Members of the Committee :
Professor Dr. Rolf Knieper, President
Professor Dr. Nicolas Angelet
Professor Yuejiao Zhang

ICSID Secretariat :
Dr. Laura Bergamini, Secretary of the Committee

Representing the Applicants :
Dr. Juan E. Garcés, Garcés y Prada, Abogados
Mr. Hernan Garcés Duran, Garcés y Prada, Abogados
Professor Robert Lloyd Howse, New York University, School of Law
Ms. Alexandra Muñoz, Gide, Loyrette, Nouel (by video-conference)
Ms. Francisca Duran Ferraz de Andrade, President Allende Foundation Management

Representing the Respondent :
Mr. Paolo Di Rosa, Arnold & Porter
Ms. Mallory Silberman, Arnold & Porter
Ms. Caroline Kelly, Arnold & Porter
Mr. German Savastano, Arnold & Porter
Ms. Aimee Kneiss, Arnold & Porter

Members of the Committee :
Professor Dr. Rolf Knieper, President
Professor Dr. Nicolas Angelet
Professor Yuejiao Zhang

ICSID Secretariat :
Dr. Laura Bergamini, Secretary of the Committee

Representing the Applicants :
Dr. Juan E. Garcés, Agent, Garcés y Prada, Abogados
Mr. Hernan Garcés Duran, Co-agent, Garcés y Prada, Abogado
Professor Robert Lloyd Howse, New York University, School of Law
Ms. Alexandra Muñoz, Gide, Loyrette, Nouel
Mr. Toby Cadman, Guernica 37 International Justice Chambers
Mrs. Ruti Teitel, Ernst C. Stiefel Professor of Comparative Law, New York Law School Visiting Fellow, London School of Economics
Ms. Francisca Duran Ferraz de Andrade, President Allende Foundation Management

Representing the Respondent :
Ms. Mairée Uran Bidegain, Republic of Chile
Ms. Macarena Rodríguez, Republic of Chile
Mr. Paolo Di Rosa, Arnold & Porter
Ms. Gaela Gehring Flores, Arnold & Porter
Ms. Mallory Silberman, Arnold & Porter
Ms. Katelyn Home, Arnold & Porter
Ms. Caroline Kelly, Arnold & Porter
Mr. Michael Rodríguez, Arnold & Porter
Mr. Kelby Ballena, Arnold & Porter
Ms. Barbara Galizia, Arnold & Porter
Ms. Sally Pei, Arnold & Porter
Mr. Brian Williams, Arnold & Porter
Ms. Andrea Rodríguez Escobedo, Arnold & Porter
Ms. Kaila Millett, Arnold & Porter
Ms. Christina Poehlitz, Arnold & Porter

Court Reporters :
Ms. Michelle Kirkpatrick (English), B&B Reporters
Ms. Catherine Le Madic (French), French Real time
Ms. Ait Ahmed ép. Oubella (French, scopist), FrenchRealtime
Ms. Audrey Lemée (French, scopist), FrenchRealtime

Interpreters :
Ms. Sarah Rossi, English-French interpreter
Ms. Chantal Bret, English-French interpreter
Ms. Christine Victorin, English-French interpreter

(1) That Ms Coral Pey Grebe cannot be regarded as a claimant in her own right in these resubmission proceedings;

(2) That, as has already been indicated by the First Tribunal, its formal recognition of the Claimants’ rights and its finding that they were the victims of a denial of justice constitutes in itself a form of satisfaction under international law for the Respondent’s breach of Article 4 of the BIT;

(3) That the Claimants, bearing the relevant burden of proof, have failed to prove any further quantifiable injury to themselves caused by the breach of Article 4 as found by the First Tribunal in its Award;

(4) That the Tribunal cannot therefore make any award to the Claimants of financial compensation on this account;

(5) That the Claimants’ subsidiary claim on the basis of unjust enrichment is without legal foundation;

(6) That there are no grounds in the circumstances of the case for the award of moral damages either to Mr Pey Casado or to the Foundation;

(7) That the arbitration costs of these resubmission proceedings are to be shared in the proportion of three quarters to be borne by the Claimants and one quarter by the Respondent, with the result that the Claimants shall reimburse to the Respondent the sum of US$159,509.43;

(8) That all other claims are dismissed.²⁸

(a) Paragraphs 61, 66, and 198, and paragraph 2 of the dispositif, of the Resubmission Award are rectified as set out in paragraphs 52, 53, 54, and 55 above.

