Pey Casado v. Chile (I)

Members of the Committee :
Professor Dr. Rolf Knieper, President
Professor Dr. Nicolas Angelet
Professor Yuejiao Zhang

ICSID Secretariat :
Dr. Laura Bergamini, Secretary of the Committee

Representing the Applicants :
Dr. Juan E. Garcés, Garcés y Prada, Abogados
Mr. Hernan Garcés Duran, Garcés y Prada, Abogados
Professor Robert Lloyd Howse, New York University, School of Law
Ms. Alexandra Muñoz, Gide, Loyrette, Nouel (by video-conference)
Ms. Francisca Duran Ferraz de Andrade, President Allende Foundation Management

Representing the Respondent :
Mr. Paolo Di Rosa, Arnold & Porter
Ms. Mallory Silberman, Arnold & Porter
Ms. Caroline Kelly, Arnold & Porter
Mr. German Savastano, Arnold & Porter
Ms. Aimee Kneiss, Arnold & Porter

Members of the Committee :
Professor Dr. Rolf Knieper, President
Professor Dr. Nicolas Angelet
Professor Yuejiao Zhang

ICSID Secretariat :
Dr. Laura Bergamini, Secretary of the Committee

Representing the Applicants :
Dr. Juan E. Garcés, Agent, Garcés y Prada, Abogados
Mr. Hernan Garcés Duran, Co-agent, Garcés y Prada, Abogado
Professor Robert Lloyd Howse, New York University, School of Law
Ms. Alexandra Muñoz, Gide, Loyrette, Nouel
Mr. Toby Cadman, Guernica 37 International Justice Chambers
Mrs. Ruti Teitel, Ernst C. Stiefel Professor of Comparative Law, New York Law School Visiting Fellow, London School of Economics
Ms. Francisca Duran Ferraz de Andrade, President Allende Foundation Management

Representing the Respondent :
Ms. Mairée Uran Bidegain, Republic of Chile
Ms. Macarena Rodríguez, Republic of Chile
Mr. Paolo Di Rosa, Arnold & Porter
Ms. Gaela Gehring Flores, Arnold & Porter
Ms. Mallory Silberman, Arnold & Porter
Ms. Katelyn Home, Arnold & Porter
Ms. Caroline Kelly, Arnold & Porter
Mr. Michael Rodríguez, Arnold & Porter
Mr. Kelby Ballena, Arnold & Porter
Ms. Barbara Galizia, Arnold & Porter
Ms. Sally Pei, Arnold & Porter
Mr. Brian Williams, Arnold & Porter
Ms. Andrea Rodríguez Escobedo, Arnold & Porter
Ms. Kaila Millett, Arnold & Porter
Ms. Christina Poehlitz, Arnold & Porter

Court Reporters :
Ms. Michelle Kirkpatrick (English), B&B Reporters
Ms. Catherine Le Madic (French), French Real time
Ms. Ait Ahmed ép. Oubella (French, scopist), FrenchRealtime
Ms. Audrey Lemée (French, scopist), FrenchRealtime

Interpreters :
Ms. Sarah Rossi, English-French interpreter
Ms. Chantal Bret, English-French interpreter
Ms. Christine Victorin, English-French interpreter

(1) That Ms Coral Pey Grebe cannot be regarded as a claimant in her own right in these resubmission proceedings;

(2) That, as has already been indicated by the First Tribunal, its formal recognition of the Claimants’ rights and its finding that they were the victims of a denial of justice constitutes in itself a form of satisfaction under international law for the Respondent’s breach of Article 4 of the BIT;

(3) That the Claimants, bearing the relevant burden of proof, have failed to prove any further quantifiable injury to themselves caused by the breach of Article 4 as found by the First Tribunal in its Award;

(4) That the Tribunal cannot therefore make any award to the Claimants of financial compensation on this account;

(5) That the Claimants’ subsidiary claim on the basis of unjust enrichment is without legal foundation;

(6) That there are no grounds in the circumstances of the case for the award of moral damages either to Mr Pey Casado or to the Foundation;

(7) That the arbitration costs of these resubmission proceedings are to be shared in the proportion of three quarters to be borne by the Claimants and one quarter by the Respondent, with the result that the Claimants shall reimburse to the Respondent the sum of US$159,509.43;

(8) That all other claims are dismissed.²⁸

(a) Paragraphs 61, 66, and 198, and paragraph 2 of the dispositif, of the Resubmission Award are rectified as set out in paragraphs 52, 53, 54, and 55 above.

