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Final Award

I. INTRODUCTION

1.1.
Pursuant to the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") / International Centre for Dispute Resolution ("ICDR") International Arbitration Rules, an evidentiary hearing ("the Hearing") was held in this proceeding over two days (originally scheduled for 5 days with the input of the parties), commencing May 8, 2018, before the duly appointed arbitrator Jeffrey G. Benz (the "Arbitrator"). The Arbitrator, having been designated in accordance with the arbitration agreement entered into between the above-named parties and dated September 25, 2015, and having been duly sworn, and having duly heard the proofs, arguments, witness testimony, and allegations, and supplemental submissions, of the parties, and having rendered a Partial Final Award dated 29 June 2018, does hereby render this Final Award pursuant to his undertaking to do so within the time required under the relevant rules, as follows:
1.2.
The Phase 1 hearing in this proceeding was limited to determining liability and the relief to which any party might be entitled.
1.3.
The issue of the amount of costs including arbitration fees and expenses, ICDR fees, attorney's fees and costs, and prejudgment interest were bifurcated and have been determined in a subsequent Phase 2 hearing (on the papers, received only from Claimant), in accordance with Procedural Order No. 4, ¶¶ 6 (a) and (b), dated 25 January 2018 ("Phase 2 Hearing").
1.4.
After having read and considered the Claimants' Phase 2 submissions, and the absence of submissions from Respondent despite having been properly and repeatedly invited to do so, the Arbitrator finds as follows:

II. THE PARTIES

2.1.
Claimant Matthias Paul p/k/a Paul van Dyk ("Paul") is an internationally renowned electronic music DJ and composer/producer whose career has spanned more than two decades. Claimant Paul van Dyk GmbH ("GmbH") is a German company wholly owned and controlled by Paul and serves essentially as his "loan out" company. Paul and GmbH will be collectively referenced as the "Claimants."
2.2.
Respondent ALDA Events B.V. ("Alda") is a Dutch company that for approximately 10 years has engaged in the business of promoting and producing electronic music concerts and festivals in The Netherlands, Europe, the United States, South America, and Asia. One of the major electronic music festivals produced and promoted by Alda is known as A State Of Trance which, as admitted in Alda's Answer, "is a worldwide-event that is held in several counties." Answer, ¶ 3.1. One of the annual A State Of Trance festivals is presented at the Jaarbeurs venue in Utrecht, The Netherlands. A State Of Trance is also the name of a radio program series presented by the well-known Dutch electronic music DJ Armin van Buuren. Each annual A State Of Trance music festival presented by Alda in Utrecht also has in its title the running total number of those radio programs presented by van Buuren. The February 2016 A State Of Trance festival in Utrecht was titled A State Of Trance 750 ("ASOT 750").
2.3.
Paul, GmbH, and Alda are parties to a September 25, 2015 agreement (the "Booking Agreement") for the musical performance of Paul at the February 27, 2016 ASOT 750 festival held at Jaarbeurs Utrecht, The Netherlands and produced by Alda.
2.4.
Paul and GmbH were represented in this proceeding and at the Hearing by Vincent H. Chieffo, Esq. of the international law firm of Greenberg Traurig, LLP and by Kurosh Nasseri, Esq. of the Law Offices of Kurosh Nasseri.
2.4.
Alda was represented during this proceeding by Dr. Christoph Jeloschek and Dr. Esther Pans of the law firm Kennedy Van der Laan. As more fully explained below, Alda did not appear at the Hearing and Dr. Jeloschek and Dr. Pans did not participate in the Hearing though they were invited to do so and served with all relevant documents.

III. ARBITRATION AND CHOICE OF LAW CLAUSE

3.1.
The Booking Agreement contains the following arbitration and choice of law provisions in Paragraph 24 of the expressly incorporated and attached "Additional Terms And Conditions" (hereinafter "Paragraph 24"):

"This Agreement shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the State of California without regard to its application of choice of laws. Any claim or dispute arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach thereof shall be settled by arbitration in Los Angeles, California in accordance with the commercial rules and regulations then in effect of the American Arbitration Association. The Parties hereto agree to be bound by the award of such arbitration and judgment on the award may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof."

3.2.
At the request of Alda, the Arbitrator, by Procedural Order No. 1, dated October 13, 2017, determined that this proceeding was an international arbitration and ruled that the ICDR International Arbitration Rules ("ICDR Rules") were the applicable procedural rules in this proceeding.

IV. PROCEDURAL HISTOR Y

A. Commencement of this Arbitration

4.1.
On March 8, 2017 Claimants commenced this Arbitration by delivering their Notice of Arbitration, dated March 7, 2017, to the AAA/ICDR. The Notice of Arbitration asserted claims for breach of the Booking Agreement and for negligence relating to a fall suffered by Paul during his performance at ASOT 750 and for recovery of all damages arising from such breach and negligence.
4.2.
Alda filed its Answer to the Notice of Arbitration ("Answer") on March 28, 2017 raising certain preliminary defenses and denying any liability to Claimants.
4.3.
In addition to determining that the ICDR Rules governed this proceeding, the Arbitrator's Procedural Order No. 1 ordered Alda to file within 7 days of the date of that Order any challenge to jurisdiction of the Arbitrator and any challenge Alda might have to the application in this proceeding of the substantive law of California chosen in the choice of law clause of Paragraph 24. The filing date was subsequently extended by the Arbitrator and Alda timely filed its Submission regarding arbitral jurisdiction and standing which is discussed immediately below.

B. Alda's Challenge to Arbitral Jurisdiction and Standing

4.4.
On October 25, 2017 Alda filed its Submission (the "Submission") regarding its two preliminary defenses challenging (1) the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to determine all or some of the claims submitted by Claimants' Notice of Arbitration because of the alleged lack of a valid arbitration agreement between the parties in the Booking Agreement and (2) the alleged lack of standing of Paul in this proceeding because he was allegedly neither a party to, nor a third party beneficiary of, the Booking Agreement.
4.5.
Claimants filed their opposition to Alda's Submission on November 1, 2017 arguing (1) that Alda had expressly agreed to the Booking Agreement including its arbitration clause in Paragraph 24, quoted above and that (2) pursuant to the express terms of the Booking Agreement, Alda had agreed that Paul was a party to that agreement because the Booking agreement expressly provides that it may be enforced by Alda against Paul personally and that it may be enforced by Paul personally against Alda. Claimants also filed the declaration of Kurosh Nasseri and attached exhibits in support of their opposition to Claimants' Submission.
4.6.
The Arbitrator has the power to rule on Alda's objection to its jurisdiction, ICDR Rules Art. 19, ¶ 1; California Code of Civil Procedures ("CCP") §1297.161.
4.7.
A telephonic hearing on Alda's Submission was held on November 10, 2017. At the close of that hearing, the Arbitrator announced his decision to enter an order denying the relief sought by Alda's Submission. By entry of Procedural Order No. 3, dated November 20, 2017, the Arbitrator denied the relief sought in Alda's Submission ruling that arbitral jurisdiction is present and that both Claimants have standing to assert their claims in this proceeding and further stating that the reasoning for the decision in Procedural Order No. 3 would be set forth in the Arbitrator's final award or in an interim award. The Arbitrator's reasoning for denying the relief sought by Alda in its Submission is set forth below.
4.8.
The Arbitrator also notes that while Alda was ordered by Procedural Order No. 1 to present its challenge, if any, that it might have had to the application of California substantive law to these proceedings, Alda's Submission did not separately argue that California substantive law should not apply to these proceedings if the Arbitrator were to deny Alda's jurisdictional challenge. Alda has not since then made any argument challenging the application of California substantive law to this proceeding. The Arbitrator finds that Alda has waived any challenge it may have had in this regard. And even if such a challenge had been made, the Arbitrator would have overruled it finding that the choice of law clause in Paragraph 24 is fully enforceable, thereby applying the chosen substantive law of California, including, where applicable, California's Arbitration and Conciliation of International Commercial Disputes statute, CCP §§1297.11, et seq.

1. The Booking Agreement Contains an Enforceable Arbitration Agreement

4.9.
Alda's contention that there was no enforceable arbitration agreement set forth in Paragraph 24 and, thus, the Arbitrator did not have jurisdiction to decide the Claims Claimants submitted to arbitration was premised on three arguments.
4.10.
First, Alda claimed that [Person 1], who signed the Booking Agreement on behalf of Claimants, did not have the legal authority to do so. This claim has no merit. Alda, Paul, and GmbH performed the Booking Agreement as evidenced by Paul rendering his personal musical performance at ASOT 750 (until interrupted by his fall) and Alda paying the contractual price for that performance. Thus, even if there were any question about Ms. [Person 1]'s authority to sign the Booking Agreement, such authority was ratified by Claimants and such ratification was accepted by Alda. Moreover, the un-contradicted evidence submitted by Claimants in support of their opposition to Alda's Submission (and the un-contradicted testimony submitted at the Hearing) proved that Ms. [Person 1] indeed had the authority to sign the Booking Agreement on behalf of both Paul and GmbH.
4.11.
Second, Alda argued that its failure to initial the bottom of the page of the Booking Agreement where Paragraph 24 appears was evidence that Alda did not agree to the arbitration agreement set forth in that paragraph. Alda's argument lacks merit. In the first place, Alda has not cited any legal authority (whether from California or any other jurisdiction) imposing a legal obligation on the contracting to initial each page of a contract that the party has otherwise signed where the contract provides the parties to sign. The Arbitrator is not aware of such legal authority or requirement under California law. Alda reviewed and negotiated all six pages of the Booking Agreement as well as the attached and incorporated multi-page "Paul van Dyk Tech & Hospitality Festival Rider." Alda signed at page 2 of the Booking Agreement and at the last page of the "Paul van Dyk Tech & Hospitality Festival Rider."
4.12.
The Nasseri Declaration and exhibits submitted by Claimants set forth the un-contradicted history of the negotiation and signing of the Booking Agreement which history clearly evidenced these facts. Pages 3-6 of the Booking Agreement set forth the "Additional Terms and Conditions" that were expressly incorporated into and made part of the Booking Agreement at pages 1 and 3. During the negotiations, Alda made interlineated comments to some terms included in the "Additional Terms and Conditions," but made no comments to Paragraph 24. Alda's signature on page 2 of the Booking agreement clearly evidences its agreement to all of the terms of the incorporated "Additional Terms and Conditions," including the arbitration agreement in Paragraph 24.
4.13.
The past contractual practices between Alda and Claimants also evidence that Alda agreed to the arbitration agreement in Paragraph 24 of the Booking Agreement. In two separate and prior agreements between Alda and Claimants for the musical performance of Paul at Alda produced and sponsored ASOT events dated December 13, 2013 and September 9, 2015, Alda agreed to arbitration clauses identical in language to the one contained in Paragraph 24 of the Booking Agreement (dated September 25, 2015) and in those earlier agreements those identical arbitration clauses were each also numbered paragraph 24.
4.14.
Third, Alda argued that under the New York Convention (Article II.1) the arbitration clause is not enforceable because it was not "signed by the parties." Alda's argument based on the New York Convention is without merit. The text of the New York Convention makes this clear. The New York Convention requires only that there be an arbitral clause in a contract signed by the parties, or an arbitration agreement signed by the parties, or, in either case, "contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams." New York Convention, Art. II.2, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, 1970 U.S.T. LEXIS 115. Claimants have presented an arbitral clause (Paragraph 24) in a contract (the Booking Agreement) signed by the parties.
4.15.
As noted above, Alda has not submitted any legal authority from any jurisdiction to support its three arguments of why Alda should be found not to have agreed to the arbitration provisions of Paragraph 24 of the Booking Agreement. In turn, Claimants have submitted authorities explaining why Alda's arguments should be rejected. The applicable test to determine whether Alda had agreed to the Booking Agreement and its arbitration clause is an objective one that asks whether a "reasonable person" would have understood Alda's actions to be a manifestation of consent. Roth v. Malson (1998) 67 Cal. App.4th 552, 557; see also, Democracy Council of Cal. v. WRN Ltd., PLC, 471 Fed. Appx. 802 (9th Cir. 2102) (holding that party had manifested consent to a foreign forum selection clause contained in the incorporated General Terms and Conditions to a contract). Under California and applicable federal law there is a strong presumption favoring arbitration of disputes, even international disputes. Agreements to arbitrate such disputes merit great deference since they operate as both choice-of-forum and choice-of-law provisions. Even the "most minimal indication" of the parties' intent to arbitrate international disputes must be given effect. Republic of Nicaragua v. Standard Fruit Co. 937 F2d 469, 477, 478 (9th Cir. 1991) ("where the parties admit to signing a document that contains an arbitration provision, … all questions regarding breach of the agreement must be referred to arbitration"). By signing the Booking Agreement and making no negative or any other comment about its arbitration clause in Paragraph 24, particularly in light of the past business dealings between Alda and Claimants, Alda manifested its consent to the arbitration clause.