(b) The costs incurred by the Centre in respect of these Rectification Proceedings, including the costs resulting from the associated challenges to Sir Franklin Berman and Mr Veeder, shall be borne by the Claimants and the Claimants shall therefore reimburse to the Respondent the sum of US$ 22,963.36, in addition to the amount specified in paragraph 255 of the Resubmission Award. The Tribunal makes no further order as to costs.²⁹

1. Accept this [brief], and its documents attached, seeking the annulment

i. of the whole resubmission Award notified on 13 September 2016, on the grounds of Article 52(1) of the Convention, including points (a), (b), (d) and (e) thereof, [and]

ii. the annulment of §§58, 61 and 62(b) of the Decision of 6 October 2017, on the grounds of points (b), (d) et (e) of Article 52(1) of the Convention;

2. Order the Republic of Chile in due course to bear the costs of this annulment proceeding and of incidental issues - such as the one that arose on 12, 15 et 16 February 2018 - along with the fees and expenses of the members of the ad hoc Committee, the charges for use of ICSID facilities, the translation expenses and the professional fees and expenses of [the Applicants], lawyers, experts and/or any other persons called upon to appear before the ad hoc Committee, and pay the relevant amounts for any other infringements established as the ad hoc Committee may deem fair and equitable, with compound interest.

3. Adopt any other measures that the members of the Committee consider fair and equitable in the circumstances of this case.³⁰

[I]n order to preserve the integrity and the fairness of the procedure, and given the nature and the seriousness of the behaviour of the Respondent State on 12,15 and 16 February 2018, its blatant bad faith, the non-rectification of its behaviour by its representatives, but the complete contrary, its deliberate amplification, that the ad hoc Committee exercises its powers and that, in compliance with Rule 26 of the IBA Guidelines on party representation:

(a) That it draws appropriate conclusions in its reasonable appreciation of the judicial evidence produced, as to the evaluation of the fact that, against this evidence, on 12, 15 and 16 February 2018 Chile presented the reference made by the Claimants in their submissions as deception, and to this end, explicitly pejorative, the injunction of 24 July 2017 of the 28th Civil Court of Santiago as being vacated since October 2017;

(b) That it draws appropriate negative inferences from the attempts by Chile's representatives, with consumed effrontery, to make the ad hoc Committee believe, with no foundation and against all of the evidence, that the Claimants’ representatives lacked professional ethics by bluntly questioning the inaccuracy of the communication of 12 February 2018 submitted by the Defendant, and that such supposed failures are abundant and proven, since the start of the arbitration, without any evidence;

(c) That it sanctions the behaviour of the Republic of Chile for its communications of 12 and 15 February and at the hearing the following day by introducing and continuously supporting inaccurate facts, infringing upon the honour and the professional integrity of the Claimants, to the point of getting the ad hoc Committee to warn that it was ready, after deliberation, to also take measures against them by virtue of Article 44 of the Convention, and to encourage a Claimant’s counsel to rectify, at the request of Chile, an entirely founded declaration produced in a circle of public debate;

(d) Warning to which the Claimants affirm, with a clear conscience, to have never exposed itself today or in the past, exclusive of the double deception in favour of which the Defendant State designated its own qualities before the ad hoc Committee on 12, 15 and 16 February, which characterise more than twenty years of the present arbitration [...];

(e) That it takes into account these facts in the allocation of costs of the arbitration, by indicating if needed how and to what extent they have led the Committee to a different allocation of these costs;

(f) That it takes all other appropriate measures to preserve the fairness and integrity of the procedure.³¹

a. [R]eject Claimants’ annulment request, in its entirety;

b. [O]rder Claimants to cover the costs of the Annulment Proceeding in their entirety; and

c. [O]rder Claimants to reimburse Chile for the full amount of its legal fees and expenses (with interest thereon, at a rate of six-month LIBOR plus 2% per annum, starting from the date of the Committee’s decision and until the date of payment).³²

With respect to "[t]he ground for annulment for manifest excess of powers," the First Committee stated that "this ground is meant to ensure, inter alia, that tribunals do not exceed their jurisdiction or fail to apply the law agreed upon by the parties." To justify annulment, "[a] tribunal (1) must do something in excess of its powers and (2) that excess must be ‘manifest.’ It is a dual requirement." The phrase "excess of powers" would include an "inappropriate [] exercis[e] of jurisdiction (or failure to exercise jurisdiction); and [a] fail[ure] to apply the proper law." Nevertheless, "there is an important distinction between a failure to apply the proper law[,] which is a ground for annulment, and an incorrect or erroneous application of that law, which is not a ground for annulment." For its part, the term "manifest" means "sufficiently clear and serious." If the tribunal’s conclusions ‘"seem tenable and not arbitrary, they do not constitute [a] manifest excess of powers’"

