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Lawyers, other representatives, expert(s), tribunal’s secretary

Final Award

I. THE PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL

1. The Claimant

1.
The Claimant in this arbitration is Novenergia, a Société d'investissement en capital à risque (SICAR) ("Novenergia " or the "Claimant") (list of definitions can be found in Annex 1) incorporated in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg on 1 February 2007, with legal address at 28, Boulevard Royal, L-2449, Luxembourg, and with registration number B124550 in the Luxembourgish Commercial and Corporate Registry.
3.
The eight PV Plants were each built and organised under the auspices of seven corporations which each bear the same name as a respective PV Plant (except Fuente Alamo Norte and Fuente Alamo Sur, which were built and are administered by the same corporation). All seven corporations have at all times been held by Novenergia Spain. The Claimant held the following indirect ownership in these seven companies:

■ 100% in Novenergia-Solarsaor, S.L. ("Solarsaor");

■ 100% in Novenergia-Bonete, S.L., formerly called Paracel Investment, S.L. ("Bonete");

■ 100% in Novenergia-Almansa, S.L., formerly called Las Cabezuelas Fotoparque, S.L. ("Almansa");

■ 100% in Novenergia-Villares del Saz, S.L., formerly called Terrapower, S.L. ("Villares");

■ 90% in Energy Engineering I Mora la Nova, S.L. ("Mora");

■ 50% in Fuente Alamo Fotoparque, S.L. ("Alamo"); and

■ 70% in Novenergia-Lobon, S.L., formerly called Morcone Invest, S.L. ("Lobon").

4.
The corporate structure after November 2015 is depicted in the chart below:
5.
Under this corporate structure, the Claimant holds a 60.27% indirect interest in Novenergia Spain. Similarly, the Claimant's interest in the seven corporations is:

■ 60.27% in Solarsaor;

■ 60.27% in Bonete;

■ 60.27% in Almansa;

■ 60.27% in Villares;

■ 57.26% in Mora;

■ 30.14% in Alamo; and

■ 71.47% in Lobon.

6.
The Claimant is represented by Mr. Fernando Mantilla-Serrano, Mr. Antonio Morales, Mr. John Adam, Ms Rosa Espin, Ms Aija Lejniece, Ms Nora Fredstie, all of whom are from the law firm Latham and Watkins LLP.

2. The Respondent

7.
The Respondent in this arbitration is the Kingdom of Spain (hereinafter together with the Claimant referred to as the "Parties").
8.
The Respondent is represented by Mr. Diego Santacruz Descartin, Fco. Javier Torres Gella, Ms Monica Moraleda Saceda, Ms Elena Onoro Sainz, Ms Amaia Rivas Kortazar, Mr. Antolin Fernandez Antuna, Mr. Alvaro Navas Lopez and Ms Ana Maria Rodriguez Esquivas, all of whom are from the Minister of Justice.

II. SUMMARY OF THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY

9.
On 8 May 2015, the Claimant submitted its Request for Arbitration. In accordance with Article 13(3) of the 2010 Arbitration Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (the "SCC Rules"), the Claimant appointed Professor Antonio Crivellaro as arbitrator. Since the Parties had not agreed on the seat of the arbitration, the Claimant proposed and requested that the seat of arbitration be fixed in a non-EU member state, in order to guarantee the normal, serene and impartial conduct of the arbitration and to protect the arbitral proceedings from any undue influence by EU member state court and EU institutions. The Claimant submitted that Switzerland (Geneva) or the United States (New York or Washington DC) were appropriate venues as the seat of the arbitration.
10.
On 11 May 2015, the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (the "SCC") confirmed receipt of the Claimant's request for arbitration and payment of the registration fee. The SCC further asked the Claimant to provide the SCC with a preliminary estimate of the value of its claims by 18 May 2015.
11.
On 18 May 2015, the Claimant submitted a letter to the SCC stating that it was not currently in the position to provide the SCC with the requested estimate.
12.
On 19 May 2015, the SCC again requested that the Claimant provide an estimated value of its claim, in order to calculate the advance on costs. On 22 May 2015, the Claimant, without prejudice to its right to adapt its quantification, provisionally estimated its claims at not less than EUR 30,000,000.
13.
On 1 June 2015, the Respondent submitted its Answer to the Request for Arbitration. In the Answer to the Request for Arbitration, the Respondent stated that it considered Madrid to be a suitable seat for the arbitration and referred to the UNCITRAL Rules in this respect. The Respondent also suggested that the SCC invite the Claimant to comply with Article 2(v) of the SCC Rules and submit its position on the number of arbitrators in the proceedings. The Respondent also requested a 21-day extension of the deadline for appointing an arbitrator until 22 June 2015.
14.
After being provided the opportunity by the SCC, the Claimant, on 10 June 2015, submitted comments on the Answer to the Request for Arbitration. The Claimant reiterated that the seat of the arbitration should be in a "truly neutral venue", i.e. neither in Spain, nor in the European Union (the "EU"). The Claimant further stated that it is evident that the Claimant considers that this arbitration should be adjudicated by a three-member arbitral tribunal.
15.
On 12 June 2015, the SCC granted the Respondent an extension of time for the appointment of an arbitrator until 22 June 2015. The advance on costs was determined to EUR 455,000. The Claimant was ordered to pay EUR 225,500 and the Respondent EUR 227,500.
16.
On 22 June 2015, the Respondent requested a two-day extension to appoint its arbitrator. On 23 June 2015, the SCC granted the Respondent an extension of time for the appointment of an arbitrator until 24 June 2015.
17.
On 24 June 2015, the Respondent appointed Judge Bernardo Sepulveda Amor as co-arbitrator in accordance with Article 13(3) of the SCC Rules.
18.
On 29 July 2015, the SCC appointed Mr. Johan Sidklev as chairperson and decided that the seat of the arbitration shall be Stockholm. On the same date, the Respondent wrote to the SCC to state that the Parties were still engaged in negotiations on the method of the appointment of the chairperson in order to reach an agreement. The Respondent further requested clarification on the procedure followed for the appointment of the chairperson.
19.
On 30 July 2015, the SCC wrote to the Parties and stated that since the Parties appointed their co-arbitrators under Article 13(3) of the SCC Rules, the chairperson shall be appointed by the SCC Board. The Claimant was asked to confirm the Respondent's statement that the Parties were engaged in discussions under Article 13(1) of the SCC Rules.
20.
On 3 August 2015, the Claimant wrote to the SCC stating that the Parties had not agreed on a procedure for the appointment of the tribunal different from the one provided for under the SCC Rules and that the Parties had merely evoked the possibility of identifying a suitable common candidate for chairperson. Accordingly, the Claimant considered that the designation of Johan Sidklev had been made in full compliance with the SCC Rules.
21.
On 6 August 2015, the SCC wrote to the Parties stating that there is no agreement between the Parties for a different appointment procedure under Article 13(1) of the SCC Rules and that the SCC had appointed the chairperson in accordance with Article 13(3) of the SCC Rules.
22.
On 7 August 2015, the SCC wrote to the tribunal (the "Tribunal") stating that the Parties had paid the advance on costs and that the case was therefore referred to the Tribunal. The SCC decided that the final award (the "Final Award") was to be rendered by 8 February 2016.
23.
On 3 September 2015, the Parties and the Tribunal held a case management conference to discuss the draft Procedural Order No. 1.
24.
On 10 September 2015, the Respondent wrote to the Tribunal stating that both Spanish and English should be the language of the proceedings and that briefs should be submitted in one procedural language provided that a translation of such document to the other procedural language is submitted within 15 days thereafter.
25.
On 24 September 2015, the Tribunal issued Procedural Order No. 1 which included provisions regarding the language of the proceedings, the seat of the arbitration, the provisional timetable and written submissions, the transmission of submissions, notifications and communications, witnesses and experts, document production, the hearing etc. It was inter alia recorded that the seat of the arbitration is Stockholm. Appended to Procedural Order No. 1 were a provisional timetable, a contact list and a Redfern Schedule.
26.
On 24 September 2015, the Tribunal requested that the time for making the Final Award should be extended. On 25 September 2015, the SCC decided that the Final Award shall be rendered by 30 October 2017.
27.
On 21 December 2015, the Claimant submitted its Statement of Claim together with the first expert report from KPMG ("First KPMG Report"), the first expert report from Compass Lexecon ("First Compass Lexecon Report"), a witness statement of Mr. Henri Baguenier as well as factual and legal exhibits.
28.
On 11 March 2016, the Tribunal granted the Respondent's request for extension of time until 12 May 2016 for filing of the Statement of Defense and Jurisdictional Objections, as well as the Claimant's request for amendments of the filing dates of the document production phase (Procedural Order No. 2). Further to this decision, the Tribunal decided to amend the provisional timetable.
29.
On 29 April 2016, the Respondent submitted its Statement of Defense and Jurisdictional Objections together with the first expert report by Accuracy ("First Accuracy Report"), a witness statement by Mr. Carlos Montoya as well as legal and factual exhibits.
30.
On 29 June 2016, the Tribunal ruled on the Claimant's and the Respondent's requests for production of documents (Procedural Order No. 3).
31.
On 16 July 2016, the Respondent addressed the Tribunal, requesting it to "reconsider its decision rendered in P.O. no 3, granting the production of the ‘Technical and Legal Due Diligence ordered or used by the Claimant' regarding its investment in the Spanish PV Plants subject to the present Case (Respondent's Document request number 17) in order to protect the Respondent's rights of Defense and the Due Process " (the "Request for Reconsideration"). The Request for Reconsideration was made outside the scope of the existing provisional timetable which had been agreed by the Parties to govern these arbitral proceedings.
32.
On 18 July 2016, the Tribunal provided the Claimant an opportunity to comment on the Request for Reconsideration.
33.
On 22 July 2016, the Claimant filed a response in which it requested the Tribunal to deny the Respondent's Request for Reconsideration.
34.
The Tribunal denied the Request for Reconsideration on 3 August 2016 (Procedural Order No. 4). In its decision, the Tribunal noted that pursuant to Procedural Order No. 1 of 24 September 2015, document production was to be carried out in accordance with the provisional timetable. The provisional timetable was negotiated and agreed by the Parties and subsequently confirmed by the Tribunal. Under the agreed provisional timetable, the Respondent was granted two opportunities to argue its document production request no. 17 before the Tribunal. First, in its Request for Document Production, and second, in its Reply to the Claimant's Objections. The Tribunal also noted that the Respondent availed itself of these opportunities. The Tribunal was therefore confident that the Respondent's rights of due process had been fully respected.
35.
In preserving the integrity and timeliness of the proceedings, the Tribunal emphasised the importance of the Parties adhering to the mutually agreed provisional timetable.
36.
In a letter dated 1 August 2016, the Claimant addressed the Tribunal, raising concerns about the Respondent's adherence to certain of the document production orders issued by the Tribunal. The Claimant's concerns related to the Respondent's failure produce the ordered documents, its failure to fully comply with the Respondent's voluntary document production it had agreed to undertake, its production of documents that were non-responsive and out of scope in relation to Claimant's requests and its failure to distinguish or allocate the documents produced to the Claimant's requests.
37.
As a consequence of these concerns, the Claimant in its letter of 1 August 2016 made a series of requests for the production of certain documents. On 30 August 2016, the Tribunal ordered the Respondent to abide by the Tribunal's previous document production rulings and to produce certain specified documents which had not yet been produced (Procedural Order No. 5).
38.
On 8 September 2016, the Claimant once more raised concerns about the Respondent's adherence to certain of the document production orders issued by the Tribunal as well as the Respondent's belated and incomplete production of the requested documents. The Claimant noted that the Respondent on 8 September 2016 had produced voluminous and potentially important documents that were, according to the original time schedule, due to be produced on 18 July 2016. Considering the volume, complexity and potential importance of the documents produced by the Respondent, the Claimant argued that it is an insurmountable task to review and analyse the produced documents within the time available before the Claimant's Statement of Reply and Answer to Jurisdictional Objections was due. Consequently, the Claimant requested an extension of time for filing its Reply and Answer to Jurisdictional Objections until 17 October 2016. The Claimant also requested the Tribunal to order the Respondent to comply forthwith and as a matter of urgency with its extant document production obligations.
39.
On 8 September 2016, the Tribunal provided the Respondent an opportunity to submit comments to the Claimant's requests. The Respondent chose not to avail itself of the opportunity to provide comments. On 12 September 2016, the Tribunal granted the Claimant's request for extension of time until 17 October 2016 to file its Statement of Reply and Answer to Jurisdictional Objections and ordered the Respondent to comply with previous procedural orders on the production of documents (Procedural Order No. 6).
40.
On 17 October 2016, the Claimant submitted its Statement of Reply and Answer to Jurisdictional Objections together with the reply expert report of KPMG ("Second KPMG Report"), the reply expert report of Compass Lexecon ("Second Compass Lexecon Report") as well as additional legal and factual exhibits.
41.
On 20 February 2017, the Respondent submitted its Statement of Rejoinder and Reply to Jurisdictional Objections together with the second expert report of Accuracy ("Second Accuracy Report"), a second witness statement of Mr. Carlos Montoya as well as additional legal and factual exhibits.
42.
On 1 March 2017, the Parties jointly requested that the Tribunal extend the deadline to submit the English version of the Respondent's Statement of Rejoinder on the Merits and Reply on Jurisdiction until 10 March 2017 and the deadline to submit the Claimant's Statement of Rejoinder on Jurisdiction until 16 May 2017. On 2 March 2017, the Tribunal granted the Parties' joint request and issued an amended provisional timetable (Procedural Order No. 7).
43.
On 3 March 2017, European Commission submitted an Application for Leave to Intervene as a Non-Disputing Party (the "EC Application"). On 8 March 2017, the Tribunal invited the Parties to submit comments on the EC Application no later than 21 March 2017. On 21 March 2017, the Claimant submitted its comments on the EC Application. On 22 March 2017, the Respondent submitted its comments on the EC Application.
44.
On 24 March 2017, the Tribunal issued a decision in which it allowed the European Commission to submit one (1) written submission confined to the issue of jurisdiction by 2 May 2017 with a page limit of thirty (30) pages (Procedural Order No. 8). The Parties were provided an opportunity to comment on the European Commission's submission at the Hearing. All other requests by the European Commission were denied.
45.
On 2 May 2017, the European Commission submitted its Amicus Curiae Brief together with a number of supporting annexes.
46.
On 8 May 2017, the Parties submitted a joint proposed hearing schedule, which outlined the agreements and disagreements between the Parties on different issues relating to the Hearing. On 9 May 2017, the Parties and the chairperson held a pre-hearing conference call during which counsel for the Parties developed the Parties' respective positions regarding the issues raised in the joint proposed draft hearing schedule.
47.
On 12 May 2017, the Tribunal issued an order concerning the deadline for demonstrative exhibits, the length of the opening statements, the length of warm-up examination-in-chief, sequestration of fact witnesses, the length of expert presentations, physical witness/expert examination binders, and the agreement according to which there should be no closing arguments during the Hearing (Procedural Order No. 9). Any issues that the Tribunal considered to be of particular relevance for inclusion in the post-hearing briefs could instead be raised by the Tribunal during the last day of the Hearing. Alternatively, the Tribunal could determine such issues following its preliminary deliberations subsequent to the Hearing and thereafter inform the Parties in writing. A Hearing Schedule was attached to the decision.
48.
On 16 May 2017, the Claimant submitted its Statement of Rejoinder on Jurisdictional Objections.
49.
On 26 May 2017, the Respondent submitted a request in which it sought the approval of the Tribunal to have a number of new documents added to the record of the proceedings. The Respondent based its request on the Claimant's submission of the Eiser award into the record (filed together with the Statement of Rejoinder on Jurisdictional Objections).
50.
On 29 May 2017, the Parties submitted their skeleton arguments.
51.
On 31 May 2017, the Claimant objected to the Respondent's request dated 26 May 2017, on the basis that the Respondent should not be allowed to reargue the Eiser case before the present Tribunal and that the Eiser award is nothing more than a legal authority and, secondly that the Respondent seeks to introduce the relevant documents at a late stage.
52.
On 2 June 2017, the Tribunal rendered a decision to the effect that the Respondent was granted the opportunity to submit into the record of the arbitration the documents in question (Procedural Order No. 10). However, the Respondent was not allowed to submit the documents together with any further written pleadings or comments. Both Parties were given the opportunity to provide comments on the documents at the Hearing.
53.
On 6 June 2017, the Respondent made a request to reallocate its allotted time during the opening statement from jurisdiction to merits (but not to extend the total time beyond the 4 hours agreed upon). On 7 June 2017, the Claimant objected to this request.
54.
On 7 June 2017, the Tribunal rendered a decision to the effect that, revising para. 2 of Procedural Order No. 9, each party was provided an equal amount of time for its opening statement (Procedural Order No. 11). Such time should not in total exceed four hours. Each party was allowed to freely allocate the time allotted to it as between opening statement on jurisdiction and opening statement on the merits.
55.
On 12 June until 16 June 2017, a hearing on jurisdiction and merits (the "Hearing") took place in Stockholm. The following persons were examined during the Hearing:

On behalf of Claimant:

(a) Mr. Henri Baguenier

(b) Mr. Carlos Solé Martin

(c) Dr. Manuel Abdala

On behalf of the Respondent:

