|Aguinda Litigation||Litigation initiated by complaint filed by María Aguinda and others against Texaco before the US District Court for the Southern District of New York, USA on 3 November 1993.|
|April Hearing||Hearing on Track I(b) held on 28-29 April 2014.|
|Chevron||The First Claimant, Chevron Corporation, a legal person organised under the laws of the USA.|
|February Hearing||Hearing on interim measures held on 11 February 2012.|
|Jurisdiction Hearing||Hearing on jurisdiction held on 22-23 November 2010.|
|Lago Agrio Litigation||Litigation initiated by Ángel Piaguage and others against Chevron by a complaint (the "Lago Agrio Complaint") filed before the Superior Court of Justice of Nueva Loja in Ecuador (the "Lago Agrio Court") on 7 May 2003. The Lago Agrio Court issued a judgment on 14 February 2011 and a clarification order on 4 March 2011 (the "Lago Agrio Judgment"). The Lago Agrio Judgment was affirmed by the Lago Agrio Appellate Court by its judgment dated 3 January 2012 and a clarification order dated 13 January 2012 (the "Lago Agrio Appellate Court Judgment"). The National (Cassation) Court of Justice of Ecuador affirmed the Lago Agrio Judgment in part by its Judgment dated 12 November 2013 (the "Cassation Court Judgment"). The Constitutional Court of Ecuador affirmed the Cassation Court Judgment, dismissing Chevron's extraordinary action for protection, by its Judgment dated 27 June 2018 (the "Constitutional Court Judgment").|
|November Hearing||Hearing on Track I held on 26-28 November 2012.|
|TexPet||The Second Claimant, Texaco Petroleum Company, a legal person organised under the laws of the USA, currently a wholly-owned indirect subsidiary of Chevron. Until 2001, TexPet was a wholly-owned direct subsidiary of Texaco.|
|Texaco||Texaco Inc., a legal person organised under the laws of the USA.|
|Treaty (or BIT)||Treaty between the USA and Ecuador concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, signed on 27 August 1993, in effect from 11 May 1997.|
|PetroEcuador||Empresa Pública de Hidrocarburos del Ecuador, an Ecuadorian State-owned oil corporation; successor to Corporación Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana, or "CEPE", from 1989.|
|RICO Litigation||Litigation initiated by Chevron on 1 February 2011 before the US District Court for the Southern District of New York, USA against Stephen Donziger and others pursuant to (inter alia) 18 USC Section 1962 (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations), leading to the RICO trial in October-November 2013 and the RICO Judgment of 4 March 2014, affirmed by the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit by its judgment of 8 August 2016 and the US Supreme Court's denial of the appellants' petition for certiorari on 19 June 2017.|
|Site Visit||Tribunal's site visit in the Sucumbíos and Orellana Provinces of the Oriente in Ecuador on 4-10 June 2015. The Site Visit included the following sites: Shushufindi-34, Aguarico-06, Shushufindi-55 and Lago Agrio-02.|
|Track II Hearing||Hearing on Track II held on 21 April-8 May 2015.|
|UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules||Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (1976).|
|Unfiled Materials||Materials allegedly incorporated into the Lago Agrio Judgment (without attribution) which were allegedly never filed by the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs during the Lago Agrio Litigation.|
|Zambrano Computers||Two Hewlett Packard computers used by Judge Zambrano during the Lago Agrio Litigation. The first (serial number MXJ64005TG) was manufactured and shipped in 2006 (the "Old Computer"), and the second (serial number MXL0382C3D) was manufactured, purchased and made available to Judge Zambrano in November 2010 (the "New Computer").|
|Aguinda Plaintiffs||Plaintiffs in the Aguinda Litigation, initiated by complaint filed before the US District Court for the Southern District of New York on 3 November 1993.|
|Douglas Beltman||Consultant, Stratus Consulting, Inc; technical expert for the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs.|
|Lawrence W. Barnthouse||Technical expert for the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs; one of the "cleansing experts" for the Cabrera Report.|
|Joseph Berlinger||Director of the documentary film Crude (2009).|
|Cristóbal Bonifaz||Legal representative acting for the Aguinda Plaintiffs and the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs.|
|Ms "C"||Temporary student secretary employed by Judge Zambrano during the Lago Agrio Litigation, from mid-November 2010 to February 2011. The Tribunal has elected not to give her full name in this Award. (The Parties are aware of her full name).|
|Richard Stalin Cabrera Vega||Global assessment expert of the Lago Agrio Court in the Lago Agrio Litigation; purported author of the Cabrera Report.|
|Charles W. Calmbacher||Technical expert retained in 2004 by the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs to act as a judicial inspection expert in the Lago Agrio Litigation.|
|Ximera Centeno||Employee at Selva Viva (an Ecuadorian legal entity).|
|Richard W. Clapp||Epidemiologist; technical expert for the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs; principal author of the 'Clapp Report'.|
|John Connor||President, GSI Environmental Inc; technical expert for the Claimants; a defendant in US Section 1782 proceedings initiated by Ecuador for discovery for use in this arbitration.|
|Steven Donziger||USA attorney, acting as representative of the Aguinda Plaintiffs and the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs.|
|Graham Erion||USA attorney, author of the 'Erion Memorandum' (2008).|
|Pablo Fajardo Mendoza||Ecuadorian attorney, acting as representative of the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs.|
|Alberto Guerra Bastidas||Ecuadorian judge, Lago Agrio Court, presiding over the Lago Agrio Litigation from May 2003 to February 2004.|
|Judith Kimerling||USA attorney; Professor of Law and Policy, The City University of New York, Queens College and School of Law, USA; author on the Amazon; legal representative of the plaintiffs in the Huaorani Litigation.|
|Joseph Kohn||USA attorney, of Kohn, Swift & Graf, acting as representative of the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs; non-party funder of the Lago Agrio Litigation.|
|Lago Agrio Plaintiffs||Plaintiffs in the Lago Agrio Litigation, initiated by a Complaint filed in the Lago Agrio Court on 7 May 2003.|
|Anne Maest||Consultant, of Stratus Consulting, Inc; technical expert for the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs.|
|Nicholas Moodie||Australian legal intern, assistant to the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs' representatives; author of the 'Moodie Memorandum' (2009).|
|Rodrigo Pérez Pallares||Legal representative of TexPet; signatory of the 1995 Settlement Agreement (with the 1998 Final Release).|
|Alejandro Ponce Villacís||Ecuadorian attorney, acting as representative of the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs.|
|Julio Prieto Méndez||Ecuadorian attorney, acting as representative of the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs.|
|Ricardo Reis Veiga||Vice-President, TexPet; signatory of the 1995 Settlement Agreement (with the 1995 Remedial Action Plan and the 1998 Final Release).|
|Ramiro Fernando Reyes||Petroleum and environmental engineer; technical expert for the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs.|
|David Russell||Environmental expert, of Global Environmental Operations, Inc; technical expert for the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs.|
|Juan Pablo Sáenz||Ecuadorian attorney, acting as representative of the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs.|
|Norman Alberto Wray||Ecuadorian attorney, and, at different times, judge of the Ecuadorian Supreme Court and representative of the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs.|
|Luis Yanza||Director of the "Frente de Defensa La Amazonia" (the Amazon Defense Front or ADF); acting as representative of the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs.|
|Germán Yánez||Ecuadorian judge, Lago Agrio Court, presiding over the Lago Agrio Litigation from February 2006 to October 2007.|
|Nicolás Augusto Zambrano||Ecuadorian judge, Lago Agrio Court, presiding over the Lago Agrio Litigation from (i) October 2009 to March 2010 and (ii) October 2010 to February/March 2011.|
|C-NoA Sept. 2009||Claimants' Notice of Arbitration dated 23 September 2009.|
|C-IM Apr. 2010||Claimants' Request for Interim Measures dated 1 April 2010.|
|R-IM May 2010||Respondent's Response to Claimants' Request for Interim Measures dated 3 May 2010.|
|R-Jur. May 2010||Respondent's Summary Description of its Preliminary Jurisdictional and Admissibility Objections dated 3 May 2010.|
|C-IM May 2010||Claimants' Reply in Support of Interim Measures dated 7 May 2010.|
|R-Jur. July 2010||Respondent's Memorial on Jurisdictional Objections dated 26 July 2010.|
|C-Jur. Sept. 2010||Claimants' Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction dated 6 September 2010.|
|R-Jur. Oct. 2010||Respondent's Reply Memorial on Jurisdictional Objections dated 6 October 2010.|
|C-Mer. Sept. 2010||Claimants' Memorial on the Merits dated 6 September 2010 (as amended on 23 September 2010).|
|C-Jur. Nov. 2010||Claimants' Rejoinder on Jurisdiction dated 6 November 2010.|
|R-TI July 2012||Respondent's Track I Counter-Memorial on the Merits dated 3 July 2012.|
|C-Mer. Mar. 2012||Claimants' Supplemental Memorial on the Merits dated 20 March 2012.|
|C-TI Aug. 2012||Claimants' Reply Memorial on the Merits Track I dated 29 August 2012.|
|R-TI Oct. 2012||Respondent's Track I Rejoinder on the Merits dated 26 October 2012.|
|C-TI Nov. 2012||Claimants' document submitted at the Track I Hearing in November 2012, setting out their prayer for relief.|
|R-TII Feb. 2013||Respondent's Track II Counter-Memorial on the Merits dated 18 February 2013.|
|R-Show Cause Apr. 2013||Respondent's letter to the Tribunal on "Show Cause" and "Reconsideration" dated 15 April 2013.|
|C-Show Cause May 2013||Claimants' Initial Pleading on "Show Cause" and "Reconsideration" dated 6 May 2013.|
|R-IM June 2013||Respondent's Request for Enforcement of Interim Measures dated 3 June 2013.|
|C-TII June 2013||Claimants' Reply Memorial–Track II dated 5 June 2013 (as amended on 12 June 2013).|
|C-IM June 2013||Claimants' Response to Respondent's Request for Enforcement of Interim Measures dated 17 June 2013.|
|R-IM July 2013||Respondent's Reply in Support of its Request for Enforcement of Interim Measures dated 17 July 2013.|
|R-Show Cause July 2013||Respondent's Reply on "Show Cause" and "Reconsideration" dated 19 July 2013.|
|C-IM Aug. 2013||Claimants' Response to Respondent's Reply in Support of its Request for Enforcement of Interim Measures dated 8 August 2013.|
|C-Show Cause Aug. 2013||Claimants' Rejoinder on "Show Cause" and "Reconsideration" dated 30 August 2013.|
|R-TII Dec. 2013||Respondent's Track II Rejoinder on the Merits dated 16 December 2013.|
|C-TI Jan. 2014||Claimants' Supplemental Memorial on Track I dated 31 January 2014.|
|R-TI Mar. 2014||Respondent's Track I Supplemental Counter-Memorial on the Merits dated 31 March 2014.|
|C-TII May 2014||Claimants' Supplemental Memorial on Track II dated 9 May 2014.|
|C-TII Aug. 2014||Claimants Post-Submission Insert to their Supplemental Memorial on Track II – Examination of Zambrano Computer Hard Drives dated 15 August 2014.|
|R-TII Nov. 2014||Respondent's Track II Supplemental Counter-Memorial on the Merits dated 7 November 2014.|
|C-TII Jan. 2015||Claimants' Reply to the Respondent's Supplemental Track II Memorial dated 14 January 2015.|
|R-TII Mar. 2015||Respondent's Track II Supplemental Rejoinder on the Merits dated 17 March 2015.|
|C-TI July 2015||Claimants' Post-Track II Hearing Brief on Track I Issues dated 15 July 2015.|
|R-TI July 2015||Respondent's Track IB Post-Hearing Memorial dated 15 July 2015.|
|C-TII Aug. 2016||Claimants' Submission Concerning Digital Forensic Evidence and the Report of the Tribunal-Appointed Digital Forensics Expert dated 12 August 2016.|
|R-TII Aug. 2016||Respondent's Track II Supplemental Memorial on the Forensic Evidence of the Republic of Ecuador dated 12 August 2016.|
|C-TII Aug. 2016||Claimants' Reply Submission Concerning Digital Forensic Evidence and the Report of the Tribunal-Appointed Digital Forensics Expert dated 26 August 2016.|
|R-TII Aug. 2016||Respondent's Track II Supplemental Reply on the Forensic Evidence of the Republic of Ecuador dated 26 August 2016.|
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), ICJ, Judgment, 14 February 2002, 2002 ICJ Reports 3, CLA-415.
The Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland), PCIJ, Judgment (Jurisdiction), 26 July 1927, 1927 PCIJ Series A No. 9; Judgment (Merits), 13 September 1928, 1928 PCIJ Series A No. 17, CLA-406.
Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America), ICJ, Judgment (Preliminary Question), 15 June 1954, 1954 ICJ Reports 19, RLA-19.
Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), ICJ, Judgment, 20 December 1974, 1974 ICJ Reports 253.
Estate of Jean-Baptiste Caire (France) v. United Mexican States, French-Mexican Claims Commission, Decision No. 33, 7 June 1929, V RIAA 516, CLA-597.
Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2007-02/AA277, UNCITRAL, Interim Award, 1 December 2008, CLA-1; Partial Award on the Merits, 30 March 2010, CLA-47.
Concurring and Dissenting Opinions of Howard M. Holtzmann with respect to Interlocutory Awards on Jurisdiction in Nine Cases Containing Various Forum Selection Clauses (Cases Nos. 6, 51, 68, 121, 140, 159, 254, 293 and 466), 5 November 1982, 1 Iran-US Claims Tribunal Reports 284.
Republic of Ecuador v. United States of America, PCA Case No. 2012-05, Award, 29 September 2012.
Award between the United States and the United Kingdom relating to the rights of jurisdiction of the United States in the Bering Sea and the preservation of fur seals, Ad hoc, Award, 15 August 1893, XXVIII RIAA 263 reprinted from J.B. Moore, History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to Which the United States has been a Party, vol. I, (1898).
Himpurna California Energy Ltd. v. PT. (Persero) Perusahaan Listruik Negara, UNCITRAL (Ad hoc), Final Award, 4 May 1999, XXV Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 11.
Aron Kahane (successor-in-interest) v. Francesco Parsi and Austria, Romanian-Austrian Mixed Arbitration Tribunal, Award, 19 March 1929, (1929) VIII Recueil des Décisions des Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes 943.
Kunkel et. al. v. Polish State, German-Polish Mixed Arbitration Tribunal, Award, 2 December 1925, (1927) VI Recueil des Décisions des Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes 979, (1929) Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases 1925-1926 418, RLA-44.
Lanco International Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/6, Preliminary Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 December 1998, CLA-176.
Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Decision on Hearing of Respondent's Objection to Competence and Jurisdiction, 5 January 2001, CLA-425; Final Award, 26 June 2003, CLA-44; Decision on Respondent's Request for a Supplementary Decision, 6 September 2004, CLA-643. See also First Opinion of Sir Robert Jennings QC, 26 October 1998, CLA-647; First Opinion of Christopher Greenwood QC, 26 March 2001, CLA-645.
Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, 11 October 2002, CLA-7.
Victor Pey Casado and President Allende Foundation v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/2, Award, 8 May 2008, CLA-82.
Rumeli Telekom A.S. and Telsim Mobil Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, 29 July 2008, CLA-231.
S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL (Ad hoc), Partial Award, 13 November 2000, CLA-462.
United Parcel Service of America Inc. v. Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/02/1, Award on Jurisdiction, 22 November 2002.
Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corporation & Texaco Petroleum Company, 638 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 17 March 2011) CLA-435, R-247.
Republic of Ecuador v. John A. Connor et. al., 2013 W1 539011 (C.A.5 (Tex.)) (5th Cir. 13 February 2013), RLA-432.
New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (29 May 2001).
D. Bowett, "Estoppel before International Tribunals and its Relation to Acquiescence" (1957) 33 British Yearbook of International Law 176, CLA-179.
D. Caron, L. Kaplan & M. Pellonpää, The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: A Commentary (2006).
D. Caron & L. Kaplan, The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: A Commentary, 2nd ed. (2013), CLA-580, RLA-545.
B. Cheng, General Principles of Law, as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (1953, reprinted 1987), CLA-108, RLA-100.
J. Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (2002), CLA-288, RLA-549.
J. Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (2013), RLA-556.
Z. Douglas, "The Hybrid Nature of Investment Treaty Arbitration" (2003) 74 British Yearbook of International Law 152, CLA-177.
G.G. Fitzmaurice, "The Meaning of the Term 'Denial of Justice'" (1932) 13 British Yearbook of International Law 93, CLA-301.
A.V. Freeman, The International Responsibility of States for Denial of Justice (1938), CLA-297.
J. Gaffney & J. Loftis, "The 'Effective Means Meaning' of BITs and the Jurisdiction of Treaty-based Tribunals to hear Contract Claims" (2007) 8(1) Journal of World Investment & Trade 5, CLA-213.
Harvard Law Review, "Developments in the Law of Res Judicata" (1951-1952) 65 Harvard Law Review 818.
J. van Hof , Commentary on the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: The Application by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (1991).
I. MacGibbon, "Estoppel in International Law" (1958) 7 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 468, CLA-107, CLA-107.
M. Mustill & S. Boyd, Commercial Arbitration (1982).
A. McNair, "The Legality of the Occupation of the Ruhr" (1924) 5 British Yearbook of International Law 17.
D.P. O'Connell, International Law, 2nd ed. (1970).
J. Paulsson, Denial of Justice in International Law (2005), RLA-61.
S. Schwebel, International Arbitration: Three Salient Problems (1987).
T. Webster, Handbook of UNCITRAL Arbitration: Commentary, Precedents and Materials for UNCITRAL Based Arbitration Rules (2010).
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries (2001) II (Part Two) Yearbook of the ILC 31, CLA-291.
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, with commentaries (1966) II (Part Two) Yearbook of the ILC 187.
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Article VI(2): "In the event of an investment dispute, the parties to the dispute should initially seek a resolution through consultation and negotiation. If the dispute cannot be settled amicably, the national or company concerned may choose to submit the dispute, under one of the following alternatives, for resolution :
(a) to the courts or administrative tribunals of the Party that is a party to the dispute; or
(b) in accordance with any applicable, previously agreed dispute-settlement procedures; or
(c) in accordance with the terms of paragraph 3".
Article VI(3): "(a) Provided that the national or company concerned has not submitted the dispute for resolution under paragraph 2 (a) or (b) and that six months have elapsed from the date on which the dispute arose, the national or company concerned may choose to consent in writing to the submission of the dispute for settlement by binding arbitration:
(iii) in accordance with the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL);..."
Article VI(4): "Each Party hereby consents to the submission of any investment dispute for settlement by binding arbitration in accordance with the choice specified in the written consent of the national or company under paragraph 3. Such consent, together with the written consent of the national or company when given under paragraph 3 shall satisfy the requirement for :
(b) an "agreement in writing" for purposes of Article II of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at New York, June 10, 1958 ("New York Convention")..."
Article VI(5): "Any arbitration under paragraph 3(a) (ii), (iii) or (iv) of this Article shall be held in a state that is a party to the New York Convention."
Article VI(6): "Any arbitral award rendered pursuant to this Article shall be final and binding on the parties to the dispute. Each Party undertakes to carry out without delay the provisions of any such award and to provide in its territory for its enforcement."
(For ease of reference, these terms cited from Article VI of the Treaty, with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976), are herein collectively called the "Arbitration Agreement").
* Dr Grigera Naón : In their Notice of Arbitration dated 23 September 2009, the Claimants notified the Respondent of their appointment as co-arbitrator of Dr Horacio A. Grigera Naón, of 5224 Elliott Road, Bethesda, Maryland 20816, United States of America.
* Professor Lowe : On 4 December 2009, the Respondent notified the Claimants of its appointment as co-arbitrator of Professor Vaughan Lowe QC, of Essex Court Chambers, 24 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3EG, United Kingdom.
* Mr Veeder : By email of 22 January 2010, the Claimants informed the Permanent Court of Arbitration ("PCA") that the two co-arbitrators were unable to agree on the appointment of the presiding third arbitrator. Pursuant to the agreement between the Parties concerning the selection of the presiding third arbitrator, the PCA was requested to act as appointing authority and "if the party appointed arbitrators cannot agree on the President by Jan. 22 , then the PCA will appoint the President but only after the PCA provides the parties an opportunity to comment on the candidate under consideration by the PCA." Accordingly, on 25 February 2010 and in accordance with the Parties' agreement, the Secretary-General of the PCA appointed as the presiding arbitrator Mr V.V. Veeder, of Essex Court Chambers, 24 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3EG, United Kingdom.
(Professor Lowe and Mr Veeder are individual members of the English Bar. As such, albeit from the same barristers' chambers, they practise as arbitrators independently from each other, as disclosed by Mr Veeder in his Declaration of Acceptance and Statement of Impartiality and Independence dated 26 January 2010).