(b) The costs incurred by the Centre in respect of these Rectification Proceedings, including the costs resulting from the associated challenges to Sir Franklin Berman and Mr Veeder, shall be borne by the Claimants and the Claimants shall therefore reimburse to the Respondent the sum of US$ 22,963.36, in addition to the amount specified in paragraph 255 of the Resubmission Award. The Tribunal makes no further order as to costs.²⁹

1. Accept this [brief], and its documents attached, seeking the annulment

i. of the whole resubmission Award notified on 13 September 2016, on the grounds of Article 52(1) of the Convention, including points (a), (b), (d) and (e) thereof, [and]

ii. the annulment of §§58, 61 and 62(b) of the Decision of 6 October 2017, on the grounds of points (b), (d) et (e) of Article 52(1) of the Convention;

2. Order the Republic of Chile in due course to bear the costs of this annulment proceeding and of incidental issues - such as the one that arose on 12, 15 et 16 February 2018 - along with the fees and expenses of the members of the ad hoc Committee, the charges for use of ICSID facilities, the translation expenses and the professional fees and expenses of [the Applicants], lawyers, experts and/or any other persons called upon to appear before the ad hoc Committee, and pay the relevant amounts for any other infringements established as the ad hoc Committee may deem fair and equitable, with compound interest.

3. Adopt any other measures that the members of the Committee consider fair and equitable in the circumstances of this case.³⁰

[I]n order to preserve the integrity and the fairness of the procedure, and given the nature and the seriousness of the behaviour of the Respondent State on 12,15 and 16 February 2018, its blatant bad faith, the non-rectification of its behaviour by its representatives, but the complete contrary, its deliberate amplification, that the ad hoc Committee exercises its powers and that, in compliance with Rule 26 of the IBA Guidelines on party representation:

(a) That it draws appropriate conclusions in its reasonable appreciation of the judicial evidence produced, as to the evaluation of the fact that, against this evidence, on 12, 15 and 16 February 2018 Chile presented the reference made by the Claimants in their submissions as deception, and to this end, explicitly pejorative, the injunction of 24 July 2017 of the 28th Civil Court of Santiago as being vacated since October 2017;

(b) That it draws appropriate negative inferences from the attempts by Chile's representatives, with consumed effrontery, to make the ad hoc Committee believe, with no foundation and against all of the evidence, that the Claimants’ representatives lacked professional ethics by bluntly questioning the inaccuracy of the communication of 12 February 2018 submitted by the Defendant, and that such supposed failures are abundant and proven, since the start of the arbitration, without any evidence;

(c) That it sanctions the behaviour of the Republic of Chile for its communications of 12 and 15 February and at the hearing the following day by introducing and continuously supporting inaccurate facts, infringing upon the honour and the professional integrity of the Claimants, to the point of getting the ad hoc Committee to warn that it was ready, after deliberation, to also take measures against them by virtue of Article 44 of the Convention, and to encourage a Claimant’s counsel to rectify, at the request of Chile, an entirely founded declaration produced in a circle of public debate;

(d) Warning to which the Claimants affirm, with a clear conscience, to have never exposed itself today or in the past, exclusive of the double deception in favour of which the Defendant State designated its own qualities before the ad hoc Committee on 12, 15 and 16 February, which characterise more than twenty years of the present arbitration [...];

(e) That it takes into account these facts in the allocation of costs of the arbitration, by indicating if needed how and to what extent they have led the Committee to a different allocation of these costs;

(f) That it takes all other appropriate measures to preserve the fairness and integrity of the procedure.³¹

a. [R]eject Claimants’ annulment request, in its entirety;

b. [O]rder Claimants to cover the costs of the Annulment Proceeding in their entirety; and

c. [O]rder Claimants to reimburse Chile for the full amount of its legal fees and expenses (with interest thereon, at a rate of six-month LIBOR plus 2% per annum, starting from the date of the Committee’s decision and until the date of payment).³²