Regarding the second ground for annulment — "that there has been a serious departure from [a] fundamental rule[] of procedure" - the First Committee "agree[d] with Chile that this ground involves a three-part test: (i) the procedural rule must be fundamental; (ii) the Tribunal must have departed from it; and (iii) the departure must have been serious." The first part of the test requires identification of "procedural rules that are essential to the integrity of the arbitral process and must be observed by all ICSID tribunals. The parties agree that such rules include the right to be heard, the fair and equitable treatment of the parties, proper allocation of the burden of proof and absence of bias." The second part (i.e., the "departure" prong) "requires that the Committee examine the full record, including the Transcripts and the Award [,] to determine whether or not the Tribunal violated the rule in question." The third part of the test — the "seriousness" prong — requires "that the applicant must demonstrate ‘the impact that the issue may have had on the award.'" The committee must "enquire whether, if the rule had been observed, there is a distinct possibility (a ‘chance’) that it may have made a difference on a critical issue."

The First Committee also stated that, in addition to the above three prongs, there is a fourth, waiver-related issue to consider: "Pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rules 27 and 53, a party may lose its right to object on the ground of a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure if it has failed to raise its objection to the tribunal’s procedure upon becoming aware of it, or ‘promptly’ as mentioned in Rule 27."

With respect to the issue of "failure to state reasons," the First Committee endorsed the statement of the Vivendi I committee to the effect that "‘Article 52(1)(e) [of the Convention] concerns a failure to state any reasons with respect to all or part of an award, not the failure to state correct or convincing reasons.’" So long as "‘the reasons given by a tribunal can be followed and relate to the issues that were before the tribunal, their correctness is beside the point in terms of Article 52(1)(e).’" Further, "‘reasons may be stated succinctly or at length, and different legal traditions differ in their modes of expressing reasons. Tribunals must be allowed a degree of discretion as to the way in which they express their reasoning.’" At bottom, the "[First] Committee believe[d] that as long as there is no express rationale for the conclusions with respect to a pivotal or outcome-determinative point, an annulment must follow, whether the lack of rationale is due to a complete absence of reasons or the result of frivolous or contradictory explanations."⁴⁸

The Respondent’s summary also represents its position.

[I]s intended to cover situations such as a departure from the parties’ agreement on the method of constituting the Tribunal or an arbitrator’s failure to meet the nationality or other requirements for becoming a member of the Tribunal⁵¹

as well as to Professor Schreuer who states that:

[Q]uestions concerning the tribunal's proper constitution might arise from dissatisfaction in the manner in which challenges to arbitrators and alleged conflicts of interest have been handled. [...] Appointment of an arbitrator who manifestly does not possess these qualities [as required by Art. 14(1) Convention] may be put forward as a ground for annulment.⁵²

"If the original award had only been annulled in part, the new Tribunal shall not reconsider any portion of the award not so annulled." If a new Tribunal reconsiders an issue not annulled, it exceeds its power.⁵⁸

[W]here it is "substantial and [is] such as to deprive the party of the benefit or protection which the rule was intended to provide." In other words, "the violation of such a rule must have caused the Tribunal to reach a result substantially different from what it would have awarded had the rule been observed."⁷²

- the committee "has to verify the existence of reasons as well as their sufficiency - that they are adequate and sufficient reasonably to bring about the result reached by the Tribunal - but it cannot look into their correctness;"⁷⁵

- reasons must not be frivolous or truly contradictory, whereby the contradiction must be serious enough "to vitiate the Tribunal’s reasoning [...] as a whole."⁷⁶

[I]s by no means unlimited and must take account of all relevant circumstances, including the gravity of the circumstances which constitute the ground for annulment and whether they had - or could have had - a material effect upon the outcome of the case, as well as the importance of the finality of the award and the overall question of fairness to both Parties.⁸⁰

Quant à l'invalidité des confiscations et au devoir d’indemnisation, il y a lieu de rappeler aussi des déclarations parfaitement claires de la défenderesse dans la présente procédure.

Après le rétablissement au Chili d’institutions démocratiques et civiles, les nouvelles autorités ont proclamé publiquement leur intention de rétablir la légalité et de réparer les dommages causés par le régime militaire.

[...]