(a) Mr. Carlos Montoya

(b) Mr. Eduard Saura

56.
On 29 June 2017, the Tribunal issued a procedural order in which it listed three questions from the Tribunal and asked the Parties to submit no later than 4 July 2017 an agreed proposed deadline for Post-Hearing Briefs (Procedural Order No. 12). The Parties were also given the opportunity to submit corrections to the transcripts from the Hearing by 7 July 2017.
57.
On 3 July 2017, the Respondent requested clarifications with respect to the questions posed by the Tribunal on 29 June 2017. In the same email, the Respondent, with reference to the Tribunal's questions, requested that it be allowed to submit, together with the Post-Hearing Brief, a complementary expert report in order to calculate the financial impact of certain measures implemented by the Respondent. Further correspondence on this issue was exchanged by the Claimant and the Respondent on 4–5 July 2017. In the Parties' emails of 4 July and 5 July 2017, the Parties agreed on a page-limit of 50 pages for the Post-Hearing Briefs. The Parties failed to agree on a proposed deadline for the Post-Hearing Briefs. In its first email of 4 July 2017 the Claimant objected to the submission of additional expert reports.
58.
On 6 July 2017, the Tribunal provided the requested clarifications in the form of a procedural order (Procedural Order No. 13). The Tribunal rejected the Respondent's request to submit a complementary expert report together with its Post-Hearing Brief. The Tribunal also considered both Parties' arguments with respect to the deadline for the Post-Hearing Briefs and concluded that 25 August 2017 would be an appropriate compromise between the Parties' positions. Considering the deadline for Post-Hearing Briefs, the Parties were ordered to simultaneously file their cost submissions no later than 1 September 2017. The Parties were also provided an opportunity to comment on each other's cost submissions no later than 8 September 2017.
59.
On 7 July 2017, the Parties mutually requested extension of time to revert with the Parties' agreed corrections of the transcripts, as well as points of disagreement by 12 July 2017. On the same date, the Tribunal confirmed the extension of time until 12 July 2017 as agreed between the Parties.
60.
On 12 July 2017, the Parties mutually requested the Tribunal's leave to submit comments on the corrections directly to Briault Reporting, copying the Tribunal. On 13 July 2017, the Parties submitted the corrections to Briault Reporting.
61.
On 25 August 2017, the Parties submitted their respective Post-Hearing Briefs.
62.
On 1 September 2017, the Parties submitted their respective cost submissions.
63.
In an email dated 23 November 2017, the Respondent made a request to add a decision from the European Commission (the "EC Decision") into the record and to allow the Parties to file additional short submissions regarding the implications of such decision. According to the Respondent, the EC Decision concerned the Spanish state aid framework for renewable sources and was, according to the Respondent, relevant for the case, both as regards jurisdiction and the merits.
64.
In a letter dated 27 November 2017, the Claimant requested the Tribunal to deny the Respondent's request to be allowed to introduce the EC Decision into the record. The Claimant argued that the EC Decision is manifestly irrelevant to the case and that its introduction into the record would be disruptive and potentially lead to a further postponement of the rendering of the Final Award.
65.
In Procedural Order No. 14 dated 30 November 2017, the Tribunal granted the Respondent's request on the basis that, despite the lateness of the Respondent's request, it was important that the Parties and the Tribunal were provided a reasonable opportunity to review, assess and comment on the potential relevance of the EC Decision prior to the Final Award being rendered. The Tribunal invited the Respondent to submit a brief submission on the content and relevance of the EC Decision by 11 December 2017 and invited the Claimant to file a short reply submission by 21 December 2017.
66.
The decisions in Procedural Order No. 14 were made subject to the Tribunal being granted extension of time until 16 February 2018 for rendering of the Final Award. A request to this effect was submitted by the Tribunal to the SCC on 30 November 2017.
67.
On 11 December 2017, the SCC granted the Tribunal's request for extension of time for rendering of the Final Award until 16 February 2018.
68.
On 11 December 2017, the Respondent filed its submission relating to the EC Decision and on 21 December 2017, the Claimant filed its response hereto.
69.
Being satisfied that the Parties have had a reasonable opportunity to present their cases, the Tribunal in Procedural Order No. 15 on 19 January 2018 declared the proceedings closed as per Article 34 of the SCC Rules.
70.
On 2 February 2018, the SCC determined the costs of the arbitration.
71.
On 5 February 2018, the Respondent requested that the Tribunal (i) reopen the case; (ii) allow the filing of the final award in Wirtgen v. Czech Republic, dated 11 October 2017 into the record of the arbitration and; (iii) allow the Parties to make short additional submissions in respect of such award. In Procedural Order No. 16, the Tribunal rejected the Respondent's request, based on, inter alia, the Tribunal being satisfied that both Parties have had reasonable opportunity to present their cases.
72.
On 9 February 2018, the SCC provided the Tribunal with a corrected determination of the costs of the arbitration.

III. THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT AND SUBSTANTIVE LAW

73.
The Respondent is a Contracting Party to the Energy Charter Treaty adopted on 17 December 1994 (the "ECT"). Article 26 of the ECT provides as follows:

"SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES BETWEEN AN INVESTOR AND A CONTRACTING PARTY

1. Disputes between a Contracting Party and an Investor of another Contracting Party relating to an Investment of the latter in the Area of the former, which concern an alleged breach of an obligation of the former under Part III shall, if possible, be settled amicably.

2. If such disputes can not be settled according to the provisions of paragraph (1) within a period of three months from the date on which either party to the dispute requested amicable settlement, the Investor party to the dispute may choose to submit it for resolution:

(a) to the courts or administrative tribunals of the Contracting Party to the dispute;

(b) in accordance with any applicable, previously agreed dispute settlement procedure; or

(c) in accordance with the following paragraphs of this Article.

3. (a) Subject only to subparagraphs (b) and (c), each Contracting Party hereby gives its unconditional consent to the submission of a dispute to international arbitration or conciliation in accordance with the provisions of this Article.

(b)(i) The Contracting Parties listed in Annex ID do not give such unconditional consent where the Investor has previously submitted the dispute under subparagraph (2)(a) or (b).

[…]

4. In the event that an Investor chooses to submit the dispute for resolution under subparagraph (2)(c), the Investor shall further provide its consent in writing for the dispute to be submitted to:

[…]

(c) an arbitral proceeding under the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.[…]

5. An arbitral tribunal established under paragraph (4) shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this Treaty and applicable rules and principles of international law.

[…]

8. The awards of arbitration, which may include an award of interest, shall be final and binding upon the parties to the dispute. An award of arbitration concerning a measure of a subnational government or authority of the disputing Contracting Party shall provide that the Contracting Party may pay monetary damages in lieu of any other remedy granted. Each Contracting Party shall carry out without delay any such award and shall make provision for the effective enforcement in its Area of such awards.

74.
On 18 December 2014, the Claimant communicated a notice of dispute to the Respondent pursuant to Article 26 of the ECT. The Claimant sent another notice on 6 March 2015.
75.
On 8 May 2015, the Claimant submitted its Request for Arbitration with the SCC.
76.
Article 26(6) of the ECT provides that "[a] tribunal established under paragraph (4) shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this Treaty and applicable rules and principles of international law".
77.
Moreover, Article 22 of the SCC Rules states that the Tribunal "shall decide the merits of the dispute on the basis of the law(s) or rules of law agreed upon by the parties".

IV. SUMMARY OF THE FACTS

3. The Initial Regulatory Framework

3.1 Law 54/1997

78.
Law 54/1997 of 27 November, on the Electric Sector ("Law 54/1997") created an energy policy centred on liberalising the energy market in Spain. One of its goals was to have 12% of the national energy demand supplied by renewable energy by 2010.1 In subsequent amendments, Law 54/1997 stated that: "[t]he Government shall modify the Renewable Energy Promotion Plan to adapt it to the targets set in this regard by the European Union of 20% by 2020, maintaining the commitment that this plan established of 12% for 2010. These targets will be taken into account when setting premiums for these kinds of facilities".2
79.
The law introduced a special regime (the "Special Regime") that was to apply to authorised energy production facilities registered in the Administrative Registry for Electrical Power Generating Units ("RAIPRE"). Facilities that were admitted to the Special Regime would be entitled "[t]o incorporate their surplus energy into the system ", and the "Government [could] authorise facilities under the special regime that use renewable energy as primary energy to incorporate all the energy produced by them into the system".3
80.
Law 54/1997 constituted the framework for remuneration under the Special Regime, but did not specify in concrete terms what the remuneration as such would consist of. Facilities qualifying under the Special Regime would be entitled to the general, market-based remuneration applicable by default to all facilities (irrespective of whether or not they were Special Regime facilities).4
81.
Article 16.7 stipulated: "The remuneration for electricity generated, as measured at the power station busbars, by generators under the special regime, shall be the remuneration corresponding to the generation of electric power, [...] and, where applicable, a premium that will be determined by the Government after seeking the views of the Autonomous Regions, as set out in article 30.4. "5
82.
Such facilities would receive a premium, "to be set by the Government ", "to obtain reasonable rates of return based on the cost of money in capital markets".6
83.
Article 30(4) stipulated that:

"The remuneration arrangements for electric power generation installations operating under the special regime shall be supplemented by the payment of a premium under statutory terms set out in regulations and in the following cases:

[…]

To work out the premiums, the voltage level on delivery of the power to the network, the effective contribution to environmental improvement, to primary energy saving and energy efficiency, the generation of economically justifiable useful heat and the investment costs incurred shall all be taken into account so as to achieve reasonable profitability rates with reference to the cost of money on capital markets."7

3.2 Royal Decree 2818/1998 and Royal Decree 436/2004

84.
Royal Decree 2818/1998 on Production of Electric Energy by Facilities Fuelled by Resources or Sources from Renewable Energy, Waste, or Cogeneration ("RD 2818/1998") was enacted on 23 December 1998.
85.
RD 2818/1998 was adopted for the purpose of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The goal was that, by 2010, 12% of the total energy demand in Spain would be covered by renewable energy sources.8 It developed and gave substance to the Special Regime outlined in Law 54/1997. RD 2818/1998 targeted certain types of facilities with a power capacity not exceeding 50 MW, including "[f]acilities that solely employ solar energy as primary energy ".9
86.
In accordance with RD 2818/1998, facilities registered with the RAIPRE were entitled to a premium for the electric energy incorporated into the grid.10 PV Plants that qualified were permitted to incorporate all electric energy produced into the grid.11
87.
Where the primary energy of a facility was non-consumable renewable energy, biomass or any type of biofuel, such facility could choose "a total price " "at all hours".12
88.
Royal Decree 436/2004, Establishing the Methodology for Updating and Systematising the Legal and Economic Regime of Electric Energy Production in the Special Regime ("RD 436/2004"), was adopted on 12 March. RD 436/2004 repealed RD 2818/1998.
89.
RD 436/2004 expanded the Special Regime by "provid[ing] those who have decided or will decide in the near future to opt for the special regime with a durable, objective, and transparent framework" and further stated that "there is no doubt that the security and stability offered by this new method for calculating the special regime remuneration should help it foster investment in this kind of facilities, with the full achievement, by 2011, of the installed power targets set out in the Renewable Energies Development Plan. "13
90.
Moreover, it was stated in RD 436/2004 that it would provide for a "durable economic regime […] based on an objective, transparent methodology to calculate the remuneration".14
91.
This Special Regime was available for inter alia "Sub-Group b.1.1 Facilities that solely use photovoltaic solar energy as primary energy".15 PV plants were entitled to "incorporate into the grid all of the electric energy produced "16 and could receive either a feed in tariff ("FIT") or a premium.17
92.
The FIT would be calculated as a certain percentage of each year's average or reference electric tariff.18 Article 33 stated the following for PV plants:

"Photovoltaic solar energy facilities in Sub-Group b.1.1 of no greater than 100 kW with installed power:

Tariff: 575 percent during the first 25 years from their start-up and 460 percent thereafter.

All other photovoltaic energy facilities in Sub-Group b.1.1:

Tariff: 300 percent during the first 25 years from their start-up and 240 percent thereafter.

Premium: 250 percent during the first 25 years from their start-up and 200 percent thereafter.

Incentive: 10 percent."19

93.
The FIT would be payable for the lifespan of the PV plants. Revision of the FIT could not affect facilities that had already commenced operation:

" Article 40. Revision of tariffs, premiums, incentives and supplements for new facilities. [...] 3. The tariffs, premiums, incentives and supplements resulting from any of the revisions provided for in this section shall apply solely to the plants that commence operating subsequent to the date of the entry into force referred to the paragraph above and shall not have a backdated effect on any previous tariffs and premiums."20 (Emphasis in Exhibit C-89.)

94.
The only condition for obtaining the remuneration under RD 436/2004 was registration with the RAIPRE.21

3.3 Royal Decree 661/2007

95.
Royal Decree 661/2007 of 25 May 2007, Regulating Electricity Production Under the Special Regime ("RD 661/2007"), updated the Special Regime in RD 436/2004, which was repealed.
96.
RD 661/2007 concerned renewable energy, namely the following renewable technologies: PV technology; cogeneration; thermal technology; solar energy; wind technology; geothermal, wave, tidal and ocean-thermal technology; hydroelectric technology; biomass, biofuels or biogas technologies; and waste technology.22
97.
The Kingdom of Spain modified the Special Regime through RD 661/2007, with the purpose of contributing to growth in the sector:

"The modification of the economic and legal framework that regulates the existing special regime has become necessary for various reasons. First, the growth of the special regime in recent years, together with the experience accumulated during the application of [RD 2818/1998], and [RD 436/2004], have brought to light the need to regulate certain technical aspects in order to contribute to the growth of those technologies..."23

98.
In the Preamble, it was also stated that:

"Spanish society [...] is increasingly demanding the employment of renewable sources of energy and efficiency in the generation of electricity as basic principles in the achievement of sustainable development from an economic, social, [and] environmental point of view.

[…]

This new system protects the promoter when the revenues..."24

99.
The purpose of RD 661/2007 was set out in Article 1:

"The purpose of this Royal Decree is:

a) To establish a legal and economic framework for the production of electric energy under the special regime, in replacement of Royal Decree 436/2004 of 12 March […]".25

100.
The compensation for investing in renewable energy sources was a fixed remuneration. Under RD 661/2007, the owners of production facilities had to choose between two remuneration regimes: payment of either a FIT or a different premium. Article 24 stated:

"1. In order to sell the totality or a part of their net production of electric energy, the owners of facilities to which this Royal Decree applies shall elect one of the following options:

a) To sell the electricity to the system through the transportation or distribution grid, receiving a feed in tariff, which shall be the same for all scheduling periods, expressed in Euro cents per kilowatt/hour.

b) To sell the electricity in the electric energy production market. In this case, the sale price of the electricity shall be either the price obtained on the organised market or the price freely negotiated by the owner or the representative of the facility, supplemented where applicable by a premium, in Euro cents per kilowatt/hour."26

101.
The FIT would be paid with respect to the total net energy produced by the plants and for the entire lifespan of the plants.
102.
Article 44(1) stated, in part:

"The values of the tariffs, premiums, supplements, and lower and upper limits to the hourly price of the market as defined in this Royal Decree, for Category b) and Sub-Group a.1.3, shall be updated on an annual basis using as a reference the increase in the CPI minus the value set out in Additional Provision One of the present Royal Decree."27

103.
Article 44(3) stated, in part:

"3. During the year 2010, given the results of the monitoring reports on the degree of enforcement of the Renewable Energies Plan (PER) 2005– 2010 and of the Strategy for Energy Efficiency and Savings in Spain (E4), together with such new targets as may be included in the subsequent Renewable Energies Plan 2011-2020, there shall be a review of the tariffs, premiums, supplements and lower and upper limits defined in this Royal Decree with regard to the costs associated with each of these technologies, the degree of participation of the special regime in covering the demand and its impact upon the technical and economic management of the system, and reasonable rates of return shall always be guaranteed with reference to the cost of money in capital markets. Further reviews shall be performed every four years, maintaining the same criteria as previously."28

3.4 The Renewable Energy Plan 2005–2010

104.
The Renewable Energy Plan 2005-2010 ("REP 2005-2010") was approved by the Kingdom of Spain in 2005. The REP 2005-2010 set out the Kingdom of Spain's energy sector policy at the time and aimed to achieve "29.4% of the electricity generation from renewable resources "29 and the installation of 3,000 MW of PV energy by 2010.
105.
With regard to the Special Regime, the REP 2005-2010 stated that:

"the proper functioning of these mechanisms must be guaranteed […] to maintain investor's confidence "; and

■ the Special Regime should maintain "investor's confidence […] through a stable and predictable support scheme".30

106.
The REP 2005-2010 added that:

"Taking the proposed energy objectives as a starting point, financing requirements were determined for each technology on the basis of their financial performance, defining several standard projects for the calculation of model.

These standard projects have been characterized by technical parameters relative to their size, equivalent operating hours, unit costs, implementation periods, service life, operation costs and maintenance and sales costs for the final energy unit. Likewise, some assumptions for funding have been applied, as well as a series of measures and financial aid, designed according to the requirements of each technology.

The technical sheets for each standard project, determined for the various technology sectors, whose data was used for the economic-financial calculation for the Plan for the 2005-2010 period, are found below."31 (Emphasis in Exhibit R-66.)

107.
As regards returns for standard projects, the REP 2005-2010 provided that:

"Return on Project Type: calculated on the basis of maintaining an Internal Rate of Return (IRR), measured in legal tender and for each standard project, around 7%, on equity (before any financing) and after taxes."32

3.5 NEC Reports

108.
The National Energy Commission ("NEC")—the Spanish electrical system regulator—has issued several reports regarding the implementation of the Special Regime.
109.
In its report 3/2007 of 14 February 2007, the NEC stated:

"Economic incentives are fundamental for the development of the different technologies, if they are sufficient to create investments. In certain cases, different incentives leading to higher returns are justified in order to reach the established targets. Said economic incentives, in a liberalised regulatory framework such as the one corresponding to electric energy production, represent an important tool of energy and environmental policy."33

"The NEC is of the understanding that transparency and predictability of the future of economic incentives reduces regulatory uncertainty which encourages investments in new capacity and minimises the cost of financing projects, reducing the end cost for consumers. The regulations must provide sufficient guarantees so as to achieve stable and predictable economic incentives throughout the lifespan of the facility, setting, as the case may be, both transparent annual update mechanisms based on solid indicators (the average or reference tariff, the CPI, 10-year bonds, etc.) as well as periodic reviews, for instance every four years which will only affect new facilities, and in terms of investment costs may also affect existing facilities."34

110.
With reference to RD 661/2007, in its report 30/2008 of 30 July 2008, the NEC commented as follows:

"Criteria to minimize regulatory uncertainty.

The production facilities under the special regime are often capitalintensive with long recovery periods. The regulation of production facilities under the special regime, established by Royal Decree 661/2007, has tried to minimize the regulatory risk of this group, providing security and predictability to the economic incentives during the facilities' lifespan, establishing transparent mechanisms for annual updates..."35 (Emphasis in Exhibit C-77.)

"Legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations.

The stability and predictability of economic incentives (tariffs and premiums) reduce regulatory uncertainty, which encourages investments in new capacity to tackle their projects, while minimizing financing cost, and reducing the final cost to the consumer. The current regulation has established annual updates of economic incentives based on robust indicators (such as CPI, ten-year bonds, etc.) and also periodic reviews every four years, which can only affect new facilities."36 (Emphasis in Exhibit C-77.)

111.
In a further report of 22 April 2009 in which it also addressed RD 661/2007, the NEC stated:

"The technical and economic regulation of the special regime is developed mainly in Royal Decree 661/2007 of 25 May, as well as in Royal Decree 616/2007 of 11 May, for high-efficiency cogeneration, and in [RD 1578/2008] of 26 September, for photovoltaic facilities.

This regulation is based on the following basic criteria, contained in the methodology developed by the NEC:

a. Achieving planned targets : Financial incentives are justified by the planned targets. These incentives are a tool of environmental and energy policy. They should be adequate for investors to obtain a reasonable return, or greater if the targets are far from being achieved.

b. Regulatory stability and non-retroactivity. The predictability and security of the financial incentives during the facilities' lifespan is essential to encourage agents to invest in these new technologies, and also to minimise regulatory risk and the financial cost of bank loans.

[…]

Tariffs and premiums under the special regime must be sufficient and stable to incentivise agents in order to achieve the planned targets."37 (Emphasis in Exhibit C-79.)

