Tomás Redondo, 1
28033 Madrid
Spain

Félix Sobrino Martínez
María Grande de Capua
Iberdrola Energía, S.A.
Tomás Redondo, 1
28003 Madrid
Spain

E-mail: fsobrino@iberdrola.es
mgrande@iberdrola.es

Gabriel Bottini
Gillian Cahill
Heidi López Castro
Uría Menéndez Abogados, S.L.P.
Príncipe de Vergara, 187
Plaza de Rodrigo Uría
28002 Madrid
Spain

E-mail: gabriel.bottini@uria.com
gillian.cahill@uria.com
heidi.lopez@uria.com
proc.iberdrola.guatemala@uria.com

Miguel Virgós
Serrano 240, 1°
28016 Madrid
Spain

E-mail: miguel.virgos@virgosarbitration.com

Jorge Luis Donado Vivar
Procurador General de la Nación
Ana Luisa Gatica Palacios
Mario René Mérida Pichardo
15 Av.9-69, zona 13
Ciudad de Guatemala
Guatemala

E-mail: despachosuperior@pgn.gob.gt
ana.gaticap@pgn.gob.gt
mario.meridap@pgn.gob.gt

Roberto Antonio Malouf Morales
Ministro de Economía
Alba Edith Flores Ponce de Molina
Viceministra de Integración y Comercio Exterior
8a Avenida 10-43 zona 1
Ciudad de Guatemala
Guatemala

E-mail: ramalouf@mineco.gob.gt
edemolina@mineco.gob.gt

Eduardo Silva Romero
Audrey Caminades
Dechert (Paris) LLP
32, Rue de Monceau
Paris, 75008
France

E-mail: eduardo.silvaromero@dechert.com
audrey.caminades@dechert.com

Juan Felipe Merizalde
Dechert (Paris) LLP
1900 K Street, NW
Washington D.C., 20006
United States of America

E-mail: juanfelipe.merizalde@dechert.com
caso-iberdrola@dechert.com

Prof. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler (President)
Lévy Kaufmann-Kohler
3-5, rue du Conseil-Général
CH-1211 Geneva 4
Switzerland
Tel.: +41 22 809 6200
E-mail: gabrielle.kaufmann-kohler@lk-k.com

Prof. Pierre-Marie Dupuy (Co-Arbitrator)
Richard Sorge Strasse 23 /De
10249 Berlin
Germany
Tel.: +33 6 77 95 24 38
E-mail: pierre-marie.dupuy@graduateinstitute.ch

J. Christopher Thomas, QC (Co-Arbitrator)
1200 Waterfront Centre
200 Burrard Street, Mail Box #48600
Vancouver, BC V7X 1T2
Canada
Tel: +1-604 640-4058
E-mail: jcthomas@thomas.ca

Ms. Sabina Sacco
Lévy Kaufmann-Kohler
3-5, rue du Conseil-Général
CH-1211 Geneva 4
Switzerland
Tel.: +41 22 809 62 00
E-mail: sabina.sacco@lk-k.com

a. It can resolve the Respondent's preliminary objections without reviewing the merits of the case, in which case the proceedings will continue to be bifurcated, and the next step will be a hearing on preliminary objections, or

b. It cannot resolve the Respondent's preliminary objections without going into the merits of the case, in which case it will join the preliminary objections to the merits and convene a procedural hearing to establish a calendar for the joined jurisdiction and merits phase.

a. Subject to paragraph (b) below, the Respondent’s primary and alternative objections to jurisdiction and/or admissibility shall be bifurcated;

b. The Tribunal reserves the possibility to join the Respondent’s alternative objection that the claims fall outside of its ratione materiae jurisdiction to the merits after the hearing;

c. The hearing scheduled for 4 June 2019 (with 5 June 2019 as reserve day) is confirmed;

d. The Respondent shall indicate if it wishes to call any of the Claimant’s experts for cross-examination by 15 April 2019;

e. A pre-hearing conference call will be held on one of the following days and times: 23, 24, 25, or 26 April at 15:00, 16:00 or 17:00 CET. The Parties are invited to state whether they are available on such dates and times by 21 March 2019. Unless either Party objects within that time limit, this conference shall be conducted by the Presiding Arbitrator on behalf of the Tribunal;

f. The Tribunal will issue a decision on the Respondent's counterclaim together with its decision on the Respondent's objections;

g. The Tribunal defers its decision on costs to a later stage.

Tribunal:
Prof. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler (Presiding Arbitrator)
Prof. Pierre-Marie Dupuy
Mr. J. Christopher Thomas QC

Secretary of the Tribunal
Ms. Sabina Sacco

PCA
Mr. José Luis Aragón Cardiel, Legal Counsel
Ms. Juana Martínez Quintero, Assistant Legal Counsel

Claimant
Mr. Félix Sobrino Martínez, Iberdrola Energía, S.A.
Ms. María Grande de Capua, Iberdrola Energía, S.A.
Mr. Miguel Virgós, Uría Menéndez Abogados, S.L.P
Mr. Gabriel Bottini, Uría Menéndez Abogados, S.L.P
Mr. Sebastián Green Martínez, Uría Menéndez Abogados, S.L.P
Ms. Jana Lamas de Mesa, Uría Menéndez Abogados, S.L.P
Mr. Daniel García Clavijo, Uría Menéndez Abogados, S.L.P

