of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
(h) That, consequently, and on account of the material and non-material damage inflicted upon the Republic of Cameroon, reparation in a form to be determined by the Court is due from the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the Republic of Cameroon.
The Republic of Cameroon further has the honour to request the Court to permit it to present an assessment of the amount of compensation due to it as reparation for the damage it has suffered as a result of the internationally wrongful acts attributable to the Federal Republic of Nigeria, at a subsequent stage of the proceedings.
These submissions are lodged subject to any points of fact and law and any evidence that may subsequently be lodged; the Republic of Cameroon reserves the right to complete or amend them, as necessary, in accordance with the Statute and the Rules of Court."
in the Reply:
"The Republic of Cameroon has the honour to request that the Court be pleased to adjudge and declare:
(a) That the land boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria takes the following course:
— from the point at longitude 14° 04'59" 9999 east of Greenwich and latitude 13° 05'00" 0001 north, it then runs through the point located at longitude 14° 12'11" 7005 east and latitude 12° 32' 17" 4013 north, in accordance with the Franco-British Declaration of 10 July 1919 and the Thomson-Marchand Declaration of 29 December 1929 and 31 January 1930, confirmed by the Exchange of Letters of 9 January 1931,
— thence it follows the course fixed by these instruments as far as the ‘very prominent peak’ described in paragraph 60 of the Thomson-Marchand Declaration and called by the usual name of ‘Mount Kombon’;
— from ‘Mount Kombon’ the boundary then runs to ‘Pillar 64’ mentioned in paragraph 12 of the Anglo-German Agreement of Obokum of 12 April 1913 and follows, in that sector, the course described in Section 6 (1) of the British Nigeria (Protectorate and Cameroons) Order in Council of 2 August 1946;
— from Pillar 64 it follows the course described in paragraphs 13 to 21 of the Obokum Agreement of 12 April 1913 as far as Pillar 114 on the Cross River;
— thence, as far as the intersection of the straight line joining Bakassi Point to King Point and the centre of the navigable channel of the Akwayafe, the boundary is determined by paragraphs 16 to 21 of the Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913.
(b) That, in consequence, inter alia, sovereignty over the Peninsula of Bakassi and over the disputed parcel occupied by Nigeria in the area of Lake Chad, in particular over Darak and its region, is Cameroonian.
(c) That the boundary of the maritime zones appertaining respectively to the Republic of Cameroon and to the Federal Republic of Nigeria follows the following course:
— from the intersection of the straight line joining Bakassi Point to King Point and the centre of the navigable channel of the Akwayafe to ‘point 12’, that boundary is determined by the ‘compromise line’ entered on British Admiralty Chart No. 3433 by the Heads of State of the two countries on 4 April 1971 (Yaounde Declaration) and, from that ‘point 12’ to ‘point G’, by the Declaration signed at Maroua on 1 June 1975;
— from point G that boundary then swings south-westward in the direction which is indicated by Points G, H with co-ordinates 8° 21' 16" east and 4° 17'00" north, I (7° 55'40" east and 3° 46'00" north), J (7° 12'08" east and 3° 12'35" north) and K (6° 45’22" east and 3°01'05" north), represented on the sketch-map R 21 on page 411 of this Reply and which meets the requirement for an equitable solution, up to the outer limit of the maritime zones which international law places under the respective jurisdictions of the two Parties.
(d) That in attempting to modify unilaterally and by force the courses of the boundary defined above under (a) and 'c), the Federal Republic of Nigeria has violated and is violating the fundamental principle of respect for frontiers inherited from colonization (uti possidetis juris) and its legal commitments concerning land and maritime delimitation.
(e) That by using force against the Republic of Cameroon and, in particular, by militarily occupying parcels of Cameroonian territory in the area of Lake Chad and the Cameroonian Peninsula of Bakassi, and by making repeated incursions, both civilian and military, all along the boundary between the two countries, the Federal Republic of Nigeria has violated and is violating its obligations under international treaty law and customary law.
(f) That the Federal Republic of Nigeria has the express duty of putting an end to its civilian and military presence in Cameroonian territory and, in particular, of effecting an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of its troops from the occupied area of Lake Chad and from the Cameroonian Peninsula of Bakassi and of refraining from such acts in the future.
(g) That the internationally wrongful acts referred to above and described in detail in the Memorial of the Republic of Cameroon and in the present Reply engage the responsibility of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
(h) That, consequently, and on account of the material and non-material damage inflicted upon the Republic of Cameroon, reparation in a form to be determined by the Court is due from the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the Republic of Cameroon.
The Republic of Cameroon further has the honour to request the Court to permit it to present an assessment of the amount of compensation due to it as reparation for the damage it has suffered as a result of the internationally wrongful acts attributable to the Federal Republic of Nigeria, at a subsequent stage of the proceedings.
The Republic of Cameroon also asks the Court to declare that the counter-claims of the Federal Republic of Nigeria are unfounded both in fact and in law, and to reject them.
These submissions are lodged subject to any points of fact and law and any evidence that may subsequently be lodged; the Republic of Cameroon reserves the right to supplement or amend them, as necessary, in accordance with the Statute and the Rules of Court."
in the additional pleading entitled "Observations of Cameroon by Way of Rejoinder":
"The Republic of Cameroon has the honour to request that it may please the International Court of Justice to adjudge and declare that the counter-claims of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which appear to be inadmissible in light of the arguments put forward in the Rejoinder, in any event have no basis in fact or in law, and to reject them."
On behalf of the Government of Nigeria,
in the Counter-Memorial:
"For the reasons given herein, the Federal Republic of Nigeria, reserving the right to amend and modify these submissions in the light of the further pleadings in this case, respectfully requests that the Court should:
(1) as a preliminary matter decide to deal with the issues relating to the land boundary;
(2) as to Lake Chad, adjudge and declare:
— that sovereignty over the areas in Lake Chad defined in Chapter 14 of this Counter-Memorial (including the Nigerian settlements identified in paragraph 14.5 hereof) is vested in the Federal Republic of Nigeria;
— that the proposed ‘demarcation’ under the auspices of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, not having been ratified by Nigeria, is not binding upon it;
— that outstanding issues of the delimitation and demarcation within the area of Lake Chad are to be resolved by the Parties to the Lake Chad Basin Commission within the framework of the constitution and procedures of the Commission;
(3) as to the central sectors of the land boundary:
— acknowledging that the Parties recognize that the boundary between the mouth of the Ebeji River and the point on the thalweg of the Akpa Yafe which is opposite the mid-point of the mouth of Archibong Creek is delimited by the following instruments:
(a) paragraphs 3-60 of the Thomson/Marchand Declaration, confirmed by the Exchange of Letters of 9 January 1931,
(b) the Nigeria (Protectorate and Cameroons) Order in Council of 2 August 1946, section 6(1) and the Second Schedule thereto,
(c) paragraphs 13-21 of the Anglo-German Demarcation Agreement of 12 April 1913,
(d) Articles XV-XVI1 of the Anglo-German Treaty of 11 March 1913; and
— acknowledging further that uncertainties as to the interpretation and application of these instruments, and established local agreements in certain areas, mean that the actual course of the boundary cannot be definitively specified merely by reference to those instruments;
affirm that the instruments mentioned above are binding on the Parties (unless lawfully varied by them) as to the course of the land boundary;
(4) as to the Bakassi Peninsula, adjudge and declare:
— that sovereignty over the Peninsula (as defined in Chapter 11 hereof) is vested in the Federal Republic of Nigeria;
(5) as to the maritime boundary, adjudge and declare:
(a) that the Court lacks jurisdiction to deal with Cameroon’s claimline, to the extent that it impinges on areas claimed by Equatorial Guinea and/or Sao Tome e Principe (which areas are provisionally identified in Figure 20.3 herein), or alternatively that Cameroon’s claim is inadmissible to that extent; and
(b) that the Parties are under an obligation, pursuant to Articles 76 and 83 of the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, to negotiate in good faith with a view to agreeing on an equitable delimitation of their respective maritime zones, such delimitation to take into account, in particular, the need to respect existing rights to explore and exploit the mineral resources of the continental shelf, granted by either Party prior to 29 March 1994 without written protest from the other, and the need to respect the reasonable maritime claims of third States;
(6) a.s to Cameroon’s claims of State responsibility, adjudge and declare that those claims are unfounded in fact and law; and
(7) as to Nigeria’s counter-claims as specified in Part VI of this Counter-Memorial, adjudge and declare that Cameroon bears responsibility to Nigeria in respect of those claims, the amount of reparation due therefor, if not agreed between the Parties within six months of the date of judgment, to be determined by the Court in a further judgment."
in the Rejoinder:
"For the reasons given herein, the Federal Republic of Nigeria, reserving the right to amend and modify these submissions in the light of any further pleadings in this case, respectfully requests that the Court should:
(1) as to the Bakassi Peninsula, adjudge and declare:
(a) that sovereignty over the Peninsula is vested in the Federal Republic of Nigeria;
(b) that Nigeria’s sovereignty over Bakassi extends up to the boundary with Cameroon described in Chapter 11 of Nigeria’s CounterMemorial ;
(2) as to Lake Chad, adjudge and declare:
(a) that the proposed ‘demarcation’ under the auspices of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, not having been ratified by Nigeria, is not binding upon it;
(b) that sovereignty over the areas in Lake Chad defined in paragraph 5.9 of this Rejoinder and depicted in Figs. 5.2 and 5.3 facing page 242 (and including the Nigerian settlements identified in paragraph 4.1 of this Rejoinder) is vested in the Federal Republic of Nigeria;
(c) that outstanding issues of the delimitation and demarcation within the area of Lake Chad are to be resolved by the parties to the Lake Chad Basin Commission within the framework of the constitution and procedures of the Commission;
(d) that in any event, the operation intended to lead to an overall delimitation of boundaries on Lake Chad is legally without prejudice to the title to particular areas of the Lake Chad region inhering in Nigeria as a consequence of the historical consolidation of title and the acquiescence of Cameroon;
(3) as to the central sectors of the land boundary, adjudge and declare:
(a) that the Court’s jurisdiction extends to the definitive specification of the land boundary between Lake Chad and the sea;
(b) that the mouth of the Ebeji, marking the beginning of the land boundary, is located at the point where the north-east channel of the Ebeji flows into the feature marked ‘Pond’ on the Map shown as Fig. 7.1 of this Rejoinder, which location is at latitude 12°31'45"N, longitude 14° 13'00"E (Adindan Datum);
(c) that subject to the clarifications, interpretations and variations explained in Chapter 7 of this Rejoinder, the land boundary between the mouth of the Ebeji and the point on the thalweg of the Akpa Yafe which is opposite the mid-point of the mouth of Archibong Creek is delimited by the terms of:,
(i) paragraphs 2-61 of the Thomson-Marchand Declaration, confirmed by the Exchange of Letters of 9 January 1931;
(ii) the Nigeria (Protectorate and Cameroons) Order in Council of 2 August 1946, section 6 (1) and the Second Schedule thereto;
(iii) paragraphs 13-21 of the Anglo-Gerinan Demarcation Agreement of 12 April 1913; and
(iv) Articles XV to XVII of the Anglo-German Treaty of 11 March 1913;
(d) that the effect of the first two of those instruments, as clarified, interpreted or varied in the manner identified by Nigeria, is as set out in the Appendix to Chapter 8 and delineated in the maps in the Atlas submitted with this Rejoinder;
(4) as to the maritime boundary, adjudge and declare:
(a) that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Cameroon’s maritime claim from the point at which its claim line enters waters claimed by or recognized by Nigeria as belonging to Equatorial Guinea, or alternatively that Cameroon’s claim is inadmissible to that extent;
(b) that Cameroon’s claim to a maritime boundary based on the global division of maritime zones in the Gulf of Guinea is inadmissible, and that the Parties are under an obligation, pursuant to Articles 74 and 83 of the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, to negotiate in good faith with a view to agreeing on an equitable delimitation of their respective maritime zones, such delimitation to take into account, in particular, the need to respect existing rights to explore and exploit the mineral resources of the continental shelf, granted by either Party prior to 29 March 1994 without written protest from the other, and the need to respect the reasonable maritime claims of third States;
(c) in the alternative, that Cameroon’s claim to a maritime boundary based on the global division of maritime zones in the Gulf of Guinea is unfounded in law and is rejected;
(d) that, to the extent that Cameroon’s claim to a maritime boundary may be held admissible in the present proceedings, Cameroon’s claim to a maritime boundary to the west and south of the area of overlapping licences, as shown on Fig. 10.2 of this Rejoinder, is rejected;
(e) that the respective territorial waters of the two States are divided by a median line boundary within the Rio del Rey;
(f) that, beyond the Rio del Rey, the respective maritime zones of the Parties are to be delimited in accordance with the principle of equidistance, to the point where the line so drawn meets the median line boundary with Equatorial Guinea at approximately 4°6'N, 8°30'E;
(5) as to Cameroon’s claims of State responsibility, adjudge and declare:
that, to the extent to which any such claims are still maintained by Cameroon, and are admissible, those claims are unfounded in fact and law; and
(6) as to Nigeria's counter-claims, as specified in Part VI of the Counter-Memorial and in Chapter 18 of this Rejoinder, adjudge and declare:
that Cameroon bears responsibility to Nigeria in respect of each of those claims, the amount of reparation due therefor, if not agreed between the Parties within six months of the date of judgment, to be determined by the Court in a further judgment."
On behalf of the Government of Cameroon,
"Pursuant to the provisions of Article 60, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court the Republic of Cameroon has the honour to request that the International Court of Justice be pleased to adjudge and declare:
(a) That the land boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria takes the following course:
— from the point designated by the co-ordinates 13° 05' north and 14° 05' east, the boundary follows a straight line as far as the mouth of the Ebeji, situated at the point located at the co-ordinates 12° 32' 17" north and 14° 12' 12" east, as defined within the framework of the LCBC and constituting an authoritative interpretation of the Milner-Simon Declaration of 10 July 1919 and the Thomson-Marchand Declarations of 29 December 1929 and 31 January 1930, as confirmed by the Exchange of Letters of 9 January 1931; in the alternative, the mouth of the Ebeji is situated at the point located at the co-ordinates 12° 31' 12" north and 14°11'48"east;
— from that point it follows the course fixed by those instruments as far as the ‘very prominent peak’ described in paragraph 60 of the Thomson-Marchand Declaration and called by the usual name of ‘Mount Kombon’;
— from ‘Mount Kombon’ the boundary then runs to ‘Pillar 64’ mentioned in paragraph 12 of the Anglo-German Agreement of Obokum of 12 April 1913 and follows, in that sector, the course described in Section 6 (1) of the British Nigeria (Protectorate and Cameroons) Order in Council of 2 August 1946;
— from Pillar 64 it follows the course described in paragraphs 13 to 21 of the Obokum Agreement of 12 April 1913 as far as Pillar 114 on the Cross River;
— thence, as far as the intersection of the straight line from Bakassi Point to King Point with the centre of the navigable channel of the Akwayafe, the boundary is determined by paragraphs XVI to XXI of the Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913.
