"3.1.6…We are therefore persuaded the studies, technology licencing fees and engineering designs that formed the basis of P&ID's presentation to the Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources were, in fact, ours…
3.2.2…[A]s per the matters in paragraph 3.1.6 hereof, we had paid the sum of $40m (Forty Million USD) to P&ID for the development of the Engineering work, Design and Off-take Consultancy Services which P&ID later used in their presentation to FMPR [Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources] to secure the now disputed [GSPA]."
"we are willing to fund, from our own resources, the entire US$700,000,000 for the gas processing facilities on land and we are also willing, if necessary, to participate in all or part of the financing of the gas gathering offshore portion of the project…"
"47. During the course of the next two years, we made good progress and reached a very advanced stage of the preparatory engineering work necessary to implement such a project on the ground. I would estimate that the total costs sunk into the preparatory work during that period were in excess of US$40 million, including initial feasibility studies, the cost of licences for the technology required to operate the gas stripping plant and the polypropylene plant respectively, the production of detailed engineering drawings and our own internal project management costs."
48. By way of example, extensive work was commissioned from various specialist engineering companies…The cost of the work from these 3 companies alone was about $29 million…
49. By the end of the first 2 years of our work on the Project, we had put together a completed engineering package … which comprised about 100 volumes of documentation, together with a 3-D model of the plant…"
"110. On 14 May 2010, I wrote to NNPC [Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation] on the progress made by P&ID. I pointed out that all of the project finance was in place, 90 percent of the engineering designs had been completed, a 50 hectare site had been allocated to P&ID by the Cross River State Government…"
"…[T]here has been some mention before me of there being an investigation conducted by Nigeria into the award of the GSPA and related matters. There is a suggestion that there may have been some sort of fraud, conspiracy or tax evasion. Those were not grounds which were relied upon before me at the hearing in June as reasons why the Final Award should not be enforced. They are not relied upon now as reasons for the grant of permission to appeal nor as grounds of appeal. On the contrary, Mr Matovu's skeleton argument states in terms that 'The court is not asked to act on these investigations or convictions at the present hearing.' Those allegations have accordingly played no part in my decision in relation to permission to appeal."
"was significantly hinged on the report of the technical committee of the [Ministry] [and] had the certification and recommendation of the legal unit of the Ministry and that the agreement was signed by the Legal Adviser, Grace Taiga, as a witness to the MOU and the [GSPA]".
The report observed that the Tribunal appeared to have acted on the material before it, although there were "strands of information that the panel acted out of the scope of its work. Focus should be the underlying transaction, if anything."
"further detailed investigation of the circumstances surrounding the award of the contract and the key parties to the transaction".
"It was never intended that the finance for the entire project would come from spare cash which [Mr Quinn] and I might have…we intended to fund the project with our own money to the point at which it became bankable, and thereafter we would raise finances…P&ID had been incorporated in the BVI in part to be an entity which would be attractive to lenders – a 'bankable' proposition. We were comfortable with the notion that the General [Danjuma] might be the source of such funding, but we were also nurturing interest from our discussions with other potential funders."
" Accordingly, although each case terms on its own facts, the following considerations are, in my judgment, likely to be material:
(i) the length of the delay;
(ii) whether, in permitting the time limit to expire and the subsequent delay to occur, the party was acting reasonably in all the circumstances;
(iii) whether the respondent to the application or the arbitrator caused or contributed to the delay;
(iv) whether the respondent to the application would by reason of the delay suffer irremediable prejudice in addition to the mere loss of time if the application were permitted to proceed;
(v) whether the arbitration has continued during the period of delay and, if so, what impact on the progress of the arbitration or the costs incurred in respect of the determination of the application by the court might now have.
(vi) the strength of the application;
(vii) whether in the broadest sense it would be unfair to the applicant for him to be denied the opportunity of having the application determined."
The Kalmneft factors and (i)-(iii) as primary factors
" For my part I do not read that judgment [Nagusina] as authority for the proposition that the first three factors are necessarily of more significance than any others. What weight each factor is to be attributed will depend on the facts of each case. All factors are relevant for consideration."
"…Section 70(3) of the Act requires challenges to an award under sections 67 and 68 to be brought within 28 days. This relatively short period of time reflects the principle of speedy finality which underpins the Act, and which is enshrined in section 1(a). The party seeking an extension must therefore show that the interests of justice require an exceptional departure from the timetable laid down by the Act. Any significant delay beyond 28 days is to be regarded as inimical to the policy of the Act."
" Secondly, factor (ii) involves an investigation into the reasons for the delay… [W]here the evidence is consistent with laxity, incompetence or honest mistake on the one hand, and a deliberate informed choice on the other, an applicant's failure to adduce evidence that the true explanation is the former can legitimately give rise to the inference that it is the latter.
 Thirdly, factor (ii) is couched in terms of whether the party who has allowed the time to expire has acted reasonably. This encompasses the question whether the party has acted intentionally in making an informed choice to delay making the application…[I]n cases of intentional non-compliance with time limits, a public interest is engaged which is distinct from the private rights of the parties. There is a public interest in litigants before the English Court treating the Court's procedures as rules to be complied with, rather than deliberately ignored for perceived personal advantage.
 Fourthly, the Court's approach to the strength of the challenge application will depend upon the procedural circumstances in which the issue arises. On an application for an extension of time, the Court will not normally conduct a substantial investigation into the merits of the challenge application, since to do so would defeat the purposes of the Act. However, if the Court can see on the material before it that the challenge involves an intrinsically weak case, it will count against the application for an extension, whilst an apparently strong case will assist the application."
…[W]here the court can determine that the challenge will succeed, if allowed to proceed by the grant of an extension of time, that may be a powerful factor in favour of the grant of an extension, at least in cases of a challenge pursuant to s. 68. In such cases the court will be satisfied that there has been a serious irregularity giving rise to substantial injustice in relation to the dispute adjudicated upon in the award. Given the high threshold which this involves, the other factors which fall to be weighed in the balance must be seen in the context of the applicant suffering substantial injustice in respect of the underlying dispute by being deprived of the opportunity to make his challenge if an extension of time is refused. Where the delay is due to incompetence, laxity or mistake and measured in weeks or a few months, rather than years, the fact that the court has concluded that the s. 68 challenge will succeed may well be sufficient to justify an extension of time. The position may be otherwise, however, if the delay is the result of a deliberate decision made because of some perceived advantage."
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