Respondent
Mr. Jorge Luis Donado Vivar, Procurador General de la Nación
Mr. Mario de Jesús Morales, Asesor de Despacho Superior de la Procuraduría General de la Nación
Ms. Ana Luisa Gatica Palacios, Jefe de la Unidad de Asuntos Internacionales de la Procuraduría General de la Nación
Ms. Karla Estefanía Liquez Aldana, Asesora Legal Vicedespacho de Integración y Comercio Exterior, Ministerio de Economía
Ms. Agnese Borsoi Jaureguí Asesora de Defensa Comercial, Dirección de Administración de Comercio Exterior, Ministerio de Economía
Mr. Eduardo Silva Romero, Dechert (Paris) LLP
Ms. Audrey Caminades, Dechert (Paris) LLP
Mr. Juan Felipe Merizalde, Dechert LLP
Ms. Ana María Durán López, Dechert LLP

Court Reporters
Ms. Michelle Kirkpatrick

Interpreters
Mr. Tomás José González
Mr. José Antonio Carvallo-Quintana

IFS Audiovisual
Mr. Erwin van den Bergh

Solve IT
Mr. Sybren Emmelkamp

i. First, in August 2008, EEGSA initiated proceedings before the Guatemalan administrative and judicial courts against the National Electric Energy Commission (Comisión Nacional de Energía Eléctrica or the "CNEE"),⁴ arguing that the CNEE's resolutions determining the tariffs were not in accordance with Guatemalan law.⁵ These proceedings included three constitutional amparo actions,⁶ which were finally decided against EEGSA by the Guatemalan Constitutional Court.⁷

ii. Second, in March 2009, Iberdrola initiated an arbitration against Guatemala before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID"), invoking provisions of the Treaty ("Iberdrola I"). The Iberdrola I tribunal declined jurisdiction with respect to all of Iberdrola's claims with the exception of its claim for denial of justice, which the tribunal dismissed on the merits.⁸ Specifically, the Iberdrola I tribunal found that the facts alleged by Iberdrola, even if proven, could not amount to a breach of the Treaty.⁹ Instead, the tribunal concluded that Iberdrola's claims involved issues of domestic law which were not covered by the Treaty dispute resolution clause. It thus denied jurisdiction.

iii. Third, Iberdrola initiated annulment proceedings pursuant to Article 52 of the ICSID Convention with respect to the Iberdrola I award. By a majority, the ad hoc Committee denied Iberdrola's annulment request.¹⁰

i. The Claimant has brought this claim in open disregard for the negative effect of res judicata. The Claimant has brought a claim based on the same facts and between the same parties, and its attempts to distinguish the legal basis of the claim are unavailing. In Iberdrola I, the Claimant brought claims under the Treaty (although the tribunal held that, even if proven, the facts alleged were not susceptible of constituting Treaty breaches). The triple identity test has been met and the Tribunal must decline jurisdiction. Were the Tribunal to hold otherwise, it should conclude that Iberdrola's international law claims are precluded in application of the principle of concentration of arguments and claims, according to which it is the claimant's duty to invoke all of its legal arguments when submitting its first claim.¹⁴

ii. Alternatively, the Claimant has violated the fork in the road clause of the Treaty (Article 11(2)). Although this clause requires a claimant to bring suit in one forum only, the Claimant has acted in three fora : the first instance court and then the Constitutional Court of Guatemala, ICSID and this Tribunal. This breach of the fork-in-the-road provision is the ground for the counterclaim.¹⁵ Even if Article 11(2) of the Treaty were not a fork-in-the-road provision, the Respondent argues that Article 26 of the ICSID Convention precludes the Claimant from bringing this arbitration.

iii. Alternatively, the claim amounts to harassment and abuse of right. As explained by the Orascom tribunal, "the initiation of multiple proceedings to recover for essentially the same economic harm would entail the exercise of rights for purposes that are alien to those for which these rights were established."¹⁶

In view of the foregoing, reserving the right to subsequently supplement, develop or modify its position and in the appropriate phases of these proceedings, Guatemala respectfully requests the Tribunal to:

a. Declare that it lacks jurisdiction over the claims of the Claimant;

b. Otherwise, declare that the claims of the Claimant are inadmissible;

c. Declare that it has jurisdiction over Guatemala's Counterclaim in accordance with Article 11(1) of the Treaty and Article 19 of the UNCITRAL Rules of 1976;

d. Declare that the Claimant violated Article 11(2) of the Treaty;

e. Order the Claimant to pay the amount of at least US$2 million plus all amounts incurred for costs and legal expenses in this arbitration, as reparation for the damages caused, plus interest;

f. In the alternative, and in accordance with Article 40 of the UNCITRAL Rules of 1976, order the Claimant to reimburse Guatemala all costs and legal expenses it incurred in this arbitration, plus interest; and

g. Order any other measures that the Arbitral Tribunal deems appropriate.

In view of the foregoing, reserving the right to subsequently supplement, develop or modify its position and in the appropriate phases of these proceedings, Guatemala respectfully requests the Tribunal to:

a. Declare that it lacks jurisdiction over the claims of the Claimant;

b. Otherwise, declare that the claims of the Claimant are inadmissible;

c. Declare that it has jurisdiction over Guatemala's Counterclaim in accordance with Article 11(1) of the Treaty and Article 19 of the UNCITRAL Rules of 1976;

d. Declare that the Claimant violated Article 11(2) of the Treaty;

e. Order the Claimant to pay the amount of at least USD 2 million plus all amounts incurred for costs and legal expenses in this arbitration, as reparation for the damages caused, plus interest;

f. In the alternative, and in accordance with Article 40 of the UNCITRAL Rules of 1976, order the Claimant to reimburse Guatemala all costs and legal expenses it incurred in this arbitration, plus interest; and

g. Order a hearing to be held on the preliminary objections pursuant to Article 15(2) of the UNCITRAL Rules of 1976; and

h. Order any other measures that the Arbitral Tribunal deems appropriate.