(b) That in consequence, inter alia, sovereignty over the peninsula of Bakassi and over the disputed parcel occupied by Nigeria in the area of Lake Chad, in particular over Darak and its region, is Cameroonian.
(c) That the boundary of the maritime areas appertaining respectively to the Republic of Cameroon and to the Federal Republic of Nigeria takes the following course:
— from the intersection of the straight line from Bakassi Point to King Point with the centre of the navigable channel of the Akwayafe to point ‘12’, that boundary is confirmed by the ‘compromise line’ entered on British Admiralty Chart No. 3433 by the Heads of State of the two countries on 4 April 1971 (Yaounde II Declaration) and, from that point 12 to point ‘G’, by the Declaration signed at Maroua on 1 June 1975;
— from point G the equitable line follows the direction indicated by points G, H (co-ordinates 8° 21'16" east and 4° 17' north), I (7° 55'40" east and 3°46'north), J (7° 12'08" east and 3°12'35" north), K (6° 45'22' east and 3° 01'05" north), and continues from K up to the outer limit of the maritime zones which international law places under the respective jurisdiction of the two Parties.
(d) That in attempting to modify unilaterally and by force the courses of the boundary defined above under (a) and (c), the Federal Republic of Nigeria has violated and is violating the fundamental principle of respect for frontiers inherited from colonization (uti possidetis juris), as well as its legal obligations concerning the land and maritime delimitation.
(e) That by using force against the Republic of Cameroon and, in particular, by militarily occupying parcels of Cameroonian territory in the area of Lake Chad and the Cameroonian peninsula of Bakassi, and by making repeated incursions throughout the length of the boundary between the two countries, the Federal Republic of Nigeria has violated and is violating its obligations under international treaty law and customary law.
(f) That the Federal Republic of Nigeria has the express duty of putting an end to its administrative and military presence in Cameroonian territory and, in particular, of effecting an immediate and unconditional evacuation of its troops from the occupied area of Lake Chad and from the Cameroonian peninsula of Bakassi and of refraining from such acts in the future.
(g) That in failing to comply with the Order for the indication of provisional measures rendered by the Court on 15 March 1996 the Federal Republic of Nigeria has been in breach of its international obligations.
(h) That the internationally wrongful acts referred to above and described in detail in the written pleadings and oral argument of the Republic of Cameroon engage the responsibility of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
(i) That, consequently, on account of the material and moral injury suffered by the Republic of Cameroon reparation in a form to be determined by the Court is due from the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the Republic of Cameroon.
The Republic of Cameroon further has the honour to request the Court to permit it, at a subsequent stage of the proceedings, to present an assessment of the amount of compensation due to it as reparation for the injury suffered by it as a result of the internationally wrongful acts attributable to the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
The Republic of Cameroon also asks the Court to declare that the counter-claims of the Federal Republic of Nigeria are unfounded both in fact and in law, and to reject them."
On behalf of the Government of Nigeria,
"The Federal Republic of Nigeria respectfully requests that the Court should
1. as to the Bakassi Peninsula, adjudge and declare:
(a) that sovereignty over the Peninsula is vested in the Federal Republic of Nigeria;
(b) that Nigeria’s sovereignty over Bakassi extends up to the boundary with Cameroon described in Chapter 11 of Nigeria’s CounterMemorial ;
2. as to Lake Chad, adjudge and declare:
(a) that the proposed delimitation and demarcation under the auspices of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, not having been accepted by Nigeria, is not binding upon it;
(b) that sovereignty over the areas in Lake Chad defined in paragraph 5.9 of Nigeria’s Rejoinder and depicted in Figs. 5.2 and 5.3 facing page 242 (and including the Nigerian settlements identified in paragraph 4.1 of Nigeria’s Rejoinder) is vested in the Federal Republic of Nigeria;
(c) that in any event the process which has taken place within the framework of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, and which was intended to lead to an overall delimitation and demarcation of boundaries on Lake Chad, is legally without prejudice to the title to particular areas of the Lake Chad region inhering in Nigeria as a consequence of the historical consolidation of title and the acquiescence of Cameroon;
3. as to the central sectors of the land boundary, adjudge and declare:
(a) that the Court’s jurisdiction extends to the definitive specification of the land boundary between Lake Chad and the sea;
(b) that the mouth of the Ebeji, marking the beginning of the land boundary, is located at the point where the north-east channel of the Ebeji flows into the feature marked ‘Pond’ on the map shown as Fig. 7.1 of Nigeria’s Rejoinder, which location is at latitude 12° 31'45" N, longitude 14° 13'00"E (Adindan Datum);
(c) that subject to the interpretations proposed in Chapter 7 of Nigeria’s Rejoinder, the land boundary between the mouth of the Ebeji and the point on the thalweg of the Akpa Yafe which is opposite the midpoint of the mouth of Archibong Creek is delimited by the terms of the relevant boundary instruments, namely:
(i) paragraphs 2-61 of the Thomson-Marchand Declaration, confirmed by the Exchange of Letters of 9 January 1931;
(ii) the Nigeria (Protectorate and Cameroons) Order in Council of 2 August 1946 (Section 6 (1) and the Second Schedule thereto);
(iii) paragraphs 13-21 of the Anglo-German Demarcation Agreement of 12 April 1913; and
(iv) Articles XV to XVII of the Anglo-German Treaty of 11 M arch 1913; and
(d) that the interpretations proposed in Chapter 7 of Nigeria’s Rejoinder, and the associated action there identified in respect of each of the locations where the delimitation in the relevant boundary instruments is defective or uncertain, are confirmed;
4. as to the maritime boundary, adjudge and declare:
(a) that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Cameroon’s maritime claim from the point at which its claim line enters waters claimed against Cameroon by Equatorial Guinea, or alternatively that Cameroon’s claim is inadmissible to that extent;
(b) that Cameroon’s claim to a maritime boundary based on the global division of maritime zones in the Gulf of Guinea is inadmissible, and that the Parties are under an obligation, pursuant to Articles 74 and 83 of the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, to negotiate in good faith with a view to agreeing on an equitable delimitation of their respective maritime zones, such delimitation to take into account, in particular, the need to respect existing rights to explore and exploit the mineral resources of the continental shelf, granted by either Party prior to 29 March 1994 without written protest from the other, and the need to respect the reasonable maritime claims of third States;
(c) in the alternative, that Cameroon’s claim to a maritime boundary based on the global division of maritime zones in the Gulf of Guinea is unfounded in law and is rejected;
(d) that, to the extent that Cameroon’s claim to a maritime boundary may be held admissible in the present proceedings, Cameroon’s claim to a maritime boundary to the west and south of the area of overlapping licences, as shown in Fig. 10.2 of Nigeria’s Rejoinder, is rejected;
(e) that the respective territorial waters of the two States are divided by a median line boundary within the Rio del Rey;
(f) that, beyond the Rio del Rey, the respective maritime zones of the Parties are to be delimited by a line drawn in accordance with the principle of equidistance, until the approximate point where that line meets the median line boundary with Equatorial Guinea, i.e. at approximately 4° 6’ N, 8° 30’ E;
5. as to Cameroon's claims of State responsibility, adjudge and declare:
that, to the extent to which any such claims are still maintained by Cameroon, and are admissible, those claims are unfounded in fact and law; and,
6. as to Nigeria’s counter-claims as specified in Part VI of Nigeria’s Counter-Memorial and in Chapter 18 of Nigeria’s Rejoinder, adjudge and declare:
that Cameroon bears responsibility to Nigeria in respect of each of those claims, the amount of reparation due therefor, if not agreed between the Parties within six months of the date of judgment, to be determined by the Court in a further judgment."
"Equatorial Guinea’s request is simple and straightforward, founded in the jurisprudence of the Court, makes good sense in the practice of the international community and is consistent with the practice of the three States in the region concerned: its request is that the Court refrain from delimiting a maritime boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon in any area that is more proximate to Equatorial Guinea than to the Parties to the case before the Court. Equatorial Guinea believes it has presented a number of good reasons for the Court to adopt this position."
"[W]e ask the Court not to delimit a maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria in areas lying closer to Equatorial Guinea than to the coasts of the two Parties or to express any opinion which could prejudice our interests in the context of our maritime boundary negotiations with our neighbours... Safeguarding the interests of the third State in these proceedings means that the delimitation between Nigeria and Cameroon decided by the Court must necessarily remain to the north of the median line between Equatorial Guinea’s Bioko Island and the mainland."
Four States border Lake Chad: Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. The waters of the lake have varied greatly over time.
In its northern part, the land boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria passes through hot dry plains around Lake Chad, at an altitude of about 300 m. It then passes through mountains, cultivated high ground or pastures, watered by various rivers and streams. It then descends in stages to areas of savannah and forest until it reaches the sea.
The coastal region where the southern part of the land boundary ends is the area of the Bakassi Peninsula. This peninsula, situated in the hollow of the Gulf of Guinea, is bounded by the River Akwayafe to the west and by the Rio del Rey to the east. It is an amphibious environment, characterized by an abundance of water, fish stocks and mangrove vegetation. The Gulf of Guinea, which is concave in character at the level of the Cameroonian and Nigerian coastlines, is bounded by other States, in particular by Equatorial Guinea, whose Bioko Island lies opposite the Parties’ coastlines.
The delimitation of the Parties’ maritime boundary is an issue of more recent origin, the history of which likewise involves various international instruments.
Pursuant to a decision taken by Great Britain on 2 August 1946 regarding the territories then under British mandate, namely the 1946 Order in Council Providing for the Administration of the Nigeria Protectorate and Cameroons (hereinafter the "1946 Order in Council"), the regions placed under its trusteeship were divided into two for administrative purposes, thus giving birth to the Northern Cameroons and the Southern Cameroons. The 1946 Order in Council contained a series of provisions describing the line separating these two regions and provided that they would be administered from Nigeria.
On 1 January 1960 the French Cameroons acceded to independence on the basis of the boundaries inherited from the previous period. Nigeria did likewise on 1 October 1960.
In accordance with United Nations directives, the British Government organized separate plebiscites in the Northern and Southern Cameroons, "in order to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants... concerning their future" (General Assembly resolution 1350 (XIII) of 13 March 1959). In those plebiscites, held on 11 and 12 February 1961, the population of the Northern Cameroons "decided to achieve independence by joining the independent Federation of Nigeria", whereas the population of the Southern Cameroons "decided to achieve independence by joining the independent Republic of Cameroon" (General Assembly resolution 1608 (XV) of 21 April 1961).
On 10 September 1884 Great Britain and the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar concluded a Treaty of Protection (hereinafter the "1884 Treaty"). Under this Treaty, Great Britain undertook to extend its protection to these Kings and Chiefs, who in turn agreed and promised inter alia to refrain from entering into any agreements or treaties with foreign nations or Powers without the prior approval of the British Government.
Shortly before the First World War, the British Government concluded two agreements with Germany, dated respectively 11 March and 12 April 1913 (see paragraph 33 above), whose objects included "the Settlement of the Frontier between Nigeria and the Cameroons, from Yola to the Sea" and which placed the Bakassi Peninsula in German territory.
In this regard, the two countries agreed to establish a "joint boundary commission", which on 14 August 1970, at the conclusion of a meeting held in Yaounde (Cameroon), adopted a declaration (hereinafter the "Yaounde I Declaration") whereby Cameroon and Nigeria decided that "the delimitation of the boundaries between the two countries [would] be carried out in three stages", the first of these being "the delimitation of the maritime boundary".
The work of that commission led to a second declaration, done at Yaounde on 4 April 1971 (hereinafter the "Yaounde II Declaration"), whereby the Heads of State of the two countries agreed to regard as their maritime boundary, "as far as the 3-nautical-mile limit", a line running from a point 1 to a point 12, which they had drawn and signed on British Admiralty Chart No. 3433 annexed to that declaration.
Four years later, on 1 June 1975, the Heads of State of Cameroon and Nigeria signed an agreement at Maroua (Cameroon) for the partial delimitation of the maritime boundary between the two States (hereinafter the "Maroua Declaration"). By this declaration they agreed to extend the line of their maritime boundary, and accordingly adopted a boundary line defined by a series of points running from point 12 as referred to above to a point designated as G. British Admiralty Chart No. 3433, marked up accordingly, was likewise annexed to that Declaration.
"from the point designated by the co-ordinates 13°05'N and 14°05'E, the boundary follows a straight line as far as the mouth of the Ebeji, situated at the point located at the co-ordinates 12°32'17"N and 14° 12'l2"E, as defined within the framework of the LCBC and constituting an authoritative interpretation of the Milner-Simon E>eclaration of 10 July 1919 and the Thomson-Marchand Declarations of 29 December 1929 and 31 January 1930, as confirmed by the Exchange of Letters of 9 January 1931; in the alternative, the mouth of the Ebeji is situated at the point located at the co-ordinates 12°31'l2"N and 14° 11'48"E".
In its final submissions, Nigeria, for its part, requests the Court to adjudge and declare:
"(a) that the proposed delimitation and demarcation under the auspices of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, not having been accepted by Nigeria, is not binding upon it;
(b) that sovereignty over the areas in Lake Chad defined in paragraph 5.9 of Nigeria’s Rejoinder and depicted in figs. 5.2 and 5.3 facing page 242 (and including the Nigerian settlements identified in paragraph 4.1 of Nigeria’s Rejoinder) is vested in the Federal Republic of Nigeria;
(c) that in any event the process which has taken place within the framework of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, and which was intended to lead to an overall delimitation and demarcation of boundaries on Lake Chad, is legally without prejudice to the title to particular areas of the Lake Chad region inhering in Nigeria as a consequence of the historical consolidation of title and the acquiescence of Cameroon".