With respect to "[t]he ground for annulment for manifest excess of powers," the First Committee stated that "this ground is meant to ensure, inter alia, that tribunals do not exceed their jurisdiction or fail to apply the law agreed upon by the parties." To justify annulment, "[a] tribunal (1) must do something in excess of its powers and (2) that excess must be ‘manifest.’ It is a dual requirement." The phrase "excess of powers" would include an "inappropriate [] exercis[e] of jurisdiction (or failure to exercise jurisdiction); and [a] fail[ure] to apply the proper law." Nevertheless, "there is an important distinction between a failure to apply the proper law[,] which is a ground for annulment, and an incorrect or erroneous application of that law, which is not a ground for annulment." For its part, the term "manifest" means "sufficiently clear and serious." If the tribunal’s conclusions ‘"seem tenable and not arbitrary, they do not constitute [a] manifest excess of powers’"

Regarding the second ground for annulment — "that there has been a serious departure from [a] fundamental rule[] of procedure" - the First Committee "agree[d] with Chile that this ground involves a three-part test: (i) the procedural rule must be fundamental; (ii) the Tribunal must have departed from it; and (iii) the departure must have been serious." The first part of the test requires identification of "procedural rules that are essential to the integrity of the arbitral process and must be observed by all ICSID tribunals. The parties agree that such rules include the right to be heard, the fair and equitable treatment of the parties, proper allocation of the burden of proof and absence of bias." The second part (i.e., the "departure" prong) "requires that the Committee examine the full record, including the Transcripts and the Award [,] to determine whether or not the Tribunal violated the rule in question." The third part of the test — the "seriousness" prong — requires "that the applicant must demonstrate ‘the impact that the issue may have had on the award.'" The committee must "enquire whether, if the rule had been observed, there is a distinct possibility (a ‘chance’) that it may have made a difference on a critical issue."

The First Committee also stated that, in addition to the above three prongs, there is a fourth, waiver-related issue to consider: "Pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rules 27 and 53, a party may lose its right to object on the ground of a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure if it has failed to raise its objection to the tribunal’s procedure upon becoming aware of it, or ‘promptly’ as mentioned in Rule 27."

With respect to the issue of "failure to state reasons," the First Committee endorsed the statement of the Vivendi I committee to the effect that "‘Article 52(1)(e) [of the Convention] concerns a failure to state any reasons with respect to all or part of an award, not the failure to state correct or convincing reasons.’" So long as "‘the reasons given by a tribunal can be followed and relate to the issues that were before the tribunal, their correctness is beside the point in terms of Article 52(1)(e).’" Further, "‘reasons may be stated succinctly or at length, and different legal traditions differ in their modes of expressing reasons. Tribunals must be allowed a degree of discretion as to the way in which they express their reasoning.’" At bottom, the "[First] Committee believe[d] that as long as there is no express rationale for the conclusions with respect to a pivotal or outcome-determinative point, an annulment must follow, whether the lack of rationale is due to a complete absence of reasons or the result of frivolous or contradictory explanations."⁴⁸

The Respondent’s summary also represents its position.

[I]s intended to cover situations such as a departure from the parties’ agreement on the method of constituting the Tribunal or an arbitrator’s failure to meet the nationality or other requirements for becoming a member of the Tribunal⁵¹

as well as to Professor Schreuer who states that:

[Q]uestions concerning the tribunal's proper constitution might arise from dissatisfaction in the manner in which challenges to arbitrators and alleged conflicts of interest have been handled. [...] Appointment of an arbitrator who manifestly does not possess these qualities [as required by Art. 14(1) Convention] may be put forward as a ground for annulment.⁵²

"If the original award had only been annulled in part, the new Tribunal shall not reconsider any portion of the award not so annulled." If a new Tribunal reconsiders an issue not annulled, it exceeds its power.⁵⁸

[W]here it is "substantial and [is] such as to deprive the party of the benefit or protection which the rule was intended to provide." In other words, "the violation of such a rule must have caused the Tribunal to reach a result substantially different from what it would have awarded had the rule been observed."⁷²