i. With respect to the Respondent’s res judicata objection, the Claimant denies that the triple identity test has been met. It does not deny that there is an identity of parties and concedes that there is some overlap in the subject matter of the dispute (in particular, it acknowledges that "the different claims arise from the same factual matrix").²⁵ It argues, however, that the claims in this dispute are claims under the Treaty, while the claims in Iberdrola I were found to be claims under domestic law, and consequently not based on the same legal ground (causa petendi).²⁶ In any event, as explained in two recent decisions of the ICJ, aside from applying the triple identity test, it is also necessary to ascertain the content of the prior decision. The Iberdrola I tribunal found that the claims submitted to it, as formulated, were national law claims. As the Claimant is now bringing treaty claims that are not premised on breaches of national law, the present claims are not precluded by res judicata.²⁷

ii. The Claimant denies that a "concentration of claims" argument is applicable. The Respondent's argument is based on national court decisions and is "contrary to the basic principles that regulate res judicata in international law", where "res judicata applies only to what has been decided."²⁸

iii. The Respondent's fork-in-the-road objection is similarly meritless. According to the Claimant, Article 11(2) of the BIT does not contain a true fork in the road. Even if it did, it would only apply to claims under Article 11 of the BIT. As none of the claims submitted so far were considered to be claims under Article 11, the fork-in-the-road argument cannot apply.²⁹ Nor does Article 26 of the ICSID Convention bar the present proceedings.

iv. The Claimant strongly denies having committed an abuse of process, noting that this is a serious accusation that should be made only in extreme circumstances, which are "clearly not present here".³⁰ The Claimant insists that it is "simply exercising a right it has to resolve its investment disputes under the Guatemala-Spain BIT through international arbitration, a way of resolving disputes to which Guatemala expressly consented in Article 11 of that Treaty."³¹ The Claimant emphasizes that it has been open and transparent with the Respondent as to why the Iberdrola I decision did not prevent Iberdrola's treaty claims from being finally determined on their merits.³²

v. The Claimant further rejects the Respondent's alternative objection, i.e., that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction ratione materiae. The Claimant insists that its claims before this Tribunal are "treaty claims not premised on any breach of national law."³³

In light of the above, Iberdrola respectfully requests the Tribunal to:

(i) Declare that it is competent to hear Iberdrola’s claims;

(ii) Declare that Iberdrola’s claims are admissible.

(iii) Consequently, dismiss all Objections on Jurisdiction and Admissibility raised by Guatemala;

(iv) Order Guatemala to bear all costs incurred by Iberdrola in relation to Guatemala’s Objections on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, plus interest; and

(v) Order any other relief that the Tribunal may deem fit and proper.

In light of the above, Iberdrola respectfully requests the Tribunal to:

(i) Declare that it has jurisdiction to hear and decide on Iberdrola’s claims;

(ii) Declare that Iberdrola’s claims are admissible;

(iii) Consequently, dismiss all Objections on Jurisdiction and Admissibility raised by Guatemala;

(iv) Dismiss Guatemala's counterclaim;

(v) In due course, find that Guatemala has breached the standards of fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, the international minimum standard, and the prohibition of arbitrary measures contained in Article 3 of the BIT.

(vi) Order Guatemala to bear all Iberdrola's costs in relation to Guatemala's Objections on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, plus interest; and

(vii) Order any other relief that the Tribunal may deem just.

The distributors of electricity in Guatemala, such as EEGSA, were paid for their services (and for the investments necessary to carry out those services) through a component of the tariff, the Valor Agregado de Distibucion or VAD. The VAD of each distributor, including EEGSA, was to be determined through a procedure established under the General Electricity Law of Guatemala (LGE) and its regulation (RLGE). The procedure contemplated the participation of the distributor (in this case EEGSA) in the determination of the VAD and the intervention of an Expert Commission of three members (appointed by the distributor and the regulator) should discrepancies arise between the distributor and the regulator.³⁹

i. The ad hoc committee found that the Iberdrola I tribunal did not manifestly exceed its power. It noted that arbitral tribunals have the authority to characterize the claims submitted by the parties from a legal perspective, and that the Iberdrola I tribunal’s approach in this regard, while strict, had been reasonable.⁷⁴

ii. The Iberdrola I tribunal did not depart from any fundamental rule of procedure. First, because the Iberdrola I tribunal had the authority to make a procedural decision, such as ruling that the claimant could not modify the relief sought after the hearing.⁷⁵ Second, the Iberdrola I tribunal addressed in its award each of Iberdrola’s claims.⁷⁶

iii. The ad hoc committee found, after reviewing the structure of the reasoning of the Iberdrola I tribunal in its Award, that the tribunal had properly stated its reasons.⁷⁷

i. It is undisputed that the parties in this case and in Iberdrola I are the same.⁹⁷

ii. In both cases, the Claimant has requested the tribunal to hold that Guatemala had violated Article 3 of the Treaty and order the State to pay compensation.⁹⁸ There is thus identity of petitum.