(i) The Claimants' Notice of Arbitration, dated 23 September 2009 ("C-NoA Sept. 2009");
(ii) The Claimants' Request for Interim Measures, dated 1 April 2010 ("C-IM Apr. 2010");
(iii) The Respondent's Response to Claimants' Request for Interim Measures dated 3 May 2010 ("R-IM May 2010");
(iv) The Respondent's Summary Description of its Preliminary Jurisdictional and Admissibility Objections dated 3 May 2010 ("R-Jur. May 2010");
(v) The Claimants' Reply in Support of Interim Measures dated 7 May 2010 ("C-IM May 2010");
(vi) The Respondent's Memorial on Jurisdictional Objections dated 26 July 2010 ("R-Jur. July 2010");
(vii) The Claimants' Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction dated 6 September 2010 ("C-Jur. Sept. 2010");
(viii) The Respondent's Reply Memorial on Jurisdictional Objections dated 6 October 2010 ("R-Jur. Oct. 2010");
(ix) The Claimants' Memorial on the Merits dated 6 September 2010 (as amended on 23 September 2010) ("C-Mer. Sept. 2010");
(x) The Claimants' Rejoinder on Jurisdiction dated 6 November 2010 ("C-Jur. Nov. 2010");
(xi) The Respondent's Track 1 Counter-Memorial on the Merits dated 3 July 2012 ("R-TI July 2012");
(xii) The Claimants' Supplemental Memorial on the Merits dated 20 March 2012 ("C-Mer. Mar. 2012");
(xiii) The Claimants' Reply Memorial on the Merits Track 1 dated 29 August 2012 ("C-TI Aug. 2012");
(xiv) The Respondent's Track 1 Rejoinder on the Merits dated 26 October 2012 ("R-TI Oct. 2012");
(xv) The Claimants' document submitted at the Track 1 Hearing in November 2012, claiming their prayer for relief ("C-TI Nov. 2012");
(xvi) The Respondent's Track 2 Counter-Memorial on the Merits dated 18 February 2013 ("R-TII Feb. 2013");
(xvii) The Respondent's letter to the Tribunal on "Show Cause" and "Reconsideration" dated 15 April 2013 ("R-Show Cause Apr. 2013");
(xviii) The Claimants' Initial Pleading on "Show Cause" and "Reconsideration" dated 6 May 2013 ("C-Show Cause May 2013");
(xix) The Respondent's Request for Enforcement of Interim Measures dated 3 June 2013 ("R-IM June 2013");
(xx) The Claimants' Reply Memorial–Track II dated 5 June 2013 (as amended on 12 June 2013) ("C-TII June 2013");
(xxi) The Claimants' Response to Respondent's Request for Enforcement of Interim Measures dated 17 June 2013 ("C-IM June 2013");
(xxii) The Respondent's Reply in Support of its Request for Enforcement of Interim Measures dated 17 July 2013 ("R-IM July 2013");
(xxiii) The Respondent's Reply on "Show Cause" and "Reconsideration" dated 19 July 2013 ("R-Show Cause July 2013");
(xxiv) The Claimants' Response to Respondent's Reply in Support of its Request for Enforcement of Interim Measures dated 8 August 2013 ("C-IM Aug. 2013");
(xxv) The Claimants' Rejoinder on "Show Cause" and "Reconsideration" dated 30 August 2013 ("C-Show Cause Aug. 2013");
(xxvi) The Respondent's Track 2 Rejoinder on the Merits dated 16 December 2013 ("R-TII Dec. 2013");
(xxvii) The Claimants' Supplemental Memorial on Track 1 dated 31 January 2014 ("C-TI Jan. 2014");
(xxviii) The Respondent's Track 1 Supplemental Counter-Memorial on the Merits dated 31 March 2014 ("R-TI Mar. 2014");
(xxix) The Claimants' Supplemental Memorial on Track 2 dated 9 May 2014 ("C-TII SMem. May 2014");
(xxx) The Claimants' Post-Submission Insert to their Supplemental Memorial on Track 2 – Examination of Zambrano Computer Hard Drives dated 15 August 2014 ("C-TII Aug. 2014");
(xxxi) The Respondent's Track 2 Supplemental Counter-Memorial on the Merits dated 7 November 2014 ("R-TII Nov. 2014");
(xxxii) The Claimants' Reply to the Respondent's Supplemental Track 2 Memorial dated 14 January 2015 ("C-TII Jan. 2015");
(xxxiii) The Respondent's Track 2 Supplemental Rejoinder on the Merits dated 17 March 2015 ("R-TII Mar. 2015");
(xxxiv) The Claimants' Post-Track II Hearing Brief on Track I Issues dated 15 July 2015 ("C-TI July 2015");
(xxxv) The Respondent's Track 1B Post-Hearing Memorial dated 15 July 2015 ("R-TI July 2015");
(xxxvi) The Claimants' Submission Concerning Digital Forensic Evidence and the Report of the Tribunal-Appointed Digital Forensics Expert dated 12 August 2016 ("C-TII Aug. 2016");
(xxxvii) The Respondent's Track 2 Supplemental Memorial on the Forensic Evidence of the Republic of Ecuador dated 12 August 2016 ("R-TII Aug. 2016");
(xxxviii) The Claimants' Reply Submission Concerning Digital Forensic Evidence and the Report of the Tribunal-Appointed Digital Forensics Expert dated 26 August 2016 ("C-TII Aug. 2016"); and
(xxxix) The Respondent's Track II Supplemental Reply on the Forensic Evidence of the Republic of Ecuador dated 26 August 2016 ("R-TII Aug. 2016").
(i) The witness statement of Rodrigo Pérez Pallares dated 4 September 2010;
(ii) The first witness statement of Ricardo Reis Veiga dated 27 August 2010;
(iii) The witness statement of Frank G. Soler dated 27 August 2012; and
(iv) The second witness statement of Ricardo Reis Veiga dated 28 August 2012.
(i) The expert report of Robert Wasserstrom dated 28 August 2010;
(ii) The first expert report of Ángel R. Oquendo dated 2 September 2010;
(iii) The first expert report of Vladimiro Álvarez Grau dated 2 September 2010;
(iv) The first expert report of Enrique Barros Bourie dated 3 September 2010;
(v) The second expert report of Enrique Barros Bourie dated 3 September 2010;
(vi) The first expert report of César Coronel Jones dated 3 September 2010;
(vii) The second expert report of César Coronel Jones also dated 3 September 2010;
(viii) The first expert report of David D. Caron dated 3 September 2010;
(ix) The first expert report of Gregory S. Douglas dated 3 September 2010;
(x) The first expert report of Gustavo Romero Ponce dated 3 September 2010;
(xi) The first expert report of John A. Connor dated 3 September 2010;
(xii) The expert report of Brent K. Kaczmarek dated 6 September 2010;
(xiii) The first expert report of Michael L. Younger dated 21 December 2011;
(xiv) The first forensic report of Robert A. Leonard dated 5 January 2012;
(xv) The first expert report of Gerald R. McMenamin dated 20 January 2012;
(xvi) The second expert report of Vladimiro Álvarez Grau dated 10 March 2012; (xvii) The first expert report of Mitchell A. Seligson dated 12 March 2012;
(xviii) The first expert report of Jan Paulsson dated 12 March 2012;
(xix) The second expert report of David D. Caron dated 24 August 2012;
(xx) The third expert report of Enrique Barros Bourie dated 27 August 2012;
(xxi) The expert report of William T. Allen dated 27 August 2012;
(xxii) The second expert report of Gustavo Romero Ponce dated 27 August 2012; (xxiii) The third expert report of César Coronel Jones dated 28 August 2012; (xxiv) The second expert report of Ángel R. Oquendo dated 28 August 2012;
(xxv) The fourth expert report of Enrique Barros Bourie. dated 19 November 2012; (xxvi) The fourth expert report of César Coronel Jones dated 19 November 2012; (xxvii) The first expert report of Weston Anson dated 6 May 2013;
(xxviii) The second expert report of Mitchell A. Seligson dated 23 May 2013;
(xxix) The second forensic report of Robert A. Leonard dated 24 May 2013; (xxx) The expert report of Adam Torres dated 24 May 2013;
(xxxi) The expert report of William D. Bellamy dated 30 May 2013;
(xxxii) The first expert report of Thomas E. McHugh dated 30 May 2013;
(xxxiii) The first expert report of Robert E. Hinchee dated 31 May 2013 (including the exhibited opinions of James I. Ebert and of William D. Di Paolo and Laura B. Hall);
(xxxiv) The first expert report of Suresh H. Moolgavkar dated 31 May 2013;
(xxxv) The expert report of Pedro J.J. Álvarez dated 31 May 2013;
(xxxvi) The expert report of Douglas Southgate dated 31 May 2013;
(xxxvii) The second expert report of Michael L. Younger dated 31 May 2013; (xxxviii) The second expert report of Gregory S. Douglas dated 1 June 2013;
(xxxix) The third expert report of Vladimiro Álvarez Grau dated 3 June 2013;
(xl) The fifth expert report of Enrique Barros Bourie dated 3 June 2013;
(xli) The second expert report of John A. Connor dated 3 June 2013;
(xlii) The fifth expert report of César Coronel Jones dated 3 June 2013;
(xliii) The first forensic report of Patrick Juola dated 3 June 2013;
(xliv) The second expert report of Jan Paulsson dated 3 June 2013;
(xlv) The expert report of Santiago Velázquez Coello dated 3 June 2013;
(xlvi) The first expert report of Jorge Wright-Ycaza dated 3 June 2013;
(xlvii) The second expert report of Weston Anson dated 30 August 2013;
(xlviii) The first forensic report of Spencer Lynch (of Stroz Friedberg) dated 7 October 2013;
(xlix) The third expert report of John A. Connor dated 7 May 2014;
(l) The sixth expert report of César Coronel Jones dated 7 May 2014;
(li) The second expert report of Thomas E. McHugh dated 7 May 2014;
(lii) The second expert report of Robert E. Hinchee dated 9 May 2014;
(liii) The second expert report of Suresh H. Moolgavkar dated 9 May 2014;
(liv) The second forensic report of Patrick Juola dated 12 August 2014;
(lv) The second forensic report of Spencer Lynch (of Stroz Friedberg) dated 15 August 2014;
(lvi) The third expert report of Robert E. Hinchee dated 11 January 2015;
(lvii) The sixth expert report of Enrique Barros Bourie dated 12 January 2015; (lviii) The second expert report of Jorge Wright-Ycaza dated 12 January 2015;
(lix) The seventh expert report of César Coronel Jones dated 13 January 2015;
(lx) The expert report of Juan Carlos Riofrío Martínez-Villalba dated 13 January 2015;
(lxi) The third expert report of Gregory S. Douglas dated 14 January 2015;
(lxii) The fourth expert report of John A. Connor dated 14 January 2015;
(lxiii) The third expert report of Thomas E. McHugh dated 14 January 2015;
(lxiv) The third forensic report of Spencer Lynch (of Stroz Friedberg) dated 14 January 2015; and
(lxv) The third expert report of Suresh H. Moolgavkar dated 14 January 2015.
