Expropriations are deemed lawful under international law if they meet a certain number of requirements.1 One of these requirements is that expropriations should not violate the principle of non-discrimination.2
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 712:
“A state is responsible under international law for injury resulting from: (1) a taking by the state of the property of a national of another state that (a) is not for a public purpose, or (b) is discriminatory, or (c) is not accompanied by provision for just compensation.”
UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements: Key Issues, Vol. 1, 2004, p. 239:
“A discriminatory taking that is pursuant to discriminatory or arbitrary action, or any action that is without legitimate justification, is considered to be contrary to the non-discrimination requirement, even absent any singling-out on the basis of nationality. This includes prohibition of discrimination with regard to due process and payment of compensation requirements. Moreover, the non-discrimination requirement demands that governmental measures, procedures and practices be non-discrininatory even in the treatment of members of the same group of aliens.”
Argentina - United States of America BIT (1991), Art. 2(b); China-Poland BIT (1998), Art. 4(1); Energy Charter Treaty (1994), Art. 10(1); NAFTA (1992), Art; 1110(1); Libyan American Oil Company v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, Award, 12 April 1977, para. 244; Blusun S.A., Jean-Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v. Italian Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/3, Award, 27 December 2016, para. 401; Les Laboratoires Servier, S.A.S., Biofarma, S.A.S., Arts et Techniques du Progres S.A.S. v. Republic of Poland, Award, 14 February 2012, para. 644; Fireman's Fund Insurance Company v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/02/1, Award, 17 July 2006, paras. 205-206; Vigotop Limited v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/22, Award, 1 October 2014, para. 309; Archer Daniels Midland and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/5, Award, 21 November 2007, para. 250; M. Meerapfel Söhne AG v. Central African Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/10, Excerpts of Award, 12 May 2011, paras. 300, 305, 319; Mobil Exploration and Development Inc. Suc. Argentina and Mobil Argentina S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/16, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, 10 April 2013, paras. 817-818; Adel A Hamadi Al Tamimi v. Sultanate of Oman, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/33, Award, 3 November 2015, para. 368; Philip Morris Brand Sàrl (Switzerland), Philip Morris Products S.A. (Switzerland) and Abal Hermanos S.A. (Uruguay) v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, 8 July 2016, para. 305; Ampal-American Israel Corp., EGI-Fund (08-10) Investors LLC, EGI-Series Investments LLC, BSS-EMG Investors LLC and David Fischer v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/11, Decision on Liability and Heads of Loss, 21 February 2017, para. 186; Burlington Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Reconsideration and Award, 7 February 2017, para. 165; Serafín García Armas and Karina García Gruber v. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, PCA Case No. 2013-03, Award, 26 April 2019, para. 295; Continental Casualty Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, 5 September 2008, para. 276; Tidewater Investment SRL and Tidewater Caribe, C.A. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/5, Award, 13 March 2015, para. 127; Marion Unglaube v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/1, Award, 16 May 2012, paras. 203, 205; Vincent J. Ryan, Schooner Capital LLC, and Atlantic Investment Partners LLC v. Republic of Poland, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/3, Award, 24 November 2015, para. 267; Marfin Investment Group Holdings S.A., Alexandros Bakatselos and others v. Republic of Cyprus, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/27, Award (redacted), 26 July 2018, para. 826; Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Europe v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/13, Decision on Liability and the Principles of Quantum, 30 December 2016, para. 395; Border Timbers Limited, Timber Products International (Private) Limited, and Hangani Development Co. (Private) Limited v. Republic of Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/25, Award, 28 July 2015, para. 501; Eco Oro Minerals Corp. v. Republic of Colombia, ICSID Case No. ARB/16/41, Decision on Jurisdiction, Liability and Directions on Quantum, 9 September 2021, paras. 635, 640-642.
Archer Daniels Midland and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/5, Award, 21 November 2007, para. 251; Corn Products International, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/1, Decision on Responsibility, 15 January 2008, paras. 90, 93; Fireman's Fund Insurance Company v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/02/1, Award, 17 July 2006, para. 205; Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Liability, 14 December 2012, para 402.