Le Tribunal arbitral ne peut que prendre note avec satisfaction de telles déclarations, qui font honneur au Gouvernement chilien. Malheureusement, cette politique ne s’est pas été traduite dans les faits.¹⁰⁰

[L]es gouvernements démocratiques qui remplacèrent en 1990, au moyen d’élection libres, le gouvernement de Pinochet, se sont primordialement préoccupés de réparer les dommages causés par le régime instauré au Chili par le coup d’état du 11 septembre 1973. En effet, leGouvernement a pris les mesures pour réparer les dommages causés aux victimes dans tous les secteurs.¹⁰¹

En outre, la partialité du Tribunal de Resoumission est manifeste en ce qu’il laisse entendre que le Comité ad hoc chargé de l’annulation n’est pas allé assez loin dans son acceptation de la demande d’annulation formulée par le Chili à l’égard de la Sentence initiale. En attaquant des aspects essentiels de la Sentence initiale où le Comité ad hoc n’a pas été d’accord avec le Chili sur ce qu’il y aurait eu une erreur susceptible d’entrainer l’annulation, mais a tranché en faveur des Demanderesses, le Tribunal de Resoumission s’est écarté d’une règle fondamentale de procédure, à savoir l’absence de biais.¹⁰⁵

Chile is not attempting to justify the expropriation, and is still conscious of the injury that the expropriation caused. As will be seen, however, this issue is entirely inapposite for the Committee’s purposes.¹⁰⁸

Now, these particular Claimants are not motivated by rational economic considerations. They are motivated, obviously, by the prospect of a big payoff, but they also see inherent value in keeping this case alive, because by keeping this case alive, they keep their ideological cause in the public eye.

This case continues to be very high profile in Chile. And so the longer this case goes on, the more of these hearings we have, the more it stays in the public eye; and, therefore, this case, in itself, just the actual act of continuing the case, has inherent value to them.¹¹²

La requête d’arbitrage et la demande introduite devant le juge chilien ont donc un objet et un fondement distincts. La première consiste à demander réparation du préjudice découlant des actes de saisie et de confiscation relatifs aux sociétés CPP S.A. et EPC Ltda sur le fondement de certaines dispositions de l’API Chili-Espagne, tandis que la seconde vise la restitution d’un bien meuble bien identifié, la rotative Goss, et expressément exclu du champ du consentement à l'arbitrage, en se fondant sur le droit chilien.¹¹³

The arbitration body shall take its decision on the basis of the provisions of this Agreement, of the law of the Contracting Party that is a party to the dispute, including the rules relative to conflicts of laws, and of the terms of any specific agreements concluded in relation to investment, as well as of the principles of international law on the subject.

Le Tribunal conclut que, au moment où a été effectuée la saisie du journal El Clarn, M. Pey Casado devait être considéré comme le seul propriétaire légitime les actions de la société CPP S.A. (paragraph 229)

Au vu de l'ensemble des développements qui précèdent, le Tribunal conclut qu’il n'existait pas, dans le droit chilien en vigueur en 1972, de définition établie de l’investissement étranger et que l'opération réalisée par M. Pey Casado s'est conformée au droit chilien qui lui était applicable. En conséquence, le Tribunal considère que l'investissement de M. Pey Casado, l'achat d'actions d'une société chilienne du secteur de la presse au moyen de paiements en devises étrangères effectués sur des comptes bancaires en Europe, satisfait les conditions posées par l'API et plus particulièrement par ses articles 1(2) et 2(2). (paragraph 411)

Sur la seconde question, celle de savoir si les investissements des demanderesses ont bénéficié d'un traitement juste et équitable, une réponse négative s'impose de l'avis du Tribunal arbitral, compte tenu des conclusions auxquelles il est parvenu précédemment aux termes de son appréciation des preuves et de son analyse juridique. En bref, il s'agit de la conclusion selon laquelle M. Pey Casado a bien démontré avoir procédé à des investissements et être propriétaire de biens meubles ou immeubles qui ont été confisqués par l'autorité militaire chilienne.

On rappellera à ce propos l'existence d'un jugement chilien reconnaissant la propriété de M. Pey Casado sur les actions confisquées ainsi que le fait que les autorités chiliennes, exécutives et administratives (comme judiciaires) étaient informées des revendications et demandes formulées par les demanderesses.

Quant à l'invalidité des confiscations et au devoir d'indemnisation, il y a lieu de rappeler aussi des déclarations parfaitement claires de la défenderesse dans la présente procédure. (paragraphs 665-667)

Le Tribunal relève qu’un certain nombre de ces décrets a été annulé par les juridictions internes chiliennes. [...] A la connaissance du Tribunal, le décret suprême n°165 est toujours en vigueur.