- the committee "has to verify the existence of reasons as well as their sufficiency - that they are adequate and sufficient reasonably to bring about the result reached by the Tribunal - but it cannot look into their correctness;"⁷⁵

- reasons must not be frivolous or truly contradictory, whereby the contradiction must be serious enough "to vitiate the Tribunal’s reasoning [...] as a whole."⁷⁶

[I]s by no means unlimited and must take account of all relevant circumstances, including the gravity of the circumstances which constitute the ground for annulment and whether they had - or could have had - a material effect upon the outcome of the case, as well as the importance of the finality of the award and the overall question of fairness to both Parties.⁸⁰

Quant à l'invalidité des confiscations et au devoir d’indemnisation, il y a lieu de rappeler aussi des déclarations parfaitement claires de la défenderesse dans la présente procédure.

Après le rétablissement au Chili d’institutions démocratiques et civiles, les nouvelles autorités ont proclamé publiquement leur intention de rétablir la légalité et de réparer les dommages causés par le régime militaire.

[...]

Le Tribunal arbitral ne peut que prendre note avec satisfaction de telles déclarations, qui font honneur au Gouvernement chilien. Malheureusement, cette politique ne s’est pas été traduite dans les faits.¹⁰⁰

[L]es gouvernements démocratiques qui remplacèrent en 1990, au moyen d’élection libres, le gouvernement de Pinochet, se sont primordialement préoccupés de réparer les dommages causés par le régime instauré au Chili par le coup d’état du 11 septembre 1973. En effet, leGouvernement a pris les mesures pour réparer les dommages causés aux victimes dans tous les secteurs.¹⁰¹

En outre, la partialité du Tribunal de Resoumission est manifeste en ce qu’il laisse entendre que le Comité ad hoc chargé de l’annulation n’est pas allé assez loin dans son acceptation de la demande d’annulation formulée par le Chili à l’égard de la Sentence initiale. En attaquant des aspects essentiels de la Sentence initiale où le Comité ad hoc n’a pas été d’accord avec le Chili sur ce qu’il y aurait eu une erreur susceptible d’entrainer l’annulation, mais a tranché en faveur des Demanderesses, le Tribunal de Resoumission s’est écarté d’une règle fondamentale de procédure, à savoir l’absence de biais.¹⁰⁵

Chile is not attempting to justify the expropriation, and is still conscious of the injury that the expropriation caused. As will be seen, however, this issue is entirely inapposite for the Committee’s purposes.¹⁰⁸

Now, these particular Claimants are not motivated by rational economic considerations. They are motivated, obviously, by the prospect of a big payoff, but they also see inherent value in keeping this case alive, because by keeping this case alive, they keep their ideological cause in the public eye.

This case continues to be very high profile in Chile. And so the longer this case goes on, the more of these hearings we have, the more it stays in the public eye; and, therefore, this case, in itself, just the actual act of continuing the case, has inherent value to them.¹¹²

La requête d’arbitrage et la demande introduite devant le juge chilien ont donc un objet et un fondement distincts. La première consiste à demander réparation du préjudice découlant des actes de saisie et de confiscation relatifs aux sociétés CPP S.A. et EPC Ltda sur le fondement de certaines dispositions de l’API Chili-Espagne, tandis que la seconde vise la restitution d’un bien meuble bien identifié, la rotative Goss, et expressément exclu du champ du consentement à l'arbitrage, en se fondant sur le droit chilien.¹¹³

The arbitration body shall take its decision on the basis of the provisions of this Agreement, of the law of the Contracting Party that is a party to the dispute, including the rules relative to conflicts of laws, and of the terms of any specific agreements concluded in relation to investment, as well as of the principles of international law on the subject.

