(a) The defendant is hereby permanently restrained (whether by its officers, servants, agents or any of them or otherwise howsoever) from taking any steps in reliance on the ruling in the March Judgment by the courts of the Republic of Maldives, or any decision upholding the March Judgment.1
It is also declared that:
(b) The Awards are final, valid and binding on the parties;2 and
(c) The defendant’s claim before the courts of the Republic of Maldives in the Maldivian action is in respect of disputes between the plaintiff and defendant that have arisen out of or in connection with the Management Agreement, and any consequential proceedings resulting therefrom (including any appeals) are in breach of the arbitration agreement in the Management Agreement and/or the Terms of Reference.3
It is further ordered that:
(d) Nothing in this order shall prevent the defendant from objecting to the recognition or enforcement of the Awards, and
(e) The defendant is to pay the plaintiff the costs of and incidental to this application to be taxed on a standard basis, if not agreed.
... the Parties irrevocably agree that any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or in connection with this [Management Agreement], or the breach, termination or invalidity thereof shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the [ICC] by one (1) or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with said Rules. Any arbitration proceedings shall be conducted in English. The venue of the arbitration shall be Singapore International Arbitration Centre.
(a) Whether the court has jurisdiction over the defendant;
(b) Whether the court has the power to grant a permanent anti-suit injunction for an arbitration seated in Singapore where arbitration proceedings have already concluded and the award issued; and
(c) If the answers to (a) and (b) are yes, whether the court should grant the permanent anti-suit injunction in the overall circumstances of this case.
(a) The plaintiffs claim falls within the scope of O 11 of the Rules;
(b) The plaintiffs claim has a sufficient degree of merit; and
(c) Singapore is the most appropriate forum.
... the court's general injunctive power emanates from s 4(10) of the CLA. This is the power that the court exercises when it grants a permanent anti-suit injunction in aid of local court proceedings. There is no reason why this power cannot be exercised to make permanent anti-suit injunctions in aid of domestic international arbitration proceedings especially since... the courts can grant interim anti-suit injunctions in such situations.
Injunctions and receivers granted or appointed by interlocutory orders
(10) A Mandatory Order or an injunction may be granted or a receiver appointed by an interlocutory order of the court, either unconditionally or upon such terms and conditions as the court thinks just, in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just or convenient that such order should be made.
The phrase "by an interlocutory order of the court" should be read to apply not only to the appointment of a receiver, but also the grant of a mandatory order and an injunction. This reading of s 4(10) was affirmed in the Court of Appeal decision in Swift-Fortune Ltd v Magnifica Marine SA  1 SLR(R) 629 ("Swift-Fortune"). Chan Sek Keong CJ, delivering the judgment of the court, held (at ) that the provision only gives the court power to grant interlocutory injunctions. Although that case concerned the interpretation of s 12(7) of the IAA, which has since been replaced by s 12A of the IAA, this court is nevertheless bound by this interpretation of s 4(10) of the CLA to hold that it does not give the court the power to grant a permanent injunction.
Article 5. Extent of court intervention
In matters governed by this Law, no court shall intervene except where so provided in this Law.
Thus, if a matter is governed by the Model Law, the court's intervention is restricted to the extent provided for in the Model Law and nothing else. As the Model Law does not provide for a court's grant of permanent injunctions, the question is thus whether the grant of a permanent anti-suit injunction or other court intervention following the conclusion of arbitral proceedings is a matter governed by the Model Law.
... in my judgment there is no good reason for diffidence in granting an injunction to restrain foreign proceedings on the clear and simple ground that the defendant has promised not to bring them.
Millet LJ recognised that the court's jurisdiction to grant the injunction was discretionary and not to be exercised as a matter of course but maintained that "good reason" needed to be shown why the jurisdiction should not be exercised in any given case. The burden of establishing the existence of such a "good reason" rests on the party in breach of the agreement to arbitrate. The fact that a foreign court (applying its own rules) has assumed jurisdiction does not constitute a good reason.
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