Since Cameroon and Nigeria disagree on the existence of a definitive delimitation in the Lake Chad area, the Court will first examine whether the 1919 Declaration and the subsequent instruments which bear on delimitation in this area have established a frontier that is binding on the Parties. The Court will subsequently address the argument of Nigeria based on the historical consolidation of its claimed title.
According to Cameroon, the boundary line in Lake Chad was established by the Milner-Simon Declaration of 1919. Article 1 of the "Description of the Franco-British frontier, marked on the [Moisel] map of the Cameroons, scale 1/300,000", annexed to that Declaration, stated that the frontier would start "from the meeting-point of the three old British, French and German frontiers situated in Lake Chad in latitude 13°05'N and in approximately longitude 14°05'E of Greenwich" and that from there the frontier would be determined by "[a] straight line to the mouth of the Ebeji". The boundary line established by this Declaration was rendered more precise by the Thomson-Marchand Declaration of 1929-1930, the text of which was subsequently incorporated in the Henderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes of 1931. Accordingly, Cameroon claims that the boundary in Lake Chad was delimited by this latter instrument.
Cameroon contends that the line of the boundary was expressly incorporated in the Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Cameroon under French administration approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 13 December 1946 and was subsequently "transferred to Cameroon and Nigeria on independence by application of the principle of uti possidetis".
"has, in principle, recognized the international boundaries in Lake Chad that were established prior to its independence, and the matter of the determination of those lake frontiers had never been addressed prior to the border incidents that occurred in the Lake between Nigeria and Chad from April to June 1983".
Cameroon recalls that, following those incidents,
"the Heads of State of the Member countries of the LCBC approved a proposal aimed at the convening, at the earliest possible time, of a meeting of the Commission at ministerial level, with a view to setting up a joint technical committee to be entrusted with the delimitation of the international boundaries between the four States which between them share Lake Chad",
and that the LCBC accordingly held an Extraordinary Session from 21 to 23 July 1983 in Lagos at which two technical sub-committees were formed: "a sub-committee responsible for border delimitation and a subcommittee responsible for security". Cameroon further states that "[t]he terminology employed by the parties [was] imprecise in places, as happens in such circumstances", but that "an examination of the mandate given to the Commissioners and experts charged with the operation leaves no room for doubt": it was "confined to the demarcation of the boundary, to the exclusion of any delimitation operation".
As evidence of this Cameroon cites the fact that the sub-committee responsible for border delimitation retained as working documents various bilateral conventions and agreements concluded between Germany, France and the United Kingdom between 1906 and 1931, including the Henderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes of 1931. Cameroon points out that the delimitation instruments thus relied on "were never disputed by the representatives of Nigeria throughout the proceedings, even at the highest level, in particular during the summits of Heads of State and Government", that ‘"[t]he demarcation of boundaries in Lake Chad has been the subject of significant work over a good ten years" and that "[i]n this regard the riparian States of Lake Chad have co-operated at all levels: experts, Commissioners, Ministers, Heads of States — without the slightest reservation being raised as to the quality of work accomplished over a very substantial period". Cameroon emphasizes that, inter alia, the LCBC defined more precisely the co-ordinates of the tripoint in Lake Chad (which were fixed at 13° 05'00" 0001 latitude North and 14° 04'59"9999 longitude East) and also defined those of the mouth of the Ebeji, as described in the Henderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes (fixing them at 12° 32' 17"4 North and 14° 12' 11"7 East). It further states that those co-ordinates were approved by the national Commissioners of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria on 2 December 1988.
According to Cameroon, the overall validity of the demarcation works carried out under the auspices of the LCBC is to be addressed in the following terms:
"The demarcation operation proper was at certain points criticized by the Nigerian representatives. However, those representatives ultimately declared themselves satisfied with the accuracy of these operations. All the works were approved unanimously by the experts, the Commissioners and the Heads of State themselves. At no time did the Nigerian representatives call into question the conventional delimitation or the instruments which decided it. It was only at the ratification stage that Nigeria made its opposition known."
Cameroon contends that Nigeria’s refusal to ratify the result of the boundary demarcation work in Lake Chad in no way impugns the validity of the previous delimitation instruments; it simply demonstrates how far Nigeria has drawn back from the demarcation operation carried out by the LCBC.
According to Nigeria, the use in Article 1 of the "Description of the Franco-British frontier, marked on the [Moisel] map of the Cameroons, scale 1/300,000", annexed to the 1919 Milner-Simon Declaration, of the word "approximately", in relation to 14°05'E, together with the fact that the mouth of the Ebeji has shifted through time, meant that the frontier in this area was still not fully delimited. Subsequent instruments did not, according to Nigeria, rectify these shortcomings; and the absence of a fully delimited frontier was one of several reasons why there was no demarcation of the frontier agreed to until this very day.
France and Great Britain (see paragraph 33 above). After the First World War a strip of territory to the east of the western frontier of the former German Cameroon became the British Mandate over the Cameroons. It was thus necessary to re-establish a boundary, commencing in the lake itself, between the newly created British and French mandates. This was achieved through the Milner-Simon Declaration of 1919, which has the status of an international agreement. By this Declaration, France and Great Britain agreed:
"to determine the frontier, separating the territories of the Cameroons placed respectively under the authority of their Governments, as it is traced on the map Moisel 1:300,000, annexed to the present declaration and defined in the description in three articles also annexed hereto".
No definite tripoint in Lake Chad could be determined from previous instruments, on the basis of which it might be located either at 13°00' or at 13° 05' latitude north, whilst the meridian of longitude was described simply as situated "35' east of the centre of Kukawa". These aspects were clarified and rendered more precise by the Milner-Simon Declaration, which provided:
"The frontier will start from the meeting-point of the three old British, French and German frontiers situated in Lake Chad in latitude 13°05'N and in approximately longitude 14°05'E of Greenwich. Thence the frontier will be determined as follows:
1. A straight line to the mouth of the Ebeji;
…"
The Moisel 1: 300,000 map was stated to be the map "to which reference is made in the description of the frontier" and was annexed to the Declaration; a further map of the Cameroons, scale 1:2,000,000, was attached "to illustrate the description of the... frontier".
"The territory for which a Mandate is conferred upon His Britannic Majesty comprises that part of the Cameroons which lies to the west of the line laid down in the Declaration signed on the 10 July, 1919, of which a copy is annexed hereto.
This line may, however, be slightly modified by mutual agreement between His Britannic Majesty’s Government and the Government of the French Republic where an examination of the localities shows that it is undesirable, either in the interests of the inhabitants or by reason of any inaccuracies in the map, Moisel 1:300,000, annexed to the Declaration, to adhere strictly to the line laid down therein.
The delimitation on the spot of this line shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the said Declaration.
The final report of the Mixed Commission shall give the exact description of the boundary line as traced on the spot; maps signed by the Commissioners shall be annexed to the report …".
The Court observes that the entitlement, by mutual agreement, to make modest alterations to the line, either by reason of any shown inaccuracies of the Moisel map or of the interests of the inhabitants, was already provided for in the Milner-Simon Declaration. This, together with the line itself, was approved by the Council of the League of Nations. These provisions in no way suggest a frontier line that is not fully delimited. The Court further considers that "delimitation on the spot of this line... in accordance with the provisions of the said Declaration" is a clear reference to demarcation notwithstanding the terminology chosen. Also carried forward from the Milner-Simon Declaration was the idea of a boundary commission. The anticipated detailed demarcation by this Commission equally presupposes a frontier already regarded as essentially delimited.
This Declaration was approved and incorporated in the Henderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes of 1931 (see paragraph 34 above). As Fleuriau put it, the Declaration "is intended to describe the line to be followed by the Delimitation Commission, more exactly than was done in the Milner-Simon Declaration of 1919". The Court observes that this would facilitate the envisaged demarcation task given to the Commission. Fleuriau conceded that the Thomson-Marchand Declaration was "a preliminary survey only", thus implying that even more detail might one day be agreed between the parties. That the frontier was nonetheless in fact now specified in sufficient detail was affirmed by Henderson’s Note in reply to Fleuriau, stating that the line described in the 1929-1930 Declaration "[did] in substance define the frontier in question".
That this Declaration and Exchange of Notes were preliminary to the future task of demarcation by a boundary commission does not mean, as Nigeria claims, that the 1931 Agreement was merely "programmatic" in nature.
The Thomson-Marchand Declaration, as approved and incorporated in the Henderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes, has the status of an international agreement. The Court acknowledges that the Declaration does have some technical imperfections and that certain details remained to be specified. However, it finds that the Declaration provided for a delimitation that was sufficient in general for demarcation.
The Court observes that specific reference to the Thomson-Marchand Declaration of 1929-1930 and to the 1931 Henderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes was made in the Trusteeship Agreements for the territory of the Cameroons under British Administration, and for the territory of Cameroon under French Administration, each approved on 13 December 1946. Although the language of each is not entirely identical, they each take the boundary as being defined by the Milner-Simon Declaration "and determined more exactly" in the Thomson-Marchand Declaration, as incorporated in the Henderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes.
The Court notes that, whereas the Mandate had reserved to the two Mandatory Powers the right of joint minor modification, in the interests of the inhabitants or because of inaccuracies in the Moisel map attached to the Milner-Simon Declaration, under the Trusteeship Agreements that right was preserved only on the former ground. The implication is that any problems associated with inaccuracies of the Moisel 1:300,000 map were by 1946 regarded as having been resolved.
Moreover, the Court cannot fail to observe that Nigeria was consulted during the negotiations for its independence, and again during the plebiscites that were to determine the future of the populations of the Northern and Southern Cameroons (see paragraph 35 above). At no time did it suggest, either so far as the Lake Chad area was concerned, or elsewhere, that the frontiers there remained to be delimited.
It recalls that, as a consequence of incidents occurring in the Lake Chad area in 1983, the Heads of State of the member States of the LCBC had convened an extraordinary session of the Commission. The report of that session in 1983 indicates that there were two topics listed on the agenda: "border delimitation problems" and "security matters". This did not, however, signify an understanding by the members that the Commission’s work was to make proposals on a non-delimited frontier, as is shown by the report itself. All substantive aspects contained within it refer to these agenda items as "demarcation" and "security". Indeed, the generalized agenda for the first of the two Sub-Committees which was established was entitled "Agenda for the Committee on Demarcation". There was envisaged an exchange of information and relevant documents on the boundary (item 1) and the establishment of a Joint Demarcation Team (item 3). Equally, the agenda for the Committee on Security included an item on the security of the demarcation team.
The Court observes that the following year, in November 1984, the "Sub-Commission Responsible for the Demarcation of Borders" agreed to adopt, as working documents, the various bilateral agreements and instruments which had been concluded in the years 1906 to 1931 between Germany, France and the United Kingdom. These were identified as the Franco-British Convention of 1906; the Franco-German Convention of 1908; the Franco-British Protocol of 1910 and the Henderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes of 1931. The Sub-Commission also addressed the following matters: "the actual demarcation of the borders", "aerial photography of the area", "ground survey and mapping".
The report submitted in 1985 by the current Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the LCBC to the Fifth Conference of Heads of State clearly indicated that the "border problems" arose from the absence of "demarcation", and referred expressly to the "technical specifications for the border demarcation" drawn up by the Sub-Commission. The Sixth Conference of Heads of State, in 1987, took a decision on "Border Demarcation", whereby the member States agreed to "finance the cost of the demarcation exercise". That decision further provided that the work would start "in March 1988". At a meeting held in March 1988 the experts of the LCBC member States accordingly adopted three documents concerning respectively: 1. "Technical Specifications for boundary demarcation, Aerial Photogrammetry and Topographical Mapping in the Lake Chad at a scale of 1/50,000"; 2. "General Conditions of the International Invitation for Tenders"; 3. "Applications for Tenders".
The Court notes further that the LCBC entrusted to the Institut geographique national-France International (IGN-F1) the following tasks, specified in Article 5 of the Contract concluded with IGN-FI, as approved on 26 May 1988:
"(i) Reconnaissance and marking out of the 21 points approached and the 7 boundary limit points.
(ii) Placing of 62 intermediate markers: al a maximum of 5 km between them.
(iii) Demarcation of the coordinates of the boundary markers and intermediate markers."
For the performance of this task there was passed to IGN-FI the "texts and documents concerning the delimitation of the boundaries in Lake Chad" (Contract, Art. 7) — namely, the legal instruments already listed in the 1984 Report of the Sub-Committee, with the addition of the Minutes signed on 2 March 1988 concerning the position of the northern limit of the border between Chad and Niger. IGN-FI completed its demarcation work in 1990, having set up two principal beacons at each end of the border between Cameroon and Nigeria in Lake Chad (that is, at the tripoint and at the mouth of the Ebeji), as well as 13 intermediate beacons. The Report of the Marking Out of the Boundary completed by IGN-FI was then signed by the experts of each member State of the LCBC. During their Seventh Summit in February 1990, the Heads of State and Governments of the LCBC "took note of the satisfactory achievement" and "directed that the Commissioners should get the appropriate documents ready within three months and were authorized to sign on behalf of their countries". However, Nigeria declined to sign the Report, expressing dissatisfaction over inter alia, beacon-numbering, the non-demolition of a beacon, and the non-stabilization of GPS and Azimuth stations. These items were clearly matters of demarcation. Shortly thereafter, the national experts ordered additional beaconing work to complete the work of IGN-FI. After several attempts, the work of the LCBC was finally completed and, at their Eighth Summit on 23 March 1994, the Heads of State of the LCBC decided to approve the final demarcation report as signed by the national experts and the executive secretariat of the LCBC and referred to in the Minutes of the Summit as "the technical document on the demarcation of the international boundaries of Member States in Lake Chad". Those Minutes specified that "each country should adopt the document in accordance with its national laws", and that "the document should be signed latest by the next summit of the Commission". Nigeria has not done so. Cameroon accordingly acknowledges that it is not an instrument which binds Nigeria.
The Court agrees with the Parties that Nigeria is not bound by the Marking Out Report. Nonetheless, this finding of law implies neither that the governing legal instruments on delimitation were put in question, nor that Nigeria did not continue to be bound by them. In sum, the Court finds that the Milner-Simon Declaration of 1919, as well as the 1929-1930 Thomson-Marchand Declaration as incorporated in the Henderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes of 1931, delimit the boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria in the Lake Chad area. The map attached by the parties to the Exchange of Notes is to be regarded as an agreed clarification of the Moisel map. The Lake Chad border area is thus delimited, notwithstanding that there are two questions that remain to be examined by the Court, namely the precise location of the longitudinal co-ordinate of the Cameroon-Nigeria-Chad tripoint in Lake Chad and the question of the mouth of the Ebeji.
