Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between States and nationals of other States (1965), Arts. 49(2), 52(4); UNICTRAL Arbitration Rules (2010), Art. 38.

Infrastructure Services Luxembourg S.à.r.l. and Energia Termosolar B.V. (formerly Antin Infrastructure Services Luxembourg S.à.r.l. and Antin Energia Termosolar B.V.) v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/31, Decision on Rectification of the Award, 29 January 2019, para. 25 (“Moreover, Article 49(2) of the ICSID Convention provides, on the one hand, for the powers of the Tribunal and on the other, for a limitation of such powers as regards rectification. A power because it expressly authorizes the Tribunal to rectify errors, and a limitation because the Tribunal’s powers in the rectification proceedings extends only to the correction of errors that are clerical, arithmetical or similar. As correctly stated by the tribunal in Pey Casado, ‘It follows that, as is already implicit in the notion of ‘rectification,’ the procedure does not encompass any alleged mistake of law by the tribunal or any factual determination or discretionary assessment by it. The procedure is not an appeal, and this in turn illuminates why Article 49 of the Convention makes the rectification of any duly established ‘clerical, arithmetical or similar error’ into a duty of the tribunal.”); Marco Gavazzi and Stefano Gavazzi v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/25, Decision on Rectification, 13 July 2017, para. 54 (“Article 49 of the ICSID Convention prescribes narrow grounds on which an award may be rectified, namely when there is ‘any clerical, arithmetical or similar error in the award.’ The Tribunal agrees with the standard for rectification set out in Gold Reserve: ‘[t]he purpose of the correction exception to the functus officio principle is to correct obvious omissions or mistakes and avoid a consequence where a party finds itself bound by an award that orders relief the tribunal did not intend to grant. The purpose is therefore to ensure that the true intentions of the tribunal are given effect in the award, but not to alter those intentions, amend the legal analysis, modify reasoning or alter findings. An authoritative commentary confirms that the correction facility found in most arbitral rules is to be used to correct miscalculation or unintended errors of expression and that ‘that remedy cannot be used to alter the meaning of the decision.’ Any purported correction that goes beyond the scope of the Tribunal’s limited mandate in this regard is likely to be subject to challenge.’”).

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between States and nationals of other States (1965), Art. 49(2).

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between States and nationals of other States (1965), Art. 52(4); Victor Pey Casado and President Allende Foundation v. Republic of Chile I, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/2, Decision on the Rectification of the Award, 6 October 2017, paras. 48-50 (“The wording of the two provisions has in common the reference to an ‘error’ and that the purpose of the procedure is the ‘rectification’ of any such error. Where the texts diverge, the wording of the Convention naturally governs. In order to fall within the rectification procedure, an error must therefore be ‘in the award,’ and it must be clerical, or arithmetical, or similar. […] Practice has established that there are two, and only two, conditions that must be met for a rectification. First, a clerical, arithmetical or similar error must be found to exist; and secondly, the requested rectification must concern an aspect of the award that is purely accessory to the underlying dispute settled by the award.”).

İçkale İnşaat Limited Şirketi v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/24, Decision on Claimant's Request for Supplementary Decision and Rectification of the Award, 4 October 2016, para. 103 (“The Tribunal notes that the scope of Article 49(2) of the ICSID Convention is limited. The provision provides a mechanism to remedy "inadvertent omissions and minor technical errors in the award," but "[i]t is not designed to afford a substantive review or reconsideration of the decision;" rather its purpose is to "enable[] the tribunal to correct mistakes that may have occurred in the award's drafting in a non-bureaucratic and expeditious manner." This position has been confirmed by ICSID tribunals, and by the ad hoc committee in Vivendi v. Argentina, which stressed that : "[I]t is important to state that that procedure [i.e. supplementation and rectification], and any supplementary decision or rectification as may result, in no way consists of a means of appealing or otherwise revisiting the merits of the decision subject to supplementation or rectification.").

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states (1965), Arts. 49(2), 52(4).

Philip Morris Brand Sàrl (Switzerland), Philip Morris Products S.A. (Switzerland) and Abal Hermanos S.A. (Uruguay) v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Decision on the Rectification of the Award, 26 September 2016, paras. 18-19 (“The drafting history of the ICSID Convention confirms the limited and exceptional nature of the remedies available to the parties after an award has been rendered. As held by ICSID itself, ‘[t]he choice of remedies offered by the ICSID Convention reflects a deliberate election by the drafters of the Convention to ensure finality of awards.’ […] Thus, any revisions of the Award, such as the mechanism provided by Article 49(2), should be construed in light of the principle of the finality of the award.”).