iii. Finally, there is identity of factual and legal bases, and thus identity of cause of action.⁹⁹ Both cases rely on the same set of facts related to the Tariff-Setting Process and, in particular, to CNEE Resolutions 144-2008, 145-2008 and 146-2008. Indeed, the Claimant has accepted that both cases are based on the same facts. Crucially, in Iberdrola I the Claimant invoked the same Treaty breaches that it is invoking now and pleaded first before the tribunal and then before the ad hoc committee that its claims were made under international law.¹⁰⁰

i. The parties to Iberdrola I thoroughly debated whether or not the facts invoked by the Claimant constituted a dispute under the Treaty. The discussion was not about the "form" in which the claims had been submitted. Indeed, the tribunal requested the parties to indicate in their post-hearing briefs whether the facts that they considered proved had produced consequences under the BIT or under international law. The Claimant made colossal efforts to show this.¹⁰⁹

ii. The Iberdrola I tribunal analyzed whether the facts alleged by the Claimant, if proven, could amount to a violation of the Treaty.¹¹⁰ After assessing these facts, as set out in the parties' pleadings and evidence, the tribunal found that "the foundation for Iberdrola's claim" was a dispute under Guatemalan law, and that Iberdrola had failed to show which "acts of authority" by Guatemala could constitute violations of the Treaty.¹¹¹

iii. The Iberdrola I tribunal also analyzed Iberdrola's legal arguments and found that there was no connection between the facts alleged and the standards invoked. Nor were there any acts of imperium which under international law may constitute violations of treaty rights.¹¹²

i. Is a general principle of law in the terms of Article 38.1 of the ICJ Statute. The references to national law have been provided by way of example. The Respondent cites more examples to support this assertion.¹⁴⁸

ii. Has been applied by many international courts and tribunals¹⁴⁹, as international law condemns the practice of "claim-splitting".

iii. Is consistent with the doctrine of "exhaustion of treaty process" (in French, "épuisement des recours prévus dans le traité") recognized by the ICJ. Like the res judicata and the principle of ne bis in idem, this doctrine seeks to put an end to disputes. Citing the Nicaragua v. Colombia case, the Respondent argues that, "[u]nder this principle, 'the renewed presentation of a claim previously examined by the Court may be considered inadmissible if that claim relies on the same treaty process as the basis of jurisdiction of the Court.'"¹⁵⁰

iv. Is supported by international legal authorities.¹⁵¹

It is not sufficient, for the application of res judicata, to identify the case at issue, characterized by the same parties, object and legal ground; it is also necessary to ascertain the content of the decision, the finality of which is to be guaranteed. The Court cannot be satisfied merely by an identity between requests successively submitted to it by the same Parties; it must determine whether and to what extent the first claim has already been definitively settled.²⁰⁶

[F]or res judicata to apply in a given case, the Court 'must determine whether and to what extent the first claim has already been definitively settled' [...] for '[i]f a matter has not in fact been determined, expressly or by necessary implication, then no force of res judicata attaches to it'.²⁰⁷

The essential point is that a decision on a preliminary objection can never be preclusive of a matter appertaining to the merits, whether or not it has in fact been dealt with in connection with the preliminary objection [...] It may occur that a judgment on a preliminary objection touches on a point of merits, but this it can do only in a provisional way, to the extent necessary for deciding the question raised by the preliminary objection. Any finding on the point of merits therefore, ranks simply as part of the motivation of the decision on the preliminary objection, and not as the object of that decision. It cannot rank as a final decision on the point of merits involved.²²⁴

i. The tribunal started by analyzing Article 11 of the BIT. It concluded that "the consent of the Republic of Guatemala to submit disputes under the Treaty to arbitration is clearly limited to those disputes concerning 'matters regulated by' the Treaty itself."²³⁷

ii. The tribunal then addressed how "the way in which the Claimant raised its claims regarding the standards of the Treaty that it considers have been violated by Guatemala." For the Claimant, this means that the tribunal was addressing how Iberdrola's claims had been formulated.²³⁸

iii. When assessing each of the claims, the tribunal concluded that Iberdrola had only presented local law claims.

iv. After this claim by claim analysis, the tribunal found that Iberdrola had only submitted claims of Guatemalan law over which it had no jurisdiction, and that, as formulated, Iberdrola's claims required a prior decision from the tribunal on claims of local law.²³⁹ However, the tribunal determined that it was not its function to act as an appellate body and review the findings of local courts.

If an ICSID tribunal declines jurisdiction, a party may also commence proceedings in another forum for a decision on the merits, provided of course that the other forum has jurisdiction. Another situation where a decision on jurisdiction does not have res judicata effect is when jurisdiction is declined based on a so-called curable jurisdictional defect.²⁵³

The issue of the alleged res judicata should be decided solely on the basis of international law. Swiss law is only applicable to the extent that annulment or recognition and enforcement proceedings are initiated in Switzerland. Even in that case, Swiss law would make a renvoi to the ICSID Convention and international law.²⁵⁸

i. The Tribunal is an international tribunal, whose constitution and jurisdiction are based on the terms of a treaty;²⁶⁰

ii. The agreement to arbitrate (made up of the State’s offer to arbitrate contained in the Treaty and the Claimant’s acceptance) is subject to international law;²⁶¹

iii. Article 11(3) provides that the arbitration shall be governed by the Treaty’s provisions, Guatemalan law and international law, and does not refer to the law of the seat;²⁶² and

iv. The Respondent’s admissibility objection stems from an international law instrument, namely an ICSID award, and thus is premised on alleged inadmissibility grounds pertaining to the international legal order.²⁶³

The answer to question (1) is not affirmative but even were that to be the case, the substantive result would not change as Swiss law contains a renvoi to international law. In all events, the content of Swiss international arbitration law as regards the res judicata effect of negative jurisdictional awards, set out below, leads to the same outcome.²⁶⁷

The Claimant concludes that had the Contracting Parties "wished to include a fork-in-the-road, they would have clearly expressed such intent",³⁰⁸ which they did not do.

i. The mandatory rules of the law of international arbitration applicable at the seat of the arbitration;

ii. The 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, save where modified by these Terms of Appointment;

iii. The Terms of Appointment and the procedural rules issued by the Tribunal, as reflected in Procedural Order No. 1 and any amendments thereof.