3.6 "The Sun Can Be All Yours" and Other Prospectuses

112.
On 24 May 2005, the Institute for Diversification and Saving of Energy ("IDAE"), an organ affiliated with the Ministry, published the first of a series of documents under the slogan "The Sun Can Be All Yours".
113.
In this document, the question was asked: "Why is it good to invest in a solar photovoltaic facility? " One of the answers provided was that "[t]he return on the investment is reasonable and can sometimes reach up to 15% ", and that there can be "significant financing of the investment".38
114.
In June 2007 the IDAE published a new prospectus in the "The Sun Can Be All Yours" series. The new prospectus explained that the objective of any investment in the PV sector was to "obtain[ ] a [maximum] return on the investment " throughout the lifespan of the facility.39 Heading Four ("Is there any aid?") stated that the support system was:

"Aid for operation is provided to photovoltaic facilities connected to the grid by means of the feed in tariff in Royal Decree 661/2007 published in the Official State Gazette (BOE) No. 126, of 26 May of 2007."40 (Emphasis in Exhibit C-74.)

115.
Heading Four ("Is there any aid?") sets out the specific revenues that investors could expect to achieve, and for how long:41

IDAE - RENEWABLE ENERGY DIRECTION Photovoltaic Energy
Tariffs established in Article 36 of Royal Decree 661/2007:
CAPACITY FEED IN TARIFF ('2007')
C< 100 kW 0.440381 € / kWh first 25 years 0.352305 € / kWh thereafter
100 kW< C< 10 MW 0.417500 € / kWh first 25 years 0.334000 € / kWh thereafter
C >10 MW 0.229764 € /kWh first 25 years 0.183811 €/kWh thereafter
Tariffs are updated annually according to the CPI - 0.25% until 2012, with CPI - 0.50% thereafter.
June 2007

116.
The FIT would be subject to an annual review based on the Consumer Price Index ("CPI") published by the Spanish National Statistics Institute.
117.
The IDAE issued a new version of the prospectus "The Sun Can be All Yours" in November 2008. In its "Renewables Made in Spain" prospectus, a document drawn up in March 2010, the IDAE identified as the key "to understanding the Spanish renewables success story " the fact that it had been "driven by a regulatory framework that has promoted development through stability " and "the support system that was selected".42 The same document states under its heading "Feed in tariff" that:

"Based on experience, it can be concluded that choosing the right economic support model is critical to successfully developing a renewable electricity generation system. Spain chose to support the sales price of renewable electricity by establishing either a fixed tariff (which differs from one technology to the next) or a premium paid on top of the market price for installations that opt to sell their electricity on the market. The scheme, commonly known as a feed-in tariff, is basically the same as that used in countries such as Germany or Denmark, which, along with Spain, have also successfully rolled out renewable energies."43

118.
The prospectus "Renewables Made in Spain" further explained as follows:

"Shortly after the second international oil crisis, Law 82/1980 on energy conservation was enacted, representing the start of the development of renewable energies in our country. Since then, comprehensive legislation has given rise to a sustained support framework for these sources of energy, which has boosted investor confidence and enabled developers and equipment manufacturers to procure the financing required to make significant investments and position "Renewables Made in Spain" at the top of the world league."44

4. Regulations Adopted after 2010

4.1 Royal Decree 1565/2010

119.
On 19 November 2010, the Respondent enacted Royal Decree 1565/2010, Regulating and Modifying Specific Aspects Related to Energy Production in the Special Regime ("RD 1565/2010").
120.
Article 1(10) of RD 1565/2010 stated that:

"In Table 3 of Article 36, the values for the feed in tariffs indicated for SubGroup b.1.1 facilities from the twenty-sixth year are deleted."45

121.
Put differently, RD 1565/2010 limited the application of the FIT to the first 25 years of a plant's operation. RD 1565/2010 retroactively limited the rights of PV plants registered under RD 661/2007, in that it applied to all plants, including those plants which had been registered with the RAIPRE prior to the enactment of RD 1565/2010.

4.2 Royal Decree-Law 14/2010

122.
The Respondent subsequently enacted Royal Decree-Law 14/2010 of 23 December, Establishing Urgent Measures for the Correction of the Tariff Deficit of the Electric Sector ("RDL 14/2010").
123.
The Preamble to RDL 14/2010 mentioned the tariff deficit, which it defined as "the difference between the income generated by the tolls on the access to the electric energy transportation and distribution grids and the costs of regulated activities from the electric sector that said tolls are intended to cover".46
124.
RDL 14/2010 was aimed at "eliminating the emergence of a new deficit in the electrical system from 2013 " by "distribut[ing] efforts to reduce the tariff deficit between all the agents of the electric sector".47
125.
RDL 14/2010 capped the number of yearly production hours that would be entitled to receive the FIT. RDL 14/2010's Additional Provision One limited PV plants' right to receive the FIT by capping the number of "equivalent reference hours " eligible to the remuneration regime.48 It defined the notion of "number of equivalent reference hours " by "climatic zone " as follows:

"The reference equivalent hours for these facilities, which depend on the climate zone where the solar facility is located, according to the classification of climatic zones based on the average solar radiation in Spain, established by Royal Decree 314/2006 of 17 March, Approving the Technical Building Code, will be:

Technology Equivalent reference hours /year
Zone I Zone n Zone DI Zone IV Zone V
Fixed facility....................... 1,232 1,362 1,492 1,632 1,753
Facility with 1 axis tracking.............. 1,602 1,770 1,940 2,122 2,279
Facility with 2 axis tracking............. 1,664 1,838 2,015 2,204 2,367

For this purpose, the number of the equivalent hours of operation of a facility for the production of electric energy is defined as the ratio of net annual production in kWh and the nominal power of the facility in kW."49

126.
RDL 14/2010's Transitory Provision Two imposed a single and temporary number of equivalent hours of reference for plants registered under RD 661/2007, which would be applicable until 31 December 2013:50

Technology Equivalent reference hours / year
Fixed Facility................................................ 1,250
Facility with 1 -axis tracking............................ 1,644
Facility with 2-axis tracking............................ 1,707

5. Regulations Adopted after 2012

5.1 Law 15/2012

127.
The Respondent further enacted Law 15/2012 of 27 December, on Tax Measures for Energy Sustainability ("Law 15/2012").
128.
Law 15/2012 created a new tax on the production of electric energy within the Spanish territory, consisting of 7% of taxable income (the "Tax"), defined as follows:

"The tax base shall consist of the total amount to be received by the taxpayer for the production and incorporation into the electric energy system, measured at plant busbar cost, for each facility, in the tax period.

For these purposes, in the calculation of the total amount, the remuneration provided in all economic regimes coming under provisions of Law 54/1997 of 27 November, on the Electric Sector, during the corresponding accounting period as well as the remuneration provided in the specific economic system in the case of production and incorporation activities into the electric energy system in non-mainland territories, will be considered."51

129.
The Tax applies to the production of electric energy, regardless of the sources employed (e.g. renewable v. fossil-based), the applicable regime (whether ordinary or special), the quantity or quality of the electric energy at issue, and the category of the producer.
130.
In the Preamble of Law 15/2012 it is stated that the new Tax on the need to "harmonise our tax system with a more efficient and environmentally friendly and sustainable use ",52 "and to also promote a balanced budget".53 It was further stated that:

"The core foundation of this Act resides in Article 45 of the Constitution, a provision in which the protection of our environment stands as one of the guiding principles of social and economic policies. Therefore, one of the focuses of this tax reform will be the internalisation of environmental costs arising from the production of electric energy and the storage of spent nuclear fuel or radioactive waste. Thus, the Act must serve as a stimulus to improve our levels of energy efficiency while enabling a better management of natural resources and to move forward with the new model for sustainable development, both economically and socially as well as environmentally."54

5.2 Royal Decree-Law 2/2013

131.
In 2013, the Respondent enacted Royal Decree-Law 2/2013 of 1 February, Concerning Urgent Measures in the Electric System and Financial Sector ("RDL 2/2013").
132.
Article 1 of RDL 2/2013 altered the mechanism for updating the FIT, which up until then, had been indexed on the CPI:

"Article 1. Updates to the remunerations for activities in the electric system linked to the Consumer Price Index ("CPI").

In force from 1 January 2013, this index will be replaced by the Consumer Price Index at constant taxes, excluding unprocessed food and energy products, in all methodologies that, linked to the Consumer Price Index, govern the update of the remuneration, tariffs, and premiums that the participants in the electric system receive from the sectorial regulation."55

133.
The "Consumer Price Index at constant taxes, excluding unprocessed food and energy products " was created by RDL 2/2013.56

5.3 Royal Decree-Law 9/2013

134.
On 13 July 2013, the Respondent enacted Royal Decree-Law 9/2013, Adopting Urgent Measures to Ensure the Financial Stability of the Electric System ("RDL 9/2013").
135.
The second final provision of RDL 9/2013 stated that:

"The Government, at the proposal of the Minister of Industry, Energy, and Tourism, shall approve a Royal Decree regulating the legal and economic regimes for the facilities for the production of electric energy from renewable energy sources, cogeneration, and waste with premium remuneration that shall modify the remuneration model of existing facilities.

This new model shall comply with the criteria laid down in Article 30 of Law 54/1997 of 27 November, on the Electric Sector, introduced by the present Royal Decree-Law and shall be applicable from the entry into force of the present Royal Decree-Law."57

136.
RDL 9/2013 established a new framework for the remuneration of PV plants, which came to be known as the Specific Regime (the "Specific Regime").
137.
RDL 9/2013 repealed the Special Regime and substituted it with a new "legal and economic regime " applicable to electric energy production plants using renewable energy.58
138.
Article 1(2) of RDL 9/2013 revised the wording of Article 30(4) of Law 54/1997, to the following:

"4. Additionally, and in the terms legally determined by Royal Decree of the Council of Ministers, for the remuneration for the sale of generated energy valued at market price, the facilities may receive specific remuneration that consists in a term for each installed capacity unit, covering, where applicable, the investment costs of a model facility that cannot be recovered by the sale of energy and a term for operation covering, where appropriate, the difference between operation costs and the revenue for the market share of said model facility.

To calculate said specific remuneration for a model facility, during its regulatory lifespan, and in reference to the activity carried out by an efficient and well-managed company, the following shall be considered:

a) The standard revenue from the sale of generated energy valued at the market price of production.

b) The standard operation costs.

c) The standard value of the initial investment.

For this purpose, under no circumstance shall the costs or investments that are determined by regulation or administrative acts that are not applicable throughout the Spanish territory be taken into account. Similarly, only the costs and investments that respond exclusively to electric energy production shall be taken into account.

As a consequence of the unique characteristics of the insular and nonmainland electric systems, facilities may be exceptionally defined as specific model facilities for each one of them."59

139.
The Specific Regime defined the "reasonable rate of return", set it as a cap and allowed for a revision every six years:

"This remuneration regime shall not exceed the minimum necessary level to cover the costs that allow the facilities to compete on an equal footing with the rest of technologies and to enable obtaining a reasonable return by reference to the model facility applicable in each case. […]

This reasonable return shall turn, before taxes, on the average yield of ten-year Government bonds on the secondary market, applying the adequate differential.

The parameters of the remuneration regime may be revised every six years."60

140.
The new Specific Regime was based on the investment costs of "model facilities " defined by reference to "an efficient and well-managed company".
141.
Pursuant to the new Article 30(4) of Law 54/1997, a plant's specific remuneration was calculated on the basis of:

■ the standard income for the sale, at market price, of the energy produced;

■ standard costs of operation; and

■ the standard initial investment.

142.
The model facilities, the standard costs of operation and initial investment were not defined in RDL 9/2013 but were left for future regulation.

5.4 Law 24/2013

144.
In December 2013, the Respondent enacted Law 24/2013 of 26 December, on the Electric Sector ("Law 24/2013").
145.
Law 24/2013 abandoned the distinction between the ordinary and the special regimes:

"The high penetration of production from renewable energy resources, cogeneration, and waste, included in the so-called special regime for electric energy production, has caused its unique regulation associated with power and its technology to lack purpose […] so the difference between the ordinary and special regime is abandoned."62

146.
Law 24/2013 confirmed the reforms brought about by RDL 9/2013 as regards the PV sector.

5.5 Royal Decree 413/2014 and Order IET/1045/2014

147.
In 2014, the Respondent enacted Royal Decree 413/2014 of 6 June, on the Regulation of the Electric Energy Production Activity from Renewable Energy, Cogeneration and Waste ("RD 413/2014") and Order IET/1045/2014 of 16 June, Approving the Remuneration Parameters, for Model Facilities, Applicable to Certain Facilities of Electric Energy Production Using Renewable Energy Resources, Cogeneration, and Waste ("Order 1045/2014").
148.
Pursuant to RD 413/2014, each model facility was assigned a number of remuneration parameters calculated in light of the activity carried out by an "efficient and well-managed company". In accordance with Article 13(2) of RD 413/2014, the most relevant remuneration parameters necessary for the implementation of the specific remuneration regime were the following:

(a) "Remuneration for investing";

(b) "Remuneration for operating"; ("Ro")

(c) "Investment incentive by reducing the generation cost";

(d) "Regulatory lifespan";

(e) "Minimum number of operating hours";

(f) "Operating threshold";

(g) "Maximum number of operating hours for the purposes of receiving the remuneration for operating, if any";

(h) "Upper and lower limits of the annual market price"; and

(i) "Average annual price of the daily and intraday market".63

149.
Article 13(2) of RD 413/2014 also includes the necessary parameters to calculate the aforementioned parameters:

(a) "Standard value of the initial investment for the model facility";

(b) "Estimated price of the daily and intraday market";

(c) "Number of operation hours of the model facility";

(d) "Estimated future income for the participation in the production market";

(e) "Other operating income";

(f) "Estimated future operating costs";

(g) "Update rate for which the value is that of the reasonable return";

(h) "Adjustment coefficient of the model facility"; and

(i) "Net asset value".64

150.
Order 1045/2014 defined the above-mentioned parameters in detail.
151.
RD 413/2014 stated that the Specific Remuneration can be amended every "regulatory period". Article 15 of RD 413/2014 defined "regulatory periods " as periods of six years, divided into two "regulatory half-periods " of three years.65
152.
Article 20 of RD 413/2014 described amendments that can be made to the Specific Remuneration:

"1. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 19, the remaining remuneration parameters may be reviewed at the end of each regulatory period by order of the Minister of Industry, Energy, and Tourism, with the prior agreement of the Executive Government Commission for Economic Affairs.

In said review, all the values of the remuneration parameters may be modified in accordance with the provisions of Article 14.4 of Law 24/2013 of 26 December.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, neither the regulatory lifespan nor the standard value of the initial investment of the model facility may be revised.

2. After each regulatory semi-period, the estimates of model facilities' standard incomes from the sale of energy valued at market price as well as the remuneration parameters directly linked thereto may be reviewed by order of the Minister of Industry, Energy, and Tourism, with the prior agreement of the Executive Government Commission for Economic Affairs.

As a result of this review, new model facilities to which remuneration for operating is applicable may be removed or added.

3. In accordance with the methodology established by regulation, the remuneration for operating for the model facilities to which it is applicable and for which the operating costs depend essentially on the price of fuel shall be reviewed at least annually.

As a result of this annual review, new model facilities to which this remuneration for operating is applicable shall not be removed or added."66

V. SUMMARY OF THE CLAIMANT'S FACTUAL CASE

6. Introduction

153.
According to the Claimant, this is not a complex case. The basic theory and allegations are straightforward: the Kingdom of Spain offered and guaranteed certain conditions to investors. Companies invested in reliance of said guarantee. Thus, the Kingdom of Spain is required as a matter of international law to honour those conditions for those investors.67
154.
Novenergia invested on 13 September 2007. It did so relying on the Kingdom of Spain's explicit offer in RD 661/2007 of a fixed long-term FIT, on the condition that Novenergia registered its PV Plants with the RAIPRE by September 2008. In light of the Kingdom of Spain's undertakings, marketing, and past conduct, Novenergia expected the Kingdom of Spain to make good on its promises. There were no warning signs that it would not. Nonetheless, the Kingdom of Spain decided actively to undermine and abolish the entire regulatory framework. It did so in complete disregard of its offer, and of the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, regulatory certainty, and transparency. Novenergia has, as a result, suffered significant harm.
155.
Contrary to what the Respondent argues, Novenergia never expected a petrification of the Spanish electric regulatory framework. It only expected the Kingdom of Spain to maintain, as per its undertakings, a fixed long-term FIT for it and others investing alongside it in 2007.68

7. RD 661/2007 Was Clear on Its Face

156.
RD 661/2007 could not have been clearer. To PV plants that registered with the RAIPRE by 28 September 2008, it guaranteed:

■ the right to incorporate all energy production into the grid;

■ a fixed FIT for the lifespan of the PV plants; and

■ that there would be no changes to the FIT except for updates in accordance with the CPI.69

157.
These favourable conditions were attached to a requirement to invest, construct, and register PV plants within one year. This, to entice investors to make enormous investments rapidly. The Kingdom of Spain needed large-scale investments in renewable energy to meet its goals and commitments. It needed these swiftly.70 Only a limited, defined, and identifiable group was able to register with the RAIPRE under RD 661/2007. This group was promised the benefits of RD 661/2007.71
158.
Given the explicit nature of the undertakings in RD 661/2007 and its limitation on modifications, had the Kingdom of Spain intended to reserve the right to renege on these promises, it should have stated so expressly. It did not do so. Anything else would have been misleading to investors.72

8. The Reasonable Rate of Return Was a Vague Starting Point

159.
RD 661/2007 implemented and fleshed out the Special Regime established by Law 54/1997. The latter only contained a skeletal regime. It stipulated that certain renewable energy producers, under any royal decree developing the Special Regime, were "to obtain reasonable rates of return based on the cost of money in capital markets". It provided no more guidance on the content of "reasonable rates of return".73
160.
"Reasonable rates of return" was the starting point, and accordingly the income floor. This was also the Kingdom of Spain's contemporary understanding of the term.74
161.
Based on a dictionary definition of "reasonable" as "appropriate, in accordance with reason, proportionate or not exaggerated", the Kingdom of Spain has alleged that "reasonable" must be dynamic.75 Since it is dynamic, it "must"— according to the Kingdom of Spain—be open to radical change. According to the Claimant, this argument is unbelievable. The requirement that something be "reasonable" does not entail that it is subject to outright repeal.76
162.
In 2013, the phrase "reasonable rates of return" was defined and given a specific content via an amendment of Law 54/1997. The Respondent attempts to argue that the 2013 wording applied in 1997. It did not. The definition upon which the Kingdom of Spain now relies only came into existence fifteen years after Law 54/1997 was adopted and six years after Novenergia invested. The Kingdom of Spain's arguments concerning the phrase are contingent on retroactively applying the new definition to the prior undefined term.77 This position is obviously artificial and should be rejected by the Tribunal.