2. Paul is a Party to the Booking Agreement and has Standing to Enforcethe Arbitration Agreement in This Proceeding

4.16.
Alda argued that Paul was neither a party to the Booking Agreement nor a third-party beneficiary to that agreement and that he, therefore, did not have standing to pursue his claims asserted in this proceeding. Alda, however, made that claim without any analysis of the express terms of the Booking Agreement and it is without merit. Paul does have standing in this proceeding to assert his personal claims.
4.17.
A party to a contract is one who exchanges one or more promises or consideration with the other party (or parties), who can enforce the promise(s) received from the other side, and who is subject to the other party's enforcement of the promise(s) given to the other party. Under California law, a contract is defined as "an agreement to do or not to do a certain thing." California Civil Code ("Cal. Civ. Code") § 1549. Once entered into, a contract gives rise to an obligation or legal duty, enforceable in an action at law. Cal. Civ. Code §§1427, 1428. Paul meets these definitions with respect to the Booking Agreement and he is personally a party thereto with standing to enforce that agreement in this proceeding.
4.18.
The signature line of the Booking Agreement signed by Ms. [Person 1] is captioned "Producer/Artist" a contractual reference to both GmbH and Paul. The official stamp Ms. [Person 1] affixed to the Booking Agreement contains both Paul's personal name and the name of the GmbH with the latter below and in smaller font than Paul's name. As noted above, the evidence presented by Claimants in opposition to the Submission and at the Hearing shows that Ms. [Person 1] had the authority to sign on behalf of Paul personally and on behalf of GmbH.
4.19.
The actual terms of the Booking Agreement also establish that Paul was a party to the that agreement personally with the personal right to enforce the terms of the Booking Agreement against Alda and subject to Alda's enforcement of those terms against him personally. The Booking Agreement allows Alda to enforce the Booking Agreement against Paul in the event of breach by Paul, although the types of damages recoverable from Paul personally or from GmbH are limited. See Booking Agreement, Additional Terms and Condition, ¶¶ 13, and 19. Conversely, Paul personally is allowed to enforce the Booking Agreement against Alda in the event of breach and is "entitled to assert all claims and to exercise all rights and remedies" against Alda. Id., ¶ 12(e).
4.20.
In addition to the mutual agreement that Paul personally and Alda could each enforce the agreement against the other, Alda made other promises directly for the personal benefit of Paul. Alda agreed that Paul personally would have no liability for any damage or injury caused by any "Adverse Conditions", a term defined in the Booking Agreement. Id. ¶ 1. Alda agreed that Paul would personally be named as an "additional insured" on the insurance coverage Alda agreed to secure. Id. ¶ 16(a). And, Alda agreed to indemnify Paul personally against any "loss, cost, damage, or expense whatsoever, (including, without limitation, reasonable attorney's fees) arising out of or in connection with" Alda's breach or alleged breach of the Booking Agreement. Id. ¶ 17.
4.21.
Alda has expressly agreed that Paul can personally enforce the Booking Agreement against Alda and that he is "entitled to assert all claims and to exercise all rights and remedies" to do so which includes resorting to the arbitration clause of the Booking Agreement. Alda has thus knowingly agreed that Paul can prosecute his personal claims in this proceeding to resolve "any claim or dispute arising out of or relating the [the Booking agreement] or the breach thereof." Booking Agreement, Additional Terms and Condition, ¶ 24. California law has a strong public policy of enforcing arbitration agreements and it dictates that Alda's agreement is enforceable. Schatz v. Allen Matkins Leck Gamble & Mallory, LLP (2009) 45 Cal. 4th 557, 564.
4.22.
Alda offered no persuasive reasons for not allowing Paul to personally assert his claims in this proceeding.
4.23.
Even if Alda had not expressly agreed that Paul could personally enforce the Booking Agreement against Alda, under California law, Paul would be considered a third-party beneficiary of the Booking Agreement with the right to enforce the provisions of the Booking Agreement that are clearly intended to benefit him personally. Cal. Civ. Code § 1559 ("A contract, made expressly for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him …"); Prouty v. Gores Technology Group (2004) 121 Cal. App.4th 1225, 1232. Under the Booking Agreement, Alda intended to confer benefits on Paul personally. Alda agreed, inter alia, to be solely responsible "to provide a safe environment" for Paul's personal performance and also agreed to indemnify Paul personally from any "loss, cost, damage, or expense" in connection with Alda's breach of the Booking Agreement. Booking Agreement, Additional Terms and Conditions, ¶¶ 1, and 17. Paul asserts in this proceeding that Alda has breached the Booking Agreement by failing to provide the "safe environment" for his performance and is liable for the damages and costs he has suffered caused by that breach. This result is the same under Dutch law. Whether Paul is characterized as a "party" or a "third party beneficiary" Dutch law treats him as a "party" to the Booking Agreement with the personal right to enforce it against Respondent. Dutch Civil Code Art. 6:253 and Art. 6: 254.

3. Alda's Reliance on Non-California Law Was Misplaced

4.24.
In its Submission, Alda made arguments based on the premise that this proceeding is an international arbitration and, therefore, non-California law should determine the issues of jurisdiction and whether Paul is individually a party to the Booking Agreement with standing to pursue his claims in this proceeding. That non-California law is not applicable in this proceeding. As noted above, the Arbitrator finds the choice of law clause in Paragraph 24 is fully enforceable. See CCP §§ 1297.281, 1297.282.
4.25.
Alda argued that the only contact with California was the Booking Agreement. Even if that factual claim were correct, it would not override the parties' freedom to contract and select a "neutral" law (i.e., neither Dutch nor German) to be applied in their arbitration agreement. Besides, the factual claim is not correct. Claimants' booking agent at the time the Booking Agreement was entered into was located in Los Angeles. Moreover, from June 2014 through June 2017, Claimants maintained an apartment in Los Angeles for business purposes. While at the Los Angeles apartment, Paul would have business meetings with the big concert promoters located in Los Angeles and with his booking agent. These meetings led to "many interesting projects and shows." Before his accident at ASOT 750, the Los Angeles apartment was used as his "hub" for his touring in the United States, Asia and Australia. Hearing Transcript ("TR.") 307-308. Claimants contacts with California were significant.
4.26.
Even if that non-California law were to be applied, it would not alter the Arbitrator's decision that Alda agreed to the arbitration clause in Paragraph 24 of the Booking Agreement and that Paul individually is a party to the Booking Agreement with standing in this proceeding to prosecute his individual claims.
4.27.
Alda relied in this regard on EU Regulation 593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations ("Rome I") and EU Regulation 1315/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters ("Brussels I recast"). Alda's reliance is misplaced. The Booking Agreement selects the internal laws of California "without regard to its application of choice of laws" to govern the agreement. Paragraph 24.
4.28.
If the choice of law rules of California were to be applied, perhaps they might look to European choice of law rules, but that is not the parties' agreement. In any event, Rome I expressly does not apply to arbitration or choice of court agreements. Rome I, Art. 1(2)(e) (Excluding from the scope of Rome I "arbitration agreements and agreements on the choice of court"). Brussels I recast referenced by Respondent also is not applicable to arbitration agreements. Brussels I recast, Art. 1(2)(d). And, in determining the issue of whether there exists an arbitration agreement between the parties, the Arbitrator is to treat the "arbitration clause … as an agreement independent of the other terms" of the Booking Agreement. ICDR Rules, Art. 19, ¶¶ 1 and 2; see also, CCP § 1297.161
4.29.
But even if Rome I were applicable to a choice of law or arbitration clause, which it is expressly not, it would also select the law of California to govern the issues raised in the Submission. First, Rome I has universal application and does not discriminate against the contractual selection of non-European laws. Rome I, Art. 2 ("Any law specified by this Regulation shall be applied whether or not it is the law of a Member State."). Thus, there is nothing in Rome I that prohibits the selection in and application of substantive California law to, the Booking Agreement and its included arbitration agreement. Rome I recognizes the freedom of choice of contracting parties and provides that "[a] contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties." Id., Art. 3(1). Moreover, and of relevance to the issues raised in the Submission, the "existence and validity of a contract, or of any term of a contract, shall be determined by the law which would govern it under this Regulation if the contract or term were valid." Id., Art. 10(1).
4.30.
While there are exceptions to these rules, the one relied upon by Alda is not applicable. Rome I provides that a choice of law agreement can be ignored if its application would violate a Dutch law "which cannot be derogated from by agreement." Rome I, Art. 3 (3). Alda cited no such Dutch law regarding either the validity of the arbitration agreement or the determination of whether Paul is a party to the Booking Agreement or is otherwise personally entitled to directly enforce its terms against Alda.
4.31.
Indeed, Dutch law specifically allows a contractual choice of law other than Dutch law to govern whether an arbitration agreement is valid. Dutch Civil Code Art. 10:166 ("Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 154, an arbitration agreement is substantively valid if it is valid under the law chosen by the parties or under the law of the seat of arbitration or, in case the parties have not agreed upon a choice of law, under the law applicable on the juridical relationship upon which the arbitration agreement relates to."). Thus, Dutch law provides that the validity of the arbitration clause in the Booking Agreement is to be decided under the internal law of California as both the law chosen by the parties and the law of the seat of arbitration, Los Angeles, California.
4.32.
On the issue of whether Paul has standing, the Dutch law cited by Alda about third party beneficiaries clearly does not prohibit the application of California law to the issue of Paul's personal standing in this proceeding. Dutch Civil Code Art. 6:253 provides, in part, that "[a] contract creates the right of a third person to claim performance from one of the parties or to otherwise invoke the contract against any of them, if the contract contains a term to that effect and if that third person so accepts." And, under Dutch law, a third-party beneficiary "is deemed to be a party to the contract." Dutch Civil Code Art. 6:254. California third-party beneficiary law is similar to Dutch law. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1559 ("A contract, made expressly for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him at any time before the parties thereto rescind it."). Application of California substantive law to the issues of whether Paul has standing because he personally is either a party to the Booking Agreement or a third-party beneficiary of the agreement, would not violate any provision of Dutch law "which cannot be derogated from by agreement." Rome I, Art. 3 (3).
4.33.
Adopting the interpretation or position espoused by Alda would work the absurd result that no event or entertainment agreement could set California as its choice of law, upending contracts in that entire industry in a manner without precedent. Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, the Arbitrator rejects this position and finds that California law is to apply here.

4. Alda Waived any Objections to Deny or Challenge Arbitral Jurisdiction by Failing to Seek Timely Court Review

4.34.
Under California law, Alda had the absolute right to have the California Superior Court in Los Angeles decide whether the Arbitrator had jurisdiction. CCP §1297.166 ("If the arbitral tribunal rules as a preliminary question that it has jurisdiction, any party shall request the superior court, within 30 days after having received notice of that ruling, to decide the matter or shall be deemed to have waived objection to such finding."). Alda never made a request to have the Superior court decide the matter at any time. Alda's decision not to request the Superior Court to decide the issue of jurisdiction acts as a waiver of Alda's objection to the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator. Id.

C. Procedural History After Alda's Preliminary Defenses Were Denied

4.35.
Since the November 10, 2017 telephonic hearing on Alda's Submission regarding its preliminary defenses, Alda has not participated substantively in this proceeding.
4.36.
During that telephonic hearing preceding the entry of Procedural Order No. 3, Alda advised the Arbitrator and Claimants that Alda would be retaining local California co-counsel to represent it in these proceedings. But Alda did not thereafter retain California counsel to appear in this proceeding and failed to participate in any substantive way in this proceeding. Alda did not comment on the Arbitrator's draft scheduling order, proposed Procedural Order No. 4, circulated to the parties on November 14, 2017. Nor did Alda comment on Claimants' mark-up of that proposed order that Claimants had sent to Alda's Dutch counsel on December 12, 2017 (which mark-up Claimants thereafter sent to the Arbitrator on December 15, 2017). Alda's only response to the Arbitrator's email of January 4, 2018, asking whether Alda's Dutch counsel intended to comment on the proposed scheduling order, was to request, on January 12, 2018, more time to locate and retain local California co-counsel.
4.37.
The Arbitrator entered the Hearing scheduling order, Procedural Order No. 4 dated January 25, 2018, without receiving any input from Alda, even though that input was requested and ample time was permitted for that input to be provided. Also on January 25, 2018, the Arbitrator entered Procedural Order No. 5 denying Alda' request for a stay of this proceeding while it tried to locate and engage local California co-counsel and ordering Claimants to personally serve in The Netherlands Procedural Orders Nos. 4 and 5 on both Alda and its Dutch counsel. Claimants filed and served proof of such personal service in The Netherlands on February 12, 2018. Despite being given until February 19, 2018 to retain local co-counsel and to request modifications to Procedural Order No. 5, Alda did neither; nor did it respond in any way.
4.38.
As provided and permitted in the final scheduling order, Procedural Order No. 4, Claimants served on January 22, 2018 and February 7, 2018 Claimants' two requests for production of documents by Alda. Alda did not object to those requests, did not produce any of the documents requested, and did not respond in any other way to the requests. Alda did not comply with any of the tasks and deadlines set forth in Procedural Order No. 4. As examples, (1) Alda did not provide any expert reports to Claimants, which reports were to be exchanged by April 9, 2018 (per the Arbitrator's March 30, 2018 email order modifying Procedural Order No. 4, ¶ 5 (b), and (2) Alda did not provide to Claimants or the Arbitrator its Opening brief, exhibit and witness lists, and related documents required by Procedural Order No. 4, ¶ 5 (c), ¶6 (c) (ii). Claimants timely complied with its obligations under Procedural Order No. 4.