Artículo 11. Controversias entre una Parte Contratante e inversores de la otra parte contratante.
[...]
3. El arbitraje se basará en las disposiciones del presente Acuerdo, el derecho nacional de la Parte Contratante en cuyo territorio se ha realizado la inversión, incluidas la reglas relativas a los conflictos de Ley, así como también en las reglas y los principios de derecho internacional que pudieran ser aplicables. (Emphasis added).

English translation:
Article 11. Disputes between a Contracting Party and investors of the other [C]ontracting [P]arty.
[...]
3. The arbitration shall be governed by the provisions of this Agreement, the national law of the Contracting Party in whose territory the investment was made, including the rules on conflicts of laws, as well as the rules and principles of international law that may be applicable. (Emphasis added).

Res judicatadepends on the law of the state of origin, so it behooves this law to specify the conditions and limits of its effect [...] Therefore, the subjective, objective, and temporal scope of res judicata may vary from one legal order to the other. Harmonization in this field must be sought to the extent possible, however, and it is achieved as follows : in Switzerland, a recognized foreign judgment has only the authority it would have if issued by a Swiss court. Thus, a declaratory foreign judgment which could be opposed to third parties according to the law of a state of origin will only enjoy such authority in Switzerland with regard to the parties to the proceedings [...]. Similarly, the res judicata effect of a foreign judgment, which could extend to its reasons according to the law of the state of origin, will be admitted in Switzerland only as to the operative part of the judgment [...]. Conversely, a foreign judgment may not produce more effects in Switzerland than it has pursuant to the legal order from which it originates [...]. (Emphasis added).³⁷³

Artículo 11. Controversias entre una Parte Contratante e inversores de la otra parte contratante.

1. Toda controversia relativa a las inversiones que surja entre una de las Partes Contratantes y un inversor de la otra Parte Contratante, respecto a cuestiones reguladas por el presente Acuerdo será notificada por escrito, incluyendo una información detallada, por el inversor a la Parte Contratante receptora de la inversión. En la medida de lo posible las partes en controversia tratarán de arreglar estas diferencias mediante un acuerdo amistoso.

2. Si la controversia no pudiera ser resuelta de esta forma en un plazo de seis meses a contar desde la fecha de notificación escrita mencionada en el párrafo 1, la controversia podrá someterse, a elección del inversor:

a) a los tribunales competentes de la Parte Contratante en cuyo territorio se realizó la inversión; o

b) a un tribunal de arbitraje ad hoc establecido de acuerdo con el Reglamento de Arbitraje de la Comisión de las Naciones Unidas para el Derecho Comercial Internacional; o

c) al Centro Internacional de Arreglo de Diferencias Relativas a Inversiones (C.I.A.D.I.) creado por el «Convenio sobre el arreglo de diferencias relativas a Inversiones entre Estados y Nacionales de Otros Estados», abierto a la firma en Washington el 18 de marzo de 1965, cuando cada Estado parte en el presente Acuerdo se haya adherido a aquél. En caso de que una de las Partes Contratantes no fuera Estado Contratante del citado Convenio, la controversia se podrá resolver conforme al Mecanismo Complementario para la Administración de Procedimientos de Conciliación, Arbitraje y Comprobación de Hechos, por la Secretaría del C.I.A.D.I.

3. El arbitraje se basará en las disposiciones del presente Acuerdo, el derecho nacional de la Parte Contratante en cuyo territorio se ha realizado la inversión, incluidas las reglas relativas a los conflictos de Ley, así como también en las reglas y los principios de derecho internacional que pudieran ser aplicables.

4. La Parte Contratante que sea parte en la controversia no podrá invocar en su defensa el hecho de que el inversor, en virtud de un contrato de seguro o garantía, haya recibido o vaya a recibir una indemnización u otra compensación por el total o parte de las pérdidas sufridas.

5. Las decisiones arbitrales serán definitivas y vinculantes para las partes en la controversia. Cada Parte Contratante se compromete a ejecutar las sentencias de acuerdo con su legislación nacional.
English translation:
Article 11. Disputes between a Contracting Party and investors of the other [C]ontracting [P]arty.
1. Any dispute relating to investments arising between one of the Contracting Parties and an investor of the other Contracting Party, concerning matters governed by this Agreement shall be notified in writing, including detailed information, by the investor to the Contracting Party receiving the investment. As far as possible, the disputing parties shall endeavour to settle these differences by amicable agreement.
2. If the dispute cannot be settled in this manner within six months from the date of written notice referred to in paragraph 1, the dispute may be submitted, at the choice of the investor:
a. to the competent courts of the Contracting Party in whose territory the investment was made; or
b. to an ad hoc arbitration tribunal established under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law; or
c. to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) created by the "Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States", opened for signature in Washington on 18 March 1965, when each State party to this Agreement has acceded to it. Should one of the Contracting Parties not be a Contracting State to said Convention, the dispute may be resolved pursuant to the Additional Facility for the Administration of Conciliation, Arbitration and Fact-Finding Procedures by the ICSID Secretariat.
3. The arbitration shall be governed by the provisions of this Agreement, the national law of the Contracting Party in whose territory the investment was made, including the rules on conflicts of laws, as well as the rules and the principles of international law that may be applicable.
4. The Contracting Party that is a party to the dispute shall not invoke in its defence the fact that the investor, by virtue of an insurance contract or guarantee, received or will receive a compensation for the total or part of the losses suffered.
5. Arbitral decisions shall be final and binding for the disputing parties. Each Contracting Party undertakes to enforce such decisions in accordance with its national legislation.