The non-discrimination principle provides that a State should not treat its foreign investors less favorably than its national investors (the principle of national treatment) or treat some of its foreign investors better than other foreign investors (the most favored nation principle).4 While there is a general consensus as to this definition of the non-discrimination principle, its exact scope and content are subject to debate.5
Diebold, N.F, Standards of Non-Discrimination in International Economic Law, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 60, p. 831-865, 2011:
“Adjudicating bodies have been applying different interpretations and standards with regard to the legal elements of 'less favourable treatment', 'likeness' and 'regulatory purpose', which leads to a high fragmentation of the non-discrimination principle in international economic law.”
The principle of non-discrimination is directly mentioned in most of today’s bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and international investment agreements (IIAs).6 This has given rise to a debate acs to whether this principle is treaty-based or based on a customary principle of international law. While some argue that the non-discrimination principle is derived from custom,7 many tribunals have refused to embrace this view.8
OECD (2004), “"Indirect Expropriation" and the "Right to Regulate" in International Investment Law”, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2004/04, OECD Publishing, p. 5.
Bishop, R., Crawford, J. and Reisman, W., Foreign Investment Disputes – Cases, Materials and Commentary, Kluwer Law International, 2005, p. 949:
“The principle of non-discrimination is recognized in international customary practice, as part of general international law, judicial decisions, and treaty law. Furthermore, a great majority of jurists have supported the principle as a yardstick of the legality of various state actions. Thus, no one doubts that in customary international law the principle is now firmly established.”
Philip Morris Brand Sàrl (Switzerland), Philip Morris Products S.A. (Switzerland) and Abal Hermanos S.A. (Uruguay) v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, 8 July 2016, para. 294; Marion Unglaube v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/1, Award, 16 May 2012, para. 203.
Newcombe, A. and Paradell, L., Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards and Treatment, Kluwer Law International, 2009:
“In international investment law, national treatment is a treaty-based obligation. Although the prevalence of national treatment provisions in IIAs might suggest consistent and general state practice sufficient for the formation of a customary international law obligation, the scope and content of the provisions vary widely and the obligations are subject to myriad exceptions. Even if sufficient state practice existed to satisfy the requirements establishing a customary obligation, there is little evidence that national treatment in IIAs is accorded out of a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris).”
Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, 3 August 2005, para. 25; Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc. and A.S. Baltoil v. The Republic of Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award, 25 June 2001, para. 368; Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et. al. v. United States of America, Award, 12 January 2011, paras. 208-209; Crystallex International Corporation v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2, Award, 4 April 2016, para. 715.
A majority of tribunals consider that to establish a violation of the principle of non-discrimination, a person or corporation must show that:
S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Partial Award (Merits), 13 November 2000, para. 250; Champion Trading Company and Ameritrade International, Inc. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/9, Award, 27 October 2006, para. 130; S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL NAFTA, Partial Award, 13 November 2000, para. 245.
Reinisch, A., Standards of Investment Protection, Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law, 2008, p. 37.
Saluka Investments BV v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2001-04, Partial Award, 17 March 2006, paras. 313-315; Pope & Talbot Inc v Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, 10 April 2001, para. 75; Crystallex International Corporation v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2, Award, 4 April 2016, para. 616.
Importantly, there is no consensus as to which party bears the burden of proof to establish that a particular treatment is discriminatory. Some tribunals hold that the burden of proof falls on the respondent State.15 Other tribunals have held that this burden falls on the claimant.16
A difference in treatment can violate the principle of non-discrimination only if it distinguishes between individuals or companies which are in a similar situation. The difference in treatment must thus be established in reference to an external comparator.17 There is a debate as to whether the comparator can be simply any kind of competitor, or anyone from the same industry, “line of business” or “economic sector”. On this question, different tribunals have articulated a variety of standards.18 See further Similarity/in like circumstances.
Bjorklund, A.K., National Treatment, in Reinisch, A. (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection, Oxford University Press, p. 38:
“Identification of the appropriate comparator is probably the most important part of the national treatment analysis, as theoutcome in most cases hinges on whether the more favourable treatment was accorded to an entity in like circumstances.”
Pope & Talbot v. Government of Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, 10 April 2001, para. 81; Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Republic of Ecuador (I), LCIA Case No. UN3467, Award, 1 July 2004, para. 173; Parkerings-Compagniet AS v Lithuania, ICSID Case No ARB/05/8, Award, 11 September 2007, para. 371; Crystallex International Corporation v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2, Award, 4 April 2016, para. 715.
Newcombe, A. and Paradell, L., Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards and Treatment, Kluwer Law International, 2009 p. 160.