The Court cannot accept this request. At no time was the LCBC asked to act by the successors to those instruments as their agent in reaching an authoritative interpretation of them. Moreover, the very fact that the outcome of the technical demarcation work was agreed in March 1994 to require adoption under national laws indicates that it was in no position to engage in "authoritative interpretation" sua sponte.
As for the specification of the frontier as it passes in a straight line from the tripoint to the mouth of the Ebeji, various solutions have been proposed by the Parties. This ending point of the straight line running from the tripoint was never described in the delimiting instruments by reference to co-ordinates. The map to illustrate the Anglo-French Declaration defining the Cameroons Boundary, annexed to the Exchange of Notes of 1931 probably shortly after their conclusion, shows a single stream of the Ebeji having its mouth on the lake just beyond Wulgo. The 1931 map states: "Note: The extent of the water in Lake Chad is variable and indeterminate."
Certainly since 1931 the pattern has generally been one of marked recession of the waters. The lake today appears to be significantly reduced from its size at the time of the Henderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes. The River Ebeji today has no single mouth through which it discharges its waters into the lake. Rather, it divides into two channels as it approaches the lake. On the basis of the information the Parties have made available to the Court, it appears that the eastern channel terminates in water that is short of the present Lake Chad. The western channel seems to terminate in a muddy area close to the present water line.
Cameroon’s position is that the mouth of the Ebeji should be specified by the Court as lying on the co-ordinates determined for that purpose by the LCBC, that being an "authentic interpretation" of the Declaration and 1931 Exchanges. The Court has already indicated why the Report of the Marking Out of Boundaries by the LCBC is not to be so regarded. Cameroon asks the Court to find that "in the alternative, the mouth of the Ebeji is situated at the point located at the co-ordinates 12°31' 12"N and 14°11'48"E". Thus Cameroon prefers, in its alternative argument, the "mouth" of the western channel, and bases itself on tests adduced by this Court in the case concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia) (I.CJ. Reports 1999, pp. 1064-1072, paras. 30-40) for identifying "the main channel". In particular, it refers to greater flow and depth of this channel. Nigeria, on the other hand, requests the Court to prefer the mouth of the longer, eastern channel as "the mouth" of the River Ebeji, finding support for that proposition in the Polena arbitration of 9 December 1966, which spoke of the importance of length, size of drainage area, and discharge (38 International Law Reports (ILR), pp. 93-95).
The Court notes that the co-ordinates, as calculated on the two maps, for the mouth of the Ebeji in the area just north of the site indicated as that of Wulgo are strikingly similar. Moreover these co-ordinates are identical with those used by the LCBC when, in reliance on those same maps, it sought to locate the mouth of the Ebeji as it was understood by the parties in 1931. The point there identified is north both of the "mouth" suggested by Cameroon for the western channel in its alternative argument and of the "mouth" proposed by Nigeria for the eastern channel.
"the process which has taken place within the framework of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, and which was intended to lead to an overall delimitation and demarcation of boundaries on Lake Chad, is legally without prejudice to the title to particular areas of the Lake Chad region inhering in Nigeria as a consequence of the historical consolidation of title and the acquiescence of Cameroon".
Thus Nigeria claims sovereignty over areas in Lake Chad which include certain named villages. These villages, according to the nomenclature used by Nigeria, are the following: Aisa Kura, Ba shakka, Chika’a, Darak, Darak Gana, Doron Liman, Doron Mallam (Doro Kirta), Dororoya, Fagge, Garin Wanzam, Gorea Changi, Gorea Gutun, Jribrillaram, Kafuram, Kamunna, Kanumburi, Karakaya, Kasuram Mareya, Katti Kime, Kirta Wulgo, Koloram, Logon Labi, Loko Naira, Mukdala, Mur-das, Naga’a, Naira, Nimeri, Njia Buniba, Ramin Dorinna, Sabon Tumbu, Sagir and Sokotoram. Nigeria explains that these villages have been established either on what is now the dried up lake bed, or on islands which are surrounded by water perennially or on locations which are islands in the wet season only.
Nigeria contends that its claim rests on three bases, which each apply both individually and jointly and one of which would be sufficient on its own:
"(1) long occupation by Nigeria and by Nigerian nationals constituting an historical consolidation of title;
(2) effective administration by Nigeria, acting as sovereign and an absence of protest; and
(3) manifestations of sovereignty by Nigeria together with the acquiescence by Cameroon in Nigerian sovereignty over Darak and the associated Lake Chad villages".
Among the components of the historical consolidation of its title over the disputed areas, Nigeria cites: (1) the attitude and affiliations of the population of Darak and the other Lake Chad villages, the Nigerian nationality of the inhabitants of those villages; (2) the existence of historical links with Nigeria in the area, and in particular the maintenance of the system of traditional chiefs and the role of the Shehu of Borno; (3) the exercise of authority by the traditional chiefs, which is claimed to be still an important element within the State structure of modern Nigeria; (4) the long settlement of Nigerian nationals in the area; and (5) the peaceful administration of the disputed villages by the Federal Government of Nigeria and the State of Borno.
Nigeria further contends that Cameroon’s evidence of its State activities in the Lake Chad area has serious flaws; in particular, it contends that the greater part of that evidence relates only to the years 1982 to 1988, whereas the evidence regarding Nigerian activities covers a substantially longer period. Moreover, Cameroon supplied no evidence in regard to a substantial number of the villages claimed by Nigeria. Nigeria further notes that "many of the documents produced on behalf of Cameroon are entirely programmatic in content, involving the planning of census tours and so forth, in the absence of evidence that the events actually occurred". Nigeria further points out that any consideration of Cameroon’s evidence regarding its State activities is bound to take account of the fact that it was only in 1994 that Cameroon first protested against the Nigerian administration of the villages, and that this silence on the part of Cameroon is of particular significance in light of the fact that Nigeria’s State activities were entirely open and visible to all.
Finally, Nigeria contends that Cameroon acquiesced in the peaceful exercise of Nigerian sovereignty over the disputed areas and that that acquiescence constitutes a major element in the process of historical consolidation of title. It claims that Cameroon’s acquiescence in Nigeria’s sovereign activities had a triple role. The first was the role that it played alongside the other elements of historical consolidation. Its second, and independent, role was that of confirming a title on the basis of the peaceful possession of the territory in dispute, that is to say, the effective administration of the Lake Chad villages by Nigeria, acting as sovereign, together with an absence of protest on the part of Cameroon. Thirdly, Nigeria contends that acquiescence may be characterized as the main component of title, that is, providing the essence and very foundation of title rather than a confirmation of a title necessarily anterior to and independent of the process of acquiescence. There can be no doubt, according to Nigeria, that in appropriate conditions a tribunal can properly recognize a title based on tacit consent or acquiescence.
As evidence of Cameroon’s acquiescence in the exercise of Nigerian sovereignty over the disputed areas, Nigeria relies in particular on the fact that the settlement of these villages by Nigerian nationals openly carrying on peaceful activities, and Nigeria’s peaceful administration of those villages, aroused no protest of any kind from Cameroon before April 1994, and that Cameroon’s armed incursions in 1987, which disturbed the Nigerian administrative status quo and were repulsed by the Nigerian villagers and security forces, did not result in any claim to the area by Cameroon.
The establishment of Nigerian villages on the Cameroonian side of the boundary by private individuals followed by Nigerian public services must therefore, in Cameroon’s view, be treated as acts of conquest which cannot found a valid territorial title under international law. Cameroon states that it has never acquiesced in the modification of its conventional boundary with Nigeria; it argues that acquiescence in a boundary change must, in order to bind a State, be the act of competent authorities and that in this regard the attitude of the central authorities must prevail over that of the local ones. Hence, according to Cameroon, once the Cameroonian central authorities became aware of the Nigerian claims, they proceeded to react so as to preserve the rights of Cameroon; they did so first in the context of the LCBC, then through a Note from the Cameroonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 21 April 1994.
Finally, Cameroon claims that an estoppel has arisen which today prevents Nigeria from challenging the existing conventional delimitation. Thus it argues that, for very many years, including while the LCBC demarcation work was proceeding, Nigeria accepted the conventional delimitation of Lake Chad without any form of protest, thus adopting an attitude which clearly and consistently demonstrated its acceptance of that boundary. Since Cameroon had relied in good faith on that attitude in order to collaborate in the demarcation operation, it would be prejudicial to it if Nigeria were entitled to invoke conduct on the ground that conflicted with its previous attitude.
The Court observes in this respect that in the Fisheries (United Kingdom v. Norway) case (I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 130) it had referred to certain maritime delimitation decrees promulgated by Norway almost a century earlier which had been adopted and applied for decades without any opposition. These decrees were said by the Court to represent "a well-defined and uniform system... which would reap the benefit of general toleration, the basis of an historical consolidation which would make it enforceable as against all States" (ibid., p. 137). The Court notes, however, that the notion of historical consolidation has never been used as a basis of title in other territorial disputes, whether in its own or in other case law.
Nigeria contends that the notion of historical consolidation has been developed by academic writers, and relies on that theory, associating it with the maxim quieta non movere.
The Court notes that the theory of historical consolidation is highly controversial and cannot replace the established modes of acquisition of title under international law, which take into account many other important variables of fact and law. It further observes that nothing in the Fisheries Judgment suggests that the "historical consolidation" referred to, in connection with the external boundaries of the territorial sea, allows land occupation to prevail over an established treaty title. Moreover, the facts and circumstances put forward by Nigeria with respect to the Lake Chad villages concern a period of some 20 years, which is in any event far too short, even according to the theory relied on by it. Nigeria’s arguments on this point cannot therefore be upheld.
Setting aside evidence relating to the years including and after 1994, when the Court was seised of the case, the Court notes that from the early 1980s until 1993 reports were made to Ngala Local Government, which provided support for health clinics in villages and mobile health units, along with advice on disease control. Evidence of this nature has been submitted as regards Kirta Wulgo, Darak and Katti Kime. There is evidence of the provision of education funding by the Ngala Local Government in 1988 for the Nigerian village of Wulgo and its dependent settlements, and for Katti Kime, Darak, Chika’a and Naga’a and for Darak in 1991. In 1989 there was an education levy in Wulgo and its dependencies and in 1992 some funding provided for classrooms in Naga’a. The Court has been shown evidence relating to the assessment and collection of taxes in Wulgo and its dependencies in 1980-1981; and to payments made to Ngala Local Government by the Fisherman’s Cooperative operating in the villages in question in 1982-1984. Among the documents submitted to the Court is a copy of a decision in 1981 by the Wulgo Area Court in a case involving litigants residing in Darak.
Some of these activities — the organization of public health and education facilities, policing, the administration of justice — could normally be considered to be acts a titre de souverain. The Court notes, however, that, as there was a pre-existing title held by Cameroon in this area of the lake, the pertinent legal test is whether there was thus evidenced acquiescence by Cameroon in the passing of title from itself to Nigeria.
The Court has already ruled on a number of occasions on the legal relationship between "effectivités'’ and titles. In the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali) case, it pointed out that in this regard "a distinction must be drawn among several eventualities", stating inter alia that:
"Where the act does not correspond to the law, where the territory which is the subject of the dispute is effectively administered by a State other than the one possessing the legal title, preference should be given to the holder of the title. In the event that the effectivité does not co-exist with any legal title, it must invariably be taken into consideration." (I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 587, para. 63; see also Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1994, p. 38, paras. 75-76.)
It is this first eventuality here envisaged by the Court, and not the second, which corresponds to the situation obtaining in the present case. Thus Cameroon held the legal title to territory lying to the east of the boundary as fixed by the applicable instruments (see paragraph 53 above). Hence the conduct of Cameroon in that territory has pertinence only for the question of whether it acquiesced in the establishment of a change in treaty title, which cannot be wholly precluded as a possibility in law (Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (EI Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992, pp. 408-409, para. 80). The evidence presented to the Court suggests that before 1987 there was some administrative activity by Cameroon in the island and lake-bed villages that were beginning to be established. There were yearly administrative visits from 1982 to 1985; the villages of Chika’a, Naga’a, Katti Kime and Darak participated in elections for the presidency of the Republic of Cameroon; administrative action was undertaken for the maintenance of law and order in Naga’a, Gorea Changi and Katti Kime. The 1984 census included 18 villages, among them Darak. Appointments of village chiefs were referred for approval to the Cameroon prefect. As for the collection of taxes by Cameroon, there is modest evidence relating to Katti Kime, Naga’a and Chika’a for the years 1983 to 1985.
Cameroon has put to the Court that it did not regard the activities of Nigeria in Lake Chad in the years 1984 to 1994 as à titre de souverain, because Nigeria was in those years fully participating in the work entrusted to the LCBC and its contractors, and agreed that they should work on the basis of the various treaty instruments which governed title. The Court cannot accept Nigeria’s argument that the explanation given by Cameroon depends upon the supposition that the Report of Experts was binding upon Nigeria automatically. It depends rather upon the agreed basis upon which the demarcation work was to be carried out.
On 14 April 1994, Nigeria in a diplomatic Note, for the first time claimed sovereignty over Darak. Cameroon firmly protested in a Note Verbale of 21 April 1994, expressing "its profound shock at the presumption that Darak is part of Nigerian territory", and reiterating its own sovereignty. Shortly after, it also enlarged the scope of its Application to the Court.
be given to the holder of the title" (Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986. p. 587, para. 63).
The Court therefore concludes that, as regards the settlements situated to the east of the frontier confirmed in the Henderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes of 1931, sovereignty has continued to he with Cameroon (see below, p. 356, sketch-map No. 2).
"13. Thence going on and meeting the bed of a better defined stream crossing the marsh of Kulujia and Kodo as far as a marsh named Agzabame.
14. Thence crossing this marsh where it reaches a river passing quite close to the village of Limanti (Limani) to a confluence at about 2 kilometres to the north-west of this village."
A careful study of the wording of the Thomson-Marchand Declaration and of the map and other evidence provided by the Parties leads the Court to the following conclusions. In the first place, the Court observes that the second channel from the north, proposed by Cameroon as the course of the boundary, is unacceptable. That channel does not meet the requirements of paragraph 14 of the Declaration, on the one hand because its distance from the village of Limani precludes it from being regarded, in the context of paragraph 14 of the Declaration, as "passing quite close" to Limani and, on the other, because its confluence is situated to the north-north-east of the village and not to the "north-west".