Thus, the arbitral tribunal, which entertains a claim that has already been the subject matter of a judgment vested with res judicata and which issues an award on such claim, even if it does so on the basis of an arbitration agreement and hence cannot be deemed to lack jurisdiction and cannot be sanctioned on the basis of the provision just mentioned [i.e., Article 190(2)(b) which provides that lack of jurisdiction is a ground for annulment], nevertheless ultimately arrogates to itself ratione materiae jurisdiction which it lacks.³⁸³

If an arbitral tribunal with its seat in Switzerland renders an award declining jurisdiction on the grounds that the arbitration agreement is invalid or inexistent or does not cover the subject-matter of the dispute, such decision must be recognised by, and thus is binding upon, any Swiss court or arbitral tribunal with its seat in Switzerland seised at a later date with the same matter between the same parties. Any Swiss authority seised second - whether a state court or an arbitral tribunal - shall thus decide on its jurisdiction without having the authority to re-examine the validity and existence of the arbitration agreement at issue. The same applies if the award declining jurisdiction has been made by an arbitral tribunal with its seat abroad, provided that such award can be recognised in Switzerland under PILS, Art.194 and the [New York Convention]. However, no binding effect emanates from a decision of an arbitral tribunal declining jurisdiction merely on the grounds that the claimant proceeded before the "wrong" arbitral tribunal or the "wrong" arbitral institution (e.g. an arbitral tribunal under the auspices of the ICC instead of the Swiss Chambers' Arbitration Institution).⁴¹¹

i. "[I]t must have been rendered between the same parties as the parties in the further arbitration proceedings" (identity of parties);⁴¹⁶

ii. "[T]he same claim or relief must be sought in the further arbitration proceedings" (identity of object or subject matter);⁴¹⁷ and

iii. "[T]he claims or relief sought in further arbitration proceedings must be based on the same cause of action as in the prior arbitration proceedings".⁴¹⁸

Por todo lo anterior, Iberdrola solicita del Tribunal:

I. Que declare que la República de Guatemala ha incumplido sus obligaciones internacionales por haber infringido las disposiciones del Tratado.

II. Específicamente, que declare que las acciones atribuidas a Guatemala constituyen, alternativamente, una expropiación según el art. 5 del Tratado o un incumplimiento de sus obligaciones de protección de la inversión de Iberdrola conforme al art. 3 del Tratado, en particular de otorgar un tratamiento justo y equitativo a las inversiones de Iberdrola, y/o de proporcionarles plena protección y seguridad jurídica, y/o de no interferir en la inversión mediante medidas arbitrarias, y/o de observar sus obligaciones contraídas por escrito en relación con las inversiones. [...].⁴²⁴

Por las razones expuestas, la Demandante solicita al Tribunal que se constituya que: [...]

(ii) Declare que Guatemala ha violado el artículo 3 del Tratado, en particular las obligaciones de otorgar un tratamiento no menos favorable que el requerido por el Derecho internacional, de otorgar un trato justo y equitativo, y de no adoptar medidas arbitrarias o discriminatorias; [...].⁴²⁵

It is not sufficient, for the application of res judicata, to identify the case at issue, characterized by the same parties, object and legal ground; it is also necessary to ascertain the content of the decision, the finality of which is to be guaranteed. The Court cannot be satisfied merely by an identity between requests successively submitted to it by the same Parties; it must determine whether and to what extent the first claim has already been definitively settled.⁴⁴⁶

[F]or res judicata to apply in a given case, the Court 'must determine whether and to what extent the first claim has already been definitively settled’ [...] for '[i]f a matter has not in fact been determined, expressly or by necessary implication, then no force of res judicata attaches to it’.⁴⁴⁷

El Tribunal Arbitral, de conformidad con los Artículos 41, 48 y 61 del Convenio del CIADI y las Reglas 28, 41 y 47 de las Reglas de Arbitraje, por unanimidad resuelve:

1. Aceptar la excepción a la jurisdicción del CIADI y a la competencia del Tribunal presentada por la República de Guatemala, con respecto a las peticiones de la Demandante de que se declare la ocurrencia de una expropiación; la violación del estándar de trato justo y equitativo; la violación de la obligación de proporcionar plena protección y seguridad; la violación de la obligación de no interferir en la inversión y la obligación de Guatemala de cumplir las obligaciones contraídas en relación con las inversiones de la Demandante;

2. Denegar la pretensión de la Demandante de que la República de Guatemala incurrió en este caso en actos de denegación de justicia;

3. Declarar que la Demandante debe asumir la totalidad de sus propios costos y la totalidad de los costos en que incurrió la Parte Demandada que ascienden a la suma de USD $5,312,107.⁴⁴⁹

a. Iberdrola somete al Tribunal un desacuerdo cuya base esencial es regulatoria y contractual y que no puede calificarse como controversia según el Tratado. Consecuentemente, no hay jurisdicción ratione materiae.

[...]

Según la Demandada, sus excepciones se refieren a la jurisdicción ratione materiae del Tribunal y se basan, en gran parte, en el hecho de que la Demandante no ha sometido al Tribunal una reclamación 'respecto a cuestiones reguladas en el Tratado,’ como dispone su Artículo 11. [...] ⁴⁵¹

[349] Como bien se puede observar en los diferentes escritos y alegaciones formuladas a lo largo de este arbitraje, la sustentación de la Demandante de la alegada violación de Guatemala de los estándares del Tratado se basa en las diferencias de interpretación de las normas de la República de Guatemala y de las fórmulas económicas para calcular el VAD que tuvieron EEGSA y la CNEE, durante el proceso de revisión tarifaria para el quinquenio 2008 - 2013. Más allá de etiquetar las actuaciones de la Demandada, la Demandante no presenta un razonamiento claro y concreto sobre cuáles son, a su juicio, los actos de imperio de la República de Guatemala que, en derecho internacional, podrían constituir violaciones del Tratado. En las alegaciones de la Demandante, el Tribunal no encuentra más que una discusión de derecho local, que no tiene competencia para retomar y volver a resolver como si fuera una corte de apelación. [...]