And again:

A la connaissance du Tribunal, la validité du Décret n°165 n’a pas été remise en cause par les juridictions internes et ce décret fait toujours partie de l'ordre juridique interne chilien.¹¹⁹

Quoi qu’il en soit de la pertinence et de la valeur des éléments qui ont été retenus à cet égard en droit interne chilien, ces éléments ne peuvent prévaloir sur les considérations qui ont conduit le Tribunal arbitral aux conclusions précédemment énoncées, en application des dispositions de l'API.¹²⁷

Any dispute concerning the existence or extent of the rights in rem alleged to constitute an investment that arises in an investment treaty arbitration must be decided in accordance with the municipal law of the host state for this is not a dispute about evidence (facts) but a dispute about legal entitlements. When the issue becomes the international validity of certain acts of the host state which have prejudiced the investor’s legal entitlements under municipal law, then international law applies exclusively.¹²⁸

[N]e peut être que positive, au regard des faits établis et déjà retenus par le Tribunal arbitral, l’absence de toute décision par les tribunaux civils chiliens sur les prétentions de M. Pey Casado s’analysant en un déni de justice. En effet, l’absence de décision en première instance sur le fond des demandes des parties demanderesses pendant sept années, c’est-à-dire entre septembre 1995 et le 4 novembre 2002 (moment de l’introduction de la demande complémentaire dans la présente procédure) doit être qualifié comme un déni de justice de la part des tribunaux chiliens. En fait, des délais procéduraux importants constituent bien une des formes classiques de déni de justice.¹³²

[D]ans la détermination du préjudice résultant du déni de justice, qui doit remettre les parties dans la situation dans laquelle elles auraient dû se trouver si le déni de justice n’avait pas eu lieu. Rappelons en effet, qu’en l’absence de déni de justice, le Tribunal arbitral initial n’aurait pas pu conclure dans la Sentence que « à la connaissance du Tribunal, la validité du Décret n° 165 n’a pas été remise en cause par les juridictions internes et ce décret fait toujours partie de l’ordre juridique interne chilien.¹³⁴

And:

Le présent Tribunal arbitral devra dès lors constater que l’un des actes de déni de justice commis par la République du Chili à l'égard de M. Pey et de la Fondation a eu pour effet d’empêcher les Demanderesses d’informer le Tribunal arbitral du jugement de la juridiction civile chilienne reconnaissant la "nullité de droit public" du Décret n°165, et, en conséquence, l’absence de titre de l’Etat défendeur sur l’investissement en 1995, compte tenu de la nullité de droit public du Décret n° 165. Ce qui a conduit le Tribunal arbitral à considérer que, "à sa connaissance", ce Décret n’avait pas été remis en cause par les juridictions internes et faisait toujours partie de l’ordre juridique interne chilien, et, par voie de conséquence, que les dispositions de l’article 5 de l’API étaient inapplicables aux faits de confiscation.

Cette tromperie fondamentale démasquée, la Défenderesse ne saurait bien évidemment pas se prévaloir de ses manœuvres procédurales subséquentes.¹³⁵

[T]hat the present Tribunal is absolved from any need to investigate afresh whether there was any breach of Chile’s obligations towards the Claimants in respect of the present dispute, what that breach consisted in, or whether the breach gives rise to a right to compensation. All of those matters have been predetermined by the First Award and are binding on all Parties under Article 53(1) of the ICSID Convention. Not only is there no need for the Tribunal to go into these matters, but it would be a manifest excess of its own jurisdiction if the Tribunal purported to do so. That is the express consequence of Arbitration Rule 55(3).¹⁴¹

[P]revent the present Tribunal from proceeding to an interpretation of the First Award for the purposes of carrying out its mandate under the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Arbitration Rules. Indeed, it could hardly be otherwise; the essence of the Tribunal’s mandate consists in giving effect, in the light of the arguments marshalled by the Parties, to certain paragraphs in the dispositif of the First Award, and this the Tribunal can hardly do without first understanding what those paragraphs mean.¹⁴²

In certain places, the Claimants contend that elements of the non-annulled parts of the First Award need to be revisited and modified by the present Tribunal. That would however (as already indicated) be well beyond the Tribunal’s functions and powers under ICSID Arbitration Rule 55 and will not be further considered in this Award. The main substance of the Claimants’ answer is, however, different. It consists essentially in the contention that the central consequence of the denial of justice found by the First Tribunal to exist, as a result of the delays in the proceedings before the Santiago court over the Goss press, was that they (the Claimants) were disabled from invoking a conclusive argument that Decree No. 165 was absolutely null (ex tunc) and as such incapable of producing any legal effects. Had they been in a position to do so, the argument continues, they (the Claimants) would either have been able to recover their confiscated property in Chile, or at the least would have been able to establish before the First Tribunal that the expropriation of this property was not an instantaneous act taking final effect in 1975, but was not in fact completed until many years later, and the result of that would have been that the expropriation did indeed fall under the jurisdiction of the First Tribunal under the BIT, contrary to the findings in the First Award.¹⁴³