9. The Claimant Invested in the PV Plants in September 2007

163.
The Claimant's investment is comprised of its shareholding in Novenergia Spain and the returns associated with that investment.78
164.
On 3 July 2007, the Claimant established Novenergia Spain to hold the Claimant's investment in the PV Plants. In order to incorporate Novenergia Spain, nominal funds were transferred on the same day.79
165.
On 13 September 2007, Novenergia acquired a 100% interest in the PV Plant Solarsaor.80 This was the day the Claimant acquired its interest in the first of the PV Plants, and accordingly irreversibly committed to investing in the Spanish PV sector. Starting with this purchase, significant funds were expended for the development of Solarsaor and the six other PV Plants. This funding was continuous and uninterrupted. All PV Plants, as a result, achieved registration under the Special Regime by September 2008.81
166.
Therefore, 13 September 2007 is the date of the investment.82
167.
The Kingdom of Spain has relied on the dates of the project finance agreements to project the date of Novenergia's investment into 2010. However, by 2010, all plants had been registered, were operating, and had been receiving the FIT for two years.
168.
The late dates of the project finance agreements are easily explained. Given the short timeframe for registration, Novenergia had to act quickly. Although financial negotiations commenced in 2007, Novenergia invested prior to obtaining project finance for each plant. It entered into a bridge agreement with BPI for all the PV Plants in early 2008. Due to the global financial crisis, BPI could not live up to its commitment, forcing Novenergia to seek and negotiate new project finance agreements. This created a situation where the project finance agreements post-dated the investment.83

10. When It Invested, the Claimant Legitimately Expected a Fixed Long-Term FIT and There Were No Warning Signs That the Respondent Would Undermine and Thereafter Abolish the Special Regime

169.
When Novenergia invested in September 2007, it expected a fixed long-term FIT. At that time, there were no warning signs that the Respondent would undermine and abolish the entire Special Regime.

10.1 The Claimant Expected a Fixed Long-Term FIT

170.
Novenergia invested heavily in the PV sector based on the guarantees contained in RD 661/2007. Its objective, legitimate expectation was to obtain what RD 661/2007 explicitly promised: a fixed long-term FIT with limited updates based on the CPI.84
171.
This expectation – which was comforted by the State's regulatory regime – was solidified by the Kingdom of Spain's public relations efforts. Through policy literature, public statements, and advertisement prospectuses, the Kingdom of Spain signalled that companies could invest in Spain with confidence and without fear of radical change to the Special Regime.85 The Kingdom of Spain's marketing campaign appeared credible in light of the State's track-record of good regulatory practice combined with promotion and protection of renewable energy.86
172.
The regulatory framework, including royal decrees, can and did generate obligations and expectations. The Respondent readily admits that Law 54/1997 gives rise to undertakings (and attendant expectations). However, it objects to RD 661/2007 being able to do the same. There is no reason why the former, but not the latter, can create obligations and expectations. RD 661/2007 is clearer than Law 54/1997, and the Kingdom of Spain has the power to change both. But merely because the Kingdom of Spain has the power to bring about a modification does not imply that such modification is foreseeable or reasonable and proportional.87

10.2 There Were No Warning Signs That the Respondent Would Undermine and Abolish the Special Regime

173.
With the same firmness that it once promoted the profitability, stability, and predictability of the Special Regime to investors, the Kingdom of Spain now in this case denies that very same stability and predictability. The Kingdom of Spain is asserting that investors should have known that RD 661/2007 was not worth the paper on which it was written.
174.
Novenergia could only be aware of the circumstances that existed at the time of its investment. This would exclude most of the evidence relied upon by the Kingdom of Spain to challenge Novenergia's legitimate expectations, leaving only a handful of facts, information, and circumstances.88
175.
The Kingdom of Spain relies on seven alleged facts, principles, and circumstances to argue that Novenergia was warned and had foreseen, or ought to have foreseen, the abolition of the Special Regime: (i) the project finance agreements; (ii) "economic sustainability "; (iii) "reasonable rate of return "; (iv) REP 2005-2010; (v) RD 661/2007; (vi) RD 436/2004; and (vii) Spanish Supreme Court judgments.
176.
First, the Respondent uses the language of the project finance agreements to allege that Novenergia could foresee the destruction of the regime. However, all of the agreements post-date the investment and only a few pre-date the construction of the PV Plants and their registration with the RAIPRE. And, at any rate, these project finance agreements only refer to a risk of failing to register within the deadline.89
177.
Second, the Kingdom of Spain alleges that the principle of "economic sustainability" should have warned Novenergia that the Respondent intended to renege on its undertakings. This argument is fictitious. Neither Law 54/1997 nor any other document included "economic sustainability" as a governing principle. Indeed, the Kingdom of Spain knowingly permitted the growth of a tariff deficit since 2000 by decoupling regulated costs and regulated revenues – behaviour that is diametrically opposed to any notion of "economic sustainability".90
178.
The principle of "economic sustainability" was first introduced together with the Specific Regime. Unlike Law 54/1997 and RD 661/2007, RDL 9/2013 and Law 24/2013 explicitly state that remuneration would be compatible with economic sustainability.91
179.
Third, the Kingdom of Spain relies on the notion of "reasonable rates of return" to artificially conjure up a warning to investors. Its interpretation is incorrect. A vague and undefined principle could not have constituted a warning. The definition given to the said notion fifteen years later is irrelevant. That definition was enacted six years after Novenergia invested, and at the same time as the Special Regime was abolished.92
180.
Fourth, the Respondent also attempts to repackage REP 2005-2010 as a warning to investors. Even a cursory reading of this REP demonstrates that it did not put investors on notice that the Kingdom of Spain would deny them the FIT.
181.
REP 2005-2010 used several assumptions to calculate the funding of each technology. The Respondent has latched on to one of these, namely an Internal Rate of Return of 7% after taxes, arguing that a reasonable rate of return meant a return of 7%. The Kingdom of Spain here confuses an assumption used in calculating the remuneration with a condition/goal of the remuneration. Importantly, the methodology used to calculate incentives is not a warning that the Special Regime was contingent on the vagaries of the economic climate after the incentives had been calculated.93
182.
If anything, REP 2005-2010 strengthened investors' expectations. The purpose of publishing this REP was to ensure that the Kingdom of Spain could cover at least 12% of its energy demand with renewable energy by 2010. It noted that Spain must continue to push for increasing growth of renewable energy by reducing economic barriers to the development of the PV sector and increasing premiums.94
183.
Fifth, RD 661/2007 was purpose-built to attract investors. It contained no warning that its promises would be undermined or abolished, and, as discussed supra, it was clear on its face and contained no governing principle of "economic sustainability". Further, there is no basis for the Kingdom of Spain's argument that it was solely a means to achieve "reasonable rate of return". Nowhere in RD 661/2007 does it say so, and the Respondent has furnished no other evidence for its proposition.95
184.
Sixth, RD 661/2007 was introduced as an improvement of RD 436/2004. Indeed, several laws and regulations have preceded RD 661/2007. Each time there was a regulatory modification of the Special Regime, the Kingdom of Spain had actively avoided negatively affecting investments already in operation. The main tool for effecting this was "grandfathering". Grandfather clauses are provisions that preserve the benefits of a previous regulatory regime for investments already in existence at the time of that regulatory regime.96
185.
Remarkably, the draft of RD 661/2007 did not initially include grandfather provisions for the facilities operating under RD 436/2004. This was remedied in the final draft as soon as the NEC detected its absence while reviewing the draft of RD 661/2007:

"Royal Decree 436/2004 is meant to be a permanent law (guaranteeing a highly convenient regulatory certainty), which is not necessarily a "petrification" of the law.

[…]

[The] NEC [is] of the opinion that the need to make the Draft for Royal Decree retroactive has not been sufficiently justified, the transition period from passing from the current remuneration system to the one established in the Draft for Royal Decree is not adequate and, last of all, investors are not sufficiently compensated for the lower remuneration.

[…]

[T]he Draft for Royal Decree analysed and reported on herein shall not apply to facilities that are already in operation as of 1 January 2008."97

186.
The Special Regime was constantly improved upon, but investors were given the option to continue relying on previous iterations of the regulatory regime should they so choose. The NEC would review draft royal decrees to ensure that this was not overlooked. None of this could have served as a warning to Novenergia that the Kingdom of Spain would undermine or abolish the Special Regime. If anything, it would have increased Novenergia's expectation of a stable and predictable regime.
188.
Moreover, the three Supreme Court judgments relied upon by the Kingdom of Spain which pre-date the investment concern a different sector, a different royal decree, and a different type of remuneration. None of the judgments concern substantial changes to the system. They only concern minor adjustments to the system. They therefore bear no comparison to the present arbitration, which concerns a radical regulatory overhaul. These judgments provided no warning to investors.99

11. The Special Regime Was Undermined and Thereafter Abolished

189.
The Respondent slowly emptied the Special Regime of content through four principal laws and regulations:

■ RD 1565/2010: introduced a cap on the number of years for which the FIT was available;100

■ RDL 14/2010: introduced a cap of the number of yearly production hours entitled to the FIT;101

■ Law 15/2012: introduced a 7% tax on energy production with a dramatic effect on remuneration (though its effects were somewhat mitigated by the Specific Regime);102 and

■ RDL 2/2013: modified the mechanism for updating the FIT. From being indexed to the CPI, updates of the FIT became indexed to a significantly less beneficial ad hoc CPI.103

190.
The Respondent, finally, completely abolished the Special Regime by means of four laws and regulations:

■ RDL 9/2013 and Law 24/2013: repealed the Special Regime and modified Law 54/1997, including defining the concept of "reasonable rate of return" as a cap on returns. A Specific (rather than a "Special") Regime was introduced with a remuneration based on the investment costs of "model facilities" defined with reference to "an efficient and well-managed company", but provided no content to these concepts. The new Specific Regime applied retrospectively to the entire lifespan of PV plants. It affected those plants that had already begun operation and had already registered with the RAIPRE. This regime could be revised, without limitation, every six years.104

■ RD 413/2014 and Order 1045/2014: provided the details for the operation of the Specific Regime. Remuneration became contingent on a litany of criteria that were wholly different from those in the Special Regime – criteria that investors were unaware of when investing in their PV plants and registering them with the RAIPRE under RD 661/2007. Further, said criteria could (and the expectation was that they would) easily be extensively reviewed, changed, and amended going forward.105

191.
The assault on the Special Regime was slow and piecemeal. It was also systematic, concerted, and designed to deprive PV investors of their returns on their investments. These actions by the Kingdom of Spain were unprecedented. Never before in the history of the Spanish electric sector had a system been subject to such an onslaught.

12. The Specific Regime Is Unreasonable and Disproportionate

192.
The Specific Regime is volatile and has removed regulatory certainty. The changes passed by the Kingdom of Spain are neither reasonable nor proportionate, and the measures were not proportionate and transparent, nor the result of any meaningful engagement with the stakeholders.

12.1 The Specific Regime Is Volatile and Removed Regulatory Certainty

193.
The Specific Regime introduced a regulatory period of six years, at the end of which all remuneration parameters could be amended. These short regulatory periods dealt a fatal blow to the income visibility of the now abolished Special Regime.106
194.
This was not the only aspect that destroyed regulatory certainty. The introduction of the Specific Regime itself did so. Investors were never warned that their remuneration would be judged against an arbitrary standard of "an efficient and well-managed company " nor that it would be capped at 7,398% – which the Kingdom of Spain decided in 2014, for the first time, would be the "reasonable rate of return". These conditions were applied to the entire, i.e., past and future, life span of the PV plants. Hence, the investments' revenuegenerating capabilities were altered ab initio but the costs remained the same. The Respondent was fully aware of the consequences of its measures.107

12.2 The Changes Are Neither Reasonable nor Proportionate

195.
Given the harsh and permanent negative effect of the measures undertaken by the Kingdom of Spain, the changes should have been reasonable and proportionate. They were not. As explained by KPMG, the changes were contrary to good regulatory practice since they did not provide: (i) stability and predictability; (ii) proportionality; (iii) transparency; (iv) effectiveness; and (v) efficiency.108 In a vain attempt to defend its actions, the Kingdom of Spain has stated that these were reasonable and proportionate. However, its assertion fails for at least three reasons.
196.
First, the Kingdom of Spain has not produced any evidence of a prior, independent assessment balancing the impact of the measures. As explained by NEC, the reports attached to the draft law were simplistic and did not fully analyse or justify the changes implemented by RDL 9/2013. This includes the Respondent's BCG report, which only reviewed certain aspects and was limited to publicly available information rather than actual expenses, costs and revenues.109
197.
Second, the Respondent fails to show that the measures were selected based on an objective consideration of viable alternatives. Indeed, KPMG has outlined several better alternatives, which the Respondent failed seriously to consider.110
198.
Third, the Kingdom of Spain fails to justify its measures based on internationally recognised good governance principles, EU-level guidance on state aid and renewable energy schemes, or Law 54/1997. It has instead focused all its attention on arguing that it complied with a principle it mischaracterises, namely that of the "reasonable rate of return".111

12.3 The Measures Were Not Proportional and Transparent, nor the Result of Any Meaningful Engagement With the Stakeholders

199.
The Specific Regime was enacted without proper widespread public consultation and without any meaningful engagement with stakeholders. This demonstrates a clear failure to adhere to the principles of transparency and predictability.
200.
No hearings took place with respect to RDL 9/2013. I.e., the Kingdom of Spain did not see it fit to convene any hearings prior to imposing the Specific Regime and its general framework. Hearings were organised only for subsequent orders and regulations which set out the details of the Specific Regime. When submissions were invited for these subsequent orders, they were invited for very preliminary texts, that ultimately bore no relationship to the final product.112
201.
In an attempt to justify proportionality, the Respondent relies heavily on proposals made by a single renewable energy association, the Spanish Renewable Energies Association ("APPA"). However, the Kingdom of Spain misrepresents that proposal by cherry-picking a few lines, leaving out that APPA emphasised that any new regulation should not apply to already existing PV plants. Further, while the APPA bill includes methods for calculating remuneration based on the investment costs of the technology, it does not include the concept of an "efficiently managed company".113

VI. SUMMARY OF THE RESPONDENT'S FACTUAL CASE

13. Introduction

202.
According to the Respondent, the Claimant has omitted numerous factual elements that are relevant to assess the numerous violations asserted by the Claimant. The Claimant has limited itself to expounding a few applicable rules of a regulatory framework as dense as that of an energy sector, and it has limited itself to expounding its own expectations and specific documents to try to substantiate the promises allegedly made by the Kingdom of Spain.
203.
The Claimant claims that its expectations have been violated, expectations that it considers reasonable and objective during the timing of its investment. Regarding this timing, the Claimant tries to bring this date of the investment forward to 13 September 2007.
204.
However, the Claimant continued carrying out investment activities in Spain after the acquisition of the shares in Novenergia Spain, as it has assumed economic obligations and risks inherent to the execution of the seven PV Plants in which it holds an indirect shareholding:

1. The Claimant assumed obligations and granted express warranties to a financial entity when it signed a bridge loan with BPI on 19 March 2008 for a sum of EUR 35 million.114 These obligations that the Claimant assumed must also be considered part of the investment activity of the Claimant.

2. The Claimant assumed the role of guarantor in other project finance vis-à-vis other lending banks. Through these contracts, the Claimant assumed new obligations as guarantor during the months of June and July 2008.115

3. The construction of all the PV Plants did not end until November 2008. Their construction implied an evident risk of delays. The investment committee minutes of 6 October 2008 shows that Alamo had not yet been concluded.116 The investment committee minutes of 11 and 24 November 2008 are the minutes that reveal that the construction of all the PV Plants had ended and that they are connected to the grid.117

4. Even the Claimant itself had to lend money to the company Novenergia Spain given that the economic and regulatory uncertainty was making it hard to obtain external financing for the PV Plants. The Claimant granted 23 loans to Novenergia Spain from 13 July 2007 until 31 January 2009.118

205.
The Claimant bases its expectations on advertising leaflets, paragraphs from NEC reports and a national energy plan to substantiate the alleged promises to maintain a fixed FIT in perpetuity in favour of registered renewable energy ("RE") plants. The Claimant has omitted warnings given to operators in the RE sector (i) since 2006 by the government, (ii) since 2005 through case law and (iii) since 2007 by the NEC reports. These warnings have been consistent with respect to

(1) the will to provide a reasonable rate of return on investments in RE plants,

(2) the dynamic nature of said return, and (3) the intervention of the government in cases of distortion of the energy market or the discovery of overremuneration.

206.
Every diligent investor is aware of or should have been aware of these warnings. The Claimant has not submitted one single regulatory or legal due diligence report that would have clarified these important issues. Additionally, the Claimant maintains an inexcusable silence or distorts facts, to suit its own ends, which are essential to ascertain the actual Spanish regulatory framework in which the Claimant invested.
207.
It is impossible to sustain that as from September 2007 the Claimant did not make any investments in the RE plants that are the subject of this arbitration. From the documentation that has been submitted, one can deduce that the Claimant (i) guaranteed the bridge loan of EUR 35 million on the condition that it obtained project finance for all the PV Plants in which the Claimant had a shareholding in March 2008 and (ii) assumed costs and risks with the construction of the PV plants. Consequently, the accredited facts in this case are that the investment by the Claimant extended from July 2007119 to, at least, the end of the construction of the plants in November 2008.

14. The Spanish Regulatory Framework

208.
The regulation of the Spanish electricity system (hereinafter "SES") in general, and RE in particular (as part of this system), is performed by means of regulations of a different nature. These regulations comply with the general outline of sources of the law in the Spanish legal system.
209.
These are as follows:

(a) The Spanish Constitution of 1978 : The supreme law of the Spanish legal system that configures the organisation of public authorities, its institutional and territorial structure, and regulates the essential aspects of the rights and duties of citizens.

(b) The law : A written rule issued by the legislative power. There are two classes of Laws:

- Organic laws : Reserved for regulating certain subjects envisaged in the Constitution (fundamental rights and public freedoms, general electoral regime, among others). An absolute majority of the congress of deputies is required for its approval.

- Ordinary laws : Regulate matters not reserved by the Constitution for an organic law. For approval, a simple majority of the congress of deputies will suffice.

(c) Royal decree-law : This is a rule with the force of law that the constitution authorises the government to approve in extraordinary situations of necessity or urgency. The adoption of a royal decree law is subject to strict conditions, controls and limits and its subsequent validation by parliament.

(d) Royal decree : a royal decree is a statutory rule that emanates from the government. It complements or develops laws and is hierarchically inferior to them. It can regulate within the authorisations that granted by law and cannot violate it.

(e) Ministerial order : This is a statutory regulation that emanates from one or several ministerial departments. In the field of energy, the most common is the ministerial order that emanates from the Minister of Industry, Energy and Tourism.

(f) Resolutions : These are acts with a lower rank than the ministerial order that emanate from the competent bodies of the administration, with a technical content.

210.
The regulations referred to above are arranged in accordance with the principle of regulatory hierarchy. The principle of regulatory hierarchy means that regulations are arranged in a hierarchical manner. This, in turn, leads to important practical consequences: (1) no regulatory provision may be contrary to the act that it develops, but is null and void and tribunals should not apply it, (2) all regulatory provisions should be interpreted and implemented in harmony with the law that they develop (3) no regulatory provision can prevent the adoption of policy measures aimed at complying with legal provisions.
211.
In addition, EU law has been part of the Spanish legal system since Spain joined the EU in 1986.
212.
Within the EU law, together with the treaties (Treaty of the European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union ("TFEU")), there are also different legal acts of European institutions (Article 288 of the TFEU):
213.
An EU regulation has a general scope and is binding in its entirety and directly applicable in each Member State.