D. Alda Failed to Attend or Participate in the Hearing

4.39.
Alda received notice of the Hearing dates, times, and location. At the commencement of the Hearing, scheduled to begin at 8:00 am PT, Claimants were present but Alda was not and had not communicated to either the Arbitrator or Claimants whether Alda intended to participate in the Hearing. The Arbitrator delayed the scheduled start of the Hearing and attempted to communicate by telephone and email with Alda's counsel of record to determine if Alda did intend to participate in the Hearing. Alda's counsel did not respond.
4.40.
Because Alda failed to appear at or participate in the Hearing and produced no evidence without a showing of good cause for such failures, the Arbitrator proceeded with the Hearing and "make[s] the award on the evidence before" him. ICDR Rules, Article 26, ¶¶ 2, 3; see also, CCP § 1297.253.
4.41.
On the record at the Hearing, the Arbitrator issued an order for the submission of a closing brief by Paul. Subsequently, this was confirmed by letter from the ICDR and the Arbitrator providing for Alda to file a response to the closing brief of Paul two weeks after the submission of the closing brief of Paul. Paul filed the closing brief timely. Despite being copied on all correspondence, neither Alda's counsel nor Alda itself ever responded to the closing brief of Paul.
4.42.
The Partial Final Award follows within the time required by the relevant rules and invited further briefing on attorney's fees, costs and expenses in accordance with the procedural order in this case and with the parties' Agreement.

V. THE FACTS

5.1.
Below is a summary of the relevant facts and allegations based on the parties' written and oral submissions, pleadings, and evidence adduced in these proceedings. References to additional facts and allegations found in the parties' written and oral submissions, pleadings, and evidence will be made, where relevant, in connection with the legal analysis that follows. While the Arbitrator has considered all of the facts, allegations, legal arguments, and evidence submitted by the parties in the present proceedings, the Arbitrator refers in this award to the submissions and evidence the Arbitrator deems necessary to explain the Arbitrator's reasoning.

A. The Booking Agreement

5.2.
Alda, Paul, and GmbH each entered into the September 25, 2015 Booking Agreement for the musical performance of Paul at the ASOT 750 festival held at Jaarbeurs Utrecht, The Netherlands, produced by Alda.
5.3.
In addition to Paragraph 24, the arbitration and choice of law clause quoted above, The Booking Agreement included the following terms:

-That Alda was "solely responsible to provide a safe environment … including but not limited to with respect to the staging, stage covering, … supervision and direction" for Paul's performance at ASOT 750 (the "Performance") (Booking Agreement, Additional Terms and Conditions, ¶ 1); and,

-That Alda "shall indemnify, protect, and hold [GmbH and Paul] …harmless from and against any claim, demand, action, loss, cost, damage, or expense whatsoever (including, without limitation, reasonable attorneys' fees) arising out of or in connection with (i) [Alda's] breach … of the Agreement; and (ii) the Performance, including, but not limited to … A breach … of any warranty, representation, or agreement made by [Alda] … in connection with the Performance…." (Booking Agreement, Additional Terms and Conditions, ¶ 17. a. 3).

B. The Main Stage Area at ASOT 750

5.4.
In February 2016, Alda sent to Claimants visual representations of the design and planned construction of the Main Stage area at ASOT 750 where Paul was to render his musical performance. These representations did not accurately depict the Main Stage area as actually constructed for ASOT 750.
5.5.
Alda did have, but did not provide to Claimants, "blueprints" of the Main Stage area of ASOT 750 that more accurately depicted how Alda intended to construct, and did construct, that Main Stage area although even these "blue prints" were not completely accurate.
5.6.
The elevated Main Stage area, as constructed for ASOT 750, had a flat surface immediately in front of the DJ table which was at the same height as the DJ table on which the DJ equipment was placed. That flat surface was covered with black, opaque Molton cloth, a fire-retardant fabric that is commonly used in Europe to "dress" the stage to make things disappear. It is common for a DJ booth, stage platforms and tables to be covered with Molton cloth, or in America, Duvetyne cloth. The Arbitrator's review of the photos and videos of the Main Stage area at ASOT 750 taken from in front of the stage as well as from behind the DJs confirm that this flat surface appeared to be a solid platform surface. That solid appearance was enhanced by the placement of various pieces of equipment including lasers, CO2 cans, and LED lamps on it as well as the dynamic lighting during a DJ's performance.
5.7.
The Arbitrator's factual findings regarding the appearance of the front flat area from viewing the images of the Main Stage area were also confirmed by Claimants' stage safety expert, Henry Bellord, who provided both an expert report and expert testimony at the Hearing. Bellord has more than two decades experience as a production manager and stage manager in the electronic music concert and festival business and he qualified as an expert in stage safety construction, procedures, and management. The Arbitrator found Bellord's written and oral expert testimony credible. Bellord testified, and the Arbitrator finds, that a DJ performing at ASOT 750 would have reasonably perceived that the flat surface in front of him was a solid platform upon which he could stand.
5.8.
However, that seemingly flat, solid, platform was not solid and it was not safe to stand upon it. The Molton cloth surface did not cover any solid platform. Instead the Molton cloth was stretched tightly over a frame work of box trusses and there was no platform in between the box trusses. The black, opaque Molton cloth disguised that approximately 10 feet below the surface of the cloth there was the floor and the equipment on it.
5.9.
Bellord also testified that the safety practices common in the electronic music concert and festival industry would have been to place platform flooring on top of the box trusses and, if that was not possible, to clearly mark with warning tape that the performers should not step on the seemingly solid, but in fact dangerous, flat, black surface in front of them. The Arbitrator so finds and finds based on the visual evidence that there were no warning markings, whether by fluorescent tape or other signage, to warn the performers of the danger of stepping on the flat, black surface in front of them. Bellord also testified that the customary safety procedures in the electronic music concert and festival industry was to also give verbal warnings to the performers of any dangerous areas on a performing area.
5.10.
Paul's stage manager, [Person 2], arrived in The Netherlands on Saturday afternoon, January 27, 2016. At approximately 6:00 pm, [Person 2] went alone to the Jaarbeurs venue where the ASOT 750 was to be presented to set up Paul's DJ equipment on the Main Stage and to perform a line/signal check. When he arrived at the Main Stage there was no stage crew present and he began to set up Paul's equipment on his own. Shortly later a few tech people showed up and he was able to complete the line/signal check successfully. While setting up the equipment he knelt on the DJ equipment and placed his foot on the black, flat platform immediately in front of the DJ table. That front platform felt solid to [Person 2].
5.11.
When he was finishing setting up, a man named [Person 3] who was the stage manager for Alda, came on to the stage where [Person 2] was. [Person 2]'s interaction with [Person 3] was short and [Person 3] never warned [Person 2] about any dangerous areas on the Main Stage or the flat, black platform immediately in front of the DJ equipment table and performance area. It was [Person 2]'s firm impression that the entire flat, black platform immediately in front of the DJ table and performance area was a solid and safe platform across the entire performance area.
5.12.
Paul and [Person 2] later arrived around 3:15 am at the Main Stage for Paul's performance scheduled to start at 3:30 am Sunday morning, February 28, 2016. [Person 3], Alda's stage manager was on the Main Stage when Paul and [Person 2] arrived. Neither [Person 3] nor anyone else gave Paul or [Person 2] any instructions or information, or warnings about the stage conditions. In [Person 2]'s experience as a stage manager, it is common for stage management personnel to give stage safety information and warnings and if no such special briefings are given it is commonly understood that "the stage is yours, everything is fine, do your thing." TR. 86:21-23.

C. Paul's Performance and Fall at ASOT 750

5.13.
As noted Paul and [Person 2] later arrived around 3:15 am at the Main Stage for Paul's performance. Paul's performance started at 3:30 am. About 20 minutes into his performance Paul climbed up on to the DJ equipment table with the assistance of [Person 2] and stood on the DJ equipment level towards stage right of where he was performing to interact with his audience and fans. He then took one step on the DJ desk, in a stage left direction; a second step in a stage left direction onto the flat platform in front of the DJ Desk; and his final and third step towards the center of the platform where he fell through the black Molton cloth covering the empty, unsafe space in front of where he had been performing. He immediately fell through the Molton cloth stretched over that empty space and fell at least 3 meters onto the floor below. Paul landed head first and was immediately rendered unconscious.
5.14.
At the Hearing, Claimants introduced a video exhibit (Exhibit 8) containing several videos of Paul's fall taken from different angles rendered in both real time and slow motion. Claimants introduced several screen shots taken from those videos and several photos showing exactly where Paul fell through the Molton cloth and where he landed. (Exhibits 7, 9). These videos and stills clearly showed the events leading to the fall and the exact location of Paul's fall.
5.15.
[Person 2] also testified, and the videos and photos proved, that Alda's stage manager was on stage when Paul began to climb up on the DJ equipment table but gave no warning about the danger in front of him and made no effort to stop Paul from proceeding as he did.
5.16.
[Person 2] and [Person 4], who also testified at the Hearing and who was on the Main Stage as a guest of Paul's, immediately after Paul's fall, left the Main Stage by the stairs at stage right and after some climbing effort through the scaffolding under the Main Stage located Paul's body where he had fallen in the darkness using the lights from their cell phones. Paul was unconscious and bleeding from a head wound.
5.17.
[Person 4] stayed with Paul holding Paul in his arms and trying to determine if he was alive. Paul did not gain consciousness while with [Person 4]. [Person 2] extricated himself from the scaffolding under the Main stage to try to get emergency help for Paul.
5.18.
Some period passed before an outside emergency crew arrived and removed Paul from below the stage on a stretcher after removing scaffolding to be able to do so. From a video introduced at the Hearing by Claimants, which ended when the emergency crew arrived but before the emergency crew removed Paul from beneath the stage it appeared that the back stage Alda personnel were not aware of Paul's fall.
5.19.
After Paul was removed from underneath the stage scaffolding he was attended to by the emergency crew and a neck brace was placed on him. Because of the nature of his injury, he could not be transported by a normal ambulance and had to wait until a special ambulance designed to transport individuals with brain injury arrived. Ultimately that special ambulance arrived and transported Paul to UMC Utrecht, a medical facility specialized in treating brain injuries.