[350] Para el Tribunal Arbitral es claro, como se expondrá más adelante, que un tribunal internacional no tiene competencia por el solo hecho de que una de las partes del proceso afirme que el derecho internacional ha sido vulnerado. En un caso como el planteado por la Demandante en este arbitraje, el Tribunal únicamente tendría jurisdicción si esta hubiera demostrado que los hechos que alegó, de ser probados, podrían constituir una violación del Tratado. Según se analiza a continuación, la Demandante no demostró esa premisa básica y se limitó a someter a la consideración del Tribunal una controversia de derecho nacional guatemalteco.

[351] Como lo afirmó el Tribunal y lo acredita el expediente, más allá de la calificación que la Demandante dio a los temas controvertidos, la parte sustancial de esos temas y, sobre todo, de las controversias que la Demandante pide al Tribunal que resuelva, se refieren al derecho guatemalteco. En los distintos escritos presentados durante el arbitraje, las Partes debatieron in extenso sobre la forma en la que debían interpretarse determinadas disposiciones del derecho guatemalteco, y particularmente, las disposiciones de la LGE y el RLGE.

[...]

[353] Por la forma en que se desarrollaron el debate y las audiencias y por los temas que se plantearon, este proceso semejaba más un arbitraje comercial internacional que uno de inversión. Por ello, el Tribunal de manera expresa solicitó a las Partes un pronunciamiento sobre las supuestas violaciones al Tratado que se habían dado, en qué consistían y mediante cuáles actos específicos se habían concretado. En su Escrito Posterior a la Audiencia, la Demandante, si bien vuelve a citar las normas del Tratado y a referirse a decisiones de otros tribunales internacionales, se siguió centrando en las diferencias de interpretación, según el derecho guatemalteco, de los temas tantas veces mencionados en el presente laudo. El Tribunal reitera que más allá de etiquetar las conductas de la CNEE como violatorias del Tratado, no planteó la Demandante una controversia bajo el Tratado y el derecho internacional, sino un debate técnico, financiero y jurídico sobre disposiciones del derecho del Estado demandado.

[...]

[355] En resumen, la Demandante pide al Tribunal que actúe como juez de instancia para definir el debate que se dio de acuerdo con el derecho guatemalteco y que le conceda la razón en su interpretación de cada uno de los asuntos debatidos, de manera que, a partir de esa decisión de este Tribunal Arbitral, la Demandante pueda construir y reclamar una violación de los estándares del Tratado.

[356] Para el Tribunal es evidente que la controversia planteada por la Demandante en este arbitraje versa sobre derecho nacional guatemalteco y que la simple mención del Tratado y la calificación de las actuaciones de Guatemala que hace Iberdrola, conforme a los estándares de ese Tratado, no basta para que la controversia se convierta en una sobre "cuestiones reguladas"por el Tratado.

[357] Según se señaló, la Demandante no demostró que si su posición en cuanto a las diferencias de derecho local que originaron este conflicto fuera la correcta, la consecuencia sería que la Demandada vulneró el Tratado o el derecho internacional. Tal demostración es necesaria para que el CIADI pueda tener jurisdicción y el Tribunal competencia. Así parece reconocerlo la propia Demandante, quien afirmó que "... no se trata de demostrar elementos suficientes para que el Tribunal decida preliminarmente si hay o no una violación de las normas del Tratado (eso es cosa del fondo), sino que se trata de comprobar que los hechos alegados, de ser ciertos, podrían constituir una violación de las normas del Tratado".