(a) A directive obliges the recipient member state regarding the result to be achieved, but allows national authorities to choose the form and methods.

(b) A decision is compulsory for the recipient member state in all its elements.

(c) Recommendations and opinions are not binding.

214.
Finally, in the Spanish legal system, the relevance of the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court must be taken into consideration. Pursuant to Article 1.6 of the Civil Code:

"Case law shall complement the legal system by means of the doctrine repeatedly upheld by the Supreme Court in its interpretation and application of statutes, customs and general legal principles."120

15. The Principle of Hierarchy in the Spanish Regulatory Framework

215.
The Claimant ignores or disregards the value of the different regulations that govern the SES and the principle of hierarchy that articulates how the different regulations of the Spanish regulatory framework actually work.
216.
This principle of hierarchy implies that the regulations cannot contradict the provisions of a higher law. In Spanish law, when a regulation infringes on the provisions of a rule with the status of law, it causes said regulation to be null and void.121 Moreover, the courts have the obligation not to apply the regulations that are contrary to law.122
217.
Law 54/1997 is based on the principle of economic sustainability of the SES.123 The Claimant now denies the existence of said principle. However:

■ Said principle appears in Law 54/1997 preamble: "[T]he basic purpose of this Act is to regulate the electricity sector with the traditional, three-fold goal of guaranteeing the supply of electric power, its quality and the provision of such supply at the lowest possible cost. [...]"124

■ Said principle was acknowledged by associations of energy producers. In 2006, during the processing of RD 661/2007, the Spanish Electricity Association ("UNESA") called for the need to: "have a stable regulation in time. It has to be capable of providing the necessary legal security to carry out Capital-intensive investments and, in those respects, [...] continue the development of the electric system in a path of sustainability."125

■ Said principle is mentioned in RD 661/2007 preamble, which the Claimant omits: "Spanish society [...] is increasingly demanding the employment of renewable sources of energy and efficiency in the generation of electricity as basic principles in the achievement of sustainable development from an economic, social, [and] environmental point of view."126

■ The Spanish Wind Energy Association (the "AEE") also invoked this principle as a guiding principle for public subsidies: "As regards wind energy, Royal Decree 661/2007 characterizes itself, in general terms, by the idea of economic sustainability and control over costs".127

■ Said principle was invoked by the General Secretary of Energy in October 2008, prior to the introduction of the subsequent Royal Decree 1578/2008, of 26 September, on Remuneration for the Activity of Electricity Production Using Solar Photovoltaic Technology for Facilities after the Deadline for the Maintenance of the Remuneration Fixed under Royal Decree 661/2007 ("RD 1578/2008"): "I received a number of foreign investors who told me that if the premiums were maintained up to the next year, they would invest billions of euros in Spain [...] We want to obtain investments that generate wealth, not just ones that absorb the resources of the consumers. [..] we must be aware of the economic sustainability of the cost of the energy [...] and that it is important for the families and for the productive sector."128

218.
Therefore, diligent investors knew or should have known that RD 661/2007 would not freeze remunerations indefinitely, along 3 or 4 decades, as this could infringe the principle of sustainability of the SES.129 Subsidies received by Special Regime producers are a SES cost130 that affects its sustainability. Similarly, no investor can expect the freezing of a regulatory provision maintaining non reasonable returns, e.g. for being far higher by reference to the capital markets. Such an interpretation would breach Law 54/1997, which sets a limit on the subsidised regime when stating that the market price + premium should provide a reasonable rate of return pursuant to the capital market.131
219.
No diligent investor could expect that, once a situation of over-remuneration was identified, said situation would not be corrected to apply Law 54/1997. In fact, the government indeed intervened in 2006 and in 2007, with respect to wind plants. Claimant was not ignorant of this.
220.
The Supreme Court made clear this situation in its judgment of October 2006: "However, the payment regime [...] does not guarantee to special regime electricity producers that a certain level of profits or revenues will be unchanged relative to those obtained in previous years, or that the formulas for fixing the premiums will stay unchanged. "132
221.
The Isolux award refers to this manifestation of the principle of hierarchy saying: "the regulatory framework had already been modified several times. The proper RDs 6611/2007 [sic!] and 1565/2008 were no more than amendments to RD 436/2004. [...] All of these regulations issued for the implementation of Law 54/1997, of 27 November 1997, regarding the Electrical Sector (LSE), showed a very unstable character of a regulatory framework that the government has the power and the duty to adapt to the economic and technical needs of the moment, within the LSE framework."133
222.
This principle of hierarchy leaves most of the Claimant's theory without substance.

16. The Special Regime Is Not an Island in the SES

223.
The Claimant equally disregards the integration of the activity of generation from RE in the SES as a cost thereof and, therefore, subject to its sustainability. The Claimant seeks to present PV technologies to the Tribunal as an "island" outside the SES. It is an interconnected legal, economic and technical system for the generation, transmission, distribution and sale of electricity. It is, therefore, a system created to ensure the power supply (1) at the lower possible cost for consumers134 and (2) sustainable in the long term.
224.
The production of electricity from the Special Regime is a part of the SES according to Law 54/1997. That is, the subsidies comprising the Special Regime producers' economic regime are a cost of the SES: "supply diversification and security costs".135 The close link between premiums (cost of the SES paid by the consumers) and the economic sustainability of the SES require the rollout of renewable technologies and their economic impact to be planned. Law 54/1997 stated: "The Government shall modify the Renewable Energy Promotion Plan to adapt it to the targets set in this regard by the European Union of 20% by 2020, maintaining the commitment that this plan established of 12% for 2010. These targets will be taken into account when setting premiums for these kinds of facilities".136
225.
The planning described is developed in renewable energy plans ("REP"). Specifically, the determination of the premiums laid-down by RD 661/2007 is linked to the provisions of the REP 2005-2010.137 In said plan, the costs to the SES that the deployment of RE involves are assessed in terms of the return that it is foreseen will be granted as reasonable.138 In addition, it analyses whether such costs are sustainable for the SES.
226.
The methodology used to determine this cost, as did the REP of 1989, the REP 2000-2010 and the economic report of RD 436/2004,139 was explained as follows:

"Using the proposed energy targets as the baseline, the financing needs for each technology have been determined according to their return, therefore defining some standard projects for the calculation model.

These standard projects have been characterised by technical parameters relating to their size, equivalent hours of operation, unit costs, periods of implementation, lifespan, operational and maintenance costs and sale prices per final unit of energy. Similarly, some financing assumptions have been applied, as well as a series of measures or financial aid designed according to the requirements of each technology."

227.
Specifically, according to the state of the technology at that time, four standard facilities were established for the PV sector.140 In all cases, the REP set the different parameters required for each standard facility to reach a return on the project and with equity close to 7%141 throughout its lifetime:

" Return on Project Type : calculated on the basis of maintaining an Internal Rate of Return (IRR), measured in legal tender and for each standard project, around 7% on equity (before any financing) and after taxes."142 (Emphasis in Exhibit R-66.)

228.
It should be noted that, as far as PV projects are concerned, the 2005-2010 REP was based on a cost opportunity on own resources of 5%.143
229.
Consistent with the above, RD 661/2007 set the corresponding subsidies. The regulator does not calculate the return taking into account the specific costs of each investor. The premiums established by RD 661/2007 are set with the aim of providing a standard facility a return of about 7% according to the standards set in the REP 2005-2010 itself: the CAPEX of a standard facility, the OPEX of a standard facility, equivalent operating hours, unit costs, implementation periods, useful life and selling prices of the final energy unit.
230.
The Claimant overlooks the methodology used by the Spanish regulator to set the premiums. This methodology was set forth in diverse regulatory instruments prior to and contemporary with the time of their investment. Evidently, the Claimant omits the Minister of Industry's declaration in the senate of the Kingdom of Spain, given on 26 October 2006:

"It is important for all operators to receive this message and to be aware that our road map entails adapting to this framework as quickly as possible, which involves generating more market that we hope will be efficient, because it is not always so, and obviously, the tariffs are not going to pay for anyone's party. Tariffs, by law can only take into account energy costs, and shareholder ventures are not energy costs. This is also a very important message for the [RE] sector [...] there shall be no further criteria other than objective energy costs and, obviously, the market price is not included; the stock market is a mixture of future remuneration expectations, etc. [...], however the tariff framework will be strictly bound to what the regulations state, that is to say, only the costs shall be taken into account, and this shall be our principle of action."144

231.
It is also essential to understand that the reasonable return was attributed to the investment in the plants. Consequently, the guarantee of reasonable return established in Law 54/1997 applies only to the capital employed directly in the economic activity that allows the formation of the assets to be used in electricity generation. In any case the concept of reasonable return could be attributable to other costs, such as premiums of a financial nature paid to acquire a PV plant. In fact, preamble of RD 661/2007 refers to promoters: "This new system protects the promoter when the revenues.... "145 This issue has not been objected to by the Claimant.
232.
On the other hand, the REP 2005-2010 is framed within the context of a given scenario of expected electricity demand. The international financial crisis that started in 2009 had an extraordinary impact on the economic database on which RD 661/2007 premiums were projected.146 The demand for electricity fell in an exceptional manner in 2009. The RE associations were aware of (i) this fall and (ii) the need to adopt measures to cope with this fall in demand.147 REP 20052010 designed the deployment of subsidies to the renewable energies based on a foreseeable evolution of the electricity demand that was completely different to what actually occurred in 2009.148
233.
Claimant tries to limit the relevance of REP 2005-2010 and its value in the regulatory framework,149 but the RE sector was aware that the returns were linked to the REP objectives. The Claimant attempts to put over to the Tribunal the erroneous idea that the activity of RE production is an island within the SES. An island outside the principles on which the SES are built; particularly, from the principle of its economic sustainability.
234.
Notwithstanding, the investors on PV plants were aware that EU law on state aid to RE is designed to achieve a level playing field, and that situations of overremuneration that distort the market or that give rise to non-sustainability were not allowed:

"[I]t is worth underlining that the last communication by the European Commission on the subject, dated last 10 November 2010, states in its section 2 that:

The development of renewable energies shall depend on such aid regimes as may be determined over time. The Commission must perform its role in guaranteeing that these are sustainable, in consonance with technological progress and with not hindering innovation or competition. '"150

235.
Importantly, the investors on PV Plants were aware that neither the legislation of the EU nor that of the European Commission would intervene to face situations of non-sustainability in national Electricity systems or situations of market distortions due to over-remunerations.

17. The Spanish Regulatory Framework in 2007 and 2008

17.1 Law 54/1997, Applied by the Government and Known by the RE Sector

17.1.1 Law 54/1997, Articles 16 and 30

236.
The structure and limits of the remuneration regime for RE producers under the Special Regime are laid-down by Articles 16.7, 30.3 and 30.4 of Law 54/1997.151 Article 16.7, omitted by the Claimants, stipulates:

"The remuneration for electricity generated, as measured at the power station busbars, by generators under the special regime, shall be the remuneration corresponding to the generation of electric power, [...] and, where applicable, a premium that will be determined by the Government after seeking the views of the Autonomous Regions as set out in article 30.4."152

237.
It is deduced from this Article that producers under the Special Regime are entitled to receive the market price and a premium for their net power production. Article 30(4) stipulates that:

"The remuneration arrangements for electric power generation installations operating under the special regime shall be supplemented by the payment of a premium under statutory terms set out in regulations and in the following cases:

[…]

To work out the premiums, the voltage level on delivery of the power to the network, the effective contribution to environmental improvement, to primary energy saving and energy efficiency, the generation of economically justifiable useful heat and the investment costs incurred shall all be taken into account so as to achieve reasonable profitability rates with reference to the cost of money on capital markets".153

238.
A literal interpretation of Article 30.4, last paragraph, leaves no room for doubt. The pool price + premium allows RE technologies to compete with conventional energy to reach a level playing field. Article 30.4 imposes a clear pairing that seeks an aim which can be expressed in the following formula: Market price + subsidy = achieve reasonable return in accordance with the cost of money on the capital market:

(a) Firstly, Special Regime producers have the right to obtain a "return", allowing them to recover both the amounts invested (CAPEX) as well as the operating costs for such assets (OPEX) and, moreover, obtain an industrial profit;

(b) Secondly, this means that the industrial profit guaranteed to the producers must be "reasonable". Thus, this profit cannot be disproportionate or "irrational".

(c) Thirdly, the assessment of reasonableness must be made based on an element that is objective and variable: "with reference to the cost of money on the capital market".

239.
The Claimant's theory is that reasonable return is merely one criterion to determine the premiums. Said theory is also breached by doctrinal publications that examined the Spanish regulatory framework. In 2010 the manual "Powering the Green Economy" – the FIT handbook points out: "Different names have been used to describe this tariff calculation approach based on actual costs and profitability for producers. [...] the Spanish support mechanism speaks of a 'reasonable rate of return' [...] the Spanish legislator calculated the tariffs based on 7 per cent returns on investment under the fixed tariff option, and 5–9 per cent under the premium FIT option. "154
240.
The award in the Isolux case, after examining the regulatory framework that existed in 2008 and 2009 has reached the same conclusion when it analysed article 30.4 of Law 54/1997: "This text does not include the concepts 'floor ' or ' ceiling '. The only guarantee that it contains for the investor is to receive, with regard to certain parameters, a reasonable rate of return with reference to the cost on money in the capital market. That is to say, that the regulator guarantees a minimum profitability, but does not guarantee that the investor will obtain a rate greater than the minimum guaranteed."155
241.
The Claimant did not object that the rollout of renewables in Spain is subject to the guidelines arising from EU regulations. However, the Claimant forgets to mention that all subsidy or aid regime implemented by a Member state is subject to EU rules on state aid.156 That is, it is subject to the principle of proportionality. The term "reasonable" of Article 30.4 means that it must be reasonable for investors, but also reasonable for the consumers who pay it.157 Furthermore, it cannot breach EU regulations on state aid, stated in Article 107.1 of the TFEU: "Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market".158
242.
The Claimant could not be unaware of this regulation and its binding nature if, in the future, the remuneration provided by RD 661/2007 became excessive, distorting the energy market.

17.1.2 The Reasonable Return Can Be Achieved in Various Ways

243.
Law 54/1997 did not define the specific mechanism through which the Special Regime subsidy system should be articulated. The act did not even require the government to establish a "feed in tariff " system to articulate the Special Regime remuneration formula. The act was confined to establishing the limits and the objective so that the government could set it. In compliance with this legal mandate, since 1997, the regulator has established different mechanisms to achieve the objectives set by the act.
244.
Changes from one mechanism to another were challenged by RE investors before the courts since 2004. The Supreme Court consistently held in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2012 that the remuneration system pivots around the principle of reasonable return. In 2006 the case law clearly stated that: "[T] he payment regime [...] does not guarantee to special regime electricity producers that a certain level of profits or revenues will be unchanged relative to those obtained in previous years, or that the formulas for fixing the premiums will stay unchanged."159
245.
Thus, no investor who had a rational understanding of the Spanish regulatory framework could have had the reasonable and objective expectation of a specific formula or mechanism for remuneration in force indefinitely, i.e. a petrification. Especially, when the Kingdom of Spain never promised this regulatory petrification to the Claimant or any other investor.
246.
The Isolux award denies that the government had undertaken to the investor that it would maintain a specific formula of remuneration or a fixed tariff : "It is precisely to settle this dispute based on the ECT and on international law, that the Arbitral Tribunal must determine whether the Claimant was aware that there were no obstacles under Spanish law to modify the regulatory framework including with regard to the modalities of investor's remuneration. The existence or inexistence of these obstacles in Spanish law is a fact, and the Supreme Court's ruling are part of this fact."160

17.1.3 The Reasonable Return Must Be Subject to Possible Changes

247.
The Claimant denies the dynamic nature of the principle of reasonable return. The support models for renewables must be dynamic enough to correct situations of over- or under-remuneration that distort the market. Proof of this is that RD 661/2007 itself and earlier RDL 7/2006, of 23 June, Establishing Urgent Measures in the Energy Sector and Approves the Social Tariff ("RDL 7/2006") were passed in order to correct situations of over-remuneration for the wind plants. Indeed, Law 54/1997 does not use the terms "fixed" or "unchangeable". It uses "reasonable with reference to the cost of money on the capital market" which, by nature, is dynamic.
248.
Consequently, without altering the essential characteristics of the Spanish regulatory framework set forth (necessarily) in Law 54/1997, amendments can be made to the regulations as required to comply with the act. The manner in which said dynamism was expressed was through regulatory amendments implementing the necessary means for complying with Law 54/1997.
249.
This dynamic nature was accepted by the RE investors as Iberdrola,161 Sener162 (and other thermosolar players as Abengoa, FCC, Sacyr, Elecnor and Samca,163 and EON164). This dynamic nature was also accepted by the main RE associations.165
250.
Importantly, in a claim filed before the Supreme Court, the Claimant's RE plants recognise the dynamic nature of the premiums which remunerates the RE plants, citing case law of 2006, 2007 and 2009:

"[T]he aforementioned Sentence rejects the unmodifiability of the remuneration system: [...] the prescriptive content of Law 54/1997, of 27th November, on the Electricity Sector, does not envisage the petrification or freezing of the remunerative system for owners of electricity facilities under the special regime, nor any recognition of the right of producers under the special regime nor the unmodifiability of said system, [...]

The Sentence determines that, apart from the fact that there is no damage, the Government may modify, in the exercising of its regulatory powers, a specific remuneration system, but providing this falls within the provisions of the Electricity Sector Act."166 (Emphasis omitted.)

251.
Claimant could not be deprived of the knowledge of its own PV Plants, even more when the managers of these PV Plants (Mr. Albert Mitja Sarvise and Mr. Alvaro Gonçalves Martins) were members of the manager team of Novenergia.
252.
Under Law 54/1997 there were successive regulations which stated different formulas in order to provide the reasonable return for RE investments. An investor who proposed to make an investment in REs in Spain since 2007 should have known that the system for calculating the remuneration of REs had experienced various changes. Said investors could have easily checked that RD 661/2007 was a consequence of RDL 7/2006, which substantially amended RD 436/2004 and that the latter had previously amended RD 2818/1998.

17.2 RD 2818/1998

253.
The first implementing regulation of Article 30.4 of Law 54/1997 was RD 2818/1998. This regulation emphasised the development of Special Regime facilities by creating a remuneration framework based on a subsidy (premium) that contemplated the market price and a complement for reactive energy.167 The deficiency of this formula was its volatility. Being referenced only to the pool, the expectation of income of an investor in REs floated on the pool.