Philip Morris Brand Sàrl (Switzerland), Philip Morris Products S.A. (Switzerland) and Abal Hermanos S.A. (Uruguay) v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Decision on the Rectification of the Award, 26 September 2016, para. 16 (“While the Spanish and French authentic versions referring, respectively, to ‘errores materiales’ and ‘toute erreur matérielle’, may be considered to include a different rectification standard than does the authentic English language text, which refers to ‘clerical errors’ the Tribunal is of the view that its power should not be construed as permitting a reassessment or re-examination of the issues decided in the Award, or of the Tribunal’s understanding of the Parties’ respective positions on the legal questions submitted to its scrutiny, as discussed below.”); Tenaris S.A. and Talta - Trading e Marketing Sociedade Unipessoal Lda v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (I), ICSID Case No. ARB/11/26, Decision on Rectification, 24 June 2016, para. 85; Watkins Holdings S.à r.l. and others v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/44, Decision on Spain's Request for Rectification of the Award, 13 July 2020, para. 38.

Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision of the ad hoc Committee on the Request for Supplementation and Rectification of its Decision concerning Annulment of the Award, 28 May 2003, paras. 11 (“In this regard, it is important to state that that procedure, and any supplementary decision or rectification as may result, in no way consists of a means of appealing or otherwise revising the merits of the decision subject to supplementation or rectification. Those sorts of proceedings are simply not provided for in the ICSID system. Still less may a request for supplementation or rectification of a decision on annulment be employed as vehicle by which to examine the correctness, not of the decision of the ad hoc committee, but of the underlying arbitral award.”), 25 (“A review of pertinent arbitral awards illustrates that the availability of the rectification remedy afforded by Article 49(2) depends upon the existence of two factual conditions. First, a clerical, arithmetical or similar error in an award or decision must be found to exist. Second, the requested rectification must concern an aspect of the impugned award or decision that is purely accessory to its merits. Simply stated (and contrary to Respondent’s assertion at paragraph 26 of its Request), Article 49(2) does not permit the ‘rectification’ of substantive findings made by a tribunal or committee or of the weight or credence accorded by the tribunal or committee to the claims, arguments and evidence presented by the parties. The sole purpose of a rectification is to correct clerical, arithmetical or similar errors, not to reconsider the merits of issues already decided. As will be seen, below, many of the Respondent’s requests derive from a misunderstanding of this fundamental principle.”); Philip Morris Brand Sàrl (Switzerland), Philip Morris Products S.A. (Switzerland) and Abal Hermanos S.A. (Uruguay) v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Decision on the Rectification of the Award, 26 September 2016, para. 20 (“Past tribunals have determined that ‘the power of the Tribunal to rectify the Award is limited’, that Article 49(2) envisages the correction of ‘minor technical error[s]’ and that a rectification request should be denied if it constitutes ‘an inappropriate attempt to revise the wording of the Decision as it concerns the Committee’s summary of the parties’ allegations, rather than to ‘rectify’ any error within the meaning of Article 49(2).”); LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc.v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Claimants' Request for Supplementary Decision, 8 July 2008, para. 16 (“In addition, the Claimants misconceive the function of the recourse to a supplementary decision by asserting that it allows Argentina to respond to their new arguments and evidence. The supplementation process is not a mechanism by which parties can continue proceedings on the merits or seek a remedy that calls into question the validity of the Tribunal’s decision. Referring to Professor Schreuer, the ad hoc Committee in the Vivendi case noted: [...] it is important to state that that procedure [by which ICSID awards and decisions may be supplemented and rectified], and any supplementary decision or rectification as may result, in no way consist of a means of appealing or otherwise revising the merits of the decision subject to supplementation or rectification.”); Tenaris S.A. and Talta - Trading e Marketing Sociedade Unipessoal Lda v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (I), ICSID Case No. ARB/11/26, Decision on Rectification, 24 June 2016, paras. 88-93; Watkins Holdings S.à r.l. and others v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/44, Decision on Spain's Request for Rectification of the Award, 13 July 2020, para. 63-64.

Victor Pey Casado and President Allende Foundation v. Republic of Chile I, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/2, Decision on the Rectification of the Award, 6 October 2017, para. 54 (“The Tribunal agrees that, once again, the paragraph in question was intended to do no more than reflect the Claimants’ submissions in their Reply Memorial, and ought therefore to have employed the Claimants’ own wording, namely ‘since’ rather than ‘by.’ As the error is one of a purely clerical nature, without impact on the substance of the Resubmission Award, the paragraph will be rectified accordingly, by substitution of the word ‘since’ in the first sentence.”).

İçkale İnşaat Limited Şirketi v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/24, Decision on Claimant Request for Supplementary Decision and Rectification of the Award, 4 October 2016, para. 97 ("The relevant legal provisions governing supplementary decisions and rectification of errors by ICSID tribunals are Article 49(2) of the ICSID Convention and ICSID Arbitration Rule 49. Article 49(2) of the ICSID Convention provides: "The Tribunal upon the request of a party made within 45 days after the date on which the award was rendered may after notice to the other party decide any question which it had omitted to decide in the award, and shall rectify any clerical, arithmetical or similar error in the award. Its decision shall become part of the award and shall be notified to the parties in the same manner as the award. The periods of time provided for under paragraph (2) of Article 51 and paragraph (2) of Article 52 shall run from the date on which the decision was rendered."").