[358] El debate de derecho internacional que se dio durante este proceso fue meramente teórico, referente a la procedencia de la aplicación a este caso de lo resuelto en algunos laudos que la Demandante citó, así como sobre el contenido de los estándares de protección. Sin embargo, en definitiva, no hay en los escritos de la Demandante una conexión entre los hechos que alega y los estándares que invoca, ni una materialización del hecho o hechos de imperio que, a la luz del derecho internacional, podrían haber sido considerados violaciones de sus derechos según el Tratado.
English translation :
[349] As may be observed in the various submissions and pleadings provided throughout this arbitration, the Claimant’s foundation for the alleged violation of the Treaty standards by Guatemala is based on the discrepancies between EEGSA and the CNEE during the tariff-setting process for the 2008-2013 term on the interpretation of the norms of the Republic of Guatemala and the economic formulas to calculate the VAD. Beyond labelling the Respondent’s actions, the Claimant does not present a clear and specific reasoning as to which are, in its view, the acts of imperium of the Republic of Guatemala which, under international law, could amount to Treaty violations. In the Claimant’s pleadings, the Tribunal can only find a discussion about domestic law, which it has no competence to resume and resolve again as if it were a court of appeals. [...]
[350] It is clear to the Tribunal, as will be explained below, that an international tribunal does not become competent merely because one of the parties to the proceedings states that there has been a breach of international law. In a case as the one raised by the Claimant in this arbitration, the Tribunal would only have jurisdiction had the Claimant demonstrated that the facts it alleged, if proven, could amount to a Treaty violation. As analyzed below, the Claimant did not demonstrate this basic premise and simply submitted a dispute about Guatemalan domestic law for the Tribunal’s consideration.
[351] As stated by the Tribunal and reflected on the record, beyond the Claimant’s characterization of the disputed matters, the essential part of these matters and, especially, of the disputes that the Claimant asks the Tribunal to resolve, concern Guatemalan law. In the various written submissions filed during the arbitration, the Parties discussed broadly how certain provisions of Guatemalan law, and particularly, of the LGE and the RLGE, should be interpreted.
[...]
[353] Based on how the discussion and the hearings developed and the matters that were raised, this proceeding resembled an international commercial arbitration rather than an investment one. Thus, the Tribunal expressly requested a statement from the Parties on the alleged violations of the Treaty that had taken place, what they entailed and through which specific actions they had materialized. In its Post-Hearing Brief, the Claimant, while again quoting the provisions of the Treaty and referring to the decisions of other international tribunals, continued focusing on the differing interpretations, according to Guatemalan law, of the matters repeatedly mentioned in the present award. The Tribunal reiterates that beyond labelling the CNEE's conduct as a Treaty violation, the Claimant did not bring a dispute under the Treaty and international law, but rather a technical, financial and legal debate on the legal provisions of the respondent State.
[...]
[355] In summary, the Claimant asks the Tribunal to act as an instance judge to settle the debate that took place in accordance with Guatemalan law and that it sides with the Claimant's interpretation of each of the disputed matters, such that, based on that decision of this Arbitral Tribunal, the Claimant may build and claim a violation of the Treaty standards.
[356] It is evident to the Tribunal that the dispute raised by the Claimant in this arbitration revolves around Guatemalan domestic law and that simply mentioning the Treaty and characterizing Guatemala's actions as Iberdrola has done, pursuant to the standards in that Treaty, is insufficient for the dispute to become one about "matters governed" by the Treaty.
[357] As was noted, the Claimant did not demonstrate that if its position with regard to the discrepancies on domestic law that gave rise to this conflict was correct, the consequence would be that the Respondent breached the Treaty or international law. Such demonstration is necessary for ICSID to have jurisdiction and for the Tribunal to be competent. The Claimant seems to acknowledge as much by stating that "... it is not about proving sufficient elements for the Tribunal to preliminarily decide whether or not there is a violation of the provisions in the Treaty (that is a question for the merits), but rather about verifying that the alleged facts, if true, could amount to a violation of the provisions in the Treaty".
[358] The debate on international law that took place during this proceeding was merely theoretical, related to the appropriateness of applying the findings of some awards that the Claimant cited to this case, as well as about the content of the protection standards. However, in sum, there is no connection in the Claimant's written submissions between the facts it alleges and the standards it invokes, nor there is an embodiment of the act or acts of imperium which, in light of international law, could have been considered as violations of its rights according to the Treaty.⁴⁵⁵

In particular, the Court will determine whether subparagraph 3 of the operative clause of its 2012 Judgment must be understood as a straightforward dismissal of Nicaragua's request for lack of evidence, as Colombia claims, or a refusal to rule on the request because a procedural and institutional requirement had not been fulfilled, as Nicaragua argues.⁴⁶⁰

Si la controversia no pudiera ser resuelta de esta forma en un plazo de seis meses a contar desde la fecha de notificación escrita mencionada en el párrafo 1, la controversia podrá someterse, a elección del inversor :

a) a los tribunales competentes de la Parte Contratante en cuyo territorio se realizó la inversión; o

b) a un tribunal de arbitraje ad hoc establecido de acuerdo con el Reglamento de Arbitraje de la Comisión de las Naciones Unidas para el Derecho Comercial Internacional; o

c) al Centro Internacional de Arreglo de Diferencias Relativas a Inversiones (C.l.A.D.I.) [...] (Emphasis added)
English translation :
If the dispute cannot be resolved in this manner within a term of six months from the date of written notice mentioned in paragraph 1, the dispute may be submitted, at the choice of the investor :
a) to the competent courts of the Contracting Party in whose territory the investment was made; or
b) to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal established in accordance with the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law; or
c) to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) [...]. (Emphasis added)

i. It is undisputed that there is identity of parties;

ii. There is also identity of petitum: in both proceedings, the Claimant has requested a declaration that Article 3 of the Treaty had been breached, together with compensation;⁴⁸⁴

iii. There is finally identity of cause of action. It is evident from the Claimant's pleadings in Iberdrola I that the Claimant invoked breaches of the Treaty before that tribunal. In reality, the Claimant concedes this point when it states that "[e]ven though in 2008 Iberdrola presented its claims in good faith as treaty claims, the tribunal in Iberdrola I ultimately considered they were not."⁴⁸⁵

Consent of the parties to arbitration under this Convention shall, unless otherwise stated, be deemed consent to such arbitration to the exclusion of any other remedy. A Contracting State may require the exhaustion of local administrative or judicial remedies as a conditions of its consent to arbitration under this Convention. (Emphasis added)

Art. 26 applies from the moment of consent [...]. If ICSID arbitration has been instituted, there will be a finding by the Secretary-General in accordance with his or her screening power under Art. 36(3) or a decision on jurisdiction by the tribunal under Art. 41. If the Secretary-General has found that, because of a lack of consent, the dispute is manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Centre or if the tribunal has determined that the Centre does not have jurisdiction because there is no valid consent, Art. 26 does not apply and other remedies may be pursued.⁴⁹⁰

(1) The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention. Each party shall abide by and comply with the terms of the award except to the extent that enforcement shall have been stayed pursuant to the relevant provisions of this Convention.