(i) The witness statement of Norman Alberto Wray dated 10 December 2013;
(ii) The witness statement of Servio Amable Curipoma Sisalima dated 12 December 2013;
(iii) The witness statement of José León Guamán Romero dated 12 December 2013;
(iv) The witness statement of Mercedes Micailina Jaramillo Jiménez dated 13 December 2013; and
(v) The witness statement of Manuel Benjamin Pallares Carrión dated 14 December 2013.
The Respondent submitted the following written expert testimony relevant to Track II:
(i) The first expert report of Roberto Salgado Valdez dated 1 October 2010;
(ii) The first expert report of Genaro Eguiguren dated 4 October 2010;
(iii) The second expert report of Genaro Eguiguren dated 2 July 2012;
(iv) The second expert report of Roberto Salgado Valdez dated 2 July 2012;
(v) The first expert report of Gilles Le Chatelier dated 2 July 2012;
(vi) The second expert report of Gilles Le Chatelier dated 25 October 2012;
(vii) The third expert report of Genaro Eguiguren dated 26 October 2012;
(viii) The third expert report of Roberto Salgado Valdez dated 26 October 2012;
(ix) The first expert report of Fabián Andrade Narváez dated 18 February 2013;
(x) The first expert report of Kenneth J. Goldstein and Jeffrey W. Short (of the Louis Berger Group) dated 18 February 2013 (including the annexed opinions of Harlee S. Strauss and Edwin Theriot);
(xi) The first expert report of Philippe Grandjean dated 22 November 2013;
(xii) The first expert report of Jeffrey W. Short dated 11 December 2013;
(xiii) The expert report of Edwin Theriot dated 12 December 2013;
(xiv) The second expert report of Kenneth J. Goldstein and Jeffrey W. Short (of the Louis Berger Group) dated 16 December 2013;
(xv) The expert report of Kenneth A. Kaigler dated 16 December 2013;
(xvi) The first expert report of J. Christopher Racich dated 16 December 2013;
(xvii) The first expert report of Harlee S. Strauss dated 16 December 2013;
(xviii) The expert report of Paul H. Templet dated 16 December 2013;
(xix) The expert report of Jan M. van Dunné dated 27 March 2014;
(xx) The second expert report of Fabián Andrade Narváez dated 7 November 2014;
(xxi) The third expert report of Kenneth J. Goldstein and Edward A. Garvey (of the Louis Berger Group) dated 7 November 2014;
(xxii) The second expert report of Philippe Grandjean dated 7 November 2014;
(xxiii) The first expert report of Blanca Laffon dated 7 November 2014;
(xxiv) The second expert report of J. Christopher Racich dated 7 November 2014;
(xxv) The second expert report of Jeffrey W. Short dated 7 November 2014;
(xxvi) The second expert report of Harlee S. Strauss dated 7 November 2014;
(xxvii) The third expert report of Fabián Andrade Narváez dated 16 March 2015;
(xxviii) The fourth expert report of Kenneth J. Goldstein and Edward A. Garvey (of the Louis Berger Group) dated 16 March 2015;
(xxix) The third expert report of Philippe Grandjean dated 16 March 2015;
(xxx) The second expert report of Blanca Laffon dated 16 March 2015;
(xxxi) The third expert report of J. Christopher Racich dated 16 March 2015;
(xxxii) The third expert report of Jeffrey W. Short dated 16 March 2015; and
(xxxiii) The third expert report of Harlee S. Strauss dated 16 March 2015.
(i) The joint expert report of Enrique Barros Bourie, César Coronel Jones and Roberto Salgado dated 6 August 2012;
(ii) The joint expert report of Enrique Barros Bourie, César Coronel Jones, Genaro Eguiguren, Ángel R. Oquendo and Gustavo Romero dated 7 August 2012; and
(iii) The joint expert report of Gilles Le Chatelier and Ángel R. Oquendo dated 7 August 2012.
"The United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador (hereinafter the "Parties");
Desiring to promote greater economic cooperation between them, with respect to investment by nationals and companies of one Party in the territory of the other Party;
Recognizing that agreement upon the treatment to be accorded such investment will stimulate the flow of private capital and the economic development of the Parties;
Agreeing that fair and equitable treatment of investment is desirable in order to maintain a stable framework for investment and maximum effective utilization of economic resources;
Recognizing that the development of economic and business ties can contribute to the wellbeing of workers in both Parties and promote respect for internationally recognized worker rights; and
Having resolved to conclude a Treaty concerning the encouragement and reciprocal protection of investment;
Have agreed as follows:..."
"For the purposes of this Treaty,
(a) "investment" means every kind of investment in the territory of one Party owned or controlled directly or indirectly by nationals or companies of the other Party, such as equity, debt, and service and investment contracts; and includes:
(i) tangible and intangible property, including rights, such as mortgages, liens and pledges;
(ii) a company or shares of stock or other interests in a company or interests in the assets thereof;
(iii) a claim to money or a claim to performance having economic value, and associated with an investment;
(iv) intellectual property which includes, inter alia, rights relating to:... and
(v) any right conferred by law or contract, and any licences and permits pursuant to law;
(b) "company" of a party means any kind of corporation, company, association, partnership, or other organization, legally constituted under the laws and regulations of a Party or a political subdivision thereof whether or not organized for pecuniary gain, or privately or governmentally owned or controlled;..."
"(a) Investment shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment, shall enjoy full protection and security and shall in no case be accorded treatment less than that required by international law.
(b) Neither Party shall in any way impair by arbitrary or discriminatory measures the management, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment, acquisition, expansion, or disposal of investments. For purposes of dispute resolution under Articles VI and VII, a measure may be arbitrary or discriminatory notwithstanding the fact that a party has had or has exercised the opportunity to review such measures in the courts or administrative tribunals of a Party.
(c) Each Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments."
"1. For purposes of this Article, an investment dispute is a dispute between a Party and a national or company of the other Party arising out of or relating to (a) an investment agreement between that Party and such national or company; (b) an investment authorization granted by that Party's foreign investment authority to such national or company; or (c) an alleged breach of any right conferred or created by this Treaty with respect to an investment.
2. In the event of an investment dispute, the parties to the dispute should initially seek a resolution through consultation and negotiation. If the dispute cannot be settled amicably, the national or company concerned may choose to submit the dispute, under one of the following alternatives, for resolution:
(a) to the courts or administrative tribunals of the Party that is a party to the dispute; or
(b) in accordance with any applicable, previously agreed disputesettlement procedures; or
(c) in accordance with the terms of paragraph 3.
3. (a) Provided that the national or company concerned has not submitted the dispute for resolution under paragraph 2 (a) or (b) and that six months have elapsed from the date on which the dispute arose, the national or company concerned may choose to consent in writing to the submission of the dispute for settlement by binding arbitration: (iii) in accordance with the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL);...
4. Each Party hereby consents to the submission of any investment dispute for settlement by binding arbitration in accordance with the choice specified in the written consent of the national or company under paragraph 3. Such consent, together with the written consent of the national or company when given under paragraph 3 shall satisfy the requirement for:.. (b) an "agreement in writing" for purposes of Article II of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at New York, June 10, 1958 ("New York Convention")..."
5. Any arbitration under paragraph 3(a) (ii), (iii) or (iv) of this Article shall be held in a state that is a party to the New York Convention.
6. Any arbitral award rendered pursuant to this Article shall be final and binding on the parties to the dispute. Each Party undertakes to carry out without delay the provisions of any such award and to provide in its territory for its enforcement..."
"During the course of the arbitral proceedings either party may amend or supplement his claim or defence unless the arbitral tribunal considers it inappropriate to allow such amendment having regard to the delay in making it or prejudice to the other party or any other circumstance. However, a claim may not be amended in such a manner that the amended claim falls outside the scope of the arbitration clause or separate arbitration agreement."
"1. The arbitral tribunal may appoint one or more experts to report to it, in writing, on specific issues to be determined by the tribunal. A copy of the expert's terms of reference, established by the arbitral tribunal, shall be communicated to the parties.
2. The parties shall give the expert any relevant information or produce for his inspection any relevant documents or goods that he may require of them. Any dispute between a party and such expert as to the relevance of the required information or production shall be referred to the arbitral tribunal for decision.
3. Upon receipt of the expert's report, the arbitral tribunal shall communicate a copy of the report to the parties who shall be given the opportunity to express, in writing, their opinion on the report. A party shall be entitled to examine any document on which the expert has relied in his report.
4. At the request of either party the expert, after delivery of the report, may be heard at a hearing where the parties shall have the opportunity to be present and to interrogate the expert. At this hearing either party may present expert witnesses in order to testify on the points at issue. The provisions of article 25 shall be applicable to such proceedings."
"1. In addition to making a final award, the arbitral tribunal shall be entitled to make interim, interlocutory, or partial awards.
2. The award shall be made in writing and shall be final and binding on the parties. The parties undertake to carry out the award without delay. …
5. The award may be made public only with the consent of both parties. …
7. If the arbitration law of the country where the award is made requires that the award be filed or registered by the arbitral tribunal, the tribunal shall comply with this requirement within the period of time required by law."
"The release, under the provisions of Article V of this Contract, of all legal and contractual obligations and liability, towards the Government and Petroecuador, for the Environmental Impact arising from the Operations of the Consortium, including any claims that the Government and Petroecuador have, or may have against Texpet, arising out of the Consortium Agreements."
