Ukraine fails to distinguish Creighton
. It invokes Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.
, 488 U.S. 428 (1989), in which the Supreme Court refused to find a waiver from the signing of an international agreement "contain[ing] no mention of a waiver of immunity to suit in United States courts or even the availability of a cause of action in the United States." Id.
at 442–43. But Creighton
specifically distinguished Amerada Hess
on the ground that signatories to the New York Convention
must have contemplated arbitration-enforcement actions in other signatory countries, including the United States. 181 F.3d at 123. Ukraine contends that, because the United States afforded foreign countries absolute sovereign immunity until the FSIA was enacted in 1976, Ukraine could not have anticipated being subjected to enforcement in the United States when it signed the Convention in 1958. But the United States transitioned from an absolute to a "restrictive" view of foreign sovereign immunity in 1952—six years earlier. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria
, 461 U.S. 480, 486–87 (1983). In any event, Ukraine raises an argument not that Creighton
is distinguishable, but that it was wrongly decided. Because Creighton
controls, the waiver exception applies here.