D. Paul's Medical Treatment at UMC Utrecht

5.20.
[REDACTED]. At the hearing [Person 2] and [Person 5] ("[Person 5]"), Paul's then fiancé and now wife, testified regarding Paul's stay, condition, and treatment while at this medical facility. [Person 6], a 14-year employee of Claimants also testified regarding Paul's condition during his hospitalization at UMC Utrecht. Claimants introduced medical records regarding Paul's stay and treatment at this facility.
5.21.
[REDACTED]. Claimants' medical expert H. Ronald Fisk, M.D., Ph. D., a neurologist in Los Angeles, testified regarding Paul's injury and the Arbitrator will discuss that testimony below.
5.22.
[Person 2] and a doctor followed the ambulance transporting Paul to UMC Utrecht in a separate car. They arrived shortly after Paul was admitted to UMC Utrecht in the early morning of February 28, 2016. [Person 2] was directed to wait until the medical personnel completed their first tests and initial screening of Paul. After about 40 minutes of waiting, [Person 2] was allowed to see Paul, who was then in a hospital bed in a preparation room waiting to be moved to intensive care. [REDACTED]. Paul was then moved into the intensive care ward with five other patients where [Person 2] continued to be with him. [Person 2] stayed with Paul for about three days and left for Berlin after [Person 5] and Paul's mother had arrived. [Person 5] had arrived at the hospital from Los Angeles.[REDACTED]
5.23.
[Person 5] testified in detail about Paul's stay at UMC Utrecht and explained some photographs she had taken while there which were admitted into evidence. The following findings are only a summary of the details of her testimony about Paul's physical, mental, and neurological condition and his treatments while at that hospital. [Person 6]'s testimony about Paul's stay at UMC Utrecht was consistent with [Person 5]'s testimony.
5.24.
[REDACTED]. [Person 5] rejected the doctors' suggestion that she go home and rest and instead went to the intensive care ward where Paul was and stayed with him taking only short breaks to sleep at her hotel. After several days, Paul was transferred to a private room and [Person 5] had a second bed moved into his room so she could stay with Paul constantly at UMC Utrecht.[REDACTED]
5.25.
[REDACTED]

E. Paul's Treatment at Medical Park Berlin Humboldtmühle

5.26.
At the hearing [Person 5] and, to some degree, [Person 6] testified regarding Paul's stay, condition, and treatment while he was at this Medical Park Berlin facility and his treatment by this facility after he was discharged on May 11, 2016. Claimants introduced medical records regarding Paul's stay and treatment at this facility as well as the January 2017 evaluation of Paul by Dr. [Person 7] of Berlin who had also attended Paul while he was treated at Medical Park Berlin.
5.27.
[Person 5] lived in Paul's hospital room for the entire time he was in this facility: from March 9 through May 11, 2016. As with her testimony about the events at UMC Utrecht, her testimony regarding the events at the Medical Park Berlin was detailed, credible, and compelling. The Arbitrator will only summarize that testimony. [REDACTED]
5.28.
Paul also testified about his stay and treatments at the Medical Park Berlin facility.[REDACTED] [REDACTED]. That testimony is summarized below in Part VI C. 2. a. i.

F. The Current and Continuing Impact on Paul Caused by his Injuries Sufferedby his Fall at ASOT 750

5.29.
Claimants introduced into evidence at the Hearing medical records from UMC Utrecht, Medical Park Berlin, and the January 2017 evaluation of Paul by Dr. [Person 7] of Berlin. In addition, Claimants submitted two expert reports from H. Ronald Fisk, M.D., Ph. D., a neurologist in Los Angeles, and an expert report from Lester M. Zackler, M.D. a neuropsychiatrist in Los Angeles. Dr. Fisk also presented expert testimony at the Hearing. Dr. Fisk's expert reports and his expert testimony were based upon his examinations of Paul in November 2017 and March 2018, his review of [REDACTED] performed on Paul in November 2017 his review of Paul's German and Dutch medical records (including [REDACTED] performed on Paul in February, March, and April 2016 and in January 2017), and the reports of Dr. Zackler, Dr. Jeffrey Schaeffer, a neuropsychologist, Dr. Edward Feldman, a gastroenterologist, and Dr. Conrad Tseng, an endocrinologist. The reports of Drs. Zackler, Schaeffer, Feldman, and Tseng were based on their respective examinations and testing of Paul in March 2018.
5.30.
Dr. Fisk's expert testimony, the reports of the other doctors, and Paul's medical records are all remarkably consistent in describing [REDACTED] of his injuries caused by his fall at ASOT 750 and the [REDACTED]. Dr. Fisk's testimony and his written reports detailed the nature and extent of the[REDACTED] [REDACTED]. Paul's current conditions and symptoms discussed by Dr. Fisk (and reported in the other medical records) were credibly corroborated by Paul's testimony and the testimony of [Person 5], [Person 6], [Person 2], [Person 8], one of Paul's booking agents, and [Person 4], a fellow DJ who performs with and composes with Paul. Dr. Fisk's testimony also established, and the Arbitrator finds, that[REDACTED]
5.31.
Dr. Fisk's reports, his testimony, and Dr. Zackler's report demonstrate that[REDACTED]. The current CACI approved mortality table for use in California jury trials (a copy of which was introduced into evidence) provides that Paul is statistically expected to live until he is at least 80, or for another 34.2 years. Dr. Fisk's expert testimony establishes that the [REDACTED]. Dr. Fisk's testimony also established that [REDACTED]

VI. ANALYSIS

A. Scope of the Arbitration

6.1.
Alda's Answer appears to challenge whether the tort claims brought by Claimants are within the scope of the arbitration clause in Paragraph 24 of the Booking Agreement. Answer at 5.2. While Alda never directly raised such a contention by any submission to the Arbitrator, the Arbitrator believes that it is appropriate to analyze and decide this issue in this award.
6.2.
As noted above, the arbitration agreement in Paragraph 24 provides, in part, that "[a]ny claim or dispute arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach thereof shall be settled by arbitration in Los Angeles, California in accordance with the commercial rules and regulations then in effect of the American Arbitration Association."
6.3.
Whether that provision allows for the arbitration of both the breach of contract and tort claims asserted by Claimants is a question interpreting the parties' contractual intent. In this proceeding this is a question for the Arbitrator. ICDR Rules, Art. 19, ¶ 1; CCP § 1297.161. The interpretation of the arbitration clause is governed by the substantive law of California given the parties' agreement to apply California law.
6.4.
The issue is generally decided by analyzing whether the arbitration clause is either "broad" or "narrow." The most common "broad form" arbitration agreement covers "[a]ny claims or disputes arising out of or relating to this agreement or the breach thereof." Larkin v. Williams, Woolley, Cogswell, Nakazawa & Russell (1999) 76 Cal App.4th 227, 230. In Larkin, the court determined that plaintiff's claims for dissolution of a law partnership and for an accounting were within the scope of the arbitration clause noting that "the controversy as alleged would not have arisen at all but for the partnership agreement." Id.
6.5.
In Buckhorn v. St. Jude Heritage Medical Group (2004) 121 Cal. App.4th 1401, 1403 the court interpreted an arbitration clause in an employment agreement that provided for arbitration of disputes "concerning the enforcement or the interpretation of any provisions of this Agreement." The court concluded that the plaintiff's tort claims (including defamation and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage) against his former employer arising after his employment was terminated were within the scope of the arbitration clause because the tort claims "stem from the contractual relationship between the parties." Id. The court also explained that the issue of the scope of the arbitration clause was "whether the tort claims are 'rooted' in the contractual relationship between the parties and because the ex-employee could not demonstrate that the "tort claims "were 'wholly independent' of the employment agreement" then "any doubts must be resolved in favor of arbitration." Id., at 1407 (citation omitted).
6.6.
The arbitration clause in Paragraph 24 is broad enough to include an agreement to arbitrate Claimants' tort claims as well as Claimants' breach of contract claims. The arbitration scope phrase is in the disjunctive and contemplates the arbitration of a claim that is not a breach of contract claim and includes a non-breach of contract claim that arises out of or relates to the Booking Agreement, but otherwise does not assert breach of the Booking Agreement. As in Larkin and Buckhorn, Claimants' tort claims would not exist had the parties not entered into the Booking Agreement and they are "rooted" in that contractual relationship. If the parties had not entered into the Booking Agreement, Paul would have never performed at ASOT 750 and would never have been injured there. The asserted tort claims arise out of or relate to the Booking Agreement.
6.7.
The Arbitrator concludes that the scope of the arbitration agreement in Paragraph 24 includes the tort claims alleged by Claimants as well as their breach of contract claims.

B. Claimants' Claims for Relief

1. Claimants' First Claim For Relief: Breach of Contact

6.8.
Under California law, to prevail on the breach of contract claim, Claimants must prove (1) the contract, (2) Claimants performance, (3) Respondent's breach, and (4) the resulting damage to Claimants. Richmond v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal. App.4th 1182, 1186; see also Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions ("CACI") 303 (a significant authority providing the basic California law standards for claims made under California law).
6.9.
Claimants have established each of the elements for their breach of contract claims.
6.10.
The first two elements are established because the evidence is that Alda and Claimants entered into the Booking Agreement; Alda paid for Paul's performance at ASOT 750, and Paul rendered that performance until it was prematurely terminated by his disastrous fall.
6.11.
The fourth element is also established by the evidence. Paul fell during his performance at ASOT 750 and that he suffered severe traumatic damages from that fall. The fact of damages is established. The calculation of the recoverable damages will be discussed below.
6.12.
The only possible issue relates to the third element: whether Alda breached the Booking Agreement. In Alda's Answer, it acknowledges that the issue is whether it breached the Booking Agreement by failing to "provide a safe environment" for Paul's performance at ASOT 750. Answer, at 3.6
6.13.
The Booking Agreement included the following terms:

-That Alda was "solely responsible to provide a safe environment … including but not limited to with respect to the staging, stage covering, … supervision and direction" for Paul's performance at ASOT 750 (the "Performance") (Booking Agreement, Additional Terms and Conditions, ¶ 1); and

-That Alda "shall indemnify, protect, and hold [GmbH and Paul] …harmless from and against any claim, demand, action, loss, cost, damage, or expense whatsoever (including, without limitation, reasonable attorneys' fees) arising out of or in connection with (i) [ALDA's] breach … of the Agreement; and (ii) the Performance, including, but not limited to … A breach … of any warranty, representation, or agreement made by [Alda] … in connection with the Performance…. (Booking Agreement, Additional Terms and Conditions, ¶ 17. a. 3).

6.14.
Alda's Answer alleges that (1) the flat surface immediately in front of the DJ equipment table was "not designed to be walked on;" (2) that the DJ equipment table was "not meant to be climbed upon;" and, (3) that Alda "was not aware, and had no reason to believe, that the DJ [equipment table] would be climbed upon and used for jumping during the performance." Answer, at 3.4, 3.6, and 3.11. Alda has not submitted at any time in this proceeding any evidence regarding these unsworn allegations. Other than its admission against self-interest that it knowingly designed and constructed the flat platform in front of the DJ equipment table in such a manner that it could not safely be walked upon, the Arbitrator could simply ignore those unproved factual allegations. Nevertheless, the Arbitrator will consider and analyze these allegations in light of the evidence presented at the Hearing.
6.15.
The evidence presented at the Hearing demonstrates that Alda's alleged defense is without merit and that it did breach the Booking Agreement by failing to provide a "safe environment" for Paul's performance at ASOT 750, an obligation for which Alda was solely responsible.
6.16.
That Alda did not design the flat portion of the Main Stage directly in front of the DJ equipment table to be safe to stand on is not a defense. Indeed, it forms part of Alda's breach. Alda admits that it knew that the front platform could not be safely stepped upon, but made no effort to warn Paul (or any other DJ performer) of that dangerous condition. Alda placed no warning markings on the unsafe platform and did not give Paul or [Person 2] any verbal warnings of that danger. Alda did mark with warning tape other areas of the Main Stage and the back-stage so Alda knew how and why to use such markings, but Alda did make any warning markings on what it admits was a dangerous condition. Alda's stage manager, [Person 3], was on the Main Stage only a few feet away when Paul, with [Person 2]'s assistance, began to climb onto the DJ equipment table, but [Person 3] made no effort whatsoever to warn Paul or [Person 2] of the dangerous condition. Alda's photographers on the Main Stage during Paul's performance also did not warn Paul or [Person 2] and simply continued to film Paul walking onto the front seemingly solid platform.
6.17.
Claimant's expert, Bellord, testified that in the electronic music concert and festival business standard safety procedures would have been to make sure the front platform was solid and could be stood upon and, failing that, to clearly mark with warning tape the dangerous area immediately in front of the DJ equipment table and to give written and verbal warnings to the DJ performers of that danger. One photo admitted into evidence illustrated Bellord's testimony and showed a DJ performing at another event where the flat area immediately in front of the DJ was clearly marked with warning tape stating in Spanish and English "no step."
6.18.
Alda alleges that Paul's on-stage movements at ASOT 750 leading to his fall were unforeseeable to Alda and that Alda in fact "was not aware, and had no reason to believe, that the DJ [equipment table] would be climbed upon and used for jumping during the performance." The evidence shows that Paul did no "jumping" on the DJ equipment table or on the front platform.
6.19.
However, Alda's allegation that Paul's stage movements were unforeseeable does merit further analysis of the evidence presented at the Hearing.
6.20.
The testimony and visual evidence presented at the Hearing demonstrated that it is not only common but expected that at festivals like ASOT 750 the performing DJs will climb on DJ equipment tables and other set pieces to interact with the audiences. Numerous photos and videos of other festival performances, including festivals produced by Alda, illustrated this DJ behavior. Exhibits 5 and 6.
6.21.
Bellord explained that because this behavior of DJs was very common and well known at these festivals it is the responsibility of those, like Alda, who are responsible to maintain the safety of the performance area to anticipate exactly those types of performance moves by a DJ. Bellord's testimony and the visual evidence showing the common behavior of DJs standing on DJ equipment tables and other portions of a stage was corroborated by the testimony of [Person 4], himself a performing professional electronic music DJ, and [Person 2], based on his experience as a stage manager at electronic music concerts and festivals.
6.22.
Paul testified during the playing of a compilation video of excerpts of a few of his earlier performances and explained that before his fall he was a "quite an active, jumpy person on stage" who ran "around and, you know, hype up the crowd and he did that to "cheer the crowd up [and] involve them in the music." This type of DJ behavior "has been part of [performances] forever really." TR. 291.
6.23.
The evidence presented also demonstrates that Alda was aware of this aspect of DJ on stage behavior and that Paul's stage movements were foreseeable to Alda.
6.24.
To promote ASOT 750, Alda used a photo of a prior performance by van Buuren which shows Van Buuren standing in front of a DJ equipment table in precisely the same stage location where Paul fell during ASOT 750. Exhibit 5A. Other photos show Van Buuren and other DJs standing on DJ equipment tables at various ASOT festivals presented by Alda. Exhibits 5B, 5C, 5D.
6.25.
Another video exhibit showed van Buuren's performance on the Main Stage at the 2015 ASOT and at the Amsterdam Music Festival, both events with which Alda is involved. Exhibits 6 and 18C. At both Alda events, van Buuren is shown climbing on the DJ table during his performance to interact with the audience.
6.26.
Alda's unsworn allegations in its Answer cannot negate the strong evidence before me that Paul's stage movements leading to his fall was foreseeable to Alda. The Arbitrator finds on the evidence and testimony at the Hearing that Paul's stage movements leading to his fall was foreseeable to Alda.
6.27.
Alda's asserted defense to the claim it breached the Booking Agreement by failing to provide a safe environment for Paul's performance is without merit based on the evidence before me. The evidence submitted at the Hearing demonstrates that Paul's stage movements leading to his fall was foreseeable to Alda, and that Alda breached its obligations to Claimants under the Booking Agreement by designing a dangerous stage element with the flat seemingly solid platform in front the DJ equipment table, by applying to that front platform element an unsafe "stage covering" that completely disguised the danger presented by the front platform, by failing to provide any warning whatsoever to Paul of that inherent, undisclosed danger, and by failing to safely supervise and direct the Main Stage area.
6.28.
For these reasons, an award shall be entered in Claimants favor on Claimants' claim for breach of contract. Claimants' awardable damages for this breach will be discussed and calculated below.