If a difference in treatment is established, this does not automatically trigger a violation of the non-discrimination principle. States can show that this difference of treatment was justified19 because (i) it pursued “a legitimate objective”20 or (ii) because there was a “rational” or “reasonable”21 relationship between the means the state employed and the aim sought. Tribunals have construed what amounts to a “legitimate objective” in various, contradictory ways.22
For instance, one tribunal held that a difference in treatment does not amount to discrimination when this difference in treatment is a “necessary consequence of the nationalization of a productive sector in which privately owned and State-owned companies coexisted”.23 See further Regulatory expropriation, Right to regulate, Police powers. Otherwise, general regulations by the State can amount to indirect expropriations if they are discriminatory.24
Mobil Exploration and Development Inc. Suc. Argentina and Mobil Argentina S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/16, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, 10 April 2013, paras. 817-818; Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, 16 December 2002, para. 194; El Paso Energy International Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award, 31 October 2011, paras. 240-241.
States that are brought to arbitration for a violation of the non-discrimination principle often argue that this principle can be violated only if the expropriatory acts carried out by the State have been committed with the specific intent to discriminate. Most tribunals do not require the claimant to prove such a discriminatory intent,25 but this point is still subject to debate.26
S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Partial Award (Merits), 13 November 2000, para. 254; Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, 16 December 2002,, para. 183; Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Republic of Ecuador (I), LCIA Case No. UN3467, Award, 1 July 2004, para. 177; Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No ARB/05/8, Award, 11 September 2007, para. 368.
To amount to an expropriation, the effect of the discriminatory measure must reach the test of substantial deprivation,27 or sufficient interference with the investor’s rights.28 See further Indirect Expropriation
Because the non-discrimination principle offers investors a principle against differentiated treatments, it has been compared to the fair and equitable treatment protection standard included in most BITs. Practitioners should be wary of this association, and both standards remain conceptually distinct.29 One difference is that the non-discrimination principle is relative, and needs to be proven through an external comparison. The fair and equitable treatment standard, on the other hand, is absolute:30 its criteria are objective, and its violation can thus be established without a comparison.
The most important difference between both standards, however, is that while a violation of the non-discrimination principle will generally trigger a violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard,31 the violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard will not by itself lead to a violation of the non-discrimination principle (or for finding an expropriation).32
Schreuer, C., Protection against Arbitrary or Discriminatory Measures, in Rogers, C.A. and Alford, R.P. (eds.), The Future of Investment, 2009:
“despite this tendency of some tribunals to amalgamate the prohibition of arbitrary or discriminatory measures with FET, there are strong arguments in favor of treating the two standards as conceptually different” and proceeding to discuss these differences.”
Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Republic of Ecuador (I), LCIA Case No. UN3467, Award, 1 July 2004, paras. 159, 167; Ronald S. Lauder v. Czech Republic, Award, 3 September 2001, paras. 214-228; Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc. and A.S. Baltoil v. The Republic of Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award, 25 June 2001, paras. 368-371; Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, 12 October 2005, paras. 175-180; Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic (I), ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, 14 July 2006, paras. 390-393; Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, 6 February 2007, paras. 318-321.
Newcombe, A. and Paradell, L., Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards and Treatment, Kluwer Law International, 2009:
“[w]ith the exception of the prohibition on discriminatory measures, which involves a comparative analysis, minimum standards of treatment measure state conduct against non-contingent, objective standards.”
Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/, Award, 26 June 2003, para. 135; Waste Management Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award, 30 April 2004, para. 98; CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina, Award, 12 May 2005, para. 290; Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, 12 October 2005, paras. 182-183.
Bjorklund, A.K., National Treatment, in Reinisch, A. (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection, Oxford University Press.
Bishop, R., Crawford, J. and Reisman, W., Foreign Investment Disputes – Cases, Materials and Commentary, Kluwer Law International, 2005.
Diebold, N.F, Standards of Non-Discrimination in International Economic Law, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 60, 2011.
Newcombe A. and Paradell, L., Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards and Treatment, Kluwer Law International, 2009.
Reinisch, A., Standards of Investment Protection, Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law, 2008.
Schreuer, C., Protection against Arbitrary or Discriminatory Measures, in Rogers, C.A. and Alford, R.P. (eds.), The Future of Investment, 2009.
UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements: Key Issues, Vol. 1, 2004.
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