"On the execution date of this Contract [i.e. 4 May 1995], and in consideration of Texpet's agreement to perform the Environmental Remedial Work in accordance with the Scope of Work set out in Annex A, and the Remedial Action Plan, the Government and Petroecuador shall hereby release, acquit and forever discharge Texpet, Texaco Petroleum Company, Compañia Texaco de Petróleos del Ecuador, S.A., Texaco Inc., and all their respective agents, servants, employees, officers, directors, legal representatives, insurers, attorneys, indemnitors, guarantors, heirs, administrators, executors, beneficiaries, successors, predecessors, principals and subsidiaries (hereinafter referred to as 'the Releasees') of all the Government's and Petroecuador's claims against the Releasees for Environmental Impact arising from the Operations of the Consortium, except for those related to the obligations contracted hereunder for the performance by Texpet of the Scope of Work (Annex A) …"
"The Government and Petroecuador intend claims to mean any and all claims, rights to Claims, debts, liens, common or civil law or equitable causes of actions and penalties, whether sounding in contract or tort, constitutional, statutory, or regulatory causes of action and penalties (including, but not limited to, causes of action under Article 19-2 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, Decree No. 1459 of 1971, Decree No. 925 of 1973, the Water Act, R.O. 233 of 1973, ORO No. 530 of 1974, Decree No. 374 of 1976, Decree No. 101 of 1982, or Decree No. 2144 of 1989, or any other applicable law or regulation of the Republic of Ecuador), costs, lawsuits, settlements and attorneys' fees (past, present, future, known or unknown), that the Government or Petroecuador have, or ever may have against each Releasee for or in any way related to contamination, that have or ever may arise in the future, directly or indirectly arising out of Operations of the Consortium, including but not limited to consequences of all types of injury that the Government or Petroecuador may allege concerning persons, properties, business, reputations, and all other types of injuries that may be measured in money, including but not limited to, trespass, nuisance, negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, or any other theory or potential theory of recovery."
" … The Government and PetroEcuador proceed to release, absolve and discharge TexPet, Texas Petroleum Company, Compañia Texaco de Petróleos del Ecuador, S.A., Texaco Inc., and all their respective agents, servants, employees, officers, directors, legal representatives, insurers, attorneys, indemnitors, guarantors, heirs, administrators, executors, beneficiaries, successors, predecessors, principals, subsidiaries forever, from any liability and claims by the Government of the Republic of Ecuador, PetroEcuador and its Affiliates, for items related to the obligations assumed by TexPet in the aforementioned Contract [the 1995 Settlement Agreement] …."
"1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted."
"All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law."
"A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if:
(a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and
(b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State."
"The international responsibility of a State which is entailed by an internationally wrongful act in accordance with the provisions of part one involves legal consequences as set out in this part."
"The State responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an obligation:
(a) to cease that act, if it is continuing;
(b) to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so require."
"1. The responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.
2. Injury includes any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the internationally wrongful act of a State."
"1. The obligations of the responsible State set out in this part may be owed to another State, to several States, or to the international community as a whole, depending in particular on the character and content of the international obligation and on the circumstances of the breach.
2. This part is without prejudice to any right, arising from the international responsibility of a State, which may accrue directly to any person or entity other than a State."
"Full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter."
"A State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to make restitution, that is, to re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed, provided and to the extent that restitution:
(a) is not materially impossible;
(b) does not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution instead of compensation."
"1. The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to compensate for the damage caused thereby, insofar as such damage is not made good by restitution.
2. The compensation shall cover any financially assessable damage including loss of profits insofar as it is established."
"1. The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to give satisfaction for the injury caused by that act insofar as it cannot be made good by restitution or compensation.
2. Satisfaction may consist in an acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology or another appropriate modality.
3. Satisfaction shall not be out of proportion to the injury and may not take a form humiliating to the responsible State."
"1. Interest on any principal sum due under this chapter shall be payable when necessary in order to ensure full reparation. The interest rate and mode of calculation shall be set so as to achieve that result.
2. Interest runs from the date when the principal sum should have been paid until the date the obligation to pay is fulfilled."
"In the determination of reparation, account shall be taken of the contribution to the injury by wilful or negligent action or omission of the injured State or any person or entity in relation to whom reparation is sought."
"1. The independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the Constitution or the law of the country. It is the duty of all governmental and other institutions to respect and observe the independence of the judiciary.
2. The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
3. The judiciary shall have jurisdiction over all issues of a judicial nature and shall have exclusive authority to decide whether an issue submitted for its decision is within its competence as defined by law.
4. There shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the judicial process, nor shall judicial decisions by the courts be subject to revision. This principle is without prejudice to judicial review or to mitigation or commutation by competent authorities of sentences imposed by the judiciary, in accordance with the law.
5. Everyone shall have the right to be tried by ordinary courts or tribunals using established legal procedures. Tribunals that do not use the duly established procedures of the legal process shall not be created to displace the jurisdiction belonging to the ordinary courts or judicial tribunals.
6. The principle of the independence of the judiciary entitles and requires the judiciary to ensure that judicial proceedings are conducted fairly and that the rights of the parties are respected.
7. It is the duty of each Member State to provide adequate resources to enable the judiciary to properly perform its functions."
"Notwithstanding other rights which are necessary for the full moral and material development that is derived from the nature of the person, the State guarantees: … 2. The right to live in an environment free of pollution. It is the duty of the State to ensure that this right is not affected and to promote the preservation of nature. The law shall establish the limitations on the exercising of certain rights and freedoms, to protect the environment;"
(In the original Spanish: "Sin perjuicio de otros derechos necesarios para el pleno desenvolvimiento moral y material que se deriva de la naturaleza de la persona, el Estado le garantiza: (…) 2. El derecho de vivir en un medio ambiente libre de contaminación. Es deber del Estado velar para que este derecho no sea afectado y tutelar la preservación de la naturaleza. La ley establecerá las restricciones al ejercicio de determinados derechos o libertades, para proteger el medio ambiente;").
"Without prejudice to the rights established in the Constitution and the international instruments currently in force, the State recognizes and guarantees the following to the people: … 15. The right to file complaints and petitions to the authorities, but under no circumstances on behalf of the people, and to receive attention or relevant responses within an appropriate period."
(In the original Spanish: "Sin perjuicio de los derechos establecidos en esta Constitución y en los instrumentos internacionales vigentes, el Estado reconocerá y garantizará a las personas los siguientes : (…) 15. El derecho a dirigir quejas y peticiones a las autoridades, pero en ningún caso en nombre del pueblo; y a recibir la atención o las respuestas pertinentes, en el plazo adecuado.").
"Each individual has the right to free access to justice and effective, impartial and expeditious protection of his rights and interests, subject to the principles of immediacy and celerity. In no case a person shall be left defenseless. Noncompliance with judgments shall be punished by law."
(In the original Spanish: "Toda persona tiene derecho al acceso gratuito a la justicia y a la tutela efectiva, imparcial y expedita de sus derechos e intereses, con sujeción a los principios de inmediación y celeridad; en ningún caso quedará en indefensión. El incumplimiento de las resoluciones judiciales será sancionado por la ley.").
"The right of persons to a defense shall include the following guarantees: … k) To be judged by an independent, impartial and competent judge. No one shall be judged by extraordinary courts or special commissions created for this purpose."
(In the original Spanish: "El derecho de las personas a la defensa incluirá las siguientes garantías: (…) k) Ser juzgado por una jueza o juez independiente, imparcial y competente. Nadie será juzgado por tribunales de excepción o por comisiones especiales creadas para el efecto.").
"The law does not provide except for the future; it has no retroactive effect; and when a later law conflicts with a prior law, the following rules shall be observed:
18. The laws in effect when a contract is executed shall be deemed incorporated into such contract.
This provision shall not apply to: (1) laws about how to sue for rights resulting from the contract and (2) laws indicating penalties for a violation of the contractual provisions, since the violation will be punished in accordance with the law under which it was committed;
20. Laws concerning the hearing of and procedure in lawsuits shall prevail over prior laws from the time at which they take effect. But time periods that have already begun to run, and any proceedings that have already commenced, shall be governed by the law that was in effect at that time;"
(In the original Spanish: "La ley no dispone sino para lo venidero: no tiene efecto retroactivo; y en conflicto de una ley posterior con otra anterior, se observarán las reglas siguientes: (…)
18. En todo contrato se entenderán incorporadas las leyes vigentes al tiempo de su celebración.
Exceptúanse de esta disposición: 1ro., las leyes concernientes al modo de reclamar en juicio los derechos que resultaren del contrato; y, 2., las que señalan penas para el caso de infracción de lo estipulado en los contratos; pues ésta será castigada con arreglo a la ley bajo la cual se hubiere cometido;
20. Las leyes concernientes a la sustanciación y ritualidad de los juicios, prevalecen sobre las anteriores desde el momento en que deben comenzar a regir. Pero los términos que hubieren comenzado a correr, y las actuaciones y diligencias que ya estuvieren comenzadas, se regirán por la ley que estuvo entonces vigente;").
"Judges shall not suspend or deny the administration of justice because of the obscurity or lack of a law. In such cases, they shall adjudicate in accordance with the following rules:
1. When the meaning of the law is clear, they shall not disregard its literal meaning, on the pretext of determining the spirit of the law.
However, to interpret an obscure provision of a law, they may indeed resort to its intent or spirit as clearly manifested in the law itself, or to the trustworthy history of the law's establishment;
2. The words in the law shall be understood in their natural and obvious meaning, in accordance with the general use of the words themselves, but when the legislator has expressly defined them for certain subjects, the words shall be given their legal meaning;
3. The technical words from any science or art shall be taken in the meaning given to them by those practicing the same science or art; unless it clearly appears that they have been taken to mean something different;
4. The context of a law shall be used to interpret the meaning of each of its parts, so that the due connection and harmony exists among all of them.
Obscure passages in a law may be illustrated by means of other laws, particularly if they deal with the same topic;
5. The favorable or odious aspect of a provision shall not be taken into account to broaden or restrict its interpretation. The scope that shall be given to any law shall be determined through its genuine meaning and in accordance with the foregoing rules of interpretation.
6. In cases where the foregoing rules of interpretation cannot be applied, obscure or contradictory passages shall be interpreted in the manner that is most consistent with the general spirit of the law and natural fairness; and,
7. If there is no law, the laws governing analogous cases shall be applied, and if there are no such laws, then the general principles of universal law shall be used."
(In the original Spanish: "Los jueces no pueden suspender ni denegar la administración de justicia por oscuridad o falta de ley. En tales casos juzgarán atendiendo a las reglas siguientes:
1a.- Cuando el sentido de la ley es claro, no se desatenderá su tenor literal, a pretexto de consultar su espíritu.
Pero bien se puede, para interpretar una expresión oscura de la ley, recurrir a su intención o espíritu claramente manifestados en ella misma, o en la historia fidedigna de su establecimiento;
2a.- Las palabras de la ley se entenderán en su sentido natural y obvio, según el uso general de las mismas palabras; pero cuando el legislador las haya definido expresamente para ciertas materias, se les dará en éstas su significado legal;
3a.- Las palabras técnicas de toda ciencia o arte se tomarán en el sentido que les den los que profesan la misma ciencia o arte, a menos que aparezca claramente que se han tomado en sentido diverso;
4a.- El contexto de la ley servirá para ilustrar el sentido de cada una de sus partes, de manera que haya entre todas ellas la debida correspondencia y armonía.