2. Claimants' Second and Third Claims for Relief: Willful Gross Negligence and Negligence

6.29.
The Notice of Arbitration alleged two tort claims – for Willful Gross Negligence and for Negligence. The primary difference under California law between these two torts is that if a claimant can prove the higher standard of gross willful negligence then the claimant would be entitled to seek an award of punitive damages. However, in this proceeding the Arbitrator has determined that the ICDR Rules are applicable. The ICDR Rules do not allow the award of punitive damages in an international arbitration unless the parties agree otherwise. ICDR Rules, Art. 31, ¶5. Alda did not consent to the award of punitive damages and the Arbitrator may not award them even if Claimants were to have proved the California factual prerequisites for an award of punitive damages. Accordingly, in the following analysis, the Arbitrator will treat both the second and third claim as one claim for negligence and will make no express findings that might otherwise be relevant to punitive damages which may not be awarded in this proceeding.
6.30.
Under California law, the elements of a cause of action for negligence are (1) a legal duty to use due care, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) the breach is the proximate cause of the resulting injury. Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917, CACI 400, 401,
6.31.
The "duty" element may be imposed by law, be assumed by Alda, or exists by virtue of a special relationship. Doe v. United States Youth Soccer Assn., Inc. (2017) 8 Cal. App.5th 1118, 1128. Based on the evidence presented at the Hearing, the Arbitrator finds that Alda owed a legal duty of care to Claimants regarding the safety of the Main Stage at ASOT 750 under all three scenarios.
6.32.
First, by California law, "[e]veryone is responsible … for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person …." Cal. Civ. Code § 1714(a). The Main Stage was under the exclusive control and management of Alda. Alda designed and constructed the Main Stage area, and Alda had a duty of care to Claimants with respect to Paul's performance imposed by California law. See Fazio v. Fairbanks Ranch Country Club (2015) 233 Cal. App.4th 1053, 1063 (recognizing that the country club defendant owed a duty of care "to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition" under section 1714(a) to a performer who was injured on a stage constructed and maintained by the defendant).
6.33.
Second, Alda assumed that duty of care by agreeing in the Booking Agreement to be solely responsible to provide "a safe environment" for Paul's performance. Under California law, the negligent performance of a contractual obligation may give rise to alternative contract and tort claims. See North American Chemical co. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal. App.4th 764, 774 (California law recognizes the "fundamental principle that accompanying every contract is a common-law duty to perform with care, skill, reasonable expedience, and faithfulness the thing agreed to be done, and a negligent failure to observe any of these conditions is a tort, as well as a breach of the contract") (internal citation and quote omitted).
6.34.
Third, there existed a "special relationship" between Claimants and Alda because with respect to Paul's performance on the Main Stage he was "particularly vulnerable and dependent on [Alda]" who controlled the main stage and thus "had some control over [Paul's] welfare. Carlsen v. Koivumaki (2014) 227 Cal. App.4th 879, 883, 893-894. Considering this "special relationship," Alda owed "an affirmative duty to protect [Paul] from foreseeable harm." Id.; see also, Huffman v. City of Poway (2000) 84 Cal. App.4th 975, 993-95 (discussing, and finding, the duty of care in the context of a rejected primary assumption of risk argument in an action brought by an actor injured in a stage accident when he fell through an open trap door on the stage noting that the owner of the theater were the accident occurred owed to the injured actor a "duty not to increase the inherent risks" of performing on a stage with open trap doors which duty was breached by, among other things, not highlighting the trap doors with Glo-tape or understage lighting, or warning devices such as spotters particularly in light of all the other demands on the actor's attention while performing the scene during which he was injured).
6.35.
Based upon the evidence presented at the Hearing, the Arbitrator finds that Alda breached its duty of care it owed to Claimants. The Arbitrator's discussions of this evidence and of Alda's allegations in its Answer regarding foreseeability (Part VI, B, 1, supra) are equally applicable here. The Arbitrator will not repeat that discussion but does incorporate it by reference to explain the Arbitrator's conclusion that Alda acted negligently and in breach of its duty of care owed to Claimants.
6.36.
The Arbitrator also finds that Alda's negligence and breach of its duty of care was the proximate cause of resulting injury to Claimants.
6.37.
For these reasons, an award shall be entered in Claimants favor on Claimants' claims for negligence. Claimants' awardable damages for this breach will be discussed and calculated below

C. Contract Damages to be Awarded to Claimants

6.38.
Before discussing and quantifying the contract damages awarded to Claimants, the Arbitrator will first discuss some basic principles of California law regarding damages awardable for breach of contract.
6.39.
"The rules of law governing the recovery of damages for breach of contract are very flexible. Their application in the infinite number of situations that arise is beyond question variable and uncertain. Even more than in the case of other rules of law, they must be regarded merely as guides to the court, leaving much to the individual feeling of the court created by the special circumstances of the particular case." Brandon & Tibbs (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 442, 455 (internal citation omitted).
6.40.
"Contract damages are generally limited to those within the contemplation of the parties when the contract was entered into or at least reasonably foreseeable by them at that time; consequential damages beyond the expectation of the parties are not recoverable. This limitation on available damages serves to encourage contractual relations and commercial activity by enabling parties to estimate in advance the financial risks of their enterprise. Cal. Civ. Code § 330 (contract damages).
6.41.
"Where the fact of damages is certain, the amount of damages need not be calculated with absolute certainty. The law requires only that some reasonable basis of computation of damages be used, and the damages may be computed even if the result reached is an approximation. This is especially true where … it is the wrongful acts of the defendant … that have caused the other party to not realize a profit to which that party is entitled." Meister v. Mensinger (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 381, 396–397 (original italics, internal citation and quotation omitted).

1. Medical Expenses

6.42.
Claimants are entitled to recover the reasonable value of all medical expenses that have been incurred, and that are reasonably certain to be incurred in the future, because of the injury. Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc. (2011) 52 Cal. 4th 541, 551. It was foreseeable to Alda that a breach of its agreement to be solely responsible for Paul's safety while performing would cause Paul to be injured and to incur medical expenses.

a. Past Medical Expenses

6.43.
Claimants are entitled to recover the "reasonable cost" of past medical care necessitated by Alda's breach of its contractual obligation to provide a safe environment for Paul's performance at ASOT 750. Reasonable compensation for past medical expenses may not exceed the amount paid or incurred—whether by Claimants directly or by insurance, or any other "collateral source." A personal injury Claimant may recover the lesser of (a) the amount paid or incurred for medical services, and (b) the reasonable value of the services." Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., supra, 52 Cal. 4th at 555-556.
6.44.
Under the "collateral source rule," medical benefits (and any other injury compensation) received by claimant from sources wholly independent of respondent (e.g., under claimant's health, disability or accident insurance, or social security or disability benefits) are not deducted from the damages otherwise recoverable. Alda is not entitled to an "offset" for claimant's "collateral source" compensation (e.g., medical bills paid by others). Lund v. San Joaquin Valley R.R. (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 1, 8-10 ; Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., supra, 52 Cal. 4th at 548; Acosta v. Southern Calif. Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal. 3d 19, 25-26.
6.45.
At the Hearing, Claimants submitted the invoices and other evidence of Paul's medical expenses incurred for medical care in Germany and The Netherlands including the expenses paid directly by the German medical insurance program, DVK. Exhibit 23A. These expenses included, for example the charges from UMC Utrecht, Medical Park Berlin, laboratory and radiologist costs, ambulance expense, and medical equipment. Claimants also submitted a chart summarizing and totaling these expenses 2016 and 2017 in Euros. Exhibit 23B. The past medical expenses totaled € 85,807.60.
6.46.
Pursuant to the ICDR Rules, Art 31, ¶ 4, all monetary awards in this proceeding are to be rendered in the same currency as the Booking Agreement, which is the American dollar. Of the total expenses of [REDACTED]were paid in 2016 and [REDACTED] were paid in 2017. Pursuant to the IRS Yearly Average Currency Exchange Rates, the exchange rate for conversion of Euros into Dollars in 2016 was 0,923 in 2017 and 0,940 in 2016. To convert from Euro to Dollars, one must divide the Euro sum by the conversion rate. Thus the 2016 medical expenses of [REDACTED] and the 2017 medical expenses of [REDACTED] for a total of $91,337.63.
6.47.
The Arbitrator awards to Claimants as past medical expenses the sum of $91,337.63.

b. Future Medical Expenses

6.48.
Claimants are awarded the reasonable value of future medical charges (e.g., medical care, services, therapy, or supplies) that are reasonably certain to be needed and given in treatment of the injury, and the condition requiring the future medical care is causally connected to the injuries inflicted by Alda. Cal. Civ. Code § 3283; Hoffman v. Southern Pac. Co. (1929) 101 Cal. App. 218, 229-230; see Garcia v. Duro Dyne Corp. (2007) 156 Cal App.4th 92, 97-99. Future medical expenses may be the product of the original injury or may result from an increased susceptibility to future injury because of the accident in question.
6.49.
The Arbitrator finds that the evidence submitted at the Hearing proved that[REDACTED] The evidence submitted at the Hearing by Claimants regarding[REDACTED]
6.50.
[REDACTED]
6.51.
In general, the Arbitrator finds that Paul's future medical needs will include[REDACTED]
6.52.
The Arbitrator also finds credible Dr. Fisk's expert testimony that [REDACTED]
6.53.
Finally, and as noted above and as Dr. Fisk credibly testified, the Arbitrator finds that the [REDACTED]
6.54.
The Arbitrator finds that the medical expenses that Paul will incur as estimated by Drs. Fisk and Zackler in their reports and in Dr. Fisk's testimony [REDACTED]
6.55.
[REDACTED]
6.56.
For all of the future medical expenses, the low estimate is [REDACTED] and the high estimate is [REDACTED]. The average between the high and low estimates is [REDACTED].
6.57.
The Arbitrator finds that a fair estimate of Paul's future medical expenses he will incur because of the injuries he suffered from his fall at ASOT 750 is $2,062,500.
6.58.
The Arbitrator awards to Claimants as recoverable future medical expenses the sum of $2,062,500.