As the Tribunal sees it, there are only two: one is that the First Tribunal was wrong in its finding that the expropriation was excluded ratione temporis from the scope of the BIT; the other is that what amounted in effect (if not in form) to the expropriation took place with Decision No. 43. Each of these has figured, in various forms, in the submissions of the Claimants in the course of these resubmission proceedings. Both of them, however, encounter insuperable difficulties. As to the first, the Tribunal is in no doubt that the First Tribunal, although it used slightly different forms of words in different parts of its Award, was of the view that the expropriation was completed (fait consomme) with the physical seizure in 1975 and thus fell outside the scope of the BIT. More to the point, however, the present Tribunal is simply not empowered to hear an appeal against that finding, or to substitute a view of its own for that of the First Tribunal, or to award any relief of any kind whatsoever on that account. As to the second (i.e. that the effective expropriation did not take place until Decision No. 43), it is also in its turn incompatible with the First Tribunal’s findings as to the chronology of the expropriation, but it is equally incompatible with Decision No. 43 itself, the whole tenor of which is that it was an award of compensation in respect of a confiscation that had already occurred. The Tribunal’s final observation before leaving the subject, is that, if the alleged nullity under Chilean law of Decree No. 165 did indeed have decisive significance, the consequence would surely be that the investment continued to be, in law, the property of Mr Pey Casado and/or the Foundation - the remedy for which could lie in the domestic sphere but clearly not before this Tribunal in these resubmission proceedings.¹⁴⁶

Comme il ressort des §§665-674 de la Sentence initiale, de la décision d’un Tribunal de Justice de Santiago du 29 mai 1995, des articles de la Constitution du Chili d’application directe et impérative tels qu’interprétés par la Cour Suprême, les Demanderesses continuent aujourd’hui à être les propriétaires légaux de tous les biens et droits du Groupe Clarin.¹⁵⁰

En effet, le déni de justice a consisté en ce que les Demanderesses ont été privées de la preuve des rapports de droits de leur investissement avec l'Etat du Chili. L’effacement des effets du déni de justice ne consiste pas à dire ce que le Tribunal arbitral initial aurait décidé, mais à statuer aujourd’hui en connaissance de cause au lieu et place du Tribunal arbitral initial, puisque cette partie de la décision a été annulée.¹⁵⁴

- manipulated and denaturalized the Claimants’ submissions with respect to the First Tribunal’s arguments and findings in order to accommodate the Respondent’s wishes, which amounts to a lack of impartiality and bias and represents a serious departure from one of the most fundamental rules of procedure, i.e. the neutrality and impartiality of the tribunal;¹⁵⁵

- failed to apply the applicable law and in particular Article 7 of the Constitution and Chilean court decisions when not treating Decree No. 165 as invalid and null ab initio¹⁵⁶

- contradicted itself within the structure of paragraph 198 of the Award, first by presenting a reasoning "concernant l'application du droit applicable sur la question la plus essentielle des échanges dans le cadre de la procédure en resoumission, [qui] est donc limitée à une « brève digression », pourrait-on dire une remarque en passant !, ce qui en soit est contradictoire"; and second by presenting a reasoning on the Claimants’ submissions with respect to Decree No. 165 and Decision No. 43 that the Claimants have never made, these contradictions amounting to a lack of reasons;¹⁵⁷ and

- systematically disrespected the unannulled portions of the First Award, in flagrant contradiction of ICSID Arbitration Rule 55(3), and thereby usurped an authority that it does not have and manifestly exceeded its powers.¹⁵⁸

[T]he Resubmission Tribunal concluded that the Chilean law issues under discussion were irrelevant simply because what [sic] Claimants’ theory about the implications of Chilean law necessarily contradicted the conclusions in the First Award. The Resubmission Tribunal therefore could not have accepted such arguments without doing violence to the First Award, which had clearly held that "the expropriation [of El Clarín] was completed (fait consommé) with the physical seizure in 1975 [sic] and thus fell outside the scope of the BIT." Given that conclusion, Claimants’ theories about Decree No. 165 were irrelevant, since the issue of whether or not the expropriation was a continuing one or not - for purposes of the BIT and of international law - did not depend on the legal status of Decree No. 165 under Chilean law. [...] Accordingly, there was no need for the Resubmission Tribunal to take any decision or make any pronouncement on the Chilean law issues that had been raised by Claimants. The tribunal’s handling of the applicable law issues was therefore unimpeachable.¹⁶²