Los pasajes oscuros de una ley pueden ser ilustrados por medio de otras leyes, particularmente si versan sobre el mismo asunto;
5a.- Lo favorable u odioso de una disposición no se tomará en cuenta para ampliar o restringir su interpretación. La extensión que deba darse a toda ley se determinará por su genuino sentido y según las reglas de interpretación precedentes;
6a.- En los casos a que no pudieren aplicarse las reglas de interpretación precedentes, se interpretarán los pasajes oscuros o contradictorios del modo que más conforme parezca al espíritu general de la legislación y a la equidad natural; y,
7a.- A falta de ley, se aplicarán las que existan sobre casos análogos; y no habiéndolas, se ocurrirá a los principios del derecho universal.").
"The creditor can act against all the joint and several debtors jointly, or against any of them, at his discretion, without the latter being able to oppose the benefit of division."
(In the original Spanish: "El acreedor podrá dirigirse contra todos los deudores solidarios juntamente, o contra cualquiera de ellos a su arbitrio, sin que por éste pueda oponérsele el beneficio de división.").
"The joint and several debtor who has paid the debt, or has canceled it through any of the means equivalent to payment, remains subrogated in the creditor's legal action with all his privileges and securities, but is limited, vis-a-vis each of the codebtors, to this co-debtor's part or share of the debt."
(In the original Spanish: "El deudor solidario que ha pagado la deuda, o la ha extinguido por alguno de los medios equivalentes al pago, queda subrogado en la acción del acreedor con todos sus privilegios y seguridades; pero limitada, respecto de cada uno de los codeudores, a la parte o cuota que tenga este codeudor en la deuda.").
"Every contract legally executed is the law for the contracting parties and cannot be invalidated except by the mutual agreement of the parties or for legal reasons."
(In the original Spanish: "Todo contrato legalmente celebrado es una ley para los contratantes, y no puede ser invalidado sino por su consentimiento mutuo o por causas legales.").
"Contracts should be performed in good faith, and thus obligate, not only what is expressly provided for, but all things that precisely emanate from the nature of the obligation whether by law or custom."
(In the original Spanish: "Los contratos deben ejecutarse de buena fe, y por consiguiente obligan, no sólo a lo que en ellos se expresa, sino a todas las cosas que emanan precisamente de la naturaleza de la obligación, o que, por la ley o la costumbre, pertenecen a ella.").
"Damages include consequential damages and lost profit, regardless of whether they result from failure to comply with the obligation, or improper performance of the obligation or delay in the performance. The foregoing rule does not apply to cases in which the law limits the damages to consequential damages. It also does not apply to damages for pain and suffering as granted by Title XXXIII of Book IV of this Code."
(In the original Spanish: "La indemnización de perjuicios comprende el daño emergente y el lucro cesante, ya provengan de no haberse cumplido la obligación, o de haberse cumplido imperfectamente, o de haberse retardado el cumplimiento. Exceptúanse los casos en que la ley la limita al daño emergente. Exceptúanse también las indemnizaciones por daño moral determinadas en el Título XXXIII del Libro IV de este Código.").
"Whoever commits an offense or tort resulting in harm to another shall indemnify the affected party, without detriment to the penalty provided by law for such offense or tort."
(In the original Spanish: "El que ha cometido un delito o cuasidelito que ha inferido daño a otro, está obligado a la indemnización; sin perjuicio de la pena que le impongan las leyes por el delito o cuasidelito.").
"If an intentional or unintentional tort has been committed by two or more persons, each of them shall be joint and severally liable for any damage stemming from the same intentional or unintentional tort, except for the exceptions in Articles 2223 and 2228."
(In the original Spanish: "Si un delito o cuasidelito ha sido cometido por dos o más personas, cada una de ellas será solidariamente responsable de todo perjuicio procedente del mismo delito o cuasidelito, salvo las excepciones de los Arts. 2223 y 2228.").
"As a general rule, all damages that can be attributed to malice or negligence by another person must be compensated for by that person. Individuals especially obligated to this compensation include: 1. An individual who causes fires or explosions recklessly; 2. An individual who recklessly shoots a firearm; 3. An individual who removes flagstones from a trench or pipe in the street or along a road without necessary precautions to prevent those traveling during the day or night from falling; 4. An individual who, obligated to build or repair an aqueduct or bridge that crosses a road, maintains it in such a state that it causes injury to those who cross it; and, 5. An individual who manufactures and circulates products, objects, or devices that cause accidents due to construction or manufacturing defects, shall be held liable for the respective damages."
(In the original Spanish: "Por regla general todo daño que pueda imputarse a malicia o negligencia de otra persona debe ser reparado por ésta. Están especialmente obligados a esta reparación: 1. El que provoca explosiones o combustión en forma imprudente; 2. El que dispara imprudentemente una arma de fuego; 3. El que remueve las losas de una acequia o cañería en calle o camino, sin las precauciones necesarias para que no caigan los que por allí transitan de día o de noche; 4. El que, obligado a la construcción o reparación de un acueducto o puente que atraviesa un camino, lo tiene en estado de causar daño a los que transitan por él; y, 5. El que fabricare y pusiere en circulación productos, objetos o artefactos que, por defectos de elaboración o de construcción, causaren accidentes, responderá de los respectivos daños y perjuicios.").
"As a general rule, a popular action is granted in all cases of contingent harm which, due to recklessness or negligence of a party threatens undetermined persons. But if the harm threatened only determined persons, only one of these may pursue the action."
(In the original Spanish: "Por regla general se concede acción popular en todos los casos de daño contingente que por imprudencia o negligencia de alguno amenace a personas indeterminadas. Pero si el daño amenazare solamente a personas determinadas, sólo alguna de éstas podrá intentar la acción.").
"Substantive formalities which are common to all proceedings and instances, are: … 3. Legal capacity;"
(In the original Spanish: "Son solemnidades sustanciales comunes a todos los juicios e instancias: (…) 3. Legitimidad de personería;").
"This Act establishes the principles and guidelines for environmental policy, determines the obligations, responsibilities and levels of participation of the public and the private sectors in environmental management and indicates the permissible limits, controls and punishments in this field."
(In the original Spanish: "La presente Ley establece los principios y directrices de política ambiental; determina las obligaciones, responsabilidades, niveles de participación de los sectores público y privado en la gestión ambiental y señala los límites permisibles, controles y sanciones en esta materia.").
"Environmental management is subject to the principles of solidarity, mutual responsibility, cooperation, coordination, recycling and reutilization of waste, use of environmentally sustainable alternative technologies and respect for traditional cultures and practices."
(In the original Spanish: "La gestión ambiental se sujeta a los principios de solidaridad, corresponsabilidad, cooperación, coordinación, reciclaje y reutilización de desechos, utilización de tecnologías alternativas ambientalmente sustentables y respecto a las culturas y prácticas tradicionales.").
"In order to protect individual or collective environmental rights, a public action is hereby granted to individuals and legal entities or human groups to denounce the violation of environmental rules without prejudice to the action for constitutional protection provided for in the Political Constitution of the Republic."
(In the original Spanish: "Con el fin de proteger los derechos ambientales individuales o colectivos, concédese acción pública a las personas naturales, jurídicas o grupo humano para denunciar la violación de las normas de medio ambiente, sin perjuicios de la acción de amparo constitucional previsto en la Constitución Política de la República.").
"Any individual, legal entity or human group can be heard in criminal, civil, or administrative proceedings filed for violations of an environmental nature, after posting a slander bond even if their own rights have not been violated.
The President of the Superior Court of the place where the harm to the environment occurred shall have jurisdiction to hear the actions that may be brought as a result of such harm. If the harm covers various jurisdictions, any of the presidents of the superior courts of those jurisdictions shall have jurisdiction."
(In the original Spanish: Toda persona natural, jurídica o grupo humano podrá ser oída en los procesos penales, civiles o administrativos, previa fianza de calumnia, que se inicien por infracciones de carácter ambiental, aunque no haya sido vulnerados sus propios derechos.
EI Presidente de la Corte Superior del lugar en que se produzca 1a afectación ambiental será el competente para conocer las acciones que se propongan a consecuencia de la misma. Si la afectación comprende varias jurisdicciones, la competencia corresponderá a cualquiera de los presidentes de las cortes superiores de esas jurisdicciones.").
"The individuals, legal entities or human groups linked by a common interest and affected directly by the harmful act or omission may file before the court with jurisdiction actions for damages and for deterioration caused to health or the environment, including biodiversity and its constituent elements.
Without prejudice to any other legal actions that might be available, the judge shall order the party responsible for the damage to pay compensation in favor of the community directly affected and to repair the harm and damage caused. The judge shall also order the responsible party to pay ten percent (10%) of the value of the compensation in favor of the plaintiff.
Without prejudice to these payments, and in the event that the community directly affected cannot be identified or such community is the entire community, the judge shall order that payment of damages be made to the institution that performs the remediation work, in accordance with this law.
In any event, the judge shall determine in his ruling, in accordance with the experts' reports that may be ordered, the amount required to remediate the damage caused and the amount to be given to the members of the community directly affected. The judge shall also determine the individual or legal entity that shall receive payment and perform the remediation work.
Claims for damages originating from harm to the environment shall be heard in verbal summary proceedings."
(In the original Spanish: "Las personas naturales, jurídicas o grupos humanos, vinculados por un interés común y afectados directamente por la acción u omisión dañosa podrán interponer ante el Juez competente, acciones por daños y perjuicios y por el deterioro causado a la salud o al medio ambiente incluyendo la biodiversidad con sus elementos constitutivos.
Sin perjuicio de las demás acciones legales a que hubiere lugar, el juez condenará al responsable de los daños al pago de indemnizaciones a favor de la colectividad directamente afectada y a la reparación de los daños y perjuicios ocasionados. Además condenará al responsable al pago del diez por ciento (10%) del valor que represente la indemnización a favor del accionante.
Sin perjuicio de dichos pagos y en caso de no ser identificable la comunidad directamente afectada o de constituir ésta el total de la comunidad, el juez ordenará que el pago que por reparación civil corresponda se efectúe a la institución que debe emprender las labores de reparación conforme a esta Ley.
En todo caso, el juez determinará en sentencia, conforme a los peritajes ordenados, el monto requerido para la reparación del daño producido y el monto a ser entregado a los integrantes de la comunidad directamente afectada. Establecerá además la persona natural o jurídica que deba recibir el pago y efectuar las labores de reparación.
Las demandas por daños y perjuicios originados por una afectación al ambiente, se tramitarán por la vía verbal sumaria.").
"Any person who has suffered harm, in any way, by a collusive procedure or act, e.g., if he/she has been deprived of the ownership, possession or occupancy of a piece of real property, or of any right in rem of use, usufruct, occupancy, easement or antichresis over such piece of real property or other rights that are legally due to such person, may file an action before the civil and commercial judge of the domicile of any of the defendants."