2. Lost Profits

6.59.
Claimants are also entitled to recover the reasonable value of all wages, commissions, bonuses and all other earnings and fringe benefits that Claimant has lost, or probably will lose because the injury. Bonneau v. North Shore R.R. Co. (1907) 152 Cal. 406, 414. Because Paul is self-employed through his wholly owned GmbH which functions essentially as a loan out company for his personal performing services, the value of lost profits can be proved by evidence of past profits (gross earnings less an appropriate cost factor) from his performing activities. See Meister v. Mensinger, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at 397. However, no discount can be made to project after tax earnings or profits. Rodriguez v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1978) 87 Cal. App.3d 626, 664-668.
6.60.
"Where the fact of damages is certain, the amount of damages need not be calculated with absolute certainty. The law requires only that some reasonable basis of computation of damages be used, and the damages may be computed even if the result reached is an approximation. This is especially true where, as here, it is the wrongful acts of the defendant that have created the difficulty in proving the amount of loss of profits or where it is the wrongful acts of the defendant that have caused the other party to not realize a profit to which that party is entitled." GHK Associates v. Mayer Group (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 856, 873–874 (internal citations omitted). "Historical data, such as past business volume, supply an acceptable basis for ascertaining lost future profits." Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 774.

a. Lost Past Profits

6.61.
At the Hearing testimonial evidence regarding Claimants' lost past profits was provided primarily by [Person 8], a booking agent for Paul, who testified both live and by a written statement, [Person 9], also a booking agent for Paul, who submitted a sworn written witness statement, Paul, [Person 5], [Person 2], and [Person 6].
6.62.
Dr. Fisk's expert medical testimony was also highly relevant. Dr. Fisk's testimony, as well as the other medical records and reports submitted at the Hearing, established the [REDACTED]
6.63.
Claimants also submitted Exhibit 24 containing documents summarizing Paul's touring activity for the years 2010 through 2017 setting forth among other things, each performance date and the gross fee received, Paul's accounting records from which an average touring expense percentage was calculated, and the details of Paul's 2016 booked dates that had to be cancelled because of Paul's fall and his hospitalization in Utrecht and Berlin.

i. Lost 2016 Performing Profits

6.64.
Because of Paul's injury, his hospitalization, and his continuing therapy after being discharged from Medical Park Berlin, 32 of his 2016 booked performance had to be cancelled during the period February 29 through June 12, 2016. Based on the reports of Paul's experts, the Arbitrator finds that the gross performance revenues lost due to these cancellations was[REDACTED]
6.65.
The Arbitrator finds that Claimants suffered additional lost gross performance fees in 2016.
6.66.
Shortly after Paul's fall at ASOT 750 a 2016 booking planning meeting previously scheduled in mid-March 2016 to be held at [Person 8]'s Los Angeles offices with employees of Claimants, including [Person 6], and [Person 9], another of Paul's booking agents was cancelled. [REDACTED] Because of this total uncertainty, no efforts were made to book Paul for any additional dates in 2016 or thereafter.
6.67.
Ultimately, Paul felt he had to try to perform again and decided he would try to do so at the Electric Daisey Carnival ("EDC") festival on June 20, 2016 that had been booked before his accident. He felt that the EDC show would be a safe environment because it was produced by friends, it had many DJ acts who could cover for him if in fact he could not perform or had to stop his performance, and it had medical teams at the performance site. He felt the EDC performance was "the right balance between a real goal versus making it as safe as possible to kind of start the first steps." TR. 300. [REDACTED]
6.68.
Paul and [Person 5] traveled from Berlin to their Los Angeles apartment about nine days before the EDC date for Paul to try to adjust and prepare for the EDC performance.[REDACTED] that he did perform at the EDC in Las Vegas and [Person 5] went with him.
6.69.
[REDACTED]
6.70.
[REDACTED] [Person 8]'s testimony about the EDC performance made the same observations. Among the evidence presented at the hearing was a video compilation of clips from some of Paul's performance between 1999 and 2015 which clearly illustrated his active and vigorous pre-accident performance style.
6.71.
In early July, [Person 8], and York started to try to book additional 2016 performances. This effort was limited by several factors including the normal lead time for booking dates of three to six months, [REDACTED]
6.72.
[REDACTED]
6.73.
The Arbitrator has reviewed the methodology used by [Person 8] and York, as well as their personal knowledge and experience in the concert booking business in general and specifically with respect to Paul, and the historical 2010 to 2017 data on which that methodology is based to reach their conclusion about lost gross revenues in 2016. The Arbitrator finds that this methodology and the information on which it is based more than satisfies California's legal standard requiring that some reasonable basis of computation of damages be used, and allowing that damages may be computed even if the result reached is an approximation. This is particularly applicable in this proceeding because it is Alda's wrongful acts that have created the difficulty in proving the amount of loss of profits.
6.74.
Accordingly, the Arbitrators find that Claimants suffered lost 2016 gross performing revenues totaling [REDACTED]. Of course, Claimants are only entitled to recover lost profits and not lost gross revenues. The Arbitrator turns now to the calculation of the lost net profits.
6.75.
Paul testified that the venues pay his gross performance fees to the agents who booked the date and that the agents in turn remit approximately [REDACTED] of that gross to GmbH after deducting their booking agent fees. Because the GmbH is wholly owned and controlled by Paul the performing revenues are treated under German practices as owned by and attributable to Paul individually for tax purposes. Additionally, the performance touring costs and expenses are also treated as Paul's personal cost and expenses. Claimants' submitted into evidence Paul's tax accountings for the years 2010 through 2016 which report all the touring revenues and expenses consistent with Paul's testimony. Claimants also submitted a calculation of the average tour expenses as a percentage of tour revenues for the years 2010 through 2015. That six-year average is [REDACTED] which the Arbitrator finds to be a reasonable amount to be used to calculate lost touring profits.
6.76.
An additional calculation must be made to be able to compute the net profits. Because of the [REDACTED] expense percentage, Paul retains [REDACTED] of the performance royalties attributed to him. Because he receives only [REDACTED] of the gross, one must multiply [REDACTED] times[REDACTED] to determine the percentage of the gross that is retained as profit. That multiplication results in [REDACTED] of gross performance fees paid by the promoters to the agents is net profits to Paul.
6.77.
The Arbitrator finds that in 2016 Claimants lost gross revenues of [REDACTED] and that [REDACTED] of that amount, is $615,173 (rounded to the nearest $1) which the Arbitrator finds to be Claimant's lost 2016 profits.

ii. Lost 2017 Performance Profits

6.78.
[Person 8] and York used their same methodology to estimate Paul's lost gross performing revenues. For all the reason and analysis discussed regarding lost 2016 performance profits stated immediately above the Arbitrator finds that estimate of damages reasonable and accepts that estimate and bases his finding on it.
6.79.
Accordingly, the Arbitrator finds that Claimants lost gross 2017 performance revenues in the amount of [REDACTED]. Applying the profit percentage of, [REDACTED] the Arbitrator finds that Claimant' lost 2017 performing profits were $297,000.

b. Lost Future Profits

6.80.
[Person 8] and York also computed future lost gross performance revenues caused by Paul's continuing conditions and symptoms cause by his fall at ASOT 750.
6.81.
As explained previously, [REDACTED]
6.82.
As Paul testified, before the accident, his decisions as to whether to accept a performance booking were made on only two factors: whether it was "good for the career" or whether it "financially made sense." Tr. 281, 305. Before his accident, travel issues were not considered because Paul was willing to and would fly from continent to continent to do shows from one weekend to another or even for shows closer in time to each other. In a Rolling Stone article, he was rated the number 2 most traveled musical artist of all time. Pre-accident, he also had the energy to perform up to six-hour sets and usually performed 3-hour sets. [REDACTED]
6.83.
[Person 8]'s and York's methodology of estimating future lost performance revenues was based on two assumptions in addition to their analysis of 2016 and 2017 lost gross revenues. [REDACTED]. This second assumption was based on the fact that there are numerous electronic music artists in their mid-fifties who continue today to enjoy active and successful touring careers as set forth in [Person 8]'s written witness statement. Moreover, Paul has had a successful international touring career since 1996 and continues to appeal to the public.
6.84.
[Person 8] and York did not try to estimate the total annual gross performance fees that Paul would earn for his performance for each of the next 10 years starting with 2018.[REDACTED]
6.85.
The Arbitrator finds that the methodology used by [Person 8] and York to estimate the future lost gross performing revenues, and the assumptions on which it is based, are based in fact and that their estimates of annual lost future gross revenues are reasonable and fair. As noted earlier, the fact of future lost gross revenues is certain and California law does not require that the amount of damages be calculated with absolute certainty. The law requires only that some reasonable basis of computation of damages be used, and the damages may be computed even if the result reached is an approximation. The estimates of future lost gross revenues presented by Claimants more that satisfy this legal standard.
6.86.
Accordingly, the Arbitrator finds, based on the evidence and reports submitted by Claimants, that Claimants will suffer over the next 10 years an average annual [REDACTED] loss in performance gross revenues for a total of [REDACTED] Applying the [REDACTED] net profit multiplier, the Arbitrator finds that claimants will suffer lost performance profits over the next 10 years in the amount of $2,475,000.

c. Summary of Lost Profits Finding

6.87.
The Arbitrator finds that Claimants have suffered lost 2016 and 2017 past profits in the sum of $912,173, and lost future profits in the sum of $2,475,000 for a total of lost profit damages of $3,387,173 which sum the Arbitrator awards in favor of Claimants.

3. Other Economic Damages

6.88.
In this proceeding, in addition to lost profits from performance engagements that had to be cancelled because of the injuries to Paul and his hospitalization, there were also performance travel and other expenses incurred regarding the cancelled dates that could not be fully mitigated. Additionally, there were some costs incurred before Paul resumed touring to mitigate the potential lost future income after Claimants determined that it might be possible for Paul to be able to resume public performing at some level.
6.89.
"A party injured by a breach of contract is required to do everything reasonably possible to negate his own loss and thus reduce the damages for which the other party has become liable. The plaintiff cannot recover for harm he could have foreseen and avoided by such reasonable efforts and without undue expense. However, the injured party is not precluded from recovery to the extent that he has made reasonable but unsuccessful efforts to avoid loss." Brandon & Tibbs v. George Kevorkian Accountancy Corp., supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at 460 (internal citations omitted). "The burden of proving that losses could have been avoided by reasonable effort and expense must always be borne by the party who has broken the contract. Since the law denies recovery for losses that can be avoided by reasonable effort and expense, justice requires that the risks incident to such effort should be carried by the party whose wrongful conduct makes them necessary. Therefore, special losses that a party incurs in a reasonable effort to avoid losses resulting from a breach are recoverable as damages." Id. at pp. 460–461 (internal citations omitted.)
6.90.
Claimants submitted three exhibits summarizing these additional economic damages (Exhibits 26A, 26B, and 26C) which were verified and explained by [Person 6].
6.91.
Exhibit 26A itemized touring travel expenses that could not be cancelled, travel expenses that were incurred for travel to or from Utrecht to attend to Paul while he was a UMC Utrecht, and cancelled travel and lodging in connection with the March 2016 booking agency meeting in Los Angeles that was cancelled because of Paul's condition after his fall at ASOT 750. Net of refunds in the amount of $6,282.80, these damages total $30,405.80.
6.92.
Exhibit 26B itemized 3.5 months (March -June 15, 2016) of expenses for the Berlin office, salary, the Los Angeles apartment, and third-parties that either could not be mitigated because of existing contracts or were incurred to try to mitigate future income loss after it seemed that Paul would be able to resume some level of performing. These expenses were explained by [Person 6] during her testimony and they total $149,506.92.
6.93.
Exhibit 26C summarized the Claimants' German accounting and legal fees that could not be mitigated for the months March – June 2016. The total pro rata portion computed for 3.5 months totals $13,450.
6.94.
The Arbitrator finds that all expenses included on Exhibits 26A, 26B, and 26C, were incurred by Claimants, either could not be mitigated or were expended in an effort to mitigate future damages, and are special losses that under California law are recoverable as damages in this proceeding. These damages total $193,453.37 and the Arbitrator awards these damages in favor of Claimants.