The southern channel proposed by Nigeria poses other problems. Its immediate proximity to the village of Limani and its apparent correspondence with the sketch-map signed by French and British administrators in 1921 are not in doubt. However, this channel does not appear on any map. Moreover, a stereoscopic examination of the aerial photographs of the area shows that, while there is indeed a small watercourse running from the Ngassaoua River to the point indicated by Nigeria, it is very short and quickly peters out, well before the Agzabame marsh, which is incompatible with the wording of paragraph 13 of the Thomson-Marchand Declaration. This small watercourse also runs much closer to Narki than Nigeria suggests. The Court cannot therefore accept this channel either.
The Court notes, however, that the river has another channel, called Nargo on DOS sheet "Ybiri N.W.", reproduced at page 23 of the atlas annexed to Nigeria’s Rejoinder, which meets the conditions specified in the Thomson-Marchand Declaration. This channel does indeed start from the Agzabame marsh, passes to the north of Narki and to the south of Tarmoa, runs not far from Limani and reaches a confluence which is about 2 km north-west of Limani. The Court therefore considers that this is the channel to which the drafters of the Thomson-Marchand Declaration were referring.
"18. Thence following the Keraua as far as its confluence in the mountains with a river coming from the west and known by the ‘Kirdis’ inhabiting the mountains under the name of Kohom (shown on Moisel’s map under the name of Gatagule), cutting into two parts the village of Keraua and separating the two villages of Ishigashiya."
The Court has first examined Cameroon’s argument that the course of the Keraua River has been diverted by Nigeria as a result of an artificial channel constructed by it in the vicinity of the village of Gange. The Court considers that Cameroon has provided no evidence of its assertions on this point. Nor has the cartographic and photographic material in the Court’s possession enabled it to confirm the existence of works to divert the course of the river near Gange.
Neither can the Court accept Nigeria’s argument that preference should be given to the eastern channel because it is broader and better defined than the western channel, since the aerial photographs of the area which the Court has studied show that the two channels are comparable in size.
The Court notes, however, that according to the Moisel map the boundary runs, as Nigeria maintains, just to the east of two villages called Schriwe and Ndeba, which are on the site now occupied by the villages of Cherive and Ndabakora, and which the map places on Nigerian territory. Only the eastern channel meets this condition.
"19. Thence it runs from this confluence as far as the top of Mount Ngosi in a south-westerly direction given by the course of the Kohom (Gatagule) which is taken as the natural boundary from its confluence as far as its source in Mount Ngosi; the villages of Matagum and Hijie being left to France, and the sections of Uledde and of Laherre situated to the north of the Kohom to England; those of Tchidoui (Hiduwe) situated to the south of Kohom to France."
The Court has therefore had to have recourse to other means of interpretation. Thus it has carefully examined the sketch-map prepared in March 1926 by the French and British officials which served as the basis for the drafting of paragraphs 18 and 19 of the Thomson-Marchand Declaration. As Nigeria pointed out in its Rejoinder this sketch-map does indeed show what the intention of the Parties was at the time, when they referred to the River Kohom. The sketch-map is particularly helpful, since it includes very clear indications in regard to the relief of the area and the direction of the river, which the Court has been able to compare with the maps provided by the Parties. The Court is able to determine, on the basis of this comparison, that the Kohom whose course the Thomson-Marchand Declaration provides for the boundary to follow is that indicated by Cameroon. In this regard, the Court notes first that the 1926 sketch-map indicates very clearly, just before the boundary turns sharply to the south, a tributary descending from Mount Kolika and flowing into the Kohom. Such a tributary is to be found on the river identified by Cameroon as the Kohom but not on that proposed by Nigeria. The Court would further observe that the 1926 sketch-map quite clearly indicates that the boundary passes well to the north of the Matakam Mountains, as does the line claimed by Cameroon, whereas that favoured by Nigeria passes well to the south of those mountains.
The Court notes, however, that the boundary line claimed by Cameroon in this area runs on past the source of the river which the Court has identified as the Kohom. Nor can the Court disregard the fact that the Thomson-Marchand Declaration expressly provides that the boundary must follow a river which has its source in Mount Ngosi. In order to comply with the Thomson-Marchand Declaration, it is therefore necessary to join the source of the River Kohom, as identified by the Court, to the River Bogaza, which rises on Mount Ngosi.
"20. Thence on a line in a south-westerly direction following the tops of the mountain range of Ngosi, leaving to France the parts of Ngosi situated on the eastern slopes, and to England the parts situated on the western slopes, to a point situated between the source of the River Zimunkara and the source of the River Devurua; the watershed so defined also leaves the village of Bugelta to England and the village of Turu to France.
21. Thence in a south-south-westerly direction, leaving the village of Dile on the British side, the village of Libam on the French side to the hill of Matakam.
22. Thence running due west to a point to the south of the village of Wisik where it turns to the south on a line running along the watershed and passing by Mabas on the French side, after which it leaves Wula on the English side running south and bounded by cultivated land to the east of the line of the watershed.
23. Thence passing Humunsi on the French side the boundary lies between the mountains of Jel and Kamale Mogode on the French side and running along the watershed.
24. Thence passing Humsiki, including the farmlands of the valley to the west of the village on the French side, the boundary crosses Mount Kuli."
"25. Thence running due south between Mukta (British) and Muti (French) the incorrect line of the watershed shown by Moisel on his map being adhered to, leaving Bourha and Dihi on the French side, Madogoba Gamdira on the British, Bugela or Bukula, Madoudji, Kadanahanga on the French, Ouda, Tua and Tsambourga on the British side, and Buka on the French side."
"is defective in that the requirement to follow a watershed line which is expressly admitted to be incorrect, shown on a 90 year old map which displays very little detail, can be interpreted in a number of ways".
Nigeria thus proposes simplifying the line up to the point where Moisel’s line cuts the true watershed north of Bourha. That simplification is claimed to be justified by a proces-verbal of 1920, which provides for the boundary to follow the centre of a track running from Muti towards Bourha. South of Bourha, Nigeria proposes following the true watershed, leaving Bourha on Nigerian territory.
The Court has carefully studied the Moisel map and has compared the data provided by it with those available on the best modern maps, and in particular sheet "Uba N.E." of the 1969 DOS 1:50,000 map of Nigeria and sheet NC-33-XIV-2c "Mokolo 2c" of the 1965 Institut geographique national (IGN) 1:50,000 map of Central Africa, both of which were provided to the Court by Nigeria. The Court observes that, while the Moisel map contains some errors in this area, it nonetheless provides certain objective criteria that permit the course of the "incorrect line of the watershed" to be readily transposed onto modern maps. The Court notes first that on the Moisel map the "incorrect line of the watershed" is clearly shown as remaining at all times to the east of the meridian 13° 30' longitude east. The Court further notes that a certain number of localities are indicated as lying either to the east or to the west of the incorrect line and must accordingly remain on the same side of the boundary after that line has been transposed onto modern maps.
The Court cannot accept the line presented by Cameroon as corresponding to a transposition of the "incorrect line of the watershed". That line lies throughout its length to the west of the meridian 13° 30' longitude east. Nigeria’s transposition of the "incorrect line of the watershed" poses other problems. While it places this line at all times to the east of the meridian 13° 30' longitude east, it cannot, however, be accepted, since it consists of a series of angled lines, whereas the line on the Moisel map follows a winding course.
"26. Thence the boundary runs through Mount Mulikia (named also Lourougoua).
27. Thence from the top of Mount Mulikia to the source of the Tsikakiri, leaving Kotcha to Britain and Dumo to France and following a line marked by four provisional landmarks erected in September 1920 by Messrs. Vereker and Pition."
"27. Thence from the top of Mount Mulikia to the source of the Tsikakiri, leaving Kotcha to Britain and Dumo to France and following a line marked by four provisional landmarks erected in September 1920 by Messrs. Vereker and Pition."
"33. Thence a line starting from Beacon 6, passing Beacon 7, finishing at the old Beacon 8.
34. Thence from this mark 8 placed on the left bank of the Mao Youwai, a small stream flowing from the west and emptying itself into the Mayo Faro, in a straight line running towards the south-west and reaching the summit of Wamni Range, a very prominent peak to the north of a chain of mountains extending towards the Alantika Mountains, and situated to the east of the old frontier mark No. 10."
"[t]he line then follows the median line of the Faro up-stream, as far as the junction of the Mao Hesso with the main stream; and afterwards the median line of the Mao Hesso, as far as a post, No. 6, on the left bank of the Mao Hesso, about 3 km north-west of Beka. It then runs from the median line of the river at right angles to its course, to No. 6 post."
Paragraph 4 then goes on to explain:
"From No. 6 post the line runs straight to a conspicuous rock, on a slight eminence on the road from Gurin to Karin. This rock has a boundary mark (No. 7) "D ↓ B" (Deutsch-British) cut into it. From this rock it runs straight to a post, No. 8, fixed on the road at the entrance to the pass through the Karin Hills, north of the village of Karin."
Nigeria claims that, pursuant to that method, Beacon 6 is situated on the left bank of the Mao Hesso about 3 km north-west of Beka, while Beacon 8 is situated at the intersection of the extension of the line joining Beacons 6 and 7 and the stream mentioned in paragraph 34 of the Thomson-Marchand Declaration.
The Court has studied most attentively the text of Annex I to the Anglo-German Agreement of 1906, as well as the cartographic material provided to it by the Parties, in order to discover the location of these beacons. The Court thus notes that the point indicated by Nigeria as corresponding to Beacon 6 and situated at 12° 53'15" longitude east and 9° 04' 19" latitude north does indeed reflect the terms of the description of it given in the Agreement, since it lies on the left bank of the Mao Hesso 3 km to the north-west of the village of Beka. The Court likewise considers that the point indicated by Nigeria as corresponding to Beacon 7 and situated at 12°51'55" longitude east and 9°01'03" latitude north must be accepted. Although Nigeria has produced no evidence of Beacon 7 having been found at that point, its location does indeed correspond to the description in the 1906 Anglo-German Agreement, particularly in view of the fact that it is the only high ground in that area. As regards the location of Beacon 8, which is described as situated at the entrance to the pass through the Karin Hills on the road crossing the pass, and on the left bank of the Mao Youwai, it is the point proposed by Cameroon, located at 12° 49'22" longitude east and 8° 58'18" latitude north, which must be taken to be the correct one, since it satisfies both the conditions laid down by the 1906 Agreement and those in paragraph 34 of the Thomson-Marchand Declaration.
"35. Thence the frontier follows the watershed from the Mao Wari to the west and from the Mao Faro to the east, where it rejoins the Alantika Range, it follows the line of the watershed of the Benue to the north-west and of the Faro to the south-east as far as the south peak of the Alantika Mountains to a point 2 kilometres to the north of the source of the River Mali."
"35. Thence the frontier follows the watershed from the Mao Wari to the west and from the Mao Faro to the east, where it rejoins the Alantika Range, it follows the line of the watershed of the Benue to the north-west and of the Faro to the south-east as far as the south peak of the Alantika Mountains to a point 2 kilometres to the north of the source of the River Mali.
36. Thence from this peak by the River Sassiri, leaving Kobi to France and Kobi Feinde to Great Britain, Tebou and Tscho to France, as far as the confluence with the first stream coming from the Balakossa Range (this confluence touches the Kobodji Mapeo Track), from this stream towards the south, leaving Uro Belo to Great Britain and Nanaoua to France.
37. Thence the boundary rejoins the old boundary about Lapao in French territory, following the line of the watershed of the Balakossa range as far as a point situated to the west of the source of the Labidje or Kadam River, which flows into the River Deo, and from the River Sampee flowing into the River Baleo to the north-west.
38. Thence from this point along the line of the watershed between the River Baleo and the River Noumberou along the crest of the Tschapeu Range, to a point 2 kilometres to the north of Namberu, turning by this village, which is in Nigeria, going up a valley northeast and then south-east, which crosses the Banglang range about a kilometre to the south of the source of the Kordo River."
Nigeria contends that, while part of the proposals in the Logan-Le Brun proces-verbal were incorporated into the text of the Thomson-Marchand Declaration, the drafters forgot to amend also the part of the Declaration concerning Jimbare and Sapeo; as far as Sapeo was concerned, the proposals in the Logan-Le Brun proces-verbal were nonetheless shown on the 1931 map annexed to the Declaration. In Nigeria’s view, it is the map which should therefore be followed and not the text of the Declaration, since this "does not accord with the extensive practice on the ground for the past three quarters of a century". Thus it asserts that Sapeo was treated as Nigerian during the 1959 and 1961 plebiscites and that Nigeria is responsible for its administration. In Nigeria’s view, the solution is therefore to construe the Thomson-Marchand Declaration in the light of the Mair-Pition Joint Proposal, of the Logan-Le Brun proces-verbal and of the well-established local practice. The new description based on the Logan-Le Brun proces-verbal would result in leaving all of the Balakossa Range to Cameroon and giving Nigeria the Sapeo plain on the southern side of Hosere Sapeo. It contends that the modified boundary line was moreover accepted by Cameroon in a letter dated 17 March 1979 to the "Prefect of Benue Department" from the SubPrefect of Poli Subdivision.
The Court notes, however, that, as regards the area to the north of Nananoua as referred to in paragraph 36 of the Thomson-Marchand Declaration, the Parties agree that the rivers whose courses form the boundary are the Leinde and the Sassiri. Similarly, the cartographic representations of this section of the boundary proposed by the Parties correspond in every respect.
To the south of Nananoua, on the other hand, there is no agreement between Cameroon and Nigeria.
The Court further concludes that paragraphs 3" and 38 of the Thomson-Marchand Declaration must be interpreted as providing for the boundary to follow the course described in paragraph 1 of the Logan-Le Brun proces-verbal, as shown by Nigeria in Figures 7.15 and 7.16 at pages 346 and 350 of its Rejoinder.
"38. Thence from this point along the line of the watershed between the River Baleo and the River Noumberou along the crest of the Tschapeu Range, to a point 2 kilometres to the north of Namberu, turning by this village, which is in Nigeria, going up a valley north-east and then south-east, which crosses the Banglang range about a kilometre to the south of the source of the Kordo River."
The Court notes that in this regard only the part of the boundary situated to the south of the source of the Noumberou poses any problem.
To the north of that point, Cameroon and Nigeria agree that the boundary should follow the course of the Noumberou. The course of the boundary shown on the Cameroonian and Nigerian maps confirms that agreement.