[T]he central consequence of the denial of justice found by the First Tribunal to exist, as a result of the delays in the proceedings before the Santiago court over the Goss press, was that they (the Claimants) were disabled from invoking a conclusive argument that Decree No. 165 was absolutely null (ex tunc) and as such incapable of producing any legal effects. Had they been in a position to do so, the argument continues, they (the Claimants) would either have been able to recover their confiscated property in Chile, or at the least would have been able to establish before the First Tribunal that the expropriation of this property was not an instantaneous act taking final effect in 1975, but was not in fact completed until many years later, and the result of that would have been that the expropriation did indeed fall under the jurisdiction of the First Tribunal under the BIT, contrary to the findings in the First Award. From this it follows, so the Claimants’ argument concludes, that the loss suffered by them arising out of the denial of justice is the loss of that right to compensation in the original arbitration, so that such loss is the one they can now claim in the present proceedings.¹⁷⁴

(a) That the Tribunal was not properly constituted (Article 52(1)(a));

(b) That the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers (Article 52(1)(b)); and

(c) That there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure (Article 52(1)(d)).

In their Reply on Annulment, the Applicants withdrew their assertion that the Tribunal failed in this respect to state the reasons on which its award is based.¹⁸²

[A]vait cru pouvoir communiquer [le projet de décision partielle proposé par le Président] à la partie qui l’avait désigné, au mépris de l’obligation, incontestée, de la confidentialité des documents de travail du Tribunal et du secret des délibérations. L'existence de cette violation n’est pas contestée, mais au contraire reconnue par défenderesse. Le doute subsiste seulement sur la question de savoir qui en a pris l’initiative mais il n’incombe pas au présent Tribunal arbitral de se prononcer à ce sujet, malgré les protestations et demandes présentées au CIRDI par les demanderesses.¹⁸⁵

[L]e Centre et, par extension, le Tribunal, auraient dû prendre en compte, au moment de la constitution du tribunal de resoumission, le fait que la Défenderesse avait perdu le droit de nommer un arbitre suite à la démission de M. Franco an cours de la procédure initiale avec la réprobation du Tribunal initial. Le fait d'avoir autorisé la Défenderesse à procéder à la nomination d'un arbitre en la personne de M. Mourre affecte la constitution du TR d’un vice au sens de l’article 52(1)(a) de la Convention.¹⁹²

Or l’arbitre ayant rempli la place du Professeur Emmanuel Gaillard, M. Alexis Mourre, a été nommé par l’Etat Défendeur en enfreignant l’autorité de la chose jugée de la Sentence du 8 mai 2008, notamment celle des §§34, 35, 36, 37, 729 en rapport avec les paras. 5 à 7 du Dispositif, la décision du 25 avril 2006 du Tribunal arbitral initial et le §359(4) de la Décision du 18 décembre 2012 du Comité ad hoc, obligatoires pour les parties.¹⁹³

At the first session, the Claimants, while indicating that they were not proposing the disqualification of the arbitrator nominated by the Respondent, nevertheless requested the Tribunal to decide whether the arbitrator in question had been duly appointed in accordance with the Convention and Arbitration Rules, and, if not, that the Tribunal invite him to resign; whereas the Respondent maintained that the arbitrator in question had been properly appointed in accordance with Article 37(2)(b) of the Convention. In the absence of a proposal for disqualification under the Convention and Rules, the Tribunal does not feel called upon to rule on the matter.¹⁹⁴

In any event, Article 56(3) cannot apply to the constitution of a tribunal because it relates to a situation that has occurred after such constitution, i.e. to the resignation of an arbitrator and a "resulting" vacancy and not the situation at the outset of the constitution of the tribunal. In addition, its plain language restricts the application to one single appointment and the replacement of one particular arbitrator. The Applicants’ theory that an appointing party would be deprived of its right to appoint arbitrators again in any subsequent new proceeding contradicts not only the ordinary meaning of the terms of Articles 56(3), 52(6) and 37 to 40 of the ICSID Convention but also their purpose to establish general rules for the constitution of a new tribunal, on the one hand, and react to a specific situation which has occurred thereafter, on the other.²⁰⁰

- the Tribunal’s decision of 21 November 2016 to refuse further disclosure on President Berman’s and Mr. Veeder’s impartiality;²¹⁰

- President Berman’s letter of 1 March 2017 where he refuses to decide the second challenge of Mr. Veeder;²¹¹

- two Decisions of the Chairman of the Administrative Council of 21 February 2017 and 13 April 2017, rejecting the proposals to disqualify President Berman and M. Veeder;

and ending with a Resubmission Tribunal’s decision of 15 June 2017 to reject a request for information from Chile on payments made to Essex Court Chambers.²¹²