(In the original Spanish: El que mediante algún procedimiento o acto colusorio hubiere sido perjudicado en cualquier forma, como entre otros, en el caso de privársele del dominio, posesión o tenencia de algún inmueble, o de algún derecho real de uso, usufructo, habitación, servidumbre o anticresis constituido sobre un inmueble o de otros derechos que legalmente le competen, podrá acudir con su demanda ante la jueza o juez de lo civil y mercantil del domicilio de cualquiera de los demandados.").
"Once the conciliation hearing has taken place and if the proceedings continue, the judge shall grant a ten day period for evidence. The judge shall request the record of the proceedings where the collusion allegedly played a role, as well as that of the associated proceedings, if any, and shall order, ex officio or at the request of the interested party, any evidence that deemed necessary for clarification of facts.
If the requested proceedings are ongoing, a copy shall be requested."
(In the original Spanish: "Realizada la junta de conciliación, caso de continuarse el juicio, la jueza o juez concederá el término de diez días para la prueba; pedirá entonces el juicio en que se pretende haber incidido la colusión, y los procesos conexos, si los hubiere, y ordenará, de oficio o a petición de parte, las pruebas que estimare procedentes para el esclarecimiento de los hechos.
Si los procesos pedidos estuvieren en trámite, se ordenará conferir copia.").
"The judge shall issue the decision within a period of fifteen days. If the grounds for the claim are confirmed, measures to void the collusive proceeding will be issued, invalidating the act or acts, and contract or contracts affected by it, as the case may be, and redressing the harm caused, by restoring to the affected party the possession or holding of the property in question, or the enjoyment of the respective right, and, as a general matter, restoring the things to the state prior to the collusion.
If the lawsuit was brought also against judges and attorneys, and there is proof that they participated maliciously, the judge shall forward copies of the court file to the Judiciary Council to initiate proceedings for removal from office or suspension of the professional practice, as the case may be, without detriment to sentencing them to joint payment of compensation for damages.
Once the judgment becomes final and enforceable, the damages amount shall be liquidated by the trial court, in a separate record. Once the amount has been determined, it shall be collected by attachment order."
(In the original Spanish: "La jueza o juez expedirá el fallo dentro del término de quince días. De encontrar fundada la demanda, se dictarán las medidas para que quede sin efecto el procedimiento colusorio, anulando el o los actos, contrato o contratos que estuvieren afectados por el, según el caso, y se reparen los daños y perjuicios ocasionados, restituyéndose al perjudicado la posesión o tenencia de los bienes de que se trate, o el goce del derecho respectivo, y, de manera general, reponiendo las cosas al estado anterior de la colusión.
Si la demanda se hubiere dirigido también contra los jueces y abogados, y se probare que han intervenido maliciosamente, la jueza o juez remitirá copias del expediente al Consejo de la Judicatura para que se inicien los expedientes de destitución o de suspensión del ejercicio profesional, según sea el caso, sin perjuicio de condenarlos, a unos y a otros, al pago solidario de los daños y perjuicios ocasionados.
Ejecutoriada la sentencia se liquidarán los daños y perjuicios ante el tribunal de primera instancia, en cuaderno separado. Determinado el monto, se lo cobrará con apremio real.").
"The affected party may bring a private criminal action seeking a punishment ranging from one month to a year of imprisonment for those responsible for the collusion. The statute of limitations period for such action shall begin on the day on which the judgment in civil proceedings became final and enforceable."
(In the original Spanish: "El afectado podrá iniciar la correspondiente acción penal privada, para que se imponga a los responsables de la colusión la pena de un mes a un año de prisión por el cometimiento de la colusión. El plazo de prescripción de la acción comenzará a correr desde el día en que se ejecutoríe la sentencia en el juicio civil.").
"Estimado Dr. Zambrano:
Me pongo en contacto con Ud. en mi capacidad de Secretario del Tribunal en el caso CPA Nº 2009-23: "Chevron Corporation y Texaco Petroleum Company c. República del Ecuador" con el fin de hacerle llegar una comunicación del Señor V.V. Veeder, Presidente del Tribunal Arbitral en dicho procedimiento, invitándole a participar en una audiencia que tendrá lugar del 21 de abril al 5 de mayo de 2015 en la sede del Banco Mundial en Washington DC, EE.UU. A tales efectos, ruego sírvase encontrar adjunta a continuación copia de la misma.
Para el caso en que decida aceptar la invitación del Tribunal para participar en esta audiencia, le ruego se ponga en contacto conmigo en la mayor brevedad en los siguientes contactos: [The Tribunal's Secretary, the PCA with full contact details supplied].
Le ruego, a este efecto, que me avise a más tardar el viernes 10 de abril de 2015 si aceptará la invitación del Tribunal, ya que después de esta fecha no será posible tomar los arreglos necesarios para su participación.
Desde ya le agradezco su atención para con este tema y no dude contactar conmigo para cualquier pregunta que le surja en relación con esta carta. Muy atentamente, Martín Doe Rodríguez …"8
"Estimado Dr. Zambrano,
Como tal vez ya sea de su conocimiento, Chevron Corporation y Texaco Petroleum Company (las "Demandantes") iniciaron en 2009 un arbitraje internacional frente a la Corte Permanente de Arbitraje en la Haya (la "CPA") bajo el Reglamento de Arbitraje de la CNUDMI en contra del Estado de Ecuador como Demandada de acuerdo con un Tratado entre Ecuador y los Estados Unidos de América (el "Tratado").
Le escribimos a usted en nuestra capacidad de Tribunal Arbitral nombrado de acuerdo con el Tratado para decidir la disputa entre las Demandantes y la Demandada.
En este procedimiento arbitral, las Demandantes alegan que la Demandada ha violado sus obligaciones de derecho internacional, inter alia, a través de las acciones y omisiones del Poder Judicial ecuatoriano durante el caso de Lago Agrio. La Demandada niega las alegaciones de las Demandantes y se opone a la base legal jurisdiccional para las demandas de las Demandantes bajo el Tratado.
Se celebrará con las Demandantes y la Demandada una audiencia en este arbitraje que tendrá lugar en el Banco Mundial en Washington DC, EE.UU. del 21 de abril al 5 de mayo de 2015.
Si fuera del todo posible, el Tribunal Arbitral quisiera recibir su testimonio sobre los hechos del caso. Por este motivo, el Tribunal le invita a presentarse como testigo en esta audiencia, o si eso no fuera posible, que participe por medio de una videoconferencia.
Si acepta esta invitación, la CPA se encargará de los arreglos necesarios para su participación, incluyendo para cubrir sus gastos razonables.
El Tribunal ha informado a ambas las Demandantes y la Demandada de su intención de extenderle esta invitación y las Partes no han planteado ninguna objeción al respecto.
Esperamos su pronta rrespuesta, antes del viernes 10 de abril de 2015.
Atentamente, [The President of the Tribunal]."9
"The tropical forests of the Oriente are among the most biologically diverse natural ecosystems on earth - a treasure trove of rare and unique species and a potential source of medicines, fruits, nuts, and other forest foods and products. Ecuador's ancient rain forests lie at the headwaters of the Amazon River system and help control flooding and erosion, even in the river's lower reaches. The Oriente's forests also help regulate the region's rainfall and climate. The forest is a storehouse of carbon. When it is burned or cleared, carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere, heightening the potential for global warming. The rain forests of the Oriente are also home to the region's indigenous peoples who depend on the forest for their livelihoods. Without the forest, Amazonian peoples would be threatened with cultural and, in some cases, physical extinction …".
"Ecuador's Oriente has a rich heritage of indigenous cultures and is home to eight groups of indigenous people. Estimates of the Oriente's indigenous population range from 90,000 to 250,000 – 25 to 50 percent [of] the region's total population. Two groups, the Quichua and the Shuar, together account for the great majority of indigenous people in the Oriente. The balance of the population is found among the Achuar, Cofan, Huaorani, Shiwiar, Secoya, and Siona. The Huaorani number roughly 1,580 individuals, the Shiwiar some 600, and together the Secoya and Siona number about 350. The Cofan population, once 15,000, is now approximately 300 [citation omitted]."
"Indigenous peoples have lived in Amazonia for thousands of years in harmony with their rain forest environment. Since the Spanish arrived in Ecuador nearly 500 years ago, the Oriente has been a magnet for fortune-seekers and missionaries. Spanish adventurers first entered upper Amazonia in what is now Ecuador, and the first mission bases were established there in the sixteenth century. It was not until the rubber extraction boom began in the late 1800s, however, that dreams of easy wealth first came true in Amazonia. A handful of 'rubber barons' became rich, but at great expense to the people. Their atrocities throughout Amazonia are well-documented. Thousands of indigenous people in Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia were killed [citation omitted]. The boom ended in the early 1900s, when rubber seeds were smuggled out of Brazil and successfully cultivated on plantations in Malaysia."
"… As a first point, I would like to talk about the present justice system in Ecuador. In the year 2008, the latest Constitutional Assembly in Ecuador as an expression of sovereign expression of the Ecuadorian nation approved the new Constitution that rules our country at the moment …
In terms of the justice administration, the new Constitution consolidated previous efforts of the judicial reform of Nineties. Although still we are not in the position that we would like to be, we are achieving important progress in this ambit. First of all, we have to concentrate the existence of Courts and other Tribunals to marginal places allowing better access to justice. [Secondly,] There is an improvement in justice efficiency in relation to the number of cases that are resolved. Thirdly, we have achieved greater transparency and publicity in terms of the activities of the judiciary; and, fourthly, we have developed norms that rules behaviour of judges and lawyers.
In this way, in our system of justice is an improvement. There is advancement. We continuously improve trying to achieve high standards, standards of efficiency for the benefit of the Ecuadorian society.
… I accepted my designation, and I have done my job as Procurador of the State of the Republic of Ecuador convinced and respectful of the autonomy of the functions of the State because I am convinced of the independency of the justice system of my country and the process of change. But by the same token I am very conscious of the difficult problems affecting our systems still. We still have delays in processes in front of our courts. We have complaints against dishonest Courts, and we have problems of salaries for judges and magistrates and lawyers. But I am conscious of our problems.
… We know our deficiencies, but we are working to correct them."