However, to the south of the source of the Noumberou, the cartographic representations of the boundary presented by the Parties diverge.
The Court considers that it is the boundary line proposed by Nigeria which is to be preferred. That is the line which runs most directly to Hosere Tapere, located at 12° 14' 30" longitude east and 8° 22' 00" latitude north, the point indicated by the Logan-Le Brun proces-verbal as the terminal for this section of the boundary. That line is moreover more favourable to Cameroon than the line shown on its own maps, and Cameroon has not opposed it.
"40. Thence along a line parallel to the Bare Fort Lamy Track and 2 kilometres to the west of this track, which remains in French territory.
41. Thence a line parallel to and distant 2 kilometres to the west from this road (which is approximately that marked Faulborn, January 1908, on Moisel’s map) to a point on the Maio Tipsal (Tiba, Tibsat or Tussa on Moisel’s map) 2 kilometres to the south-west of the point at which the road crosses said Maio Tipsal."
Cameroon maintains, however, that there is a demarcation problem in this area, namely in identifying on the ground the features mentioned in those provisions. Specifically, it contends that there is a locality called Tipsan on Cameroonian territory some 3 km from the town of Kontcha.
Nigeria denies the existence of a village called Tipsan on the Cameroonian side of the boundary, claiming that the only place called Tipsan is an immigration post situated on Nigerian territory.
"48. Thence to Hosere Lowul, which is well over 2 kilometres from the Kwancha-Banyo main road. This peak (Hosere Lowul) lies on a magnetic bearing of 296 from the apex of the Genderu Pass on the above-mentioned main road. From this apex, which is distant 3,5 miles from Genderu Rest-house, and which lies between a peak of Hosere M’Bailaji (to the west) and a smaller hill, known as Hosere Burutol, to the east, Hosere M’Bailaji has a magnetic bearing of 45 and Hosere Burutol one of 185.
49. Thence a line, crossing the Maio Yin at a point some 4 kilometres to the west of the figure 1,200 (denoting height in metres of a low conical hill) on Moisel’s map E 2, to a prominent conical peak, Hosere Gulungel, at the foot of which (in French Territory) is a spring impregnated with potash, which is well-known to all cattle-owners in the vicinity. This Hosere Gulungel has a magnetic bearing of 228 from the point (5 miles from Genderu Rest-house, which is known locally as ‘Kampani Massa’ on the main Kwancha-Banyo road where it (Hosere Gulungel) first comes into view. From this same point the magnetic bearing to Hosere Lowul is 11. The Salt lick of Banare lies in British Territory."
"60. Thence the Frontier follows the watershed amongst these Hosere Hambere (or Gesumi) to the north of the sources of the Maio Kombe, Maio Gur and Maio Malam to a fairly prominent, pointed peak which lies on a magnetic bearing of 17° from a cairn of stones, 8 feet high, erected on the 15th September, 1920, on the south side of the above Banyo-Kumbo-Bamenda road at a point 1 mile from N’Yorong Rest-camp and 814 miles from Songkorong village.
61. From this peak in the Hosere Hambere (or Gesumi), which is situated just to the east of the visible source of the Maio M’Fi (or Baban), the Frontier follows the watershed, visible all the way from the Cairn, between the Maio Malam to east (French) and the Maio M’Fi (or Baban) to west (British), till it cuts the Banyo-Kumbo-Bamenda road at the Cairn. This Cairn is immediately under the highest peak of the Hosere Nangban, which is shown on Moisel’s map F 2 as Hosere Jadji, but Jadji is really the name of the Pagan head of N’Yorong village."
Thus the Court observes that, while Itang Hill does indeed lie on a magnetic bearing of 17° (a true bearing of 8° after conversion) calculated from the point which Nigeria describes as corresponding to the site of the stone cairn referred to in paragraph 60 and located on a meridian lying to the east of that of the sources of the River M’Fi, it does not, however, satisfy any of the other criteria prescribed by paragraphs 60 and 61. Thus Itang Hill does not lie on the watershed running through the Hosere Hambere, which is located 2 km to the north. Moreover, at no time does the watershed between the Mayo Malam and the Mayo M’Fi come at all close to Itang Hill.
"thence the River Mburi southwards to its junction with an unnamed stream about one mile north of the point where the new Kumbo-Banyo road crosses the River Mburi at Nyan (alias Nton), the said point being about four miles south-east by east of Muwe; thence along this unnamed stream on a general true bearing of 120° for one and a half miles to its source at a point on the new Kumbo-Banyo road, near the source of the River Mfi; thence on a true bearing of 100° for three and five-sixths miles along the crest of the mountains to the prominent peak which marks the Franco-British frontier."
The Court next notes that the village of Yang does indeed correspond, as Nigeria contends, to that of Nyan referred to in the Order in Council, and that, as Nigeria stressed, the "new Kumbo-Banyo road" does not cross the River Mburi at Nyan, but to the north of Nyan. The Court notes, however, that there is, between the sources of the M’Fi and a point situated 1 mile north of Nyan, a river whose course corresponds to the description in the Order of the boundary to the east of Nyan: this is the river called Namkwer on the first edition of the sheet, "Mambilla S.W.", of the 1965 DOS 1:50,000 map of Nigeria, provided to the Court by Nigeria. This river, whose source is indeed in the immediate vicinity of the western sources of the River M’Fi, flows from its source on a general true bearing of 120°, over a distance slightly greater than 1.5 miles, to a point situated 1 mile north of Nyan, where it joins the River Mburi, as shown on sheet 11 of the third edition of the 1953 Survey Department 1:500,000 map of Nigeria, provided to the Court by Cameroon, and on the sketch-maps projected by Nigeria at the oral proceedings. Moreover, the source of the River Namkwer lies precisely on the crest line which, further east, marks the former Franco-British frontier and on which the "prominent peak" described in the Order in Council must be situated. It accordingly follows that the boundary to the east of Nyan follows the course of the River Namkwer and this crest line.
In respect of the section of the boundary lying west of Nyan, the Court would first note that the Parties agree on the point at which the boundary, following the River Mburi from the north as described in the Order in Council, should turn eastward. The Parties also agree that the boundary must follow the River Mburi, also here called the Maven or Ntem, for a distance of slightly more than 2 km to the point where it divides into two. The Court would next note that the Order in Council provides for the boundary to follow the course of the River Mburi to its junction with a watercourse which the Court has identified as the River Namkwer. However, only the northern branch of the River Mburi/Maven/Ntem joins the River Namkwer. Thus the boundary must follow this branch.
"thence a straight line to the highest point of Tosso Mountain; thence in a straight line eastwards to a point on the main Kentu-Bamenda road where it is crossed by an unnamed tributary of the River Akbang (Heboro on Sheet E of Moisel’s map on Scale 1/300,000) — the said point being marked by a cairn; thence down the stream to its junction with the River Akbang; thence the River Akbang to its junction with the River Donga; thence the River Donga to its junction with the River Mburi".
A study of the text of the 1946 Order in Council and of the maps available to the Court has led the Court to the conclusion that the River Akbang is indeed the river indicated by Nigeria and that it has two main tributaries, one to the north, the other to the south, as Nigeria claims. The question is then which of these tributaries is the one where the Order in Council provides for the boundary to run.
The Court observes that the northern tributary of the River Akbang cannot be the correct one. While it does flow close beside the Kentu-Bamenda road, it never crosses it, however, and could not do so, since in this area the road runs along the line of the watershed.
The Court finds, on the other hand, that the southern tributary of the Akbang does indeed cross the Kentu-Bamenda road as Nigeria claims. It is accordingly the course of the boundary proposed by Nigeria which must be preferred.
"From boundary post 64 on the old Anglo-German frontier the line follows the River Gamana upstream to the point where it is joined by the River Sama; thence up the River Sama to the point where it divides into two; thence a straight line to the highest point of Tosso Mountain."
The Court has begun by addressing Nigeria’s argument that the southern tributary should be preferred because it is longer and has a greater flow and the point of division occurs in a larger valley. The Court observes that, while Nigeria’s observations in regard to the length of the tributaries and the topography of the area are confirmed by the maps which it has presented, this is not, however, the case in respect of other maps. Thus the Court notes in particular that, on the Moisel map, the two tributaries are of the same length and size. Moreover, the Court has no information enabling the flow to be determined. The Court accordingly cannot accept Nigeria’s argument.
Nor can the Court accept Cameroon’s argument that the Parties have always in practice taken the northern tributary as determining the boundary. Cameroon has provided no evidence of this practice.
The Court considers, however, that a reading of the text of the Order in Council permits it to determine which tributary should be used in order to fix the boundary. The Court observes in this connection that, just as with the Thomson-Marchand Declaration, the Order in Council describes the course of the boundary by reference to the area’s physical characteristics. Here again, the text of this description must have been drafted in such a way as to render the course of the boundary as readily identifiable as possible. The description of the boundary in the Order in Council starts from the north, and provides for it to run "up the River Sama to the point where it divides into two". Thus the inference is that the drafters of the Order in Council intended that the boundary should pass through the first confluence reached coming from the north. It is accordingly that confluence which must be chosen, as Cameroon contends.
" (a) [t]hat the land boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria takes the following course:
— thence [from Pillar 114 on the Cross River], as far as the intersection of the straight line from Bakassi Point to King Point with the centre of the navigable channel of the Akwayafe, the boundary is determined by paragraphs XVI to XXI of the Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913.
(h) That, in consequence, inter alia, sovereignty over the peninsula of Bakassi... is Cameroonian."
Nigeria takes the contrary position. In its final submissions it requests that the Court should
"(1) as to the Bakassi Peninsula, adjudge and declare:
(a) that sovereignty over the Peninsula is vested in the Federal Republic of Nigeria;
(b) that Nigeria’s sovereignty over Bakassi extends up to the boundary with Cameroon described in Chapter 11 of Nigeria’s Counter-Memorial".
Nigeria further claims that that Agreement is defective on the grounds that it is contrary to the Preamble to the General Act of the Conference of Berlin of 26 February 1885, that it was not approved by the German Parliament and that it was abrogated as a result of Article 289 of the Treaty of Versailles of 28 June 1919.
As regards the argument based on the General Act of the Conference of Berlin, the Court notes that, having been raised very briefly by Nigeria in its Counter-Memorial, it was not pursued either in the Rejoinder or at the hearings. It is therefore unnecessary for the Court to consider it.
Cameroon’s position was that "the German Government took the view that in the case of Bakassi the issue was one of simple boundary rectification, because Bakassi had already been treated previously as belonging de facto to Germany"; and thus parliamentary approval was not required.
Cameroon argues that Article 289 of the Treaty of Versailles did not have any legal effect on the Agreement of 11 March 1913, because "the scope of this Article was limited to treaties of an economic nature in the broad sense of the term" — which in Cameroon’s view was confirmed by the context of the Article, its position within the scheme of the Treaty, its drafting history and its object and purpose in light of the Treaty as a whole.
In this regard, Cameroon contends that the Agreement of 11 March 1913 fixed the course of the boundary between the Parties in the area of the Bakassi Peninsula and placed the latter on the Cameroonian side of the boundary. It relies for this purpose on Articles XVIII to XXI of the said Agreement, which provide inter alia that the boundary "follows the thalweg of the Akwayafe as far as a straight line joining Bakasi Point and King Point" (Art. XVIII) and that "[s]hould the lower course of the Akwayafe so change its mouth as to transfer it to the Rio del Rey, it is agreed that the area now known as the Bakasi Peninsula shall still remain German territory" (Art. XX). Cameroon further states that, since the entry into force of the Agreement of March 1913, Bakassi has belonged to its predecessors, and that sovereignty over the peninsula is today vested in Cameroon.
Nigeria contends that the title to sovereignty over Bakassi on which it relies was originally vested in the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar. It argues that in the pre-colonial era the City States of the Calabar region constituted an "acephalous federation" consisting of "independent entities with international legal personality". It considers that, under the Treaty of Protection signed on 10 September 1884 between Great Britain and the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar, the latter retained their separate international status and rights, including their power to enter into relationships with "other international persons" although under the Treaty that power could only be exercised with the knowledge and approval of the British Government. According to Nigeria, the Treaty only conferred certain limited rights on Great Britain; in no way did it transfer sovereignty to Britain over the territories of the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar.
Nigeria argues that, since Great Britain did not have sovereignty over those territories in 1913, it could not cede them to a third party. It followed that the relevant part of the Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913 was "outwith the treaty-making power of Great Britain, and that part was not binding on the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar". Nigeria adds that the limitations on Great Britain’s powers under the 1884 Treaty of Protection,
"and in particular its lack of sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula and thus its lack of legal authority in international law to dispose of title to it, must have been known to Germany at the time the 1913 Treaty was concluded, or ought to have been on the assumption that Germany was conducting itself in a reasonably prudent way".
In Nigeria’s view, the invalidity of the Agreement of 11 March 1913 on grounds of inconsistency with the principle nemo dat quod non habet applied only, however, "to those parts of the Treaty which purport to prescribe a boundary which, if effective, would have involved a cession of territory to Germany", that is to say, essentially Articles XVIII to XXII. The remaining provisions of the Treaty were untainted by that defect and accordingly remained in force and fully effective; they were self-standing provisions, and their application was not dependent upon the Bakassi provisions, which, being in law defective, were to be severed from the rest of the Agreement.
In Cameroon’s view, the treaty signed on 10 September 1884 between Great Britain and the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar established a "colonial protectorate" and, "in the practice of the period, there was little fundamental difference at international level, in terms of territorial acquisition, between colonies and colonial protectorates". Substantive differences between the status of colony and that of a colonial protectorate were matters of the national law of the colonial Powers rather than of international law. The key element of the colonial protectorate was the "assumption of external sovereignty by the protecting State", which manifested itself principally through
"the acquisition and exercise of the capacity and power to cede part of the protected territory by international treaty, without any intervention by the population or entity in question".
Cameroon further argues that, even on the hypothesis that Great Britain did not have legal capacity to transfer sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula under the Agreement of 11 March 1913, Nigeria could not invoke that circumstance as rendering the Agreement invalid. It points out that neither Great Britain nor Nigeria, the successor State, ever sought to claim that the Agreement was invalid on this ground; in this regard Cameroon states that,
"[o]n the contrary, until the start of the 1990s Nigeria had unambiguously confirmed and accepted the 1913 boundary line in its diplomatic and consular practice, its official geographical and cartographic publications and indeed in its statements and conduct in the political field",
and that "[t]he same was true as regards the appurtenance of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon". Cameroon further states that there is no other circumstance which might be relied on to render the Agreement of 11 March 1913 invalid.