- The appointment to and the continued membership in the Resubmission Tribunal of President Berman and Mr. V.V. Veeder amount to an improper constitution of the Tribunal (Article 52(1)(a)) of the ICSID Convention) and a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure (Article 52(1)(d) of the ICSID Convention).²¹³

- The Resubmission Tribunal’s decision of 21 November 2016 "constitue une infraction grave à la règle de procédure établie à la Règle 6(2) [...] et elle comporte l’annulabilité de la Sentence du 13 septembre 2016 pour le même motif"²¹⁴

- President Berman’s letter of 1 March 2017 "constitue une inobservation grave des articles 57 et 58 de la Convention, un excès de pouvoir, une inobservation grave d’une règle fondamentale de procédure et un défaut de motifs."²¹⁵

- The Decision of the Chairman of the Administrative Council, dated 21 February 2017:

[C]onstitue une inobservance grave de la Règle n° 6 et un excès de pouvoir ne pouvant pas valider le vice existant dans la constitution du Tribunal arbitral dans l'étape processuelle régie par l’article 49(2) de la Convention, le manque d'impartialité et de neutralité des arbitres, et son inobservance grave des règles de procédure applicables lors du traitement de la proposition de récusation du 22 novembre 2016.²¹⁶

- The Decision of the Chairman of the Administrative Council, dated 13 April 2017:

[C]onstitue une inobservance grave des obligations établies à la Règle n° 6 et à l'art. 14(1) de la Convention, et un excès de pouvoir ne pouvant pas valider, le vice dans la constitution du Tribunal arbitral lors de l'étape processuelle régie par l’article 49(2) de la Convention, le manque de neutralité et d’impartialité de M. Veeder et l’inobservance grave des règles de procédure applicables lors du traitement de la proposition de récusation de M. Veeder du 23 février 2017.²¹⁷

- The Decision of the Chairman of the Administrative Council, dated 13 April 2017:

[C]onstitue une inobservation grave des articles 57 et 58 de la Convention, un excès de pouvoir, avec défaut de motifs, ne pouvant pas valider le vice dans la constitution du Tribunal arbitral lors de l’étape processuelle régie par l'article 49(2) de la Convention, le manque de neutralité et d'impartialité de M. Berman et l’inobservance grave des règles de procédure applicables lors du traitement des propositions de récusation de M. Berman des 28 février et 4 mars 2017.²¹⁸

- The Tribunal’s decision of 15 June 2017 constitutes an "excès de pouvoir, défaut de motifs et manquement à une règle fondamentale de procedure."²¹⁹

Que les arbitres n 'aient pas connaissance des montants précis en cause peut se comprendre. Qu 'ils prétendent n 'avoir pas eu connaissance de l'intervention de leurs collègues pour la République du Chili relève en revanche de la gageure.²²⁷

[T]he role of an ad hoc committee is not to determine whether or not an arbitrator possesses the requisite qualities of independence and impartiality; Articles 57 and 58 entrust that function to the remaining members of the tribunal, or to the Chairman of the Administrative Council. Only if the matter is raised for the first time after the proceedings are closed does the ad hoc committee become the primary decision-maker in respect of this issue;²²⁹

and:

[A] decision has been made on this issue [of the proper constitution of the Tribunal] in the underlying proceedings and in light of the context as well as the object and purpose of the annulment proceeding, it is not for this Committee to perform a de novo review of any issues decided in the underlying proceedings.²³⁰

- were taken after the Resubmission procedure;

- did not take the merits into account and concentrated on purely procedural considerations and thereby have no res iudicata effect, at least as far as the Decision of 21 February 2017 is concerned;

- could not take facts into consideration that emerged only after the Chairman’s decisions;

- and are untenable and manifestly unreasonable.²³¹

- assuming that it was the Applicants’ duty to conduct a conflict search;

- believing Chile’s arguments, failing to examine the press clippings and to add even new ones sua sponte that he had never shared with the Applicants;

- not ordering Sir Franklin Berman and Mr. Veeder to make an inquiry into the relations between Chile and Essex Court Chambers;

- not taking into consideration that the relations had been kept secret and therefore out of reach of the Applicants; and

- defining the period from which to determine whether the Applicants had acted "promptly" in the sense of Rules 9 and 27 from the moment of the appointment of the arbitrators and not from the moment when the Applicants started to have access to secret information, which would undoubtedly lead him to understand that "le caractère prompt de la réaction des Demanderesses est manifeste."²³⁹