Le Tribunal conclut que, au moment où a été effectuée la saisie du journal El Clarn, M. Pey Casado devait être considéré comme le seul propriétaire légitime les actions de la société CPP S.A. (paragraph 229)

Au vu de l'ensemble des développements qui précèdent, le Tribunal conclut qu’il n'existait pas, dans le droit chilien en vigueur en 1972, de définition établie de l’investissement étranger et que l'opération réalisée par M. Pey Casado s'est conformée au droit chilien qui lui était applicable. En conséquence, le Tribunal considère que l'investissement de M. Pey Casado, l'achat d'actions d'une société chilienne du secteur de la presse au moyen de paiements en devises étrangères effectués sur des comptes bancaires en Europe, satisfait les conditions posées par l'API et plus particulièrement par ses articles 1(2) et 2(2). (paragraph 411)

Sur la seconde question, celle de savoir si les investissements des demanderesses ont bénéficié d'un traitement juste et équitable, une réponse négative s'impose de l'avis du Tribunal arbitral, compte tenu des conclusions auxquelles il est parvenu précédemment aux termes de son appréciation des preuves et de son analyse juridique. En bref, il s'agit de la conclusion selon laquelle M. Pey Casado a bien démontré avoir procédé à des investissements et être propriétaire de biens meubles ou immeubles qui ont été confisqués par l'autorité militaire chilienne.

On rappellera à ce propos l'existence d'un jugement chilien reconnaissant la propriété de M. Pey Casado sur les actions confisquées ainsi que le fait que les autorités chiliennes, exécutives et administratives (comme judiciaires) étaient informées des revendications et demandes formulées par les demanderesses.

Quant à l'invalidité des confiscations et au devoir d'indemnisation, il y a lieu de rappeler aussi des déclarations parfaitement claires de la défenderesse dans la présente procédure. (paragraphs 665-667)

Le Tribunal relève qu’un certain nombre de ces décrets a été annulé par les juridictions internes chiliennes. [...] A la connaissance du Tribunal, le décret suprême n°165 est toujours en vigueur.

And again:

A la connaissance du Tribunal, la validité du Décret n°165 n’a pas été remise en cause par les juridictions internes et ce décret fait toujours partie de l'ordre juridique interne chilien.¹¹⁹

Quoi qu’il en soit de la pertinence et de la valeur des éléments qui ont été retenus à cet égard en droit interne chilien, ces éléments ne peuvent prévaloir sur les considérations qui ont conduit le Tribunal arbitral aux conclusions précédemment énoncées, en application des dispositions de l'API.¹²⁷

Any dispute concerning the existence or extent of the rights in rem alleged to constitute an investment that arises in an investment treaty arbitration must be decided in accordance with the municipal law of the host state for this is not a dispute about evidence (facts) but a dispute about legal entitlements. When the issue becomes the international validity of certain acts of the host state which have prejudiced the investor’s legal entitlements under municipal law, then international law applies exclusively.¹²⁸

[N]e peut être que positive, au regard des faits établis et déjà retenus par le Tribunal arbitral, l’absence de toute décision par les tribunaux civils chiliens sur les prétentions de M. Pey Casado s’analysant en un déni de justice. En effet, l’absence de décision en première instance sur le fond des demandes des parties demanderesses pendant sept années, c’est-à-dire entre septembre 1995 et le 4 novembre 2002 (moment de l’introduction de la demande complémentaire dans la présente procédure) doit être qualifié comme un déni de justice de la part des tribunaux chiliens. En fait, des délais procéduraux importants constituent bien une des formes classiques de déni de justice.¹³²

[D]ans la détermination du préjudice résultant du déni de justice, qui doit remettre les parties dans la situation dans laquelle elles auraient dû se trouver si le déni de justice n’avait pas eu lieu. Rappelons en effet, qu’en l’absence de déni de justice, le Tribunal arbitral initial n’aurait pas pu conclure dans la Sentence que « à la connaissance du Tribunal, la validité du Décret n° 165 n’a pas été remise en cause par les juridictions internes et ce décret fait toujours partie de l’ordre juridique interne chilien.¹³⁴

And:

Le présent Tribunal arbitral devra dès lors constater que l’un des actes de déni de justice commis par la République du Chili à l'égard de M. Pey et de la Fondation a eu pour effet d’empêcher les Demanderesses d’informer le Tribunal arbitral du jugement de la juridiction civile chilienne reconnaissant la "nullité de droit public" du Décret n°165, et, en conséquence, l’absence de titre de l’Etat défendeur sur l’investissement en 1995, compte tenu de la nullité de droit public du Décret n° 165. Ce qui a conduit le Tribunal arbitral à considérer que, "à sa connaissance", ce Décret n’avait pas été remis en cause par les juridictions internes et faisait toujours partie de l’ordre juridique interne chilien, et, par voie de conséquence, que les dispositions de l’article 5 de l’API étaient inapplicables aux faits de confiscation.