İçkale İnşaat Limited Şirketi v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/24, Decision on Claimant Request for Supplementary Decision and Rectification of the Award, 4 October 2016, para. 116 (“According to Article 49(2) of the ICSID Convention, upon a request of a party made within 45 days after the date on which the award was rendered, an ICSID tribunal ‘shall rectify any clerical, arithmetical or similar error in the award.’ The language (‘shall rectify’) suggests that, unlike a supplementary decision, an ICSID tribunal has no discretion as to whether or not to make a correction; rather, ‘any clerical, arithmetical or similar’ errors ‘shall’ be rectified. Like a supplementary decision dealing with a question that was omitted from the award, such a decision ‘shall become part of the award and shall be notified to the parties in the same manner as the award.’”).

ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V., ConocoPhillips Hamaca B.V. and ConocoPhillips Gulf of Paria B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, Decision on the Rectification of the Award, 29 August 2019, para. 30 (“Article 49(2) of the ICSID Convention, quoted above, requires a party to submit a request to have any clerical, arithmetical or similar error in the award rectified by the Tribunal.”).

ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V., ConocoPhillips Hamaca B.V. and ConocoPhillips Gulf of Paria B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, Decision on the Rectification of the Award, 29 August 2019, para. 30 (“The provision does not mention that the Tribunal could undertake a rectification of such an error on its own motion.”).

ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V., ConocoPhillips Hamaca B.V. and ConocoPhillips Gulf of Paria B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, Decision on the Rectification of the Award, 29 August 2019, para. 30 (“However, if in the correction of the error of an amount identified by the Respondent the Tribunal finds that the same amount includes another error, the Tribunal could not simply correct the error invoked by the Respondent knowing that another error exists in the same amount and that it has an effect in the Award. In case the requesting party has correctly identified a clerical or arithmetical error in an amount, it is the Tribunal’s duty not only to correct the error invoked by the requesting party but other errors in the same amount, so that all erroneous components of the Award related to the same amount are corrected. Otherwise the Tribunal would be correcting a mathematical error in an amount but leaving in place another mathematical error related to the same amount. This is part of the Tribunal’s inherent decision-making power that it exercises independently from the party’s application. If this is done, as in the instant case, the Tribunal must proceed with the rectification in such a way that the total outcome of the Award is correct.”).

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states (1965), Art. 49(2).

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states (1965), Art. 49(2).

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between States and nationals of other States (1965), Art. 49(2).

Murphy Exploration and Production Company International v. Republic of Ecuador II, PCA Case No. 2012-16 (formerly AA 434), Procedural Order No. 4, 1 July 2016, para. 6 (“The Tribunal notes in the first place that Claimant’s Request does not involve a miscalculation, mistake or typographical error on the part of the Tribunal. It does not therefore meet the conditions of Article 36 of the UNCITRAL Rules.”).

British Caribbean Bank Ltd. v. Government of Belize, PCA Case No. 2010-18, Decision on the Respondent Motion pursuant to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Articles 36 and 37, 7 March 2015, para. (T) (“That Article 36 of the UNCITRAL Rules applies only to the correction of unintentional errors of a technical nature and does not extend to the revision of the reasoning or substance of a tribunal’s award.”).

UNICTRAL Arbitration Rules (2010), Art. 38(1).

UNICTRAL Arbitration Rules (2010), Art. 38(1).

UNICTRAL Arbitration Rules (2010), Art. 38(1).

UNICTRAL Arbitration Rules (2010), Art. 38(2).

Christian Doutremepuich and Antoine Doutremepuich v. Republic of Mauritius, PCA Case No. 2018-37, Correction of the Award on Jurisdiction, 3 October 2019, para. 8 (“Pursuant to Article 36 of the UNCITRAL Rules, on its own initiative, the Tribunal makes the following corrections to the Award on Jurisdiction: A. Paragraph 246 of the Award on Jurisdiction shall read as follows: ‘Pursuant to Article 38 of the UNCITRAL Rules, the Tribunal fixes the arbitration costs at EUR 391,692.00. The PCA’s Corrected Statement of Account is annexed to this Award. The PCA will return the surplus (EUR 58,308) to the Parties in equal shares (EUR 29,154 to each Party).’ B. The Corrected Statement of Account issued by the PCA and annexed to this Correction of Award shall be annexed to the Award on Jurisdiction in place of the PCA’s Statement of Account dated 22 August 2019.”).

UNICTRAL Arbitration Rules (2010), Art. 38(3).