Cameroon also contends that, in any event, the Agreement of 11 March 1913 forms an indivisible whole and that it is not possible to sever from it the provisions concerning the Bakassi Peninsula. It maintains that "there is a strong presumption that treaties accepted as valid must be interpreted as a whole and all their provisions respected and applied"; and that "parties cannot choose the provisions of a treaty which are to be applied and those which are not — they cannot ‘pick and choose’ —, unless there is a provision enabling them to act in that way".
In turn, under Article II of the Treaty of 10 September 1884,
"The King and Chiefs of Old Calabar agree[d] and promise[d] to refrain from entering into any correspondence, Agreement, or Treaty with any foreign nation or Power, except with the knowledge and sanction of Her Britannic Majesty’s Government."
The Treaty with the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar did not specify the territory to which the British Crown was to extend "gracious favour and protection", nor did it indicate the territories over which each of the Kings and Chiefs signatory to the Treaty exercised his powers. However, the consul who negotiated and signed the Treaty, said of Old Calabar "this country with its dependencies extends from Tom Shots... to the River Rumby (on the west of the Cameroon Mountains), both inclusive". Some six years later, in 1890, another British consul, Johnston, reported to the Foreign Office that "the rule of the Old Calabar Chiefs extends far beyond the Akpayafe River to the very base of the Cameroon Mountains". The Court observes that, while this territory extends considerably eastwards of Bakassi, Johnston did report that the Old Calabar Chiefs had withdrawn from the lands east of the Ndian. Bakassi and the Rio del Rey lay to the west of the Ndian, an area referred to by Johnston as "their real, undoubted territory".
In the view of the Court Great Britain had a clear understanding of the area ruled at different times by the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar, and of their standing.
In relation to a treaty of this kind in another part of the world, Max Huber, sitting as sole arbitrator in the Island of Palmas case, explained that such a treaty
"is not an agreement between equals; it is rather a form of internal organisation of a colonial territory, on the basis of autonomy of the natives... And thus suzerainty over the native States becomes the basis of territorial sovereignty as towards other members of the community of nations." (United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards (RIAA), Vol. II, pp. 858-859.)
The Court points out that these concepts also found expression in the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion. There the Court stated that in territories that were not terra nullius, but were inhabited by tribes or people having a social and political organization, "agreements concluded with local rulers... were regarded as derivative roots of title" (Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 39, para. 80). Even if this mode of acquisition does not reflect current international law, the principle of intertemporal law requires that the legal consequences of the treaties concluded at that time in the Niger delta be given effect today, in the present dispute.
Nigeria itself has been unable to point to any role, in matters relevant to the present case, played by the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar after the conclusion of the 1884 Treaty. In responding to a question of a Member of the Court Nigeria stated "It is not possible to say with clarity and certainty what happened to the international legal personality of the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar after 1885."
The Court notes that a characteristic of an international protectorate is that of ongoing meetings and discussions between the protecting Power and the Rulers of the Protectorate. In the case concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain) the Court was presented with substantial documentation of this character, in large part being old British State papers. In the present case the Court was informed that "Nigeria can neither say that no such meetings ever took place, or that they did take place... the records which would enable the question to be answered probably no longer exist...".
The Court notes in this regard that in 1885 Great Britain had established by proclamation a "British Protectorate of the Niger Districts" (which subsequently changed names a number of times), incorporating in a single entity the various territories covered by the treaties of protection entered into in the region since July 1884. The Court further notes that there is no reference to Old Calabar in any of the various British Orders in Council, of whatever date, which list protectorates and protected States. The same is true of the British Protected Persons Order of 1934, the Schedule to which refers to "Nigerian Protectorate and Cameroons under British Mandate". Nor is there any reference to Old Calabar in the Second Schedule to the British Protectorates, Protected States and Protected Persons Order in Council, 1949, though in the First Schedule there is a reference to the "Nigerian Protectorate".
Moreover, the Court has been presented with no evidence of any protest in 1913 by the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar; nor of any action by them to pass territory to Nigeria as it emerged to independence in 1960.
Cameroon contends that the mandate and trusteeship period, and the subsequent independence process, show recognition on the part of the international community of Cameroon’s attachment to the Bakassi Peninsula.
Following the First World War, it was decided that the German colony of Cameroon should be administered in partitioned form by Britain and France under the framework of League of Nations mandate arrangements. Bakassi is said to have formed part of the area of the British Cameroons termed Southern Cameroons. This territorial definition is said to have been repeated in the trusteeship agreements which succeeded the mandates system after the Second World War. According to Cameroon, there was never any doubt in the minds of the British authorities that Bakassi formed part of the mandated and trusteeship territory of the Cameroons since Bakassi had formed part of German Cameroon pursuant to the Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913. Moreover, although the British Cameroons Order in Council of 1923 established that the Northern and Southern Cameroons would be administered "as if they formed part of’ Nigeria, Cameroon emphasized that this was merely an administrative arrangement which did not lead to the incorporation of these territories into Nigeria. Cameroon produces documentary evidence, British Orders in Council and maps which, it claims, evidence that Bakassi is consistently placed within the British Cameroons throughout this period.
Cameroon further recalls that the United Nations plebiscites, held on 11 and 12 February 1961, resulted in a clear majority in the Northern Cameroons voting to join Nigeria, and a clear majority in the Southern Cameroons voting to join Cameroon. It maintains that the process of holding the plebiscite meant that the areas that fell within the Northern and Southern Cameroons had to be ascertained. Cameroon points out that the map attached to the Report of the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner shows that the Bakassi Peninsula formed part of the Victoria South West plebiscite district in the south-east corner of Cameroon. This would show that the peninsula was recognized by the United Nations as being a part of the Southern Cameroons. Cameroon also emphasizes the absence of protest by Nigeria to the proposed boundary during the independence process, and the fact that Nigeria voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 1608 (XV) by which the British trusteeship was formally terminated.
Cameroon further refers to the maritime negotiations between Nigeria and Cameroon since independence, which resulted in instruments under which Nigeria is said to have recognized the validity of the Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913, the boundary deriving from it, and Cameroon’s sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula. These instruments included the Nigerian Note No. 570 of 27 March 1962, the Yaounde II Agreement of 4 April 1971, the Kano Agreement of 1 September 1974 and the Maroua Agreement of 1 June 1975.
Cameroon finally refers to its granting of permits for hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation over the Bakassi Peninsula itself and offshore, commencing in the early 1960s as well as to a number of consular and ambassadorial visits to the Bakassi region by Nigerian consuls and ambassadors, whose conduct in requesting permission and co-operation from the Cameroonian local officials and expressing thanks for it is said to corroborate Cameroon’s claim to sovereignty over Bakassi.
Nigeria further denies the binding nature of the delimitation agreements referred to by Cameroon, in particular the Maroua Declaration, whose adoption, it claims, was never approved by the Supreme Military Council in contravention of Nigeria’s constitutional requirements. It also denies the evidentiary value of the visits to the Bakassi region by Nigerian dignitaries referred to by Cameroon, on the basis that consular officials are not mandated to deal with issues of title to territory, nor to make assessments of questions of sovereignty, and, as such, their actions cannot be taken to impact upon these questions. Finally, on the issue of the granting of oil exploration permits and production agreements, Nigeria argues inter alia that "the area in dispute was the subject of competing exploration activities" and that "the incidence of oil-related activities was not... regarded [by the Parties] as conclusive of the issue of sovereignty".
When, after the Second World War and the establishment of the United Nations, the mandate was converted to a trusteeship, the territorial situation remained exactly the same. The "as if’ provision continued in place, and again the Administering Authority had no authority unilaterally to alter the boundaries of the trusteeship territory. Thus for the entire period from 1922 until 1961 (when the Trusteeship was terminated), Bakassi was comprised within British Cameroon. The boundary between Bakassi and Nigeria, notwithstanding the administrative arrangements, remained an international boundary.
The Court is unable to accept Nigeria’s contention that until its independence in 1961, and notwithstanding the Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913, the Bakassi Peninsula had remained under the sovereignty of the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar. Neither the League of Nations nor the United Nations considered that to be the position.
The Court notes in particular that there was nothing which might have led Nigeria to believe that the plebiscite which took place in the Southern Cameroons in 1961 under United Nations supervision did not include Bakassi.
It is true that the Southern Cameroons Plebiscite Order in Council, 1960 makes no mention of any polling station bearing the name of a Bakassi village. Nor, however, does the Order in Council specifically exclude Bakassi from its scope. The Order simply refers to the Southern Cameroons as a whole. But at that time it was already clearly established that Bakassi formed part of the Southern Cameroons under British trusteeship. The boundaries of that territory had been precisely defined in the "Northern Region, Western Region and Eastern Region (Definition of Boundaries) Proclamation, 1954", issued pursuant to the Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council, 1951. That Proclamation, repeating the provisions of the Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913, provided in particular: "From the sea the boundary follows the navigable channel of the River Akpa-Yafe; then follows the thalweg of the aforesaid River Akpa-Yafe upstream to its confluence with the Rivers Akpa-Korum and Ebe." That the 1960 Order in Council applied to the Southern Cameroons as a whole is further confirmed by the fact, as noted in the Report of the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner for the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, that the 26 "plebiscite districts" established by the 1960 Order in Council corresponded to the "electoral constituencies for the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly".
The United Nations map indicating the voting districts for the plebiscite also reflected the provisions of the Agreement of 11 March 1913 reiterated in the above-mentioned 1954 Proclamation.
The Court further observes that this frontier line was acknowledged in turn by Nigeria when it voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 1608 (XV), which both terminated the Trusteeship and approved the results of the plebiscite.
This common understanding of where title lay in Bakassi continued through until the late 1970s, when the Parties were engaging in discussions on their maritime frontier. In this respect. Article XXI of the Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913 provided:
"From the centre of the navigable channel on a line joining Bakassi Point and King Point, the boundary shall follow the centre of the navigable channel of the Akwayafe River as far as the 3-mile limit of territorial jurisdiction. For the purpose of defining this boundary, the navigable channel of the Akwayafe River shall be considered to lie wholly to the east of the navigable channel of the Cross and Calabar Rivers."
Article XXII provided that: "The 3-mile limit shall, as regards the mouth of the estuary, be taken as a line 3 nautical miles seaward of a line joining Sandy Point and Tom Shot Point."
In 1970 Cameroon and Nigeria decided to carry out a total delimitation and demarcation of their boundaries, starting from the sea. Under the terms of Article 2 of the Yaounde I Declaration of 14 August 1970 and the agreement reached in the Yaounde II Declaration of 4 April 1971 with its signed appended chart, it was agreed to fix the boundary in the Akwayafe estuary from point 1 to point 12 (see paragraph 38 above). Then, by declaration signed at Maroua on 1 June 1975, the two Heads of State "agreed to extend the delineation of the maritime boundary between the countries from Point 12 to Point G on the Admiralty Chart No. 3433 annexed to this Declaration" and precisely defined the boundary by reference to maritime co-ordinates (see paragraph 38 above). The Court finds that it is clear from each one of these elements that the Parties took it as a given that Bakassi belonged to Cameroon. Nigeria, drawing on the full weight of its experts as well as its most senior political figures, understood Bakassi to be under Cameroon sovereignty.
This remains the case quite regardless of the need to recalculate the co-ordinates of point B through an Exchange of Letters of 12 June and 17 July 1975 between the Heads of State concerned; and quite regardless whether the Maroua Declaration constituted an international agreement by which Nigeria was bound. The Court addresses these aspects at paragraphs 262 to 268 below.
Accordingly, the Court finds that at that time Nigeria accepted that it was bound by Articles XVIII to XXII of the Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913, and that it recognized Cameroonian sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula.
Equally, the Court has not found it necessary to pronounce upon the arguments of uti possidetis advanced by the Parties in relation to Bakassi.
The Court now turns to further claims to Bakassi relied on by Nigeria. Nigeria advances "three distinct but interrelated bases of title over the Bakassi Peninsula":
"(i) Long occupation by Nigeria and by Nigerian nationals constituting an historical consolidation of title and confirming the original title of the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar, which title vested in Nigeria at the time of independence in 1960;
(ii) peaceful possession by Nigeria, acting as sovereign, and an absence of protest by Cameroon; and
(iii) manifestations of sovereignty by Nigeria together with acquiescence by Cameroon in Nigerian sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula."
Nigeria particularly emphasizes that the title on the basis of historical consolidation, together with acquiescence, in the period since the independence of Nigeria, "constitutes an independent and self-sufficient title to Bakassi". Nigeria perceived the situation as comparable to that in the Minquiers and Ecrehos case, in which both parties contended that they retained an ancient title (I.C.J. Reports 1953, p. 53) but the Court considered that "[w]hat is of decisive importance... is... the evidence which relates directly to the possession of the Ecrehos and Minquiers groups" (ibid., p. 57). Nigeria also presents evidence of various State activities, together with other components of historic consolidation of title. It contends inter alia that Nigerian authorities had collected tax as part of a consistent pattern of activity, that Nigeria had established health centres for the benefit of the communities at Bakassi, often with the assistance of local communities, and that its health centre at Ikang on the other side of the Akwayafe treated patients from Bakassi. Nigeria also refers to a number of other miscellaneous State activities during the post-independence era, including the use of Nigerian currency for both public and commercial purposes or the use of Nigerian passports by residents of Bakassi.
Historical consolidation was also invoked in connection with the first of Nigeria’s further claimed bases of title, namely peaceful possession in the absence of protest. The Court notes that it has already addressed these aspects of the theory of historical consolidation in paragraphs 62 to 70 above. The Court thus finds that invocation of historical consolidation cannot in any event vest title to Bakassi in Nigeria, where its "occupation" of the peninsula is adverse to Cameroon’s prior treaty title and where, moreover, the possession has been for a limited period.
The Court cannot therefore accept this first basis of title over Bakassi relied on by Nigeria.
The Court finds that the evidence before it indicates that the small population of Bakassi already present in the early 1960s grew with the influx from Nigeria in 1968 as a result of the civil war in that country. Gradually sizeable centres of population were established. The Parties are in disagreement as to the total number of Nigerian nationals living in the peninsula today, but it is clear that it has grown considerably from the modest numbers reported in the 1953 and 1963 population censuses. Nor is there any reason to doubt the Efik and Effiat toponomy of the settlements, or their relationships with Nigeria. But these facts of themselves do not establish Nigerian title over Bakassi territory; nor can they serve as an element in a claim for historical consolidation of title, for reasons already given by the Court (see paragraphs 64-70).