Cette tromperie fondamentale démasquée, la Défenderesse ne saurait bien évidemment pas se prévaloir de ses manœuvres procédurales subséquentes.¹³⁵

[T]hat the present Tribunal is absolved from any need to investigate afresh whether there was any breach of Chile’s obligations towards the Claimants in respect of the present dispute, what that breach consisted in, or whether the breach gives rise to a right to compensation. All of those matters have been predetermined by the First Award and are binding on all Parties under Article 53(1) of the ICSID Convention. Not only is there no need for the Tribunal to go into these matters, but it would be a manifest excess of its own jurisdiction if the Tribunal purported to do so. That is the express consequence of Arbitration Rule 55(3).¹⁴¹

[P]revent the present Tribunal from proceeding to an interpretation of the First Award for the purposes of carrying out its mandate under the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Arbitration Rules. Indeed, it could hardly be otherwise; the essence of the Tribunal’s mandate consists in giving effect, in the light of the arguments marshalled by the Parties, to certain paragraphs in the dispositif of the First Award, and this the Tribunal can hardly do without first understanding what those paragraphs mean.¹⁴²

In certain places, the Claimants contend that elements of the non-annulled parts of the First Award need to be revisited and modified by the present Tribunal. That would however (as already indicated) be well beyond the Tribunal’s functions and powers under ICSID Arbitration Rule 55 and will not be further considered in this Award. The main substance of the Claimants’ answer is, however, different. It consists essentially in the contention that the central consequence of the denial of justice found by the First Tribunal to exist, as a result of the delays in the proceedings before the Santiago court over the Goss press, was that they (the Claimants) were disabled from invoking a conclusive argument that Decree No. 165 was absolutely null (ex tunc) and as such incapable of producing any legal effects. Had they been in a position to do so, the argument continues, they (the Claimants) would either have been able to recover their confiscated property in Chile, or at the least would have been able to establish before the First Tribunal that the expropriation of this property was not an instantaneous act taking final effect in 1975, but was not in fact completed until many years later, and the result of that would have been that the expropriation did indeed fall under the jurisdiction of the First Tribunal under the BIT, contrary to the findings in the First Award.¹⁴³

As the Tribunal sees it, there are only two: one is that the First Tribunal was wrong in its finding that the expropriation was excluded ratione temporis from the scope of the BIT; the other is that what amounted in effect (if not in form) to the expropriation took place with Decision No. 43. Each of these has figured, in various forms, in the submissions of the Claimants in the course of these resubmission proceedings. Both of them, however, encounter insuperable difficulties. As to the first, the Tribunal is in no doubt that the First Tribunal, although it used slightly different forms of words in different parts of its Award, was of the view that the expropriation was completed (fait consomme) with the physical seizure in 1975 and thus fell outside the scope of the BIT. More to the point, however, the present Tribunal is simply not empowered to hear an appeal against that finding, or to substitute a view of its own for that of the First Tribunal, or to award any relief of any kind whatsoever on that account. As to the second (i.e. that the effective expropriation did not take place until Decision No. 43), it is also in its turn incompatible with the First Tribunal’s findings as to the chronology of the expropriation, but it is equally incompatible with Decision No. 43 itself, the whole tenor of which is that it was an award of compensation in respect of a confiscation that had already occurred. The Tribunal’s final observation before leaving the subject, is that, if the alleged nullity under Chilean law of Decree No. 165 did indeed have decisive significance, the consequence would surely be that the investment continued to be, in law, the property of Mr Pey Casado and/or the Foundation - the remedy for which could lie in the domestic sphere but clearly not before this Tribunal in these resubmission proceedings.¹⁴⁶