D. Negligence Damages to be Awarded to Claimants

6.95.
"Tort damages are awarded to [fully] compensate the victim for [all] injury suffered." (Erlich v. Menezes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 543, 550 (internal citations and quotations omitted.) Cal. Civ. Code § 3333.
6.96.
"Tort damages are awarded to compensate a plaintiff for all of the damages suffered as a legal result of the defendant's wrongful conduct." North American Chemical Co., supra, 59 Cal. App.4th at 786 (italics omitted). "While a defendant is liable for all the damage that his tortuous act proximately causes to the plaintiff, regardless of whether or not it could have been anticipated, nevertheless a proximate causal connection must still exist between the damage sustained by the plaintiff and the defendant's wrongful act or omission, and the detriment inflicted on the plaintiff must still be the natural and probable result of the defendant's conduct." Chaparkas v. Webb (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 257, 260 (internal citations omitted). And "[w]here the fact of damages is certain, the amount of damages need not be calculated with absolute certainty. The law requires only that some reasonable basis of computation of damages be used, and the damages may be computed even if the result reached is an approximation. This is especially true where … it is the wrongful acts of the defendant … that have caused the other party to not realize a profit to which that party is entitled." Meister v. Mensinger (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 381, 396–397 (original italics, internal citation and quotation omitted). See generally, CACI, 3900, 3902, 3903A, 3903C, 3903D, 3903N, 3905A, 3932.

1. Economic Damages

6.97.
The economic damages awarded to Claimant as proximately caused by Alda's breach of the booking Agreement as explained and analyzed above are equally awardable to Claimants as proximately caused by Alda's negligence. Accordingly, the Arbitrator awards to Claimants as damages proximately caused by Alda's negligence the previously found amounts of past and future medical expenses, past and future lost profits, and amount of other economic damages.

2. Non-Economic Damages

6.98.
Claimant Paul is entitled to be compensated in damages for his non-economic damages for the pain and suffering he has already suffered and reasonably will suffer in the future caused by Alda. This includes not only physical pain and emotional trauma, but also "hedonic" damages (impaired enjoyment of personal and professional life). See Loth v. Truck-A-Way Corp. (1998) 60 Cal. App. 4th 757, 760 & fn. 1. Reasonableness is the only limit on the amount of pain and suffering non-economic damages. Cal. Civ. Code § 3359. No definite standard or formula is prescribed by California law to fix reasonable pain and suffering compensation. See CACI, 3905A.
6.99.
Indeed, California law does not permit opinion testimony on the amount of such reasonable compensation, and any argument urging a particular calculation or amount cannot be considered evidence. Loth v. Truck-A-Way Corp, supra, 60 Cal App. 4th at 764-768. The calculation of pain and suffering damages is left to the Arbitrator's subjective discretion and the only guideline is a reasonable amount based on the evidence and on common sense. See Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles (1979) 26 Cal. 3d 86, 103; Corenbaum v. Lampkin (2013) 215 Cal. App. 4th 1308, 1332-1333. Moreover, the Arbitrator can infer future pain and suffering from the type of injury involved and the pain experienced up to the Hearing. Loper v. Morrison (1944) 23 Cal.2d 600, 609-610.
6.100.
However, the failure to award any non-economic damages where negligence and injury are established will result in a damage award inadequate as a matter of law. For example, "[W]here a plaintiff has undergone surgery in which a herniated disc is removed and a metallic plate inserted, and the jury has expressly found that defendant's negligence was a cause of plaintiff's injury, the failure to award any damages for pain and suffering results in a damage award that is inadequate as a matter of law." Dodson v. J. Pacific, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 931, 933, 936-938.
6.101.
While there is no rule on the calculation of non-economic damages other than "reasonableness" based on the evidence and common sense, a review of several illustrative California decisions affirming non-economic awards is instructive. In Barry v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, 2011 WL 4360994 (2011), a California Court of Appeal affirmed a jury award of $1,317,000 in economic damages and $2,634,000 in non-economic damages to a plaintiff camera operator who suffered two broken legs because of the defendants' negligence while filming in Namibia a miniature scene of a plane crash for a feature motion picture. In Fagerquist v. Western Sun Aviation, Inc, 191 Cal. App. 3d. 709 (1987), a California Court of Appeal affirmed a jury verdict award in a negligence, wrongful death case of non-economic damages 15 times greater than the economic damage award. In Shahinian v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 194 Cal. App. 4th 987 (2011), a California Court of Appeal found an arbitrator's award of non-economic damages three times the award of economic damages was a reasoned judgment.

a. The Arbitrator's Exercise of His Subjective Discretion in Computing Non-Economic Damages

6.102.
The Arbitrator is firmly convinced that he must award some amount of non-economic damages to Paul. The facts presented in this proceeding and at the Hearing mandate such an award. As the authorities quoted above teach, the failure to do so would render any arbitral award inadequate as a matter of law.
6.103.
The Arbitrator has considered the entire record before him in reaching his decision about the amount of non-economic damages to be awarded. The Arbitrator intends to summarize some of the facts in the record that played a significant factor in the exercise of his subjective discretion, but that summary will not be exhaustive nor set forth all that the Arbitrator has considered in exercising his discretion.
6.104.
More importantly, the Arbitrator wants to be clear about what he has not considered in deciding the amount of non-economic damages to be awarded in this proceeding. The Arbitrator has not considered in exercising his subjective discretion any views about the degree of culpability of Alda in causing damage to Paul. The non-economic damages the Arbitrator has decided to award are not calculated in any way to "punish" Alda for any of its actions or inactions upon which the Arbitrator has based his decision that Alda is liable to Claimants in this proceeding. As mentioned above, punitive or exemplary damages may not be awarded in this proceeding and the Arbitrator will not and does not award such damages in any way nor disguise them as some other element of damages.
6.105.
The amount of non-economic damages the Arbitrator awards in this proceeding is solely to compensate Paul for the undisputable non-economic damages he has suffered [REDACTED]
6.106.
[REDACTED]
6.107.
[REDACTED]
6.108.
[REDACTED]
6.109.
[REDACTED]
6.110.
Paul grew up in East Germany raised by a single mother before the Berlin Wall fell. At 10 years old he first heard music on a western radio station that meant something to him other than background noise. As Paul explained, "from then on, I just became what you would call a geek or freak when it comes down to music" and that was "how I got into electronic music, how I fell in love in [sic] electronic music." TR. 275-76. Paul began to perform professionally in March 1991 and has been a professional musician ever since. By 1993, Paul was performing once a month at a club in New York City. In 1996 Paul began doing "crazy touring, kind of like all over the world." TR. 280. Paul was still doing "crazy touring" before his accident at ASOT 750. Music and performing has been Paul's life and the essence of his being.
6.111.
[REDACTED]
6.112.
[REDACTED]
6.113.
[REDACTED]
6.114.
[REDACTED]
6.115.
[REDACTED]
6.116.
[REDACTED]
6.117.
[REDACTED]
6.118.
[REDACTED]
6.119.
As the mentioned above, the foregoing is not everything that the Arbitrator considered in exercising his discretion indeed it is not even a majority of what has been considered, but the foregoing does give some insight to the Arbitrator's thinking.

b. The Arbitrator's Award of Non-Economic Damages

6.120.
In the exercise of the Arbitrator's subjective discretion, and based on all of the evidence adduced at the hearing in this matter, the Arbitrator awards in favor of Paul the sum of $5,500,000 in non-economic damages, and amount which reasonably compensates Paul for the non-economic damages he suffered as a result of the acts and omissions of Alda.

E. Other Relief

6.121.
The Arbitrator reserved to the Phase 2 hearing the issues of determining pre-judgment interest, any award of attorneys' fees and costs, and the shifting, if at all, of the arbitral institution's fees and the Arbitrator's compensation. The Arbitrator invited additional submissions on these points, including the submission of relevant legal argument and evidence. Claimants made ample submissions supporting its claims on these matters and Respondent did not submit anything, despite being properly and repeatedly invited to do so.
6.122.
As a result of the submissions received by the Arbitrator, the Arbitrator has determined the issues of pre-judgment interest, attorneys' fees and costs, and arbitral institution fees and arbitrator compensation as follows:

1. Pre-Judgment Interest

6.123.
As already established in the Partial Final Award, under California law, in both contract and tort cases pre-judgment interest on economic damages may be awarded at the discretion of the Arbitrator. California Code of Civil Procedure § 3287(b) (contract claim) and § 3288 and §3291 (tort claim). However, no pre-judgment interest may be awarded on non-economic damages. Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. 3d at 109.
6.124.
In the Partial Final Award, the Arbitrator awarded in favor of Claimants pre-judgment interest as allowed under California law on all economic damages awarded and set a briefing schedule thereon pursuant to Procedural Order No. 4, ¶ 6(b). Claimants submitted detailed prejudgment interest calculations and Respondent did not make any submissions on prejudgment interest.
6.125.
Claimants submitted a detailed schedule setting forth the calculation of pre-judgment interest on the awards made in the Partial Final Award for past medical expenses of $91,337.63 (at p. 39); lost 2016 profits of $615,173 (at p. 47); and, lost 2017 profits of $297,000 (at p. 47). Chieffo Decl. ¶ 23, Schedule F. The California pre-judgment interest rate for breach of a contract that, as here, does not stipulate an interest rate is 10% per annum. Civil Code §3287(b) and §3289(b). The weekly interest rate is thus 0.19% or 0.0019. Exhibit F calculates pre-judgment interest on the past medical damages and the lost 2016 profits from the date of commencement of this proceeding, March 7, 2017 through the date of the Partial Final Award, June 29, 2018. Exhibit F calculates pre-judgment interest on the lost 2017 profits from January 1, 2018 through the date of the Partial Final Award, June 29, 2018.
6.126.
The total pre-judgment interest awarded to Claimants as a result is $105,388.67.

2. Attorney's Fees and Costs

a. Attorneys' Fees

6.127.
The Booking Agreement provides that Alda indemnified Claimants for all loss, cost, damage, and expense, including reasonable attorneys' fees, arising out of or in connection with Alda's breach of the Booking Agreement or Paul's performance. Thus, Claimants attorney's fees and costs incurred in this Arbitration are part of the recoverable breach of contract damages, but not the recoverable negligence damages. Moreover, a prevailing party's attorneys' fees and costs are also recoverable under the ICDR Rules, Article 34, even if that party prevails on a tort claim and does not have a contractual claim to recover attorneys' fees. California law also provides for an award of attorney's fees and costs. CCP § 127,318 (b)(2)
6.128.
In the Partial Final Award, the Arbitrator awarded to Claimants their reasonable legal fees and costs, including expert fees, incurred in this proceeding, pursuant to Procedural Order No. 4, ¶ 6(b), and set a briefing schedule thereon. Claimants submitted argument and evidence but Respondents did not submit anything on this point.
6.129.
Generally, reasonable attorney fees to be awarded are ordinarily determined pursuant to the "lodestar" or "touchstone" method.

"The lodestar method, or more accurately the lodestar-multiplier method, calculates the fee by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by counsel by a reasonable hourly rate. Once the court has fixed the lodestar, it may increase or decrease that amount by applying a positive or negative multiplier to take into account a variety of other factors, including the quality of the representation, the novelty and complexity of the issues, the results obtained, and the contingent risk presented."

See, generally, Laffitte v. Robert Half International, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 489 (internal quotation and citation omitted).