17.3 RD 436/2004

254.
In order to eradicate the volatility of the first calculation formula for the remuneration of REs, RD 436/2004 established a different remuneration system. An operator who operated a facility under the Special Regime would have the right to receive a premium that was equal to a multiple of the mean benchmark tariff (hereinafter, "TMR "). A PV investor would perceive a tariff which would be 575% of the TMR until year 25 (460% as from then) for facilities of less than 100 kW. The tariff would be 300% for 25 years (240% as from then) for facilities of over 100 kW, or, optionally for facilities of over 100 kW, a premium of 250% for 25 years and 200% as from then. Thus, it stated two different formulas to set up the subsidies.168
255.
Additionally, RD 436/2004 stated a quadrennial revision system in Article 40.3:169

"Article 40. Revision of tariffs, premiums, [incentives] and supplements for new plants. [...] 3. The tariffs, premiums, incentives and supplements resulting from any of the revisions provided for in this section shall apply solely to the plants that commence operating subsequent to the date referred of the entry into force referred to in the paragraph [above] and shall not have a backdated effect on any previous tariffs and premiums."

256.
Notwithstanding this Article, RD 436/2004 remuneration formula was modified for registered PV plants only two years later through RDL 7/2006 and later substituted by another through RD 661/2007.

17.3.1 Distortions Created by RD 436/2004 Remuneration Formula: RDL 7/2006

257.
The link between the subsidies for renewable energies and the TMR created a potential risk to the economic sustainability of the SES. This was because the TMR was calculated based on the costs of the SES themselves, including subsidies to the Special Regime. Therefore, a loop arose in the mechanism for setting premiums; the premium was a percentage of the TMR which, in turn, was calculated taking into account the increase in the amount of the premiums. This constant feedback meant a disproportionate increase in the costs of the SES.
258.
By 2006, the weight of REs (especially wind) in the SES already represented 17% of the total production.170 The problem of cost overrun was compounded in light of the planning targets established in the REP 2005-2010, which would have meant a greater participation of the Special Regime in electricity generation.
259.
As a result, the government intervened and enacted RDL 7/2006, of 23 June. It should be noted that Royal Decree-Acts are rules with the force of an act that the government may issue in cases of extraordinary and urgent need. This RD-Acts are to be confirmed by the parliament within 1 month to acquire the binding nature of an act. RDL 7/2006, in its preamble, highlighted the inefficiency of the current remuneration formula. Therefore, its 2nd Transitory Provision froze all the Special Regime subsidies until a new remuneration formula were implemented.
260.
These changes included the untying of premiums from the TMR. Therefore, the applicable update of the TMR from 1 July 2006, was not applicable to the RE premiums and Special Regime tariffs of the existing Plants. RD 436/2004 generated "windfall profits" for the wind farms that it was necessary to eradicate. These windfall profits also pushed upwards the tariff deficit existing at the time.
261.
The Claimant was aware that, due to a situation of over-remuneration, the government acted to correct that over-remuneration. This is what the PV Plants investors stated in the claim they lodged before the Supreme Court:

"[T]hrough the analysing of previous justification of retroactive measures in relation to [RD 661/2007], 25 of May with respect to [RD 436/2004]. [...] said Royal Decree applied a retroactive measure to premiums of the wind sector and at the time, this was justified by the distortion of the market price. Initially, when [RD 436/2004] was passed, the price was low (36c€/nNh) and later it went up to 50/60 c€/KWh. This fact led to an exaggerated increase in the remuneration and the moving of the wind parks to the remuneration system of the market price. Faced with this distortion, and in the name of general interest as a result of the deviation of a free market price when this was variable, a retroactive measure was applied."171

262.
Surprisingly, such intervention, known by the Claimant in 2011, has been continuously hidden by it to the Tribunal from 2015 onwards.
263.
It must be recalled that due to these wind fall profits, the Ministry of Industry warned the RE sector on 26 October 2006 about the market efficiency and the limit nature of the premiums:

"It is important for all operators to receive this message and to be aware that our road map entails adapting to this framework as quickly as possible, which involves generating more market that we hope will be efficient, because it is not always so, and obviously, the tariffs are not going to pay for anyone's party. Tariffs by law can only take into account energy costs, and shareholder ventures are not energy costs. This is also a very important message for the [RE] Sector [...] there shall be no further criteria other than objective energy costs and, obviously, the market price is not included".172

264.
Warnings for the RE sector were repeated on November 2006 by the Secretary General for Energy:

"The regulation of wind power in 2004 was rather unfortunate. […] This remuneration has an IRR of around 20 percent. I believe in renewable energies as much as anyone, but I also believe that we have to do things reasonably. Technologies, that is my opinion, whose investment is guaranteed through a premium […] cannot have returns of 20 per cent; nobody has those. Some speculators do have them. We must be reasonable ".173 (Emphasis added to Exhibit R-260.)

17.3.2 The Modification of RD 436/2004 Was Harshly Criticised by the Sector

265.
The Claimant's theory on the aim of RD 661/2007 to entice investors contrasts with the opinion held by the RE sector in the period in which the regulatory change took place. The leading associations of the renewables sector, APPA, AEE and ASIF, sent a joint letter to the Minister of Industry on 26 July 2006 in relation to RDL 7/2006 and the reform of the Special Regime remuneration formula which said RD-Act announced. They requested the "immediate cessation of the ongoing regulatory process ":174

■ "the appearing associations can only state their rejection, their most profound discontent and their most serious concern about how and why the process is being carried out".

■ "[RDL 7/2006] substantially ruptures the regulation of renewable energies established in the Energy Sector Act (Law 54/1997)".

■ "[RDL 7/2006] eliminates the objective parameters that established minimum remuneration for the different renewable energies included in said Act. These minimums were the guarantee of stability, predictability and durability that attracted investment to the sector (....)"

■ "This situation, already compromising and disconcerting, is further compounded when we acknowledge that the planned revision of RD 436/2004 is being transformed into the introduction of a new regulatory framework."

266.
In December 2006, APPA continued to harshly criticise this RDL 7/2006:

■ "RD 436/2004 [...] is therefore conditioned by the elements of retroactivity and legal uncertainty introduced in the sector by said [RDL 7/2006]."

■ "Last June, [RDL 7/2006] was approved, which contains a frontal attack against the national policy of promoting renewables: it eliminates the 8090% band and the retributive stability mechanisms [of RD 436/2004] , without also contemplating the guarantees and timeframes established. The legislation, which tears up the rules half way through play, introduces retroactivity and seriously destroys legitimate investor confidence. "175

267.
Therefore, the measures introduced by RDL 7/2006 and RD 661/2007 in the period in which they took place, was criticised by RE sector. At that time, as at present, certain parties used expressions such as the following to define the changes: "substantial destruction of the system ", "frontal attack against the national policy of promoting renewables ", "breaking the rules of the game halfway through the match ", etc. This notwithstanding, the Claimant requested neither in 2007 nor in 2008 one single regulatory due diligence report.

17.4 REP 2005 – 2010 Does Not Contain an Overall Increase in Return for RE

268.
The REP 2005-2010 is the key instrument passed by the Council of Ministers in August 26, 2005176 for setting the subsidies in RD 661/2007. This governmental planning to increase the RE costs did not mention any rise in PV subsidies. In fact, the REP 2005-2010 maintained, in general, the subsidies established by Renewable Energy Promotion Plan 2000-2010, which were reflected in RD 436/2004.
269.
Both the Renewable Energy Promotion Plan 2000-2010 and the REP 2005-2010 established, in general, for all technologies, return for standard projects amounting to close to "7 % with own resources, before financing and after tax".177 Indeed, REP 2005-2010 expressly stated that the PV targets forecast can be achieved by maintaining the remuneration level.178
270.
The Respondent has proved the Awareness by ASIF (PV), APPA, Isolux, Abengoa, KPMG, Deloitte and Poyry of (i) the link between REP 2005-2010 with RD 661/2007 and (ii) the will of the government to provide a reasonable return close to 7% IRR to the RE plants projects.179 Furthermore, the PV Plants were aware that, in line with the provisions of the 2005-2010 REP, the government aimed to grant a remuneration "of around 7%" on the investment and exploitation costs of RE plants:

"[T]he profitability foreseen by the [NEC] was between 7.6% and 8% annually, slightly higher than that proposed by the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce for the regulated tariffs which was 7.1%. The [NEC] determined the internal rate of return of free cash flows and after taxes (IRR) based on the regulated tariff of the Royal Decree proposal and the real costs of the facilities commissioned since the year 2004."180 (Emphasis in Exhibit R-183.)

271.
The Claimant could also not be unaware of the relevant information stemming from its own PV Plants.

17.5 RD 661/2007

17.5.1 The Aim and the Literal Wording of RD 661/2007

272.
RD 661/2007 stated a new remuneration formula according to the purposes of REP 2005-2010: "The regulated tariff has been calculated for the purpose of guaranteeing a return of between 7% and 8% depending on the technology. Premiums have been calculated following the same criteria as in RD 436/2004… "181 Importantly, RD 661/2007 eliminated the pool plus premium option for existing PV plants. The Claimant could not be unaware of this radical abolition of a remuneration formula for existing PV plants, from publication of RD 661/2007 onwards without Transitory Provisions.
273.
Even more, it is proved that, RD 661/2007 did not establish a better economic regime than RD 436/2004.182 The witness statement of Mr. Montoya includes a comparative table of the highest regulated tariff (RT) contemplated in RD 436/2004 and RD 661/2007. Marked in red are the values that would have corresponded to each Royal Decree if RD 436/2004 would have not been modified in 2006. Marked in blue are the estimated mean reference tariff (TMR) for 2007:

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2006 (julio) 2007
TMR ∆ TMR €/MWh % 7,0853 7,2072 1,72% 7,3304 1,71% 7,5588 7,7644 4,48% 1,38% 8,2193 5,86%
TR RD 2818/1998 c€/kWh 39,6668 39,6668 39,6668 39,6668 39,6668 39,6668 39,6668
TR RD 435/2004 c€/kwh 41,4414 42,1498 44,0381 44,0381 44,0381
44,6453 47,2610
TR RD 661/2007 c€/kWh 44,0381
Potencia MW 1,48 1,53 2,04 3,81 7,22 11,40 22,76 47,35 145,67 690,46

274.
On the other hand, the wording of Article 44(3) of RD 661/2007 was more limited than Article 40(3) of RD 436/2004. Article 44(3) refers literally to the Quadrennial "revisions indicated in this paragraph". That is, periodic and regular reviews. This article did not prevent other revisions motivated by justified reasons, such as the economic sustainability of the SES or to cut off over-remunerations. Critically, previous Article 40(3) of RD 436/2004 was not an obstacle to regulatory adjustments, due to these reasons, made visible through RDL 7/2006 and RD 661/2007.
275.
RD 661/2007 is a general rule applicable to national or foreign investor, with no distinction at all. This regulation could not create different expectations to the Claimants than to other stakeholders of the RE sector, as RD 661/2007 was directed neither to the Claimant specifically nor to its PV Plants.

17.5.2 The Relevance of the Case Law as a Fact to Understand the Regulatory Framework

276.
The Claimant has voluntarily omitted to take into consideration the relevance of the case law of the Supreme Court of the Kingdom of Spain, as the ultimate interpreter of Spanish law.183 By doing so, it is endeavouring to hide the fact that the extension and limits of the rights of any investor in RE plants were stated by said case law prior to its investments of 2007 and 2008. Therefore, the Kingdom of Spain describes the case law of the Supreme Court as a relevant fact (together with the Spanish internal laws) that should be taken into account by any RE investor in Spain.
277.
In the Spanish regulatory framework, the source of expectations comes from the rational and comprehensive "understanding " of the rights and obligations arising from such regulatory framework. This "understanding " certainly must include the case law of the Supreme Court. Ignoring such case law means ignoring a key component of the regulatory framework in which an investor invests. The Respondent has proved184 that since 2005 this case law has continuously stated that:

■ The RE plant's owners do not have a "right " to the economic regime remaining unaltered;

■ Unless Article 30(4) of Law 54/1997 is amended, the limit for the government in regulatory modifications is to provide Special Regime Plants a reasonable rate of return with reference to the cost of money on the capital market.

■ The integration of the Special Regime Plants into the SES implies that the companies have to assume a regulatory risk.

278.
The Supreme Court made crystal clear this case law on its judgment of October 2006, which confirmed the previous ruling of December 2005:185

"Until it is replaced by another, the above outlined legal regulation (Article 30 of the Electricity Law) allows the respective companies to expect that the fixing of the premiums can be included as a factor relevant to their obtaining "reasonable rates of return with reference the cost of money in the capital market" or, to put it again in the words of the preamble to [RD 436/2004], 'reasonable compensation for their investments.' However the payment regime under examination does not guarantee to special regime electricity producers that a certain level of profits or revenues will be unchanged relative to those obtained in previous years, or that the formulas for fixing the premiums will stay unchanged."186

279.
This case law was newly confirmed by judgments of October 2006,187 March 2007188 and October 2007.189 No investor in 2007 or 2008 could be unaware of such case law and the limits stated for the government regarding possible future regulatory changes.

17.5.3 Admissibility of Possible Future Changes by NEC Due to the Case Law

280.
The NEC, as the advisory body in energy matters, stated its disagreement with the amendments introduced in RD 661/2007, due to the review system stated in art. 40 of RD 436/2004. However, the NEC knew that Supreme Court case law on remuneration of the Special Regime was binding on it. As a consequence, the NEC considered that the measures introduced by RD 661/2007 were adequate and possibly in accordance with Spanish law:

"To such purpose, the recent Judgment by the Supreme Court dated 25 October 2006 […] is highly illustrative. This Judgment analyzes in particular a regulatory change provided in said Royal Decree in regard to the calculation procedure for premiums offered to encourage the electrical power production activity under the special regime. In said Judgment, the Supreme Court concludes that such regulatory modification did neither violate the principle of legal certainty nor the principle of protection of legitimate expectation".190

281.
NEC highlighted the arguments of the judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court, dated 25 October 2006, that it considered essential for justifying its position:

"As long as not replaced by another one, the abovementioned legal regulation (article 30 of the Electricity Sector Act) enables the relevant companies to pursue that premiums include as a significant factor when being established, the achievement of 'reasonable return rates in reference to the cost of money in capital markets' or, to express it once again in words of the preamble of [RD 436/2004], 'a reasonable remuneration for their investments'. The regime for remunerations being analyzed does not assure, on the contrary, owners of facilities operating under the special regime an intangible nature of certain level of profit or income in comparison to that obtained in previous years as it neither assures indefinite application of formulae used for establishment of premiums. In the same way as based on economic policy drivers of a widely varying sign (…) premiums and incentives for production of electrical power under the special regime may increase from one year to the following but also decrease whenever made advisable by those same consideration. Provided that, we insist, variations are kept within the legal limits [...].

Companies that decide to get established on free will in a market such as the electrical power generation under the special regime, while knowing beforehand that this market is highly dependent on the establishment of incentives by public authorities, are or must be aware that such incentives may be modified, within legal guidelines, by said authorities. One of the 'regulatory risks' facing these companies -and which must necessarily be taken into account- is precisely the change in parameters for calculation of premiums or incentives, which is mitigated by the Electrical Sector Act in this regard, but not excluded altogether."191 (Emphasis omitted.)

282.
As it can be seen, the NEC considered the Supreme Court case law prior to 2007 to be fully applicable and warned for this possibility in its final Report 3/2007:

" LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS IN REGARD TO THE RETROACTIVE NATURE OF THE ROYAL DECREE PROPOSED. [...] "As both scientific research and case law have shown, [...] the principle of legal security [...] does not mean that the legal framework is reformproof.

In this regard, said principles do not prevent a dynamic innovation in the legal framework. It does neither prevent new provisions from being applied in the future to already existing situations that remain upon the entry into force of the new regulations" […]

"Application in the future of the new economic regime for production of electrical energy in the special regime to all facilities -including existing ones that already enjoyed the benefits of the previous regime for tariffs, premiums, incentives and complements... • Does not involve the suppression of acquired or patrimonialized entitlements."192 (Emphasis in Exhibit R-78.)

283.
Importantly, the explanation of RD 661/2007 to Novenergia was made by an engineer and politician, Mr Albert Mitja. This manager of the Claimant briefly explained on 4 June 2007:193

(A) Spain

(i) General Information

AMS informed that the new law on renewables (Real Decreto 661/2007) Is very favourable to the market players and above all consolidates the financial and regulatory stability of the activity in Spain.

284.
No more reference exist on the record of an assessment by the Claimant or by a Claimant's regulatory advisor regarding RD 661/2007. Notwithstanding, during the investments of Novenergia, NEC also warned in July 2008 of possible future changes on regulation:

"[T]hese principles do not prevent the dynamic innovation of the regulatory frameworks, nor of new normative provisions which can be applied pro-future to situations initiated before it comes into force."194

285.
There is no record regarding a Claimant request of any legal due diligence to clarify the warnings raised by the NEC, especially given the Fifth Additional Provision of RD 1578/2008. Importantly, this provision did not distinguish if it could be applied to existing PV plants:

"Modification of the compensation for generation by photovoltaic technology. During the year 2012, based on the technological evolution of the sector and the market, and the functioning of the compensatory regime, compensation for the generation of electric power by photovoltaic solar technology may be modified."195

286.
Even more, the General Secretary of Energy warned about the costs of the Special Regime subsidies and necessary sustainability of the SES: "we must be aware of the economic sustainability of the cost of the energy [...] and that it is important for the families and for the productive sector."196
287.
No request for clarification of any type appears, either because the Claimant was already aware of the possibility of future modifications or because it was not diligent in its exhaustive examination of the Spanish regulatory framework in 2007 or in 2008. If the Claimant had requested a due diligence from a regulatory advisor such as Poyry after RD 661/2007 was passed, the Claimant would have been aware of possible future changes in the remuneration formulas for the RE sector:197

Although Poyry now considers the appearance of a market-based mechanism (i.e. Green Certificates) to replace the tariff system very unlikely, the Government could, in the year 2010, and depending on the rate of success of the latest REP, change to a market-based system. In any case, in the event of a change from the current feed-in tariff mechanism to a market mechanism (possibly at the end of 2010), we would expect to see a transitory period essentially extending the feed-in tariff mechanism applicable to operating wind farms for a number of years.

288.
Without one single due diligence report, Novenergia could not reasonably expect the petrification of RD 661/2007 regime during 2 or 3 decades.

17.5.4 Critics to RD 661/2007 by RE Sector and Awareness of the Limits for Future Possible Regulatory Measures

289.
RD 661/2007 modified the remuneration formulas without following the review system established in Article 40.3 of RD 436/2004. Therefore, it was harshly criticised by the RE sector. APPA, the main Spanish RE association, which involves all the RE technologies including PV plants, stated in its submission against the final draft of RD 661/2007:

"Breach of this principle of legal certainty and legitimate expectations: changing the economic regime retroactively.

In the opinion of the APPA, the provision in the Draft, which completely ignores the stable regime undertaken in [RD 436/2004], is unlawful since it breaches the principles of legal certainty, the non-retroactivity of laws and legitimate expectations. […]

In this sense, the message that the Government is transmitting to the [RE] sector in this respect, if it approves the Draft exactly as it has been put forward, is disastrous and devastating for the future investments. [...]