It is true that the provision of education in the Bakassi settlements appears to be largely Nigerian. Religious schools were established in 1960 at Archibong, in 1968 at Atabong and in Abana in 1969. These were not supported by public funds, but were under the authority of the Nigerian examination and education authorities. Community schools were also established at Atabong East in 1968, Mbenonong in 1975 and Nwanyo in 1981. The schools established in Abana in 1992, and in Archibong and Atabong in 1993, were Nigerian government schools or State secondary schools.
There is evidence that since 1959 health centres have been established with the assistance of local communities receiving supplies, guidance and training for personnel in Nigeria. The ten centres include centres established at Archibong in 1959, Mbenonong in 1960, Atabong West in 1968, Abana in 1991 and Atabong East in 1992.
There was also some collection of tax, certainly from Akwa, Archibong, Moen Mong, Naranyo, Atabong and Abana.
Nigeria notes that Cameroon failed actively to protest these administrative activities of Nigeria before 1994 (save, notably, the building by Nigeria of a primary school in Abana in 1969). It also contends that the case law of this Court, and of certain arbitral awards, makes clear that such acts are indeed acts d titre de souverain, and as such relevant to the question of territorial title (Minquiers and Ecrehos, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1953: Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975: Rann of Kutch, Arbitral Award, 50 International Law Reports (ILR) 1; Beagle Channel Arbitration, 52 ILR 93).
In the view of the Court the more relevant legal question in this case is whether the conduct of Cameroon, as the title holder, can be viewed as an acquiescence in the loss of the treaty title that it inherited upon independence. There is some evidence that Cameroon attempted, inter alia, to collect tax from Nigerian residents, in the year 1981-1982, in Idaboto I and II, Jabare I and II, Kombo Abedimo, Naumsi Wan and Forisane (West and East Atabong, Abana and Ine Ikoi). But it engaged in only occasional direct acts of administration in Bakassi, having limited material resources to devote to this distant area.
However, its title was already established. Moreover, as the Court has shown above (see paragraph 213), in 1961-1962 Nigeria clearly and publicly recognized Cameroon title to Bakassi. That continued to be the position until at least 1975, when Nigeria signed the Maroua Declaration. No Nigerian effectivités in Bakassi before that time can be said to have legal significance for demonstrating a Nigerian title; this may in part explain the absence of Cameroon protests regarding health, education and tax activity in Nigeria. The Court also notes that Cameroon had since its independence engaged in activities which made clear that it in no way was abandoning its title to Bakassi. Cameroon and Nigeria participated from 1971 to 1975 in the negotiations leading to the Yaounde, Kano and Maroua Declarations, with the maritime line clearly being predicated upon Cameroon’s title to Bakassi. Cameroon also granted hydrocarbon licences over the peninsula and its waters, again evidencing that it had not abandoned title in the face of the significant Nigerian presence in Bakassi or any Nigerian effectivités contra legem. And protest was immediately made regarding Nigerian military action in 1994.
For all of these reasons the Court is also unable to accept the second and third bases of title to Bakassi advanced by Nigeria.
In its Application filed on 29 March 1994 under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute Cameroon requested the Court, "[i]n order to avoid further incidents between the two countries,... to determine the course of the maritime boundary between the two States beyond the line fixed in 1975". In its final submissions presented to the Court at the end of the oral proceedings on 21 March 2002, Cameroon maintained its request for the drawing of the maritime boundary, but it did so in a different form. Cameroon now requests that the Court confirm that "[t]he boundary of the maritime areas appertaining respectively to the Republic of Cameroon and the Federal Republic of Nigeria takes the following course", which Cameroon describes in detail in the two subparagraphs of paragraph (c) of its submissions.
Nigeria claims that the Court should refuse to carry out in whole or in part the delimitation requested by Cameroon, first, because the delimitation affects areas claimed by third States, and, secondly, because the requirement of prior negotiations has not been satisfied.
The Court must first deal with these arguments of Nigeria.
"[W]here the parties do not oppose the intervention and the latter is authorized, as in the present case,... the Court may (and must, in accordance with the mission incumbent upon it definitively to settle the disputes referred to it) proceed to a complete delimitation, whether or not the latter is legally binding on the intervening party...";
otherwise "the intervention regime would cease to have any point". Cameroon argues that the purpose of Equatorial Guinea’s intervention is essentially to inform the Court with regard to the whole range of interests at stake in the area concerned and to enable it with full knowledge of the facts to undertake a complete and final delimitation. Nonetheless, in so doing, the Court will need to ensure that it does not prejudice the interests of the intervening State, the relevance of which it is for the Court to assess. Further, Cameroon contends that an intervening State cannot, by making fanciful claims, preclude the Court from ruling in its judgment on the area to which such claims relate.
"by which it shall either uphold the objection, reject it, or declare that the objection does not possess in the circumstances of the case, an exclusively preliminary character. If the Court rejects the objection or declares that it does not possess an exclusively preliminary character, it shall fix time-limits for the further proceedings." (Rules of Court, Art. 79, para. 7.)
(See Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, pp. 27-28, paras. 49-50; Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, pp. 132-134, paras. 48-49; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 30, para. 40.) Since Nigeria maintains its objection, the Court must now rule on it.
The jurisdiction of the Court is founded on the consent of the parties. The Court cannot therefore decide upon legal rights of third States not parties to the proceedings. In the present case there are States other than the parties to these proceedings whose rights might be affected, namely Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe. Those rights cannot be determined by decision of the Court unless Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe have become parties to the proceedings. Equatorial Guinea has indeed requested — and has been granted — permission to intervene, but as a non-party intervener only. Sao Tome and Principe has chosen not to intervene on any basis.
The Court considers that, in particular in the case of maritime delimitations where the maritime areas of several States are involved, the protection afforded by Article 59 of the Statute may not always be sufficient. In the present case, Article 59 may not sufficiently protect Equatorial Guinea or Sao Tome and Principe from the effects — even if only indirect — of a judgment affecting their legal rights. The jurisprudence cited by Cameroon does not prove otherwise. In its decision in the case concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), the Court did not deal with rights of third States; what was principally at issue there was the question of proportionality of coastline lengths in relation to the process of delimitation between the parties (I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 91, para. 130). It follows that, in fixing the maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, the Court must ensure that it does not adopt any position which might affect the rights of Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe. Nor does the Court accept Cameroon’s contention that the reasoning in the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali) (I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 554) and the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad) (I.C.J. Reports 1994, p. 6) in regard to land boundaries is necessarily transposable to those concerning maritime boundaries. These are two distinct areas of the law, to which different factors and considerations apply. Moreover, in relation to the specific issue of the tripoint, the Court notes that both Parlies agree that it should not fix one. It is indeed not entitled to do so. In determining any line, the Court must take account of this.
In view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that it cannot rule on Cameroon’s claims in so far as they might affect rights of Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe. Nonetheless, the mere presence of those two States, whose rights might be affected by the decision of the Court, does not in itself preclude the Court from having jurisdiction over a maritime delimitation between the Parties to the case before it, namely Cameroon and Nigeria, although it must remain mindful, as always in situations of this kind, of the limitations on its jurisdiction that such presence imposes.
"in this case, it ha[d] not been seised on the basis of Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute, and, in pursuance of it, in accordance with Part XV of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea relating to the settlement of disputes arising between the parties to the Convention with respect to its interpretation or application".
The Court had, on the contrary, "been seised on the basis of declarations made under Article 36, paragraph 2", and those declarations "[did] not contain any condition relating to prior negotiations to be conducted within a reasonable time period" (I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 322, para. 109).
The Court noted in its Judgment of 11 June 1998 (I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 321, para. 107, and p. 322, para. 110) that negotiations between the Governments of Cameroon and Nigeria concerning the entire maritime delimitation — up to point G and beyond — were conducted as far back as the 1970s. These negotiations did not lead to an agreement. However, Articles 74 and 83 of the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention do not require that delimitation negotiations should be successful; like all similar obligations to negotiate in international law, the negotiations have to be conducted in good faith. The Court reaffirms its finding in regard to the preliminary objections that negotiations have indeed taken place. Moreover, if, following unsuccessful negotiations, judicial proceedings are instituted and one of the parties then alters its claim, Articles 74 and 83 of the Law of the Sea Convention would not require that the proceedings be suspended while new negotiations were conducted. It is of course true that the Court is not a negotiating forum. In such a situation, however, the new claim would have to be dealt with exclusively by judicial means. Any other solution would lead to delays and complications in the process of delimitation of continental shelves and exclusive economic zones. The Law of the Sea Convention does not require such a suspension of the proceedings.
The Court is therefore in a position to proceed to the delimitation of the maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria in so far as the rights of Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe are not affected.
Cameroon argues that the signing of the Maroua Agreement by the Heads of State of Nigeria and Cameroon on 1 June 1975 expresses the consent of the two States to be bound by that treaty; that the two Heads of State manifested their intention to be bound by the instrument they signed; that no reservation or condition was expressed in the text, and that the instrument was not expressed to be subject to ratification; that the publication of the Joint Communique signed by the Heads of State is also proof of that consent; that the validity of the Maroua Agreement was confirmed by the subsequent exchange of letters between the Heads of State of the two countries correcting a technical error in the calculation of one of the points on the newly agreed line; and that the reference to Yaounde II in the Maroua Agreement confirms that the legal status of the former is no different from that of the latter.
Cameroon further argues that these conclusions are confirmed by the publicity given to the partial maritime boundary established by the Maroua Agreement, which was notified to the Secretariat of the United Nations and published in a whole range of publications which have widespread coverage and are well known in the field of maritime boundary delimitation. It contends that they are, moreover, confirmed by the contemporary practice of States, by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and by the fact that international law comes down unequivocally in favour of the stability and permanence of boundary agreements, whether land or maritime.
Nigeria says that Cameroon, according to an objective test based upon the provisions of the Vienna Convention, either knew or, conducting itself in a normally prudent manner, should have known that the Head of State of Nigeria did not have the authority to make legally binding commitments without referring back to the Nigerian Government — at that time the Supreme Military Council — and that it should therefore have been "objectively evident" to Cameroon, within the meaning of Article 46, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that the Head of State of Nigeria did not have unrestricted authority. Nigeria adds that Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides that Heads of State and Heads of Government "[i]n virtue of their functions and without having to produce full powers... are considered as representing their State", is solely concerned with the way in which a person’s function as a State’s representative is established, but does not deal with the extent of that person’s powers when exercising that representative function.
However, it is unnecessary to determine the status of the Declaration in isolation, since the line described therein is confirmed by the terms of the Maroua Declaration, which refers in its third paragraph to "Point 12... situated at the end of the line of the maritime boundary adopted by the two Heads of State on April 4, 1971". If the Maroua Declaration represents an international agreement binding on both parties, it necessarily follows that the line contained in the Yaounde II Declaration, including the co-ordinates as agreed at the June 1971 meeting of the Joint Boundary Commission, is also binding on them.
The Court cannot accept Nigeria’s argument that Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is solely concerned with the way in which a person’s function as a State’s representative is established, but does not deal with the extent of that person’s powers when exercising that representative function. The Court notes that the commentary of the International Law Commission on Article 7, paragraph 2, expressly states that "Heads of State... are considered as representing their State for the purpose of performing all acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty" (ILC Commentary, Art. 6 (of what was then the draft Convention), para. 4, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966, Vol. II, p. 193).
In this case the Head of State of Nigeria had in August 1974 stated in his letter to the Head of State of Cameroon that the views of the Joint Commission "must be subject to the agreement of the two Governments". However, in the following paragraph of that same letter, he further indicated: "It has always been my belief that we can, both, together re-examine the situation and reach an appropriate and acceptable decision on the matter." Contrary to Nigeria’s contention, the Court considers that these two statements, read together, cannot be regarded as a specific warning to Cameroon that the Nigerian Government would not be bound by any commitment entered into by the Head of State. And in particular they could not be understood as relating to any commitment to be made at Maroua nine months later. The letter in question in fact concerned a meeting to be held at Kano, Nigeria, from 30 August to 1 September 1974. This letter seems to have been part of a pattern which marked the Parties’ boundary negotiations between 1970 and 1975, in which the two Heads of State took the initiative of resolving difficulties in those negotiations through person-to-person agreements, including those at Yaounde II and Maroua.
"the most appropriate criteria, and the method or combination of methods most likely to yield a result consonant with what the law indicates, can only be determined in relation to each particular case and its specific characteristics" (I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 290, para. 81).
Cameroon insists on the fact that the equidistance principle is not a principle of customary law that is automatically applicable in every maritime boundary delimitation between States whose coasts are adjacent, observing that, if a strict equidistance line were drawn, it would be entitled to practically no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf, despite the fact that it has a longer relevant coastline than Nigeria.
Cameroon further contends, arguing a contrario from the Court’s reasoning in the case concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta) (I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 42, para. 53), that "[t]he delimitation regime is not identical for an island State and for a dependent, isolated island falling under the sovereignty of a State". Arguing that Bioko should not necessarily be given its full effect, it insists that what must be avoided at all costs is a "radical and absolute cut-off of the projection of [Cameroon’s] coastal front". In this regard it cites a dictum from the Award in the case concerning Delimitation of Maritime Areas between Canada and the French Republic (St. Pierre et Miquelon), in which the Arbitral Tribunal stated that "the delimitation must leave to a State the areas that constitute the natural prolongation or seaward extension of its coasts, so that the delimitation must avoid any cut-off effect of those prolongations or seaward extensions" (ILM, Vol. 31 (1992), p. 1167, para. 58).
"— from point G the equitable line follows the direction indicated by points G, H (co-ordinates 8°21' 16" east and 4° 17" north), I (7° 55'40" east and 3° 46' north), J (7° 12'08" east and 3° 12'35" north), K (6° 45'22" east and 3° 01'05" north), and continues from K up to the outer limit of the maritime zones which international law places under the respective jurisdiction of the two Parties".
"pre-empt any delimitation between Nigeria and the two States whose coasts face its own with no intervening obstacle, i.e., Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe, in areas that at each point are nearer to and more closely connected with the coasts of these three States than with the Cameroonian coastline".
In that sense it is claimed to be an exclusion line and hence incompatible with international law.