6.130.
The fact that Claimants have a contingency fee agreement with Greenburg Traurig ("GT") and the Law Offices of Kurosh Nasseri, PLLC ("Nasseri Law Office") does not foreclose a reasonable fee award and a contingency client has the same right as an hourly client to recover all or a portion of the fees. Fairchild v. Park (2001) 90 Cal. App.4th 919, 924; Persson v. Smart Inventions, Inc. (2005) 125 Cal. App.4th 1141, 1172-1176 (fee award exceeding amount party owed under contingent fee agreement was not erroneous).
6.131.
Normally, "(t)he reasonable market value of the attorney's services is the measure of a reasonable hourly rate." Nemecek & Cole v. Horn (2012) 208 Cal. App.4th 641, 651, 145 (internal quotes omitted) (retainer agreement provided for prevailing party's recovery of reasonable attorney fees).
6.132.
Normally, a "reasonable" hourly rate used to calculate the lodestar is the prevailing rate for similar work in the community where the court is located. See, Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin, (2014), 226 Cal App. 4th 691, 695-696, 701-702 (trial court's rate calculation was supported by adjusted Laffey Matrix (official source of rates based on District of Columbia area, adjusted to San Francisco Bay Area) and counsel's more than 20 years' experience in litigation of this kind (trial judge considered services rendered as "sophisticated" legal work and stated the hourly rate requested was "not even close to the highest hourly rate that I have seen in this area"). The reasonable hourly rate standard applies even where the attorney claiming the fees is retained on a straight contingent fee basis. Nemecek & Cole v. Horn, supra, 208 Cal App.4th at 651.
6.133.
Fees may be awarded for investigation and evaluation of a plaintiff's claim incurred before the filing of a complaint or notice of arbitration and it is recognized that to deny fees for such services would discourage careful lawyering. Stokus v. Marsh (1990) 217 Cal. App.3d 647, 655.
6.134.
The lodestar amount may be adjusted based on various factors specific to the case in order to fix the attorney fees at fair market value for the services provided. PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095-1096; Holguin v. DISH Network LLC (2014) 229 Cal. App.4th 1310, 1329.
6.135.
The factors include:

• "the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved";

• "the skill displayed in presenting them";

• "the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys"; and

• "the contingent nature of the fee award." Holguin v. DISH Network LLC, supra, 229 Cal. App.4th at 1332-1333 (internal quotes omitted)]

6.136.
Claimants used the services of two sets of lawyers in this proceeding, GT and the Nasseri Law Office, who accepted representation of Claimants on a contingency basis. Under these circumstances, Claimants would be entitled to seek a loadstar multiplier to increase the award of reasonable fees, but Claimants have elected only to seek an award of the loadstar amount. The lodestar for GT services is $790,748 and for the Nasseri Law Offices is $205,925 for a total of $996,673. The calculation of the loadstar is discussed below.
6.137.
Claimants have submitted a detailed schedule of the services rendered by GT timekeepers to Claimants in this matter setting forth those timekeepers' normal hourly rates charged to and paid by non-contingency clients, the hours expended by each timekeeper, and a detailed description of the specific services provided. Chieffo Decl. ¶¶13, 14, Schedule D. Those GT timekeepers were in GT's Los Angeles and Amsterdam offices. Id. There was no duplication of effort by the Los Angeles and Amsterdam GT attorneys because the nature of the dispute in these proceedings had discrete Dutch substantive and procedural law issues and Dutch discovery issues that were primarily handled by the Amsterdam attorneys. See generally, Chieffo Decl. ¶¶.15, 17 – 20.
6.138.
Based on the normal hourly rates charged to non-contingency clients and the 968.9 hours recorded on Schedule D, the normal billable value of the services rendered to Claimants is $790,748. Chieffo Decl. ¶ 14. Of that amount approximately $104,000 is attributable to the services rendered by the Amsterdam attorney's or about 13% of the total. Chieffo Decl. ¶ 15.
6.139.
The hours incurred and the normal hourly rates charged for the services of the GT personnel who worked on this matter were both reasonable. Chieffo Decl. ¶ 22. The total of $790,748 is the appropriate lodestar calculation for GT.
6.140.
Claimants have submitted a summary of the amount of time expended by the Nasseri Law Office representing Claimants in this matter and a month-by-month detailed description of the services rendered. Nasseri Decl. ¶ 6, Schedule E, and Ex. N19. The Nasseri Law Office expended 411.85 hours rendering those services. At Nasseri's normal hourly rate of $500 charged to and paid by his non-contingency clients, the billable value for its services in this matter is $205,925. See generally, Nasseri Decl. ¶¶ 5 – 9. The hourly fee of $500 and the hours expended by the Nasseri Law Office are both reasonable and $205,925 is the lodestar for the Nasseri Law Office's services.
6.141.
Acccordingly, the total amount of attorney's fees awarded to Claimants is $996,673.

b. Costs

6.142.
Claimants retained five medical experts in Los Angeles, Drs. Fisk, Feldman, Tseng, and Schaeffer to provide medical services and evaluations, for Dr. Fisk's expert reports and oral testimony regarding the past, present, and future damage done to Paul as a result of Respondent's breach of contract and negligence. As part of these medical services and evaluations, in November 2017 Claimants also incurred expenses for MRIs of Paul in November 2017, and, in March 2018, incurred expenses for a medical test ordered by Dr. Feldman and performed at the Taper Imaging Center at Cedar Sinai Hospital and for blood lab work ordered by Dr. Tseng at Quest Diagnostic. At the request of Dr. Fisk, Claimants also incurred the expense of shipping prior Dutch and German to Los Angeles for Dr. Fisk's review. The total medical expert fees and medical costs totaled $58,753.11. Chieffo Decl. ¶ 5, Schedule A at Category Codes 3.1 – 3.5, and Exs. 2 – 10. The Arbitrator finds these fees reasonable and necessary to the presentation of the case.
6.143.
Claimant also retained a stage safety expert, Henry Bellord, to provide an expert report and expert testimony regarding safety issues arising from the design and construction of the Main Stage area of the Alda presented A State Of Trance festival held in Utrecht in February 2016 ("ASOT 750") where Paul was injured. In this connection, Claimants incurred an expert fee of $3,400 and related travel expenses of $976 for Mr. Bellord to travel from his home in Costa Rica to testify at the Phase 1 Hearing. Chieffo Decl. ¶ 5, Schedule A at Category Code 3.6, and Ex. 11. The Arbitrator finds these fees and costs reasonable and necessary to the presentation of the case.
6.144.
Claimants' arbitration travel costs arise from three required trips from Germany to Los Angeles in November 2017, March 2018, and May 2018.
6.145.
The first two trips were required for Paul to be evaluated and examined by the above referenced Los Angeles medical professionals to complete the necessary expert medical reports and testimony presented at the Phase 1 Hearing.
6.146.
In November 2017 Paul and his wife [Person 5] ("[Person 5]) traveled to Los Angeles for the initial evaluation by Dr. Fisk and, upon Dr. Fisk's order to have new MRIs performed by the Medical Imaging Center of Santa Monica. Paul and [Person 5] stayed in Los Angeles for these purposes and for meetings with Chieffo and Nasseri from November 26 through November 29, 2017. The total costs for this trip, including airfare to and from Los Angeles, hotel lodging, and miscellaneous expenses including ground transportation costs, was $8,372.82. Chieffo Decl. ¶ 6, Schedule A at Category Code 4, and Exs. 3, 12,13,14, and 15.
6.147.
In March 2018 Paul and [Person 5] traveled again to Los Angeles to complete the required medical tests and evaluation necessary to complete the research required for the finalization of the necessary expert medical reports and testimony to be presented at the Phase 1 Hearing and for meetings with Chieffo and Nasseri. Paul and [Person 5] stayed for these purposes in Los Angeles from March 6 – 15, 2018. The total costs for this trip including airfare to and from Los Angeles, Airbnb lodging, and miscellaneous expenses including ground transportation costs, was $21,917.13. Chieffo Decl. ¶ 7, Schedule A at Category Code 5, and, Exs. 6, 16 - 18.
6.148.
In May 2918 Paul and [Person 5] as well as [Person 2], [Person 6], and [Person 4] traveled to Los Angeles to complete their witness preparation and to testify at the Phase 1 Hearing. The total costs for this trip including airfare to and from Los Angeles, Airbnb lodging (for Paul, [Person 5], [Person 6] and [Person 4], as well as Nasseri), hotel lodging for [Person 2], and miscellaneous expenses including food and ground transportation costs, in Los Angeles and in Europe was $29,370.02. Chieffo Decl. ¶ 8, Schedule A at Category Code 6, and Exs. 19 -41.
6.149.
In addition to the costs on schedule A, discussed immediately above, Claimants incurred litigation costs with GT (Schedule B) and with the Nasseri Law Office (Schedule C).
6.150.
Pursuant to the contingency fee engagement letter between Claimants and GT, Claimants were only charged for GT's third-party expenses and disbursements and not for internal charges such as copying or computerized research. Chieffo Decl. ¶¶ 10. 11, Schedule B.
6.151.
All of the hard, third-party expenses and disbursements on Schedule B are customary and usual in such matters as this proceeding and the costs on Schedule B are the actual costs billed to GT without any markup or premium. Id.at ¶ 10. These GT costs total $21,884.92.
6.152.
Pursuant to the contingency fee engagement, Claimants were only charged for the Nasseri Law Office's third-party expenses and disbursements and not for internal charges such as copying or computerized research. Nasseri Decl. ¶¶ 2 – 4, Schedule C, and Exs. N1 – N18.
6.153.
These costs were incurred for three trips Nasseri took to Los Angeles. The two trips in November 2017 and March 2018 to Los Angeles were to join with co-counsel for meetings and witness preparation with Paul and [Person 5] while they were in Los Angeles for Paul's expert medical appointments discussed immediately above. The third trip in May 2018 to Los Angeles was for final witness preparation and for attendance at the Phase 1 Hearing. Id.
6.154.
The hard, third-party expenses and disbursements on Schedule C are customary and usual in such matters as this proceeding and the costs on Schedule C are the actual costs billed to the Nasseri Law Office without any markup or premium. Id. These Nasseri Law Office costs total $3543.61.
6.155.
The Arbitrator finds all of the costs sought to be reasonable and necessary to the presentation of the case. Accordingly, the Arbitrator awards total non-legal fee costs to Claimants in the amount of $148,217.61.

3. Arbitration Expenses

6.156.
The ICDR Rules, Article 34, allows the Arbitrator to "fix the costs of arbitration" in its award. Such costs include the fees and expenses of the Arbitrator, the administrative fees of the ICDR, and, as noted above, the reasonable legal and other costs incurred by the parties. In this connection, and with particular application to these proceedings, the ICDR Rules, Article, 20, ¶ 7, allows the Arbitrator to "allocate costs … as necessary to protect the efficiency and integrity of the arbitration." Under California law, the Arbitrator in this proceeding may award all costs incurred in this proceeding including expert fees, fees and expenses of the Arbitrator, ICDR administrative fees, and any other expenses incurred in connection with this proceeding. CCP § 1297.318 (b).
6.157.
In the Partial Final Award, the Arbitrator awarded in favor of Claimants all their recoverable arbitral expenses, including, but not limited, to the fees and expenses of the Arbitrator and the administrative fees of the ICDR. Pursuant to Procedural Order No. 4, ¶ 6(b), the Arbitrator set a briefing schedule to quantify the amount of the cost of arbitration to be awarded in Claimants favor and against Alda. Claimants made detailed submissions, and Respondent made no submissions on this point.
6.158.
Claimants have incurred expenses of $28,935.17 for ICDR administration fees and advanced $72,625 for arbitrator compensation. Chieffo Decl.¶¶ 3, 4, Schedule A at Category codes 1 and 2, and Ex. 1. The ICDR has advised Claimants' counsel that Respondent Alda Events BV ("ALDA") has never made any payments to the ICDR (despite agreeing to arbitration in its agreement with Paul) with respect to these proceedings and that Claimants have been billed and have incurred 100% of these costs. Id.
6.159.
Accordingly, the Arbitrator awards to the Claimants 100% of the total amounts advanced or paid by the Claimants for the ICDR fees and Arbitrator compensation, or the sum of $28,935.17 in ICDR fees and $74,965 in Arbitrator compensation, less any unused amounts to be refunded by ICDR.

4. Summary of Fees, Costs and Interest Awarded

6.160.
In summary the Arbitrator finds the following to constitute the award of attorney's fees, costs, and prejudgment interest:

a. ICDR fees and Arbitrator compensation advanced or paid in the total sum of $103,900.17 ;

b. Attorneys' fees in the amount of $996,673 ;

c. Non-attorneys' fee costs in the amount of $148,217.61; and

d. Pre-judgment interest in the amount of $105,388.67.

The sum of these amounts total an additional award of $1,351,839.45.

VII. AWARD

7.1.
On the basis of the foregoing facts, legal analysis, and conclusions of fact, the Arbitrator renders the following award:

a. The Arbitrator awards in favor of Claimants and against Alda on the breach of contract and negligence claims the following economic damages:

• Past and future medical expenses in the amount of $2,153,837.63;

• Past and future lost profits in the sum of $3,387,173; and

• Other economic damage in the sum of $193,453.37.

b. The Arbitrator awards in favor of Paul and against Alda on his negligence claims the amount of $5,500,000 as non-economic damages.

c. The Arbitrator awards to Claimants and against Alda Claimants' pre-judgement interest as allowed by California law in the amount of $105,388.67.

d. The Arbitrator awards to Claimants, as prevailing party, and against Alda Claimants' attorneys' fees in the amount of $996,673.

e. The Arbitrator awards to Claimants, as prevailing party, and against Alda, Claimants' non-attorneys' fees costs in the amount of $148,217.61.

f. The Arbitrator awards in favor of Claimants the compensation and expenses of the Arbitrator and the administrative fees of the ICDR, as paid by Claimants, in the amount of $103,900.17.

g. This Final Award shall be in full and final resolution of all claims and counterclaims submitted to this Arbitration. The Arbitrator has considered all of the arguments made by the parties, whether or not they are specifically referenced in this Final Award. All claims not expressly granted herein are hereby denied.

I hereby certify that, for the purposes of Article I of the New York Convention of 1958, on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, this Final Award was made in Los Angeles, California on the date indicated below.
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