"When TexPet came and drilled oil, they set up their oil rig here where the hole in the ground is; and to get to the oil it's approximately 3,000 meters deep. So 9 to 10,000 feet is where the oil-producing layers are in this area. To drill down that far, there's a significant amount of rock and dirt that came out of the hole; and they had to have some place to put that. These are called cuttings pits or reserve pits. And this large pit over here to the side probably started off as a cuttings and reserve pit, so the debris would [be] placed immediately to the side of the well. When you're drilling a well, to get the debris to come out, you have to force drilling mud, which is a sort of a thick mud that, as you push it down, it pushes the rocks and the debris out; and to make drilling mud, you need a significant amount of water … After the well was drilled and they reached the oil layers, this pit and these reserve pits would often end up filled with oil …"
"… In order for us to find oil present to the surface, the reservoir that's supplying this oil has to be quite large because it has to have been insulated from weathering for 30 years. How was it insulated? … We have leaf litter falling on top of the pit. It prevents oxygen from penetrating into the underground; and, as a result, the oil here is effectively capped temporarily by this leaf litter and prevented from weathering. What does that mean? Well, it means that a small disturbance … that a farmer might make would very quickly release the oil back to the surface here. Additionally, a large change in the water table … could also push the oil upward above it. This may, in fact, be the reason we see oil at the surface here …".
"… this Court further concludes that there is another independently- sufficient reason why this action must be dismissed: plaintiffs' failure to join indispensable parties, namely, Petroecuador and the Republic of Ecuador. The extensive equitable relief sought by the plaintiffs-ranging from total environmental 'cleanup' of the affected lands in Ecuador to a major alteration of the consortium's TransEcuador pipeline [i.e. the "SOTE" pipeline] to the direct monitoring of the affected lands for years to come cannot possibly be undertaken in the absence of Petroecuador, which has owned 100% of the consortium since 1992 and 100% of the pipeline since 1986, or the Republic of Ecuador, which has helped supervise the consortium's activities from the outset and which owns much, if not all, of the affected lands. Petroecuador and the Republic of Ecuador thus are necessary 'persons to be joined if feasible' under either and both prongs of Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a)
"Section A - Actions to Which Agreements Apply: Texaco Inc.'s agreements herein apply only to a lawsuit that meets all the following conditions:
1. The lawsuit must be brought by a named plaintiff in Aguinda. et al. v, Texaco Inc., Case No. 93 Civ. 7527 (JSR) (hereafter "Aguinda").
2. The lawsuit must have been filed in an appropriate court of competent civil jurisdiction in Ecuador;
3. The lawsuit must arise out of the same events and occurrences alleged in the Aguinda Complaint filed in this Court on November 3, 1993.
4. To insure prompt notice, a copy of each Complaint intended to be filed by Aguinda plaintiffs (or any of them) in Ecuador must have been delivered to Texaco Inc.'s designated representative in Ecuador identified in Section B(1) below not later than the actual date on which it is filed.
Section B - Agreements: With respect to any lawsuit that meets the conditions set forth above (a "Foreign Lawsuit"), Texaco Inc. hereby makes the following agreements:
1. Texaco Inc. will accept service of process in a Foreign Lawsuit in accordance with the applicable law of Ecuador. Texaco Inc.'s designated representative in Ecuador authorized to accept service of process in a Foreign Lawsuit shall be: [Name and address of Texaco's representative in Quito Ecuador here omitted]. The authority of [Texaco's representative] to accept service of process in a Foreign Lawsuit will become effective upon final dismissal of this action and judgment by this Court. (The judgment shall become "final" upon the exhaustion of all available appeals or, if no appeal is filed, the time for filing appeals has expired.)
2. In any such Foreign Lawsuit, Texaco Inc. will waive and/or not assert an objection based on lack of in personam jurisdiction to the civil jurisdiction of a court of competent jurisdiction in Ecuador.
3. In any such Foreign Lawsuit, Texaco Inc. will waive any statute of limitations-based defense that matured during the period of time between: (a) the filing date of the Aguinda Complaint in this Court (i.e. November 3, 1993), and (b) the 60th day after the dismissal of this action and judgment becomes final, as defined in Section B(1) above. Texaco Inc., however, is not waiving any statute of limitations-based rights or defenses with respect to the passage of time prior to November 3, 1993, and Texaco Inc. expressly reserves its right to contend in a Foreign Lawsuit that plaintiffs' claims were barred, in whole or in part, by the applicable statute of limitations as of November 3, 1993 when they filed their Complaint in this Court.
4. Texaco Inc. agrees that discovery conducted to date during the pendency of Aguinda in this Court may be used by any party in a Foreign Lawsuit, including Texaco Inc., to the same extent as if that discovery had been conducted in proceedings there, subject to all parties' rights to challenge the admissibility and relevance of such discovery under the applicable rules of evidence.
5. Texaco Inc. agrees to satisfy a final judgment (i.e. a judgment with respect to which all appeals have been exhausted), if any, entered against it in a Foreign Lawsuit in favor of a named plaintiff in Aguinda, subject to Texaco Inc.'s reservation of its right to contest any such judgment under New York's Recognition of Foreign Country Money Judgments Act, 7B N.Y. Civ. Prac. L&R § 5301-09 (McKinney 1978)."
(This undertaking, as varied, came into effect with the eventual stay of the Aguinda Litigation on 16 August 2002, i.e. after Texaco's "merger" with Chevron in 2001).
"Chevron Corporation claims, without citation to relevant case law, that it is not bound by the promises made by its predecessors in interest Texaco and ChevronTexaco, Inc. However, in seeking affirmation of the district court's forum non conveniens dismissal, lawyers from Chevron-Texaco appeared in this Court and reaffirmed the concessions that Texaco had made in order to secure dismissal of Plaintiffs' complaint. In so doing, Chevron-Texaco bound itself to those concessions. In 2005, Chevron-Texaco dropped the name "Texaco" and reverted to its original name, Chevron Corporation. There is no indication in the record before us that shortening its name had any effect on Chevron-Texaco's legal obligations. Chevron Corporation therefore remains accountable for the promises upon which we and the district court relied in dismissing [the Aguinda] Plaintiffs' action."51
"At the outset, we note that Chevron is not a party to the BIT. Unlike the more typical scenario where the agreement to arbitrate is contained in an agreement between the parties to the arbitration, here the BIT merely creates a framework through which foreign investors, such as Chevron, can initiate arbitration against parties to the Treaty. In the end, however, this proves to be a distinction without a difference, since Ecuador, by signing the BIT, and Chevron, by consenting to arbitration, have created a separate binding agreement to arbitrate."73
"… Broadly speaking, plaintiffs allege that Donziger and the ADF are seeking complete control of the proceeds of the Lago Agrio litigation, for their own benefit and to the detriment of the Huaorani … Plaintiffs allege that the Donziger defendants have … claimed to represent all of the indigenous people, including plaintiffs and other Huaorani, in activities related to the Lago Agrio. However, it is plaintiffs' position that plaintiffs never authorised such representation and that there is no written retainer agreement, nor any other agreement, which sets forth Donziger or ADF's obligations to plaintiffs in connection with the Lago Agrio Litigation. Nevertheless, plaintiffs allege that as a result of Donziger's and ADF's representations that Donziger is counsel for plaintiffs in the Lago Agrio litigation and that ADF brought the Lago Agrio litigation on behalf of all of the Ecuadorian people harmed by Texaco's operations, including the Huaorani, the Donziger defendants and ADF owe plaintiffs a fiduciary duty, including a duty to protect their interests in the Lago Agrio litigation, a duty to notify plaintiffs of any arrangements with third parties (investors, funders, and/or the Republic of Ecuador) regarding the proceeds of the judgment, and a duty to notify plaintiffs of enforcement efforts, settlement negotiations or any other significant developments regarding the proceeds of the litigation.
Plaintiffs claim, on information and belief, that the money that the Donziger defendants and ADF collect will be 'dissipated and funnelled to off-shore havens beyond the reach of US Courts and that the Donziger Defendants and ADF intend to assign away [the Huaorani's] interest in the Lago Agrio judgment in exchange for money'. It is plaintiffs' position that the Donziger defendants and ADF have agreements with investors and funders in exchange for interests in the judgments and that they have already collected more than $10 million by selling shares in the judgment, that the Republic of Ecuador expects to receive at least 90% of the proceeds of the judgment; and that the Donziger defendants and ADF intend to distribute the remaining proceeds of the judgment to lawyers and investors before passing the remaining money to Ecuadorian trusts controlled by ADF." (pp. 4-5).
"… I explained to Dr González [the Legal Under-Secretary General of the Presidential Office] that …. [w]ith respect to the topic of the contract, I explained that the Attorney General's Office [sic] and all of us working on the State' s defense were searching for a way to nullify or undermine the value of the remediation contract and the final acta and that our greatest difficulty lay in the time that has passed."
(The "remediation contract" and "final acta" were references to the 1995 Settlement Agreement ad the 1998 Final Release. The "State's defense" referred to the pending AAA Arbitration in New York, described above).
"Today, President Rafael Correa called upon the District Attorney of Ecuador to allow a criminal case to be heard against the Petroecuador officers who approved the petroleum remediation in Ecuador's Amazonia performed by the multinational company, Texaco. The petition was made after a visit was made to the covered pits of Well 7 (Shushufindi), supposedly remediated by the oil company in the 1990s. Residents in the area said that the oil company did not solve the problem, rather just covered the crude waste pits with dirt. Those affected emphasized that the waste also contaminates the river around which indigenous communities traditionally live. Similarly, some residents in the area stated their complaints about the activities being carried out by Petroecuador in the area. One person reported to the president and the Minister of Health, Caroline Chang, on a disease he has, allegedly linked to oil activities, asking the government for help. During the president's visit, the visitors became familiar with some sites where oil waste remains in spite of the fact that an environmental remediation was carried out. The others who participated in this visit were the Minister of Health, Caroline Chang; the Minister of Tourism, Marfa Isabel Salvador; the Minister of the Environment, Ana Alban; the Minister of Energy, Alberto Acosta, Petroecuador's president, Carlos Pareja; and the Secretary of Communication, Monica Chuji."
" … (3) An order and award requiring Ecuador to inform the court in the Lago Agrio Litigation that TexPet, its parent company, affiliates, and principals have been released from all environmental impact arising out of the former Consortium's activities and that Ecuador and Petroecuador are responsible for any remaining and future remediation work;
(4) A declaration that Ecuador or Petroecuador is exclusively liable for any judgment that may be issued in the Lago Agrio Litigation;
(5) An order and award requiring Ecuador to indemnify, protect and defend Claimants in connection with the Lago Agrio Litigation, including payment to Claimants of all damages that may be awarded against Chevron in the Lago Agrio Litigation;
(6) An award for all damages caused to Claimants, including in particular all costs including attorneys' fees incurred by Claimants in defending the Lago Agrio Litigation and the criminal indictments; …".