If the Government fails to do so [pass the RD project], it will no longer be credible in the future: any rational investor, [...] must bear in mind not only the costs and the foreseeable remuneration, but it also must consider the risk that such remuneration could be lowered".198

290.
APPA was fully aware of the regulatory risk which involved passing RD 661/2007 and the only limit of the government to adopt regulatory measures: RE plants of Special Regime could only aspire to reach "reasonable rates of return with regard to the cost of money in capital markets". APPA expressly recognised that this reasonable return was dynamic and could involve different formulas. In this sense, APPA published a legal report before any of the measures breached in the present Case was passed. APPA's conclusion is crystal clear:

"The case law of the Supreme Court is conclusive: it justifies openly and resoundingly the retroactivity of the regulations that regulate or could regulate the economic system of the special regime, while the principles established in the Act are met, leading back in the final analysis to the so-called 'reasonable rates of return with reference to the cost of money in the capital market' [...] at least it guarantees certain profit levels that allow 'reasonable rates of return with reference to the cost of money in the capital market', by remaining within the letter of the law [Law 54/1997]. 'Reasonable rates of return' that the Supreme Court has set, as indicated by the IDAE, in an Internal Rate of Return of 7 percent.

[it is desirable] to reject any optimism [...], a certain modification of the premiums [...] below that 7 percent [...] could be perfectly 'validated' by the Court simply by maintaining that the 'reasonable character' of the rates of return in 2006 or 2007 might be the cited 7 percent, but that they do not have to coincide with that figure at the time the modification is made, so the other line of attack against the legal adjustment of retroactively modifying the tariffs and premiums would be frustrated."199

291.
ASIF (PV) tried to enhance the revision system proposing to be applied to "any" revision of that section, including premiums and tariffs with "no retroactivity regarding previous tariffs and premiums".200 Such proposal was dismissed and the wording of Article 44.3 was limited to the "revisions of this paragraph", with no reference to premiums or retroactivity.
292.
The second most important Spanish RE Association, AEE (wind is the Spanish most relevant RE technology from 2006 onwards) was also aware of the regulatory risk which derived from the amendment by RD 661/2007 of RD 436/2004:

"For AEE, today the important thing is to ensure the door is not left open to changes in remuneration parameters at the halfway point, as is the case with the current wording of the decree. The "stable" nature of the twenty-year period proposed by the new Royal Decree for the allocation of remuneration is fictional if the premium amendments are retroactive as is contradictorily regulated now."201

293.
In 2008, the AEE's 2007 Yearbook, stated that RD 661/2007 nullified the nonretroactivity of the revisions in the future:

"The new Decree removes the incentive to participate in the electricity market and annuls the non-retroactivity of this revision and of future revisions concerning premiums and remuneration supplements, thereby applying universally to all facilities regardless of when they are commissioned. The proposal also entails a high level of uncertainty with regard to the indices for the annual updating of all parameters".202

294.
AEE was fully aware of the limits of the government in 2007 when adopting possible regulatory measures. AEE recognised these limits before any of the breached measures were passed:

"It is true that the Supreme Court has declared, in relation to this type of retroactive modification, that it is not an "unchangeable right" that the economic regime remains unaltered [...] the jurisprudence has established limits [...] with regard to the retroactive modification of this remuneration framework, in particular "that the requirements of the Law on the Electrical Sector are observed with regard to the reasonable return of investments".203 (Emphasis and footnotes omitted.)

295.
The RE associations continuously published their opinion during 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 (i) against the regulatory risk due to the successive measures enacted by the government and (ii) recognizing the limits of the government when applying regulatory measures. Additionally, the main RE investors stated publicly the limit of the government when applying possible new regulatory measures: to provide a reasonable return on RE plants investments. Spain has proved this knowledge by Iberdrola, Abengoa, Isolux, Sener, Sacyr, Elecnor, Samca, FCC or EON.204 Even more, Spain has proved the knowledge of regulatory advisors as Poyry, Deliotte, KPMG and RE international doctrine such as Miguel Mendonça, David Jacobs and Benjamin Socacool.205
296.
These expectations of (i) the RE associations, (ii) the main RE investors, (iii) the regulatory advisors and (iv) the RE international doctrine proves that the alleged expectations of Novenergia regarding the petrification of RD 661/2007 regime during 2 or 3 decades are not only unreasonable, but also not objective at all. Even more so when not one single due diligence report has been provided by Novenergia.
297.
All the RE sector was fully aware that the government could implement prospectively measures for existing plants, with the only limit to respect Law 54/1997 requirements providing a reasonable return to the investment costs of the RE plants.

17.5.5 The Claimant's Awareness of Possible Prospective Regulatory Measures

17.5.5.1 The PV Plants' Knowledge of the Case Law, Hidden by the Claimant

298.
Importantly, the investors on the PV plants in which the Claimant invested were fully aware of the relevance of the case law to understand the regulatory framework. The Claimant could not be unaware of the factual information relating to its own PV Plants:

1. The PV Plants knew that the RE plants remuneration system would be modified for reasons of public interest. However, the PV Plants argued in their claim that RD 1565/2010 was not adopted due to reasons of general interest: "RD 661/2007 […] applied a retroactive measure to premiums for the wind sector and at the time, this was justified by the distortion of the market price. […] Faced with this distortion, and in the name of general interest as a result of the deviation of a free market price when this was variable, a retroactive measure was applied. "206

2. The PV Plants did not really know whether a regulatory measure would be admissible in the event of extraordinary or unforeseen situations: "This party does not know, nor is the subject of this Appeal whether or not the regulatory power can amend current legislation regarding the establishing of regulated tariffs that affects third party rights in relation to facilities already built. […] However, this is definitely not the case that we have here, where it is not possible, under any circumstances, to admit the existence of any unforeseeable or extraordinary factor."207 The proved exceptional fall of demand in 2009 was not considered by them as an extraordinary factor.208

3. The PV Plants knew the doctrine of the Constitutional Court applied by the Supreme Court when ruling on the possible modification of the remuneration systems of RE plants from 2005 to 2017: "With respect to the retroactivity of the regulations, Sentence 182/1997 of the Constitutional Court, of 28 October, in its Eleventh Legal Basis, is key to understanding its dimension, assumptions and limitations: improper medium retroactivity [prospective]"209

299.
Importantly, the Claimant's RE plants clearly admit the existence of the case law that applies to the "remuneration regime of the owners of special regime electric energy facilities". The PV Plants attempt to separate the tariffs from the premiums saying that the Supreme Court has always referred to the "premiums":

"[W]e need to bring up the fact that various Sentences of the High Court have been passed in relation to retroactivity and its possible admissibility, but it is worth pointing out that the existing ones, to date, have always been in relation to cases of the retroactivity of premiums, never in relation to regulated tariffs as in this case."210 (Emphasis omitted.)

300.
Contradictorily, the PV Plants transcribe in the following page the judgment of the Supreme Court of 25 October 2006, which (i) rules in a general way to "premiums and incentives", not only to "premiums" and, (ii) admits modifications not only to "revenues" but also to the "formulas for fixing the premiums":

"[D]epending on very varied factors of economic policy [...], the premiums and incentives for the production of electrical energy under the special regime may increase from one year to the next and may also decrease when these same considerations should so advise."211 (Emphasis omitted.)

301.
This argument by the PV Plants by which they endeavour to demarcate the premiums from the tariffs was totally rejected by the Supreme Court, as Articles 16.7 and 30.3 and 30.4 of Law 54/1997 did not make, since 1997, any distinction between "tariffs" and "premiums". This act only refers to "premiums", and the case law refers to such premiums when stated the limits of the act.
302.
Indeed, the PV Plants knew perfectly well that the case law of 2006 was reiterated in 2007 and 2009. The judgments from 2006 until 2009 are examined by the PV Plants throughout pages 69 to 73 of Exhibit R-183. Said judgments refer generically to the "remuneration regime" and the PV Plants also refer generically to the "remuneration regime", not to the premiums remunerative formula. The conclusion of the PV Plants is relevant for this Case:

"The Sentence determines that, apart from the fact that there is no damage, the Government may modify, in the exercising of its regulatory powers, a specific remuneration system, but providing this falls within the provisions of the Electricity Sector Act."212

303.
The PV Plants recognise that they do not have a right to a specific remuneration system (through tariffs) providing that the regulatory powers respect the provisions of Law 54/1997 granting a reasonable return by reference to the cost of the money in the capital markets.
304.
The claim lodged by the PV Plants in 2011 demonstrates the knowledge that the Claimant had of the numerous facts which are relevant for this case and that have been presented by the Claimant to the Tribunal in a totally different way. The Claimant reasonably knew or should have known these relevant facts.
305.
Importantly, an express declaration of the Kingdom of Spain was given to the PV Plants. The Supreme Court judgment rendered on April 2012 maintained the consistent case law existing since 2005 and applied it to the PV Plants. A legal organ of the State made an express interpretation with respect to that the Plants were claiming against RD 1565/2010 and this resolution became res judicata for the PV Plants.213
306.
This express declaration by the State to the PV Plants of the Claimant is also a relevant fact which has been inexplicably hidden from the Tribunal by the Claimant. This judgment is relevant to demonstrate the non-existence of objective expectations with the Claimant, as it has been proved that (i) the reduction of the tariffs was foreseeable for any diligent investor and for the majority of the RE sector and (ii) this judgment confirmed to its PV Plants such circumstances.
307.
The Claimant has maintained contradictory positions in two of its pleadings. In its Statement of Claim the case law of the Supreme Court for the Special Regime is hidden. Later, in its Statement of Reply, the Claimant admits its existence, yet it sustains that said case law is irrelevant when configuring the legitimate expectations of the Claimant.214 This theory is denied by Spanish bodies as NEC, the main RE associations, RE investors and the PV Plants which knew the 2006 government's intervention "for the sake of the general interest " and the 2006 case law statements.
308.
Said judgment links the economic baseline data of the planning to the dynamic nature of the reasonable return and reveals its foreseeability for operators in the RE sector. That corresponds with the declarations of the RE associations proved by the Respondent and omitted by the Claimant:

"Private operators or agents who 'renounce' the market, […] were aware or should have been aware that said public regulatory framework, approved at a given time, in the same way as it was consistent with the conditions of the economic scenario in force at that time and with the electricity demand forecasts made at that time, could not subsequently be immune to any relevant modifications to basic economic data in the light of which it is logical for the public authorities to keep in step with the new circumstances. […] And this is all the more so in the event of situations involving a widespread economic crisis and, in the case of electrical energy, in view of the growth in the tariff deficit…"215 (Emphasis omitted.)

309.
This judgment considers that any diligent market operator should have quality legal advice:

"The established economic administrative regime [...] relies on a series of implied assumptions, of which any diligent market operator - or any operator seeking high quality consultancy in advance - could not have failed to be aware. One of those implicit conditioning factors is that the measures for promotion (...) cannot be considered to be "perpetual" or unlimited over time. It is not reasonable to think that RD 661/2007 would guarantee the receipt of a regulated tariff for an unlimited period, in other words, without any time limit whatsoever."216

310.
The judgment reminds the RE plants that the reduction of the regulated tariff was foreseeable for most of the RE sector:

"The limitation of the regulated tariff or, in general terms, that of the remuneration regime […] was foreseeable in the light of the course of later circumstances, especially the economic and technical circumstances, that ensued after 2007".217

17.5.5.2 The Claimant's PV Plants Contracts Foresee Future Changes of Law

311.
The Claimant's O&M contracts were signed by managers of the Claimant such as Mr. Albert Mitja Sarvise. Said manager also acted in his role as Joint Administrator of the companies that managed the PV Plants. These contracts include the existence of a regulatory risk as they establish as an exclusion clause the possible future legislative changes:

"The contract does not include the provision of the Services, when the cases detailed below arise […] Suspension of the operation of the Plant […] due to a legislative change."218

312.
The parties to the contract accepted that a legislative change was possible, which would render the PV Plant unprofitable. In such a case, both contracting parties (the Executive of the Claimant and the supplier of the Services) agree that the supplier shall not have to continue to provide O&M services.
313.
This clause was agreed by the Executive of the Claimant Mr. Alvaro Gonçalves Martins in the O&M contracts signed in 2008:

■ O&M contract for the PV Solar Farm "Fuente Alamo", signed on 13 February 2008.219

■ O&M contract for the PV Solar Farm "Lobon", signed on 7 April 2008.220

314.
This clause was also agreed in the contracts signed in 2009 by Mr. Albert Mitja:

■ O&M contract for the PV Solar Farm "Villares", signed on 19 May 2009.221

■ O&M contract for the PV Solar Farm "Mora la Nova", signed on 19 May 2009.222

■ O&M contract for the PV Solar Farm "Almansa", signed on 31 May 2009.223

315.
The contracting parties did not establish any time limit when they signed these contracts in 2008 and 2009. It is obvious that they admit that this regulatory change is possible, although they do not know when it might happen.

17.5.5.3 Internal Documentation Proves the Existence of a Hidden Due Diligence

316.
In this procedure, the Claimant has not provided one single due diligence report that it might have carried out before or during its investments between 2007 and 2008. What is more, the Claimant strongly refused to provide it after the Respondent had requested it during the document production phase. Notwithstanding, the Claimant has provided some documents which prove the existence of these due diligence reports which were not voluntarily provided.

17.5.5.4 Registration in the RAIPRE Does Not Grant an Acquired Right to RD 661/2007.

324.
The Claimant maintains that the Kingdom of Spain assumed a specific commitment to the Claimant through the registration of the PV Plants in the RAIPRE. Registration in the RAIPRE230 is an administrative requirement (Articles 6 et seq. of RD 661/2007) that the facilities that wish to form part of the Special Regime must fulfil. Registration is a formal requirement for producing energy. It has nothing to do with the fact that the facilities acquire an "acquired right" to receive future yield, indefinitely.
325.
The Tribunal's attention is called to the fact that in the Administrative Registry, all the facilities, both ordinary and Special Regime, were registered. The RAIPRE is a mere "Section Two" of the Administrative Register of the electricity production facilities referred to in Article 21.4 of Law 54/1997.231
326.
The Claimant wants to hide from the Tribunal an evident fact: RD 2818/1998 provided that all the Special Regime production facilities should be registered in an Administrative Register. This registry did not prevent the adoption of RD 436/2004 and that this regulation affected all the registered plants. Furthermore, the registration of the plants in said Administrative Registry during enforcement of RD 436/2004 was not an obstacle for RD 661/2007 to be also applied to all the Plants already registered in said register.
327.
The NEC has never recognised the existence of a "acquired right to future profits" due to the simple fact of being registered in the corresponding Administrative Registry. In its report 4/2004, it expressly stated the lack of these acquired rights:

"The production facilities included in the special regime have the right to receive a certain remuneration for energy sold, but logically they only have the acquired right to receive said remuneration with respect to the energy already sold, but not regarding the energy they forecast selling in the future, which only constitutes an expectation."232

328.
In the RAIPRE there are tens of thousands of registered owners (more than 44,600) and tens of thousands of registered facilities (more than 64,400).233 To these numbers we must add the changes of owners who could also claim damages. Over 5,200 changes of ownership have been recorded in the register.234 And this does not take into account changes of ownership due to share transfers, which are not mentioned. This would be the case of the Claimant, whose ownership does not appear in any entry.
329.
It is not rational to deduce that the tens of thousands of registered owners, not to mention those that have changed, have reached vis-a-vis agreements with the Kingdom of Spain. The Claimant has not submitted even one legal due diligence that might sustain this theory.
330.
Notably, the RE Associations themselves are fully aware that the registration in the Administrative Registry does not grant an acquired right to the relevant regime. That is shown by the submission filed by APPA, concerning the draft of the Electricity Sector Law of 2013, whose article 27 also refers to the Administrative Register:

"In the precept, there is confusion between what in general theory of law is known as declaratory acts and constituent acts, repeating the same mistake made when the Pre-allocation Remuneration Registry was set up. What should provide entitlement to the Specific Remuneration Regime is the producers' fulfilment of the requirements established by Law to enjoy it, not being registered in the registry whose only role is not to provide producers with rights (to enjoy the specific remuneration regime), but to give publicity to those who have achieved it (precisely by fulfilling the legal requisites)."235

331.
Consequently, registration in this Administrative Register was not a government commitment to indefinitely and unalterably maintain the future and immutable return of the facilities registered therein, but rather a way to control and know those involved in the SES.

18. Basis of the Regulatory Measures Taken During 2009 and 2010

18.1 RDL 6/2009

332.
In 2009, due to the exceptional fall of demand due to the economic crisis, it was extremely urgent and necessary to try to rebalance the sustainability of the SES. Moreover, RDL 6/2009 created the so-called "social bond" in order to protect the most vulnerable consumers, who could not cope with the increasingly high cost of electricity bills.
333.
The RDL 6/2009 noted that the REs would not be outside the regulatory measures necessary to adopt: "The trend of these technologies may put at risk the sustainability of the system in the short term, both from the economic point of view and its impact on the electricity tariff, as well as from the technical point of view..." Therefore, the RD-Act noted that without prejudice to other immediate measures that could be taken, it was necessary to set "the foundations to establish new economic schemes which afford fulfilment of the intended objectives..."236
334.
In this way, for the purpose of achieving the objective sought, RDL 6/2009 introduced major modifications to RD 661/2007: a) it created the Pre-assignment register and b) gave the government the power to scale the entry into operation of preregistered facilities whenever the economic or technical sustainability of the SES so required. This power was made effective by means of the Council of Ministers' Agreement of 13 November 2009, scaling the entry into operation of preregistered facilities.237
335.
The RDL 6/2009 is described by the Claimant to the Tribunal in a biased manner, as a policy instrument aimed at "further stimulate investment " on RE sources and ensure the proper functioning of RD 661/2007.238 However, this positive outlook contrasts with the sector's strong criticism of RDL 6/2009. In May 2009, APPA, ran a strong editorial against the Minister of Industry making him responsible for the publication of RDL 6/2009. When analysing the RD-Act said editorial stated:

"[The Minister] has never met with or considered the sector regarding the regulatory changes […] adopting diverse measures to reduce the tariff deficit and to increase the administrative obstacles for clean energies.

The measures under the RDL, [...] will make the sector's development even more difficult, while, as in other sectors, it suffers from funding issues arising from the crisis".239

336.
The previous editorial was accompanied by a joint letter signed by various associations from the renewable sector against R-DL 6/2009. The title of the memorandum read "The RD-Act 6/2009, new imposed decree against renewables".240 This letter was published by APPA in its Partner Journal:

"APPA, ADAP, APREAN, EolicCat, GiWatt and the Cluster of Energy of Extremadura strongly criticize the decree and call on the government to develop its contents in the future Renewable Energy Law." (Emphasis added to Exhibit R-239.)

337.
Through this joint letter, the various signatory associations strongly criticised this rule, referring to its similarity to the previous RD 1578/2008, of 26 September,241 issued in the PV sector months before:

"A clear and disastrous example can be seen in Royal Decree 1578, which regulates activity relating to solar photovoltaic technology and has caused the sector to grind to a halt, leading to factory closures and investment relocation. The new RDL may have the same impact on other renewable technologies and even affect wind energy, the most developed."242

338.
It is evident that the RE sector did not appreciate RDL 6/2009 as a regulatory instrument aimed at providing "further stimulation to investment" in RE sources, and guaranteeing the grandfathering of RD 661/2007. It is evident that the Claimant intends to provide the Tribunal with a distorted view of the development of RE prior to the contested measures.
339.
Given the warning of possible new measures for RE producers, the RE sector on 20 May 2009 proposed a new remuneration formula.243 APPA and Greenpeace, with the legal advisor Cuatrecasas, proposed to the government the specification by the act of the reasonable return guaranteed to the RE through reference to the 10-year Spanish bonds, plus a spread of 300 base points:

"The government will establish the amount of the regulated tariffs, premiums and complements, therefore assessing, in all cases, the operating and maintenance costs and the investments costs incurred by the owners of a facility in order to obtain reasonable rates of return in reference to the cost of money in capital market. As a fee for the remuneration of capital, an annual percentage equal to the mean of the preceding year for the remuneration of 10-years Treasury bonds will be used, increased by 300 basis points."244

340.
The APPA also proposed in 2009 that the estimation of the investment costs be performed through standard facilities:

"For the preceding purposes, the government will estimate the investment costs associated with the various classes of facilities, differentiated by technology and size, such that they reflect the usual values that said investments actually reach."245

341.
The similarity between the proposal from the RE sector of May 2009 and the measures enacted by the Kingdom of Spain in 2013 is evident. The Claimant has, once again, hidden this proposal.

18.2 National Action Plan for Renewable Energy in Spain 2011-2020

342.
The Claimant also remains silent on what is stated in Spain's National Renewable Energy Action Plan ("PANER") because it is clearly in opposition with the thesis it is attempting to hold before the Tribunal. The PANER notes when describing the legal framework of the subsidies for electricity generation through REs that the system of tariffs and premiums for special regime facilities "provide for electricity generation remuneration levels that afford a reasonable rate of return on investment. In determining those levels, account is taken of the specific technical and economic aspects of each technology, installed capacity and the date operation commenced, in all cases using criteria of system economic sustainability and efficiency. "246
343.
Moreover, when addressing the future evolution of the remuneration system for RE, according to the methodology followed to date, the PANER relies on a premise:

"Technical parameters and investment costs incurred will be considered in determining remuneration with a view to providing a reasonable rate of return referenced to the cost of money on the capital market in accordance with the provisions of the Electricity Sector Act."247

18.3 RD 1614/2010

344.
Royal Decree 1614/2010, of 7 December, Regulating and Modifying Certain Aspects Related to Electric Energy Production Using Thermoelectric Solar and Wind Power Technologies ("RD 1614/2010") was adopted by the government of Spain in light of the need to reform the RE remuneration costs. In RD 1614/2010, cut measures were introduced to the remuneration received by wind facilities.248 In the same vein, AEE was aware of the need to take measures because of "the exceptional fall in electricity demand".249 Therefore, the RE sector knew that the approval of RD 1614/2010 responded to this basic purpose.
345.
Furthermore, the AEE expressly recognised before the NEC the existence and binding nature of the consolidated case law:

"It is true that the Supreme Court has declared, in relation to this type of retroactive modification, that it is not an 'unchangeable right' that the economic regime remains unaltered and that 'of the prescriptive content of [Law 54/1997], […] the petrification or freezing of the remuneration regime of the owners of electricity installations under the special regime or the unchangeability of this regime is not apparent', thus recognising a relatively broad margin to the 'ius variandi' of the Administration in a regulated sector involving general interests [provided that it respects] the reasonable return of investments".250 (Emphasis and footnotes omitted.)

346.
In its arguments, the AEE reveals perfect knowledge of the Spanish legal system, citing the Supreme Court Rulings of 25 October 2006, 3 December 2009 and 9 December 2009. The AEE does not claim the freezing of the remuneration regime contained in RD 661/2007. All it claims is the respect of the principle of reasonable return stated in Law 54/1997.

19. The Challenged Measures Introduced by the Respondent

347.
The measures that are the subject of this arbitration from 2010 until 2014 are: (1) RD 1565/2010, of 19 November; (2) RDL 14/2010, of 23 December; (3) the introduction of the Tax on the value of the production of electric energy (IVPEE); (4) the updating of the remunerations, tariffs and premiums for electricity sector activities to the Consumer Price Index at constant tax rates, without raw foodstuffs nor energy commodities; (5) reduction of the premium to zero euros in the electric energy sales option at production market price plus a premium and; (6) the new regulatory framework.

19.1 The Challenged Measures Were Adopted Due to a Proved Public Policy

348.
The measures challenged in this arbitration were adopted in a context of international economic crisis that produced severe effects on both the demand for electricity and capital market yields. The aforementioned international economic crisis substantially altered the economic parameters which were the basis for the subsidies to energy production from renewable sources, through REP 2005-2010.

19.1.1 Regulatory Measures Passed in 2010

349.
In 2010 the government passed RD 1565/2010 and RDL 14/2010. With the enactment of RD 1565/2010, a maximum number of years were established in which plants would be entitled to receive a subsidy. The useful regulatory life determines when the investor has reached the "level playing field". If the PV plants would have been receiving subsidies beyond its useful regulatory life, this would have been contrary to EU recommendations. Once the level playing field has been achieved, there should be no payment of additional subsidies in order to avoid over-remunerations and market distortions. Even more, obtaining tariffs indefinitely would also go against the essential characteristics of the feed-in tariff system.
350.
The following RDL 14/2010 was targeted at correcting situations of excess remuneration in the number of production hours subsidised. In this regard, the government stated its aim to cut off over remunerations:

"The compensation values of [RD 661/2007] were calculated in order to obtain reasonable profitability rates and using as hypothetical starting point the average operating hours for facilities in these three technologies. These operating hours can be found in the [REP 2005-2010] for all technologies.

Subsequently, in the actual operation of the system, it has been shown that there are more operating hours at the facilities than initially planned in some cases. There are diverse reasons for this – technical improvement, over-installations, etc. In any case, this means that for these facilities the compensation obtained is more than reasonable."251

351.
In consequence, the limitations introduced by RDL 14/2010 have their reason for being in the methodology used by the REP 2005-2010. The equivalent operating hours established in RDL 14/2010 are exactly the equivalent operating hours which, as standard, were used in the standard facilities contained in REP 20052010 to determine the tariff. In any case, this limitation refers to the hours with tariff, not to the operation of the facility, which may in any case (i) receive the market price for the excess of hours and (ii) also enjoy priority access and priority feed-in.

19.1.2 The Challenged Measures Enacted After the Collapse of the Spanish Financial Market in 2012

352.
In this macroeconomic context, the main part of the challenged measures were enacted after the Memorandum of Understanding of 12 July 2012, which is an international agreement signed by the Kingdom of Spain and the EU and its Member States (including the Claimants' State). This MoU introduced, among other commitments, the duty of adopting macroeconomic control measures upon the Kingdom of Spain in order to comprehensively deal with the tariff deficit.252 Any measures that could be adopted by the Kingdom of Spain should take into account necessarily these commitments.
353.
In addition, the analysis conducted at that time revealed the existence of renewable remunerations that, either due to deficiency or to excess, did not maintain the principle of reasonable return laid down for the remunerations of the so-called Special Regime, in special for the thermosolar technology.253 The changes in the Spanish legal system have been addressed, precisely, at underpinning and making sustainable the principle of reasonable return in the long term.
354.
Firstly, the Tax is a tax levied on the performance of the activities of production and incorporation of electrical energy into the SES. The Tax is a measure that applies to both conventional and renewable electrical energy producers and is a Spanish state income included in the General State Budgets.254 Thus, the Tax, together with other state revenues, contributes to form the state's resources with which public expenditures are financed.
355.
Secondly, the revision of remunerations in line with the Consumer Price Index at constant tax rates (excluding unprocessed foods and energy products)255 did not eliminate the updating of RE remunerations. This measure, introduced by RDL 2/2013, replaced one updating index with another that is more in keeping with the normal calculation standards of the consumer price indices in the international economy. This was made in order to avoid distortions in the consumer price index and during the time in which the new measure was in force. It is proven that this measure did not cause any adverse effect for the Claimants.256
356.
Finally, the Claimant has argued that the new remuneration model enacted in 2013 involved a complete review of the previous remunerative framework. However, this statement derives from a deliberately distortion of the remunerative framework in which the Claimant made its investments. The essential characteristics of the new remuneration formula were already contained in Law 54/1997. The current remuneration formula is contained in RDL 9/2013257 and Law 24/2013.258 These acts were developed by RD 413/2014259 and by Order 1045/2014.260 The measures adopted have affected all sectors of the SES and have allowed the economic sustainability of the SES. That is, the efficiency of the Spanish energy market.

19.2 The Challenged Measures Maintain the Essential Characteristics of the Remuneration System of LSE 1997, Are Reasonable and Proportionate

357.
The challenged measures have maintained the essential characteristics of the Spanish remuneration models in place since 1997.261 Specifically the contested measures have maintained:

■ The subsidies for RE as a cost of the SES and therefore related to its economic sustainability.

■ The priority of access and dispatch for RE.

■ The characteristics of a reasonable return: its proportionality and dynamism, and continues to be assessed by reference to the price of money on the capital market.

■ The concept of efficiency pursued by the SES since 1997, which involves supplying electricity to the Spanish consumer at the lowest possible cost.

■ The methodology always used by the SES to determine the reasonable return (defining Standard Facilities and Common Standards) has been maintained and improved.

■ The guarantee of a reasonable return for RE plants to be obtained. The return provided by the Spanish remuneration model is better than the discount rate (opportunity cost) of the sector and, specifically, better than the discount rate (opportunity cost) of the Claimants.

358.
The basic structure of Law 54/1997 remuneration model, allowing RE plants to achieve a reasonable return by the combination of the market price (pool) + premium.

19.2.1 The New Remuneration Formula Maintains the Support to RE Producers Within a Sustainable Framework

359.
The challenged measures have re-established the efficiency of the SES by eliminating situations which produced over-remunerations such as the indexation of all the components of the subsidy according to the CPI or the imbalances caused by the pool plus premium option.
360.
Moreover, the new remuneration model continues to guarantee the support of the Kingdom of Spain for the investments that have been made in renewable assets. Thus, the SES is going to channel, in favour of facilities that were previously referred to as under the special regime since 2014 and until the end of their regulatory life, the amount of EUR 150,565 billion. Of this, 62,234 billion is to be earmarked for promoting PV technology. This enormous amount of public subsidies will be charged to subsidies paid for by Spanish consumers.262

TECHNOLOGY Estimated premiums received 1998-2013 (millions of €) Estimated premiums yet to be received from 2014 to the end of the useful life (millions of €) Estimated total premiums received throughout the useful life (millions of€)
CO-GENERATION 12,917 19,504 32,421
PHOTOVOLTAIC 14,617 64,234 78,851
THERMAL SOLAR 2,640 32,464 35,104
HYDRAULIC 4,263 1,250 5,513
WIND 15,400 20,500 35,900
BIOMASS AND BIOGAS 2,003 6,685 8,688
TREATMENT OF WASTE 2,626 4,220 6,846
COMBUSTION OF
WASTE AND BLACK LIQUOR 1,827 1,708 3,535
TOTAL RENEWABLES, CO-GENERATION AND 56,294 150,565 206,859

361.
The PV Plants that are the subject of this arbitration are no exception. These plants, with the new remuneration model, continue to enjoy a high level of subsidies that complement the income derived from their ordinary economic activity; producing and selling energy. An activity that they continue to develop without any limitation. An activity that is protected by priority rights of access and feed-in. In the following graph, it is showed the weight of the public subsidies received by the PV Plants in the total amount of their income, taking account of the actual revenues of the plants in 2015:263
362.
FIGURE 8. TOTAL income of the plants of NOVENERGIA
363.
In any event, as it was indicated by the European Commission when assessing the public aid schemes to the deployment of renewable energies within the framework of the European Union, there is "no right to State aid".264 It is therefore a non-existent right that is being claimed in this arbitration. On this point, it must be recalled that what the Claimant is claiming in this arbitration is that a higher level of public subsidies should be kept frozen and non-modifiable over time.

19.2.2 The New Remunerative Formula Maintains the Priority of Access andFeed-In

364.
The regulation maintains the principles of priority of access and feed-in of electricity generated by installations that use sources of RE and highly efficient cogeneration. The new regulation extends such priority even further than what was set out in the EU standards265 in article 26 of Law 24/2013.266
365.
The priority (i) of feed-in and (ii) of access and connection to the grid are stated as rights that producers of energy from renewable sources maintain. This right may only be limited on the grounds of maintaining reliability and safety of the SES. Furthermore, unlike what was established in the previous regime, said priority feed-in also applies with regard to high-efficiency cogeneration installations.

19.2.3 The New Remuneration System Maintains the Objective of Providing the Investor With a Reasonable Rate of Return on a Standard Facility

366.
The new system of remuneration is configured for the purpose of providing investors with a reasonable rate of return on their investments. With regard to this point, the main new item has been that of setting the reasonable rate of return in a specific way through legal regulations. This has endowed the system with greater stability and security.
367.
In line with the provisions set out in Law 54/1997, with the methodology pursued in the REPs and relevant case law, the system of remuneration is based on a reasonable rate of return for a standard project.
368.
As a consequence, the new model, the same as the previous one, is constructed for the purpose of enabling any investor in renewable energies to recover their investment cost within specific period of time, as well as their operation costs and also to obtain a reasonable return. The same as in Law 54/1997, the reasonableness of the return must be determined in accordance with the cost of money in the money markets.
369.
In the Spanish SES there are several references to the Spanish bond at 10 years as the criterion set for the remuneration of regulated activities since 2006:

■ The production and the power guarantee for ordinary production plants of the mainland and island electricity systems. A regulation of 2006 set the remuneration of this regulated activity at the Spanish bond at 10 years plus 300 base points. RDL 20/2012 lowered the spread to 200 base points.267

Transport activity. A regulation from 2008268 set the remuneration of this regulated activity at the Spanish bond at 10 years plus 375 base points. RDL 9/2013 lowered the spread to 200 base points.

Distribution activity. RDL 9/2013269 set the remuneration of this regulated activity at the Spanish bond at 10 years plus 200 basis points.

370.
It must be recalled that in 2009 APPA quantified the return required from renewable energies as that of the Spanish bond at 10 years plus 300 base points. In 2010 such remuneration formula was discussed as applicable to the existing RE plants and in 2012 UNESA, an Energy Producers' Association (whose partners are, among others Iberdrola, EON or Endesa) publicly sought: "These [ER] energies must receive what is indicated by law, a 'reasonable rate of return', which, in his opinion should mean that all regulated activities receive a similar remuneration ."270 (Emphasis added to Exhibit R-221.)

19.2.4 Both Models Respond to the Same Concept of Efficiency

371.
The current remuneration system responds to the same efficiency model on which the previous one was constructed. The Spanish regulatory framework has always maintained a requirement of efficiency when it supports the rollout of renewable energies. Law 54/1997 established that the purpose of the SES, like the new regulatory framework, was:

"[T]he basic purpose of this Act is to regulate the electricity sector with the traditional, three-fold goal of guaranteeing the supply of electric power, its quality and the provision of such supply at the lowest possible cost."271

372.
Therefore, the aid or subsidies for renewable energies, as a cost of the SES, could not be unconnected with this purpose. This concept of efficiency was also contained in the REP 2005-2010 when it stated that:

"The analysis tries to balance the application of resources so that ROI levels make it attractive relative to other alternatives in an equivalent sector, in terms of profitability, risk and liquidity, and always attempting to optimise available public resources".272

373.
It is proven that the previous remuneration formulas, like the new one, were also based on the concept of efficiency.273

19.2.5 Both Models Set the Subsidies Based on the Standards Contained for Various Standard Facilities

374.
The subsidies derived from RD 661/2007 were not established in contemplation of the individual plants of each investor. The purpose of these subsidies was to achieve a specific return on fixed investment costs in standard facilities.
375.
As required by Law 54/1997, the subsidies set in RD 661/2007 were based on the corresponding REP.274 Specifically, in the REP 2005-2010. This REP provided details of the methodology used to determine the return at approximately 7%.275
376.
As a result, within the concept of standard facilities, standards and parameters are not a new feature introduced by the current regulatory framework. These concepts already existed as a basic element for setting the subsidies in the previous model. Thus, the only thing that the new remuneration model does is that instead of referring to a REP for setting the subsidies, it includes the concept expressly in the act. Once the concept has been set in the act, these parameters and standards are introduced into a regulation276 and a Ministerial Order.277
377.
The Claimant ignores the fact that in the previous remuneration model the subsidies were based on the REP 2005-2010. In this REP 2005-2010, as in the Renewable Energy Promotion Plan 2000-2010, the subsidies had their origin in a specific methodology:

(a) Recognising and reconstructing a financial operating structure, therefore includes identifying the standard investment costs (CAPEX) and the operating and maintenance costs (OPEX), in accordance with the actions of a "diligent investor". Standard facilities;

(b) Set a balanced and appropriate return target in terms of reasonable rate of return on a standard facility.

378.
Consequently, if the plants adjusted or improved the standards set for a standard facility (investment costs, operating costs, etc.) they would manage to achieve or exceed the return considered reasonable. In this respect, the Economic Report of RD 436/2004 stated:

"Parameter A [the investment, operating and maintenance costs of each technology] has a significant weighting in establishing the amount of the regulated tariff for sale to distributors. This way, any plant in Spain in the regime, provided it is equal to or better than the standard (the standardised plant) for its group, will obtain reasonable return".278

379.
The Claimant states that the standards for the investment costs used in the Standard Facilities of Order 1045/2015 are not in line with the real investment costs. This statement completely lacks foundation. It was easy for the Claimant to demonstrate to the Tribunal that the costs of the Standard Facilities where its plants were included do not correspond to its actual costs, both investment and operating. However, the Claimant did not dedicate even a single paragraph to this question.
380.
The Tribunal is invited to compare (i) the actual cost of the PV Plants of this arbitration and (ii) the investment cost standards set for the Standard Facilities where the Claimant's plants are located. The comparison leads us to the following result:

■ The Claimant invested EUR 159.5 million in the construction of the plants.279

■ These PV Plants will recover a standard investment cost of EUR 173.4 million.280

381.
This proves that the investment costs contained in Order 1045/2015 were not set retroactively. They are not only linked to the costs, but are also 13.9 million higher than the actual costs incurred for construction of the PV Plants. This means that, throughout the regulatory life of these plants, the Claimant is going to have returned to it all the amounts that were invested in the construction of the plants, as well as an additional EUR 14.6 million.

19.2.6 The Remuneration Formula Allows the PV Plants to Achieve a Reasonable Return

382.
In the previous remuneration formula the reasonable rate of return should have been the result of the sum of two elements: the market price and a premium.281 At present, the new model maintains the same structure. The reasonable rate of return should be achieved by adding two components together: the market price and a subsidy that is broken down into two elements, the Return on Investment (Ri) and